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1CHAPTER-1
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1.1  Human Rights – Evolution of the Concept
The law of Human Rights has  been envolved to solve the Human
Rights issues and day-today problems of the people. A uniform approach for
the development of theory of Human Rights law has not been made yet.  It is
to confessed that there are various factors that hinder in development of the
theory of Human Rights and to provide them a conclusive shape.
 The observations determined hereunder have to be accepted as
ground reality in shaping the concept of Human Rights.  The present
Researcher, therefore, submits these  hindrances as confession.
1.2   STATEMENT OF CONFESSIONS :
1.2.1    Involvement of diverse culture :
Culture and standard of living vary from place to place, community to
community, region to region and country to country.  The concept of
right also changes according to the culture, which  has an important
role in shaping the Human Rights, e,g, Right to privacy, standards of
meaningful life etc.
1.2.2 Positive underpinnings are shaky :
 The present jurisprudence of Human  Rights is based mainly on the
negative concepts of rights.  Secondly, it is rather difficult to develop
positive definition covering all aspects in all time for all groups. In
absence of positive jurisprudence of rights in this regard poses difficulty
in shaping the concept of Human Rights.
21.2.3 Implementation mechanism are non existent or fragile :
 The  Human Rights jurisprudence is a part of International Law
Jurisprudence, which is described as no law since it does not have an
effective mechanism to implement rights. For the same, reasons are
described as rights lacking the enforcement mechanism and does not
have an element to satisfy the requirement of legal relationship
necessary to constitute even the concept of right.
1.2.4 Which rights are absolute :
 The concept of Human Rights consists in it, right to life, liberty, equality
and dignity.  It is difficult to say that among these four, which is
absolute and which is not.  Secondly, one right, absolute in one case
need not be absolute in another. Therefore, poses, difficulty in deciding
the nature of right as an absolute one.
1.2.5 Which rights are universal :
 Human Rights are considered to be universal, because of its nature
and feature.  All human beings benefit from the Human Rights. Just for
dignified human life, Human Rights are indispensable. Human Rights,
has universal source, acceptance and recognition. But the secondary
rights emerge from Human Rights as their variable may or may not be
universal in all situations and thus creates and thus creates an illusion
about their universal nature.
1.2.6 Which should be given priority :
 Human Rights are considered more important and necessary than
other types of individual, social or political rights. But it is difficult to
3determine a mechanism to give priority and decide the supremacy of
one right over other in all cases and in all situations.
1.2.7 Which can be overruled by other interests  :
Human Rights used to satisfy and protect individual and community
interests. It is difficult to evolve principle to decide priority between
individual and community interests with singly formulated norm for all
cases.
1.2.8 Which call for international pressures :
 Civil wars, communal violence, terrorism, ethnic violence, class
conflicts etc. are man made tragedies.  Human Rights violations in a
massive scale, within a state, can be stopped by calling international
pressure and sanctions.  It is a difficult to decide that which right in
which situation call international pressure or not.  It is difficult to
formulate  uniform and conclusive norms.
1.2.9 Which can demand programme for implementation :
 The present world has several problems, which hit Human Rights, such
as poverty, unemployment, racial discrimination, disease, mal-nutrition
etc. It is difficult to formulate a norm to deal with such recognized and
unrecognized and unrecognized challenges.
1.2.10 Which will be fought for :
 Human Rights jurisprudence through International Instruments, identity
several variables of Human Rights in addition to the four concepts of
Human Rights.  It is difficult to determine which right to fight for and
not, since their seriousness go on changing from situation to situation.
41.2.11   Process of definition is crucial :
 It is, therefore, difficult to come out with a definition of Human Rights
acceptable to all, covering all situations and ensure fool-proof justice to
the concept. So it is difficult to explore a definition, since it consists in it
a crucial procedure both at international and municipal level.
1.2.12
 Submitted that it is difficult to develop theories and norms, which can
shape and define Human Rights in conclusive sense.  Even then, the
society cannot live and endeavor in furtherance of the goal of
determining Human Rights, since the process of determination of
Human Rights forms a part of organic jurisprudence.
STATEMENT OF COMPULSIONS
1.2.1 Right definitional process complex :
 Rights mean different things to different people.  There are moral
rights, legal rights and religious rights.  All these cannot be brought into
the same framework of enforceability. The Researcher submits that
enforceability is one of the criteria that decide the nature of right.  The
structure of right is built on the foundation of enforceability. To define
structure of rights and its enforceability is an elaborate and complex
process involving definition of various other principles and standards.
Structure and enforceability of rights depend on the source of right.
1.2.2 Source of right society :
 The idea of right comes from the time of formation of human society.
The act of association or joining together to live in community in the
5past was due to natural, geographical and psychological reasons.
Concept of right entangled with law has emerged during the formation
of community. "but in any event, God having constituted man a social
creature such "that, in his own Judgment, it is not good for him to be
alone, put him under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience,
and Inclination to drive him into Society."1
 When democratic form of government came into existence, a two-way
relationship has been established.  They are the relationship among
the people themselves and between the people and their government.
These relationships form the structure of right. Grotius defines state as
"a complete association of free men, joined together for the enjoyment
of rights and for their common interest."2
 Various intentions, interests and purposes in lie are fulfilled through
these relationships.  The conditions that bind each other in the
relationship are called the rights and duties relationship. Such
relationships when acquire enforceability, they are called legal rights.
Rights, therefore, emerge from the conditions and stipulations
contained in the social and political relationships of human beings.
"Everybody must divest himself of the right he has to do all things by
nature; everyman must stand by and perform his covenants; all men
should help and accommodate each other as far as may be done
without danger to their persons; no man should reproach, revile, or
slander another man;
1 WEINREB.L.L.,Natural Law and Justice,1987 Edn.,Harvard University Press, London p.80
2 E. Bodenheimer.
6there must be an impartial arbiter in controversies; and, above all, men should
not do to others what they would not wish others to do to them."3
1.3  NATURE OF RIGHT IN A LEGAL SENSE
 Human beings are knowingly or unknowingly live in a society with a
legal structure.  Only way to get out of the legal structure is to live in isolation
from society. But that is against the very nature of human beings. Right-duty
relationship is an inevitable condition of human life. "Every right or duty
involves a vinculum juris or bond of legal obligation, by which two or more
persons are bound together."4
 Hohfeld has identified four types (pairs) of legal rights. They are
arranged in the following table.5
Right (Stricto Sensu) Liberty Power  Immunity
Duty    No-right Liability Disability
There are also exceptions and contradictions in the relationships
shaping legal rights. "Thus no-right is the absence of right in oneself, and
disability is the absence of power in oneself…Thus liberty (not) is the absence
of right in another, and immunity is  absence of power in another.6
1.4 HUMAN RIGHTS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND ITS
SUBJECTS:
 By a presumed social contract people among themselves and between
the government and the people agree to enjoy liberty in a pre-decided
manner.
3 Ibid p. 40.
4 Salmond on Jurisprudence  p. 220
5 Ibid p. 224.
6 Ibid pp. 232-233.
7The state is constituted to exercise power upon its subjects. "The great and
chief  end of men united into commonwealths, and putting themselves under
governments, is the preservation of their property, to which in the state of
Nature there are many things wanting."7
 According to the social contract theory, the people while surrendering
their natural liberty have retained with them some natural rights to liberty,
equality, dignity and security of life. "In contrast to Hobbes, who construed the
social contract as a pact of complete  subjection to an absolute sovereign,
Locke asserted that men in establishing a political authority retain those
natural rights of life, liberty, and property (often grouped by Locke under the
single concept of property) which were their own in the pre-political stage."8
1.5 HUMAN RIGHTS DUTY/OBLIGATION/RESTRAINT ON GOVERNMENT :
Having constituted a government by the people and invested with
power to govern them, the government is put under a duty to protect the basic
rights of the people. "And the view that it was the function of the courts to
defend human rights, as recognized and sanctioned by the Constitution,
against any violations by the legislature, was held not only by Wilson, but also
by Hamilton and Jefferson."9  In a democratic form of government, people
"entrusts the enforcement of man's natural rights to the wisdom of a
parliamentary majority, n the expectation that the commands of reason and
justice will act as moral restraints on the omnipotence of the legislature."10
7 Supra note 4  p. 36
8 E Bodenheimer Loc cit. p. 45-46.
9 E. Bodenheimer Loc cit p. 52.
10 E. Bodenheimer Loc cit p. 57.
81.6  THEORY OF HOHFELD IN HUMAN RIGHTS :
 Modern Human Rights are contained in the International Covenants of
Human Rights. They are "(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (2)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, and (3)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966."
Specific individual Human Rights have been conferred by these documents.
The International Covenants on Human Rights are declarations and
statements of standards.  They acquire enforceability through the application
of the theory of Hohfeld.
1.7  IN THE STRICT SENSE OF RIGHT HOLDER :
 Right in the strict sense means the existence of a claim-duty
relationship between two persons. "To ascribe a right to one person is to imply
that some other person is under a  corresponding duty."11 To say that a
person has a right means that he has a right to obtain some benefit from
another. "This may  entail that others ought to provide him with it, or that they
ought not to prevent him getting it, or merely that it would not be wrong for him
to get it."12
 Art.1and 3of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) confer
to all persons, rights to protect life, liberty, dignity and equality. The rights
referred therein are to be primarily derived by the individual by his efforts.
Government is only bound to facilitate the attainment and enhancement of the
rights of the individuals.  These rights come as claims to the  individual when
government is bound by a contract or law to provide such rights.
11 Salmond, Loc cit p. 217
12 Salmond, Loc cit p. 217
9The right to "equal pay for equal work," conferred by Art. 23 (2) of
(UDHR), is a claim of an individual who rendered the work entitling him to
claim an equal pay with others. Government is bearing the duty to enforce it.
 Art. 13 and 14 of the economic, social and cultural Rights (ESCR)
envisages a free and compulsory primary education and higher education by
the progressive introduction of  free education.  These Articles put an
obligation on the government to provide free and compulsory education to a
certain level. It is a claim right against the government.
 Art. 11 of the ESCR recognizes the right of every one to an adequate
standard of living. Strictly it is not a claim against the government as most of
the  world are not politically and financially sound to provide adequate and
minimum standards of living conditions to its respective citizens. Constant
efforts of every individual are necessary to achieve this goal. Government and
the people are bound each other by rights and duties to achieve this goal. In a
populous and economically weak country like India, the adequate living
standard to all is near to impossible to achieve. Therefore, a contract or a law
does not exist in the regard.  In specific cases where a contract or law exists,
the  claim of adequate standard of living is an enforceable claim right.
ART. 14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) says that all persons are equal before the Courts and Tribunals.  Sub
–Art.(2) of the same says, "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall
have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."
These provisions enable an accused in a criminal case to be equal with the
prosecution by the presumption of innocence in his favour. To be presumed
innocent in a criminal trial is a claim of the accused against the State.
10
1.8  IMMUNITY :
 Immunity is a protection from the legal power of some other person. It
also  means "an exemption from having a given legal relation changed by
another."13 It's co-relative is disability. "Disability is simply the absence of
power."14 Immunity is either a legal prohibition of somebody or a freedom to
act within certain limits and conditions.
 Immunity is given through prohibitive laws. Art. 12 of the UDHR
provides protection to one's privacy, family, home, correspondence, hour and
reputation from arbitrary interference.  Immunity from degrading, cruel or
inhuman treatment has been provided under Art.5 of the UDHR.  Immunities
from deprivation of one's nationality and property have been provided
respectively under Art. 15(2) and 17(2) of the UDHR.
 Immunity from arbitrary and extra-judicial deprivation of life has been
provided under Art.6 of the ICCPR. The right to life against the authoritarian
regime is provided in the form of immunity. Art.7 of the ICCPR provides
immunity from medical and scientific experimentation without consent. Art.8 f
the ICCPR prohibits  slavery and slave trade. This prohibition works as
immunity for people under subjugation or  subordination.
 Everyone is protected from arbitrary arrest and detention under Art. 9
of the ICCPR Actually right to freedom of oneself is immunity against another
person.
13 Salmond Loc cit p. 231.
14  Ibid.
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1.9  PRIVILEGE :
 Privilege is the absence of duty on oneself and freedom (liberty) to do
as one wish. "The sphere of my legal liberty is that sphere of activity within
which the law is content to leave me alone."15 Liberty contains human
capacity with a will to act and opportunity to act. Privilege right can be
exercised where legal opportunity is present. Privilege is, therefore attached
with conditions. To cause no harm to others is a condition attached to a
person's liberty right.
 The correlative of privilege is no right. "Everyone has the right to seek
and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution"16 for criminal
offences. Privileges are always conditioned by the State. State has no right to
bring back a person who sought asylum from persecution.
 Freedom of movement, freedom to marry, freedom to acquire property,
freedom of thought and freedom of opinion and freedom to participate in the
cultural life guaranteed  under the International Covenants of Human Rights
are liberties. Freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and right to work
guaranteed under the International Covenants on Human Rights are
controlled by strict laws and conditions. Therefore, they can be counted as
privileges.
Free and compulsory primary education to all is guaranteed under Art.
13 (2)(a) of the ICESCR. The same Article provides for progressive free
higher education and equal accessibility to such education. It is the
unrestrained right of an individual to have free primary education. Therefore, it
15 Salmond Loc cit p. 225.
16 Art.14(1) of UDHR.
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is a liberty right. The higher education, according to the above Article is
conditional. Therefore the same is a privilege.
The rights to vote and to take part in the government are rights
guaranteed under Article 21 of UDHR.Under certain system and criteria one
can exercise his rights. These are privileges granted by the Constitution of a
Country.
1.10  POWER :
A power may be defined as ability  conferred upon a person by the law
to alter, by his own will directed to that end the rights, duties, liabilities or other
legal relations, either of himself or of  other persons.17 Power right is some
thing more than liberty. Exercise  of power right affects either the right or duty
of other person or persons. The correlative of power is liability.
Right to legal remedies has been granted under Art.8 of UDHR. One
cannot prevent anyone from availing remedies against Human Rights
violations. The right to defend in a criminal prosecution and presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused are powers conferred by law to an
accused person that cannot be taken away.
Right to marry, right to acquire and transfer property, right to work are
in fact power rights. Also they are liberty  rights. When above rights affect
others rights and duties they are called as power rights. When such rights do
not affect others, it is a liberty right.
Art. 47 of the ICCPR says. "Nothing in the present Covenant shall be
interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize
17 Salmond Loc cit p. 229.
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fully and freely their natural wealth and resources." Natural resources and
wealth are related to others rights through the society. One can claim fully the
price of his labour involved in producing wealth and In recovering and refining
the natural resources. Other parts of the wealth and resources require
sharing.  Therefore, they are power rights.
Right to life guaranteed under Art.3 of UDHR contains the right to
defend oneself within certain legal  limits. To defend one's body, wealth and
reputation is a power right accepted by all systems of law.
1.11  WHICH ARE HUMAN RIGHTS ?
1.11.1 Apparent complexities
Since birth till death, human beings inevitably are placed in the web of
right-duty relationships. Legal rights are recognized and enforced by
the power of the state.  A variety of such rights exist in every human
society. The Research submits that Human Rights are a species of
rights having certain features and characteristics among the general
rights recognized and enforced by the state. A complex process of
analysis is required to identify and distinguish Human Rights from other
rights.
1.11.2   Possession by virtue of human being
Human beings are possessed with human capacities, faculties and
talents. The faculties and powers require expression. Rights exist for
the expression of one's capacity and talents. Right to work, right to
food, right to life and liberty are linked to a person himself. The rights
linked to a person by  virtue of being a human are called Human
Rights.
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1.11.3    Right to be a human
Every human being demands treatment as a human being everywhere.
The conditions and provisions for remaining as a human being are
necessary  every where.  This includes concern for each other and
equal treatment by  government. Right to be a human means providing
equality and dignity for everyone.
1.11.4   Necessary for survival as a human being
"All functions of law", said Bentham, "may be referred to these four
heads : to provide subsistence; to produce abundance; to favour
equality; to maintain security."18  A human being requires the right
conditions for survival.
1.11.5  Inevitable necessity for human being
Rights are associated with human necessities and wants. The rights
that satisfy inevitable necessities of human life are Human Rights.
Human Rights, therefore, include such rights as right for food, clothing,
housing, medical facilities and education. Contributory and
complimentary duties exist among individuals and government towards
the fulfillment of Human Rights.
1.11.6  Assist in making life respectful, meaningful and dignified :
Human life requires respect from other human beings and associations
of human beings including government. Every individual should grow to
his full potential  subject to his nature and conditions. One can lead a
meaningful and dignified life when he starts to grow to his full potential.
18 Edger Bodenheimer Loc cit p. 85.
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1.12   HUMAN RIGHTS MEANS RIGHTS WHICH ARE
1.12.1 Important
Rights that are important in life means the  comparative value and
utility of the rights to a person. Comparative value depends on one's
own  choice and choice before others. The value of rights is measured
indifferent ways.
1.12.2   Intrinsic value
Certain rights have got its own value independent of its utility to one
self and others. One's right to life is independent of any  utility  or value
for others or state. "To say that something has intrinsic value is to say,
not that something has value even if it has no value for anyone (not
even God) or anything – what that mean ? –but that something has
value for someone (or something) not merely as a means to an end but
and end in itself."19 Right to liberty, right to dignity and right to equality
also have intrinsic values independent of any purpose.
1.12.3 Instrumental value
Instrumental value means objective value, value as a means  to an end
of Human Rights. "And to say that something has "objective" value and
not (or not merely) "subjective" value is to say that something has value
for someone (for example, that it is good for her, that it is conductive to
or perhaps even constitutive of her flourishing) even if she is unaware
that it has value for her – indeed, even if she believes that it has
disvalue for her."20 Rights to liberty, equality and dignity are means to
leave as human beings.
19 Michael J. Perry,The Idea of Human Rights,Four Inquiries,1998,Oxford Uni. Press p. 26.
20 Ibid.
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1.12.4 Value to a scheme of rights
Human life comprises many aspects such as family life, social life,
working life etc. Human beings also stand at various times in various
capacities and status such as a refugee, a victim or a criminal.  All
these positions carry with it certain rights as well as duties. Art 11 of
the UDHR declares the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law. Art. 16 of the UDHR provides the rights relating
to marriage and family. Art. 23 of UDHR provides right to work and
various conditions of work. All these rights are related to different
values in a scheme of rights.
1.12.5 Structural support for the system of good life
A democratic form of government with legislature, executive and
judiciary form the foundation on which the legal structure of rights are
built. The set up that provides good life to all are important rights.
1.12.6 Its importance is not being outweighed by other considerations
The value of human rights cannot be outweighed by any other social or
political considerations or general welfare of the community. Each and
every right is equal to or more important than all other rights.
1.13  MORAL
1.13.1 The will to be good
Human Rights are also moral rights according to a general conviction
developed from the International Covenants on Human Rights.  There
is no legal or scientific basis for claiming that Human Rights are moral
rights., Morality comes from the  notion of good and bad things. "Now
the man has become like one of us and has knowledge of what is good
17
and what is bad."21
1.13.2 Certain things ought to be done and certain things ought not to be
done
 The urge to do good and bad things is naturally present in human
beings. In social and practical life human beings are compelled to do
good things always. Moral principles have been historically developed
through societies, communities, religion and state.  There may or may
not have similarities in the moral principles of different people and
communities. The Researcher submits that the idea of good and bad
remains always constant. "The idea of human rights consists of two
parts : the premise or claim that every human being is sacred
(inviolable,etc.)and the further claim that because every human is
sacred (and given all other relevant information), certain choices
should be made and certain other choices rejected; in particular,
certain things ought not to be done to any human being and certain
other things ought to be done for every human being."22
1.14 UNIVERSAL
1.14.1 Human beings are all alike in some respect
 There is no common human nature. Every one is living in his own
physical and intellectual world with his own standards. "It cannot
seriously be denied or perhaps I should say, we should not take
seriously the denial- that human beings are all alike in at least some
respects such that there are some things that are good and some
things that are bad for every human being-some things that serve and
21 Book of Genesis, Ch. 3 words 22.
22 Michael J. Perry, Loc cit p. 57.
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some things that disserve the well-being of every human being.23
1.14.2 Universalism about human good
 Human Rights stand for human good. "Different people, different
cultures, different traditions have different views about the way or ways
of life that are good or fitting, not merely for themselves, but for any
human being and for any human community."24  the morality and
human good in Human Rights make it a Universal Law. "many beliefs
aboutwhat is good for every human being and, especially, many beliefs
about what is bad for every human being are widely shared across
cultures."25
1.14.3 Historical, social, cultural and political factors made Human
Rights Universal
 Historical development of law and cultural and political interaction of
the people of the world have promoted the development of Human
Rights. The characteristics and features of importance, morality and
universality of Human Rights have been acquired through cultural,
social and political interactions through out human history. Human
Rights acquired its importance, morality and universality from its
sources.
1.15  Classification of Human Rights
Louis B. Sohn has classified human rights in the following three
categories.26
23 Michael J. Perry, Loc cit p. 63-64.
24 Michael J. Perry, Loc cit p. 70
25 Michael J. Perry, Loc cit p. 71.
26 Louis B. Sohn, "the New International Law : Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
than States", 32.
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1) The Human Rights of First Generation;
2) The Human Rights of Second Generation; and
3) The Human Rights of Third Generation
1.15.1  The Human Rights of First Generation
 The human rights of first generation are civil and political rights of the
individuals.  The various civil and political rights are conferred through
different Constitutions and also by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966.  However these rights are not new rights.  They have
been recognized since very long periods.  These rights have developed from
the time of Greek city states and over the period have found expression in
different national charters. They have been concretized in the form of Magna
Carta of 1215; The American Declaration of Independence, 1776 and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789.
 The right to life, liberty, security, free speech, assembly and worship
etc are some of the civil rights. Right to free elections and representative
institutions are examples of political rights which provide legitimation,
integration and participation by linking the ruler to the consent of the ruled.
These rights are human rights arising out of the conflict between people and
governmental tyranny. For this reason, the main source of the civil and
political rights is considered to be the American and French Revolutions.
These rights came as formal assurance against the oppression and arbitrary
governmental tyranny. Moses Moskowitz calls the human freedom and liberty
as "the fruits of struggle against the authority of state."27
27 Moses Moskowitz, Human Rights and World Order, (New York : Ocean Publications
Inco., 1958), p. 159.
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 The human rights of first generation reflect long established human
values and as such are incorporated not only in almost every Constitution of
various States but also in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 1966; in the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedom, 1950, and in American and African Instruments of
1969 and 1981, respectively.
 As the civil and political rights are incorporated in different national,
regional and international instruments, they represent an overwhelming
consensus of international community and further have given rise to rules of
international customary law of general application. Lois Sohn has suggested
that "the consensus on virtually all provisions of the covenant on civil and
political rights is so widespread that they can be considered as part of the law
of mankind, a jus cojens for all.28
1.15.2  the Human Rights of Second Generation
 These rights are the economic, social and cultural rights. Rights to
education, health, freedom from want, fear or terror are examples of economic
and social rights.  These rights require that the Government should act to
secure these to the people. Freedoms of thought, of communication and of
cultural and aesthetic experience are examples of cultural rights.  These rights
are claimed in response to threat of mass manipulation.
 These rights are incorporated in the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 1960.  The main source for the origin of
these rights is considered to be the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Paris
28 Ibid.
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Peace Conference of 1919.  The Russian Revolution is significant in
recognizing economic rights.  The Paris Peace Conference is more significant
for the establishment of the International Labour Organisation.  The
International Labour Organisation has laid emphasis on the concept of social
justice by proclaiming that "peace can be established only if it is based upon
social justice"; and that "the failure of any nation to adopt human conditions of
labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the
conditions in their own countries."29
 (T)he real credit for giving expression to economic and social rights
goes to the American President Roosevelt. He, for the first time expressed his
hope for an instrument dealing with the economic and social rights. In his
message to the Congress of January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt referred to
the four essential freedoms viz., freedom of speech and expression, freedom
of every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want and
freedom from fear to which he looked forward as the foundation of a future
world.30  "Freedom from want" formed the basis on which the concepts of
economic and social rights were formulated. President Roosevelt in his
another message to Congress in 1944 made the concept of "freedom from
want" clear. He contemplated that "true individual freedom can not exist
without economic security and independence" and that "people who are
hungry and out of job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made", thus
economic truths have become accepted as self-evident.  He was of the view
that  economic problems in  the  present day world have  acquired  alarming
29 Fenwick, Charles G., International Law, 3rd ed., Indian Reprint, 1971 N.67, p.152.
30 See(1941), 35 A.J.I.L. p.662, cited in Dr. U.Chandra.
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magnitude, therefore, he advocated for drastic economic and social reforms.
In his opinion, "true individual freedom can not exist without economic security
and  independence."31  these pronouncements had exercised their full impact
upon the United Nations when it began to address itself to the human rights
issue.32
1.15.3  The Human Rights of Third Generation
 These are collective rights. According to Louis B. Sohn, individuals are
also members of communities-family, religious communities, social or
professional communities or racial communities (groups) or political
community, the state. It is not surprising, ther4efore,that international law not
only recognizes inalienable rights of individuals, but also recognizes certain
collective rights exercised jointly by individuals who are grouped into larger
communities including people and nation.33 The right to self-determination,
right to development, right to peace and right to solidarity are examples of
third generation human rights.
 According to Karel Vesak, the third generation of human right refer to
the fraternity or brotherhood.  This category of rights is based on the sense of
solidarity, which is essential for the realization of the major concern of the
international community such as peace, development and environment.34
 The human rights of third generation infuse the human dimension into
areas where it has all too often been missing having been left to the state or
states and these rights can be realized only "through the concerted efforts of
31 Eleventh Annual Message to Congress, Jan,11,1944, 2881, cited by Dr.U.Chandra.p.21
32  Dr. U. Chandra Supra n.16, p.21
33 Thomas Buergenthal and Dinash Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas,
Cases and Materials, 1995, p.11, cited in Dr. U. Chandra, Ibid.21.
34 Lecture byKarel Vessak, :Tenth Study Session of the International Institute of Human
Rights,"(July,1979), cited by Thomas Bergenthal and DinahShelton,Ibid.p.15
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all the actors on the social scene; the individual, the state, the public and
private bodies and the international community.35  These are the rights which
belong to people as group; they emphasize that human needs are best
fulfilled within a collectivity.
1.16  Religious Approach to Human Rights
 The religions texts, be it the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Quran or the
Bible, all have references to the divinity of man. Every human being is a divine
being and has a claim to dignity, liberty and equality.  This theory held sway in
that period of history when society was not so complex and the political
structure a simple one.36 Human rights as claims of the human beings found
recognition at such early ages.
1.16.1  Hinduism
 Hindus consider law as a revealed law.  Theory is that someone
amongst us, or great Rishis had attained such spiritual heights that they would
be in direct communication with God.  The revealed law has come to us in the
form of four Vedas.  The assumption is, the later development, the Smrities,
the Digests and Commentaries are nothing but exposition of sacred law
contained in the Vedas.37
 In the Hindu philosophical thought, the concept of 'Dharma' pervades
throughout.  And law is considered as a branch of Dharma.  According to
Manu 'Dharma' is "what is followed by those learned in Vedas and what is
35 Ibid.
36 Govind Mukhoty and Ranjani Ramakrishna, "Universals Declaration of Human Rights.  Its
Application to India," in Human Rights in the changing World, ed. Justice E.S.
Venkataramaiah, (New Delhi: International Law Associated, 1998), p.140.
37  Sen,General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence,(Allahabad :Allahabad LawAgency,1984),
p.11
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approved by the conscience of the virtuous who are exempt from hatred and
inordinate affection."38  'Dharma' in simple parlance means the sum total of
religious, moral, social and legal duties.  There is no distinction between legal
duties and moral and religious duties. There is a blending, and inter-working
of religious, ethical and legal principles, because law was not separated from
religion.  Hindu philosophy spoke of Righteousness in terms of law, and law in
terms of righteousness.39
 In ancient India, original Vedic concept of 'Dharma' is a fine blend of
rights and duties of an individual and it stood like a colossus during the whole
period of Indian Civilisation.40
 In the Hindu Philosophy, the starting point is not the individual; it is the
whole complex concatenation of the Real.  Dharma is the order of the entire
reality, that which keeps the world together.  The individual's duty is to
maintain his rights; it is to find one's place in relation to society, to the cosmos,
and to the transcendent world.  As Pannikar writes :
 "Human rights are not Rights only.  They are also duties and both are
interdependent. Humankind has the 'right' to survive only in so far as it
performs the duty of maintaining the world (Lokasamagraha).  We have the
right to each only in as much as we fulfill the duty of allowing ourselves to be
eaten by a hierarchically higher agency.  Our right is only a participation in the
entire metabolic function of the universe."41 Rigveda which is regarded as the
38 Manu Smriti, II, I, quoted by naikar L.D., The Law Relating toHuman Rights, Bangalore:
Puliani & Puliani,2004), p.67
39 Derret Duncan, Religion andState in India(Faber & Faber,London,1968)p.29.cited in
Naikar L.D., Ibid.
40 Patil, J.S. and Patil,C.S., supra, n.11, p.1.
41 Pannikar, Is The Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept ? 120, Diogenes, 75(1982),
in Henry Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights, In Context, Law Politics,
Moral, 2nd ed.(Oxford : Oxford University Press,  2000), p.388
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oldest document declares that all human beings are equal and they are
brothers.  The Atharvana Veda declared that all human beings have equal
right over water and food (natural resources).  The Vedas  including
Upanishads (shrutis) were the primordial source of 'Dharma' which is a
compendious term for all human rights and duties.42 The ancient philosophers
considered that a right can be secured to every individual by creating a
corresponding duty in other individuals, and preferred a 'duty-based society
where the right given to an individual is the right to perform his duty.43'
 Human rights gain meaning only if there is an independent judiciary to
enforce rights. Here the dharmashastras are clear and categorical. As quoted
by V. R. Krishna Iyer :
"The independence of the judiciary was one of the outstanding features
of the Hindu judicial system. Even during the days of the Hindu monarchy, the
administration of justice always remained separate from the executive. It was
a rule independent both in form and in spirit. It was the Hindu judicial system
that first realized and recognized the importance of separation of the judiciary
from the executive, and gave this fundamental principle a practical shape and
form.  The evolution of the principle of separation of the judiciary form the
executive was largely the result of the Hindu conception of law as binding on
the sovereign. Law in Hindu jurisprudence was above the sovereign.  It was
the dharma.44
42 Rama Jois, Seeds of Modern Public Law in Ancient IndianJurisprudence, 2nd
ed.,(Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 2000),p.171.
43 Ibid.,p.175
44 P.B. Mukherji, TheHindu JudicialSystem. The CulturalHeritage of India, Vol.II, pp.434-35
quoted by V.R. Krishna Iyer, The dialectics and Dynamics of Human Rights,(Calcutta:
Eastern Law House,1999),p.115.
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Thus the King was subject to the law as any other citizen.  As Justice
Rama Jois aptly observes : 'According to Rajadharma the king was given the
power only to enforce the law. Dharmasastras did not confer on or recognize
any legislative power in the King.  But under the kingship as recognized and
established under the Dharmashastras the laws were those laid down by the
Dharmasashtras themselves.  They did not authorize the king to lay down
new laws or amend the provisions of Dharmasastras.  On the other hand,
Dharmasastras also laid down the laws governing the conduct of the king
himself (Rajadharma).45  The best known Indian Treatise, Arthashastra by
Koutilya, treats the 'duties' of a king towards his subjects rather than of devine
'perogaratives.' It says: In the happiness of his subjects lies the king's
happiness; in their welfare his welfare; whatever pleases the king himself the
king shall consider as good.  The king shall ever be active and discharge his
duties.46 It not only affirmed and elaborated the civil and legal rights
formulated by Manu, but also added a number of economic rights. It also
prescribes : "the king may be punished if he does not follow the path of
dharma."47
While religion prescribed certain duties, it propounded certain
freedoms, freedom form violence; wants; exploitation; dishonor and from early
death and diseases; certain virtues like tolerance compassion for fellow
beings; knowledge;  freedom of thought and conscience and from fear or
despair (frustration).48 The Hindu Dharmashastra and Arthashastra etc.,
45 Justice Rama Jois, Legal and Constitutional History of India, Part-I,p.13.
46 D.P. Khanna, Reforming Human Rights,(New Delhi : Manasa Publications, 2001)p.77
47   Ibid.
48 See Puntambekar, The Hindu Concept of Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations,
A Symposium,(ed.) by UNESCO,(Allen Wingate,1949),pp.195-198
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contain a system which regulates the duties of persons from king to his
subjects.  The functional focus of Dharma is social order. The message is
dharma is the supreme value which binds kings and citizens, men and
women.49
1.16.2  Christianity
Though the term 'human right' as such is not found in traditional
religions, human rights are found to have basis in a law higher than the State.
The Almighty or the Supreme Being is held to be the source of the higher law.
With reference to concept of rights it is said that a common father gives rise to
common humanity and from this flows a universality of rights.  Since rights
stem from divine sources, they are inalienable by moral authority.  There is a
positive aspect to divine order since obedience derives from one's duty to
God.  Since duties are ordered by God, those duties accrue to the individual
benefit and therefore it should not be violated by state.50
Expressions of many of the human rights are found in Bible. For
instance, limitation of slavery;51 racial equality;52 justice to the poor;53 fair
treatment to strangers54 etc. Equality of all human beings is recognized on the
basis of the common fatherhood of man.  This is also evident from the words
of Jesus Christ, when he said: "Do not do unto others what is hateful to you.
The God will know. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."
49 V.R. Krishna Iyer, Supra n. 63,p.115.
50 Naikar L.D., Supra, n. 57, p.15
51 Exodus 21 : 2.
52 Amos 9:7
53 Isaih 1; 16:17.
54   Leviticus:23:22.
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Universality, higher than territorial possessions, denunciation of
unrighteous riches and exploitation of the poor, egalitarianism of all in the
eyes of God, respect for the despised and the destitute etc were implicit in
Christ's gospels.  The right to dignity, self-expression and other freedoms
even for the destitute and the despised and for those branded as prostitutes
were integral to the ideology of Jesus.  He, incarnated, as it were, to spread
the message f the noblest version of human rights and the divinity of all God's
children and opposed exploitation, material and sacerdotal.55
1.16.3  Islam
Islam is the Arabic word for submission to the will of God (Allah),
emphasized unity of humanity.  Equality, the status of women, the rights of the
less privileged (minorities, poorer working groups) were reflected in the
Prophet's message."56  In the Holy Quran there is an injunction that all men
are brothers and that non-Muslims should be treated with no less dignity and
respect for their personality than Muslims.  The Quran prohibits discrimination
against all persons whether white or black.57 Quran and Sunna have
repeatedly talked about the importance of human rights.  The basic principle
of Islam is that all men are equal and Islam believes in universal brotherhood.
There are a number of Quaranic verses, which recognize absolute equality
between human beings.58 Galwash observes it in the following words:59
55 See V.R. Krishna Iyer, Supra n. 63, pp.123-124.
56 Akbar S. Ahmad; Discovering Islam (Vanguard Books), pp 19-20,cited by V.R.Krishna
Iyer, Ibid, p.128.
57 RajindarSachar, "Human Rights: Towards A Global Consensus," in Human Rights in the
Changing World, (ed.)by Justice E.S. Venkataramaiah,(New Delhi : Internatioal Law
Association 1988), p. 214.
58 Syed Mohammad Afzal Qadri, Islam, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, K.U.L.R.
Vol.XI 2004, p.4.
59 Ahmad Galwash, The Religion of Islam,(Cairo,1945),pp.87-88,cited in Ibid.p.6.
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"Equality of right was the distinguishing feature of the Islamic
Commonwealth. A convert from a slumber clan enjoyed the same rights and
privileges as one who belongs to the noblest Quraish."
In Islam human rights are concerned with dignity of the individual, the
level of self-eastern that secures personal identity and promotes human
community.60 Community has gained primacy over individuals. Individual as a
part of the community was to realize that community provides for the
integration of human personality.  Individual owed obligations for the good of
community as a whole.
So in Islam the language of duty seemed more natural than that of
rights, and obligation in consolidated by its being owed to God.  Rules of
conduct for all Muslims were laid down by Allah, and communicated through
Mohammad, and Muslims do service to God through obedience to these
rules. Thus essential characteristic of human rights in Islam is that they
constitute obligations connected with the divine and derive this force from this
connection.61
Muslims are enjoined constantly to seek ways and means to assure to
each other what in modern parlance called human rights. Quran contemplated
certain basic rights like-Right to protection : to justice; to disobey what is
unlawful; to participate in public life; to freedom; to freedom of conviction; of
expression; to protection against persecution on the ground of religion; to
protection of honour and good name; to privacy; to property to adequate
remuneration and compensation.62
60 Abdul Aziz Said, Precepts & Practice of Human Rights in Islam, Universal HumanRights,
Vol.1, New York: Jan-March, 1979, p.63.
61 Ibid.
62 Khalid Ishtaque,"Hum.Rights in Islam Law",Review of the Int.Comm.of Juris.12,30-39.'74
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1.17  theoretical Basis of Human Rights
1.17.1  Natural Law Theory
Human rights are those irreducible minima which belong to every
member of the human race when pitted against the state or other public
authorities or group or gangs and other oppressive communities.63 As  a
member of human family, he has a right to be treated as human. It is an
inalienable right. When this right is denied, human mind expresses
dissatisfaction. Whenever there was an attempt 'to suppress the individual's
freedom an appeal to natural law was made on the assumption that, beyond
religious superiors and crowned heads, there was a system of natural law
which embodied reason, justice and universal ethics.'64
Natural rights which were akin to modern human rights were derived
from natural law.  The credit of giving birth to natural law goes to the Greek,
with great scholars like Sophocles and Aristotle. Romans further developed it.
The early law of Romans was called 'Jus civil'.  Later the Romans developed
the legal systems called 'Jus gentium', this was the law of universal
application. In the republican era of  Rome, jus gentium was reinforced by
natural law as jus natural. Jus natural meant "the sum of those principles
which ought to control human conduct because founded in the very nature of
man as a national and social being.65 According to Romans natural law
embodied the elementary principles of justice which were the dictate of right
reason.66  From this natural law based on right reason, 'the right of man as a
63 V.R. Krishna Iyer, Supra n. 63, p.54.
64 Ibid
65 Brierly, J.L., The Law of Nastions, IX ed.,(Humphrey Waldock, 1963),p.17.
66 Dr. S.K. Kapoor, Supra n. 21, p.3.
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legal or moral concept' first appeared in the form of natural rights.67 These
natural rights of man were moral rights which every human being, every
where, at all times, ought to have simply because of the fact that, in
contradiction with other beings, he is rational and moral.68  the natural rights
of man, being embodiment of right reason, were "not the particular privilege of
citizens of certain state, but something to which every human being,
everywhere, was entitled in virtue of the simple fact of being human and
rationa.69  As man is endowed with reason, for that reason, he is also
endowed with "certain rights without which he ceased to be a human being.70
Thus, the natural rights were derived from the nature of man for these are
inherent in the nature of man and form part of his intrinsic nature.
During middle ages, St. Thomas Aquinas preached for equality within
the framework of a stable society. Teutonic law stressed the fact that law
belonged to the community, to the folk, and was thereby the common
possession of everyone.  Even feudalism, while prescribing duties owed by a
vassal to his lord, inspired the idea of 'right' by saying that no more could be
demanded of him than was due.71  During the period of Reformation and
Renaissance, philosophers like Hobbes, Locke and Roussleau propounded
social contract theories advocating for individuals inalienable rights for life,
liberty and estate, and insisted that the purpose of government was to protect
67 Premanand Singh, "What are Human Rights ? Human Rights: Issues and Perspectives",
Jawahar L. Kaul,(ed), Human Rights,(New Delhi : Regency Publications,1995),p.6
68 Gaius Ezejiofor, Protection of Human Rights under the Law,(London:Butterworths,
1964),p.3.
69 Cranston, M. Human Rights Today, 1962, p.9.
70 Carl J.Fredrick,"Constitutional Government and Democracy"1968,p156,cited in Dr.U.
Chandra, Supra n.16, p.1.
71 Dias R.W.M.,Jurisprudence,(London:Butterworths,1985),p.78.
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these rights. However, these rights were retained by individuals within a
system of social contract – a balancing factor.72
1.17.1.1 Natural Rights
The Natural law theory led to the Natural rights theory. For John Locke,
the chief exponent of this theory, natural law can be understood as protective
of the subjective interest and rights of individual persons.73 It is asserted  that
the failure to respect natural law, the violation of the principles of equality and
non-arbitrariness, provided justification for the natural rights. The doctrines of
natural rights have received their fullest expression in the writing of John
Locke and other social contract theorists.74 Locke writes,'man is by nature
endowed with enough freedom to become a man in conformity with his law.
This law in shape of reason, obliges everyman to preserve his life and limits
his liberty and possession and to be active in rendering the same service to
others. For everyman his original liberty has meaning only by reference to this
law.75
The need to delineate the scope of natural rights perhaps was not
pressing for the early natural law philosophers. Life, liberty, property, trial by
jury, the right to assembly and to petition appeared to represent such self-
evident values that they seemed to require little elaboration. Hence, the
doctrine of natural rights was less concerned with the content of the rights
than with the rationale, such as the inherent nature of man, the divine will, or
72 Patil J.S. and Patil C.S., Supra n. 11, p2.
73 Rosenbaum,(ed), Philosophy of Human Rights,(London: Aldwych, 1981), p.11.
74 Margaret Macdonald, "Natural Rights" in Jeremy Waldron(ed), Supra n.35,p.23.
75 Polin Raymond, "Rights of Man in Hobbes and Locke", in Raphael(ed), Political Theory
and Rights of Man, (Bloomington: Indian Press,1967), p.20.
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historic tradition.76 In all, the rationale determined the content.
Under Locke's view of human beings, in the state of nature, all that was
needed was the opportunity to be self-dependent; life, liberty and property
were the inherent rights that met this demand.77
The list of natural rights varied with each exponent.78 Most of the norm-
setting of natural rights theories contain a priori elements deduced by the
norm setter, thus, the rights considered to be natural differ from theorist to
theorist, according to the theorist's conception of nature.  The natural rights
doctrine was frequently associated with metaphysical and theological principle
and also natural rights were confined to negative rights protected against the
state.79  the other weakness was that, the natural rights were claimed to be
inalienable, absolute and unalterable and therefore, claimed natural rights
unless confined to a single right, tended to come into conflict with each
other.80  Further natural rights theory was also criticized by utilitarians like
Bentham and by Marxist.  Bentham calls natural rights as "simple non-sense;
natural and imprescriptibly rights rhetorical non-sense, non-sense upon
stilts.81 His   rejection of natural rights derives from his analysis of rights and
obligations,101 that is, one has a right only if one is supposed to benefit from
another's compliance with an obligation. Thus, he could not recognize moral
76  Theodor Meron, Supra n. 28 p.78.
77 Ibid, p.79.
78 Margaret Macdonald, Supra n.93, p.23
79 PennockJ.R,"Rights Natural Rights and Human Rights-A General View", in J.R. Pennock
and John W. Chapman(eds.)Human Rights NOMOS XXIII,(New York: New York
University Press, 1981), p.3.
80 Burns Weston, "HumanRights", 15th ed., 20,New Encyclopedia Britannica,(1992), p.656.
81 Browning J.(3d),Works of Jeremy Bentham,(New York:Russel&Russel,1962),Vol.II,p.105
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or natural rights, independent of social recognition and enforcement Marxists
reject the doctrine of natural rights because they were opposed to liberal
individualism.
Making a scathing attack on natural rights concept in "On the Jewish
Question" Marx considers it as the ideological expression of bourgeois egoism
and social atomization. "The so called rights of man. . . are nothing but. . . the
rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and, from the
community. . .None of the so called rights of man, therefore, go beyond
egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society, that is, individuals
withdrawn into himself, and separated from the community82. . . None of the
so called rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a
member of civil society, this is, an individual withdrawn into himself, and
separated from the community.
F.M. Bradely too opposed the idea of individual rights when he wrote,
"The rights of the individuals today are not worth serious criticism. The welfare
of the community is the end and is the ultimate standard. And over its
members the right of its moral organism is absolute. Its duty and right is to
dispose of those members as it seems best."83
The effect of such criticism of natural law and natural rights theory was
to  undermine the rationale behind the theory and also of its universality.  One
consequence of the weaknesses recognized in this helped the other –
especially utilitarian concept to gain significance and prevail during the 19th
and the early 20th century.84
82 See H.L.A. Hart,"Bentham on Legal Rights,"A.W.B.Simpson(ed),Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence,(Oxford: Clarendon Press,1973),pp 171-201.
83 Karl Marx,"On the  Jewish Question"quoted by Jack Donnelly,The Concept of Human
Right.(Kent : Croom helm, 1985),p.73.
84 Quoted in Maurice Cranston, Supra n.41, p.5.
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1.17.1.2   Revival of Natural Rights
The revival of natural rights is a consequence of revival of the theory of
natural law itself.  Kelsen has said : 'The theory of natural law, which was
dominant through out the 17th and 18th centuries, after relapsing during 19th,
has again in the 20th re-entered the foreground of social and legal philosophy,
in company with religious and metaphysical speculation.85 An approach
kindred to that of 'natural law' colours the current movement to bind states by
international covenants to observe human  rights and fundamental freedoms,
while to some extent a 'natural law' philosophy underlines the Draft
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States of 1949 prepared by the
International Law Commission of the United Nations. 'Natural law' was
invoked also in order to justify the punishment of offenders, guilty of the
grosser and more brutal kind of war crimes.86
Though the heyday of natural rights proved short, the idea of human
rights nonetheless endured in one form or another.  The abolition of slavery,
factory legislation, popular education, trade unionism, the universal suffrage
movement – these and other examples of the 19th century reformist impulse
afford ample evidence that the idea was not to be extinguished even if its
transempirical derivation had become a matter of skepticism.  But it was not
until the rise and fall of Nazi Germany that the idea of rights – human rights –
came truly into its own.87
85 See, A Rosenbaum (ed.), Super n.92, pp 21-22.
86 Kelson, "The Foundation of the Theory of Natural Law" in 'Essays In Legal and Moral
Philosophy,(1973) Ch.II, 114 at 141 cited in Starke, J.G. Introduction toInternational
Law,(New Delhi: Aditya Books Pvt. Ltd., 1994), pp. 22-23.
87 Starke J.G., Ibid, p.23.
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The twentieth century saw the revival of natural rights as human rights.
The natural rights doctrine remains one of the most powerful concepts and "its
regained prominence is apparent in national and international law and
politics."88 this is evident from the fact that almost every state in the modern
world has incorporated the concept of human rights in its constitution.
Importance of human rights is also recognized in international law – a number
of instruments on human rights are made since 1948.
Many factors can be held responsible for the revival of natural rights
theory :
(i)  The great wars of twentieth century and the need for peace and respect
for human rights;
(ii) Need to counter dreadful treatment of people by totalitarian
governments;
(iii) Need to make persons and states accountable for their crimes against
humanity;
(iv) Desire for international peace and security and countering terrorism etc.
Human rights have become a fundamental premise in the international
premise in the international, political dialogue.  The  most important
manifestation of human rights in the world scene is the belief that a totalitarian
regime may no longer victimize its own people with impurity or in virtual
silence.89
88 Burns Weston, HumanRights in InternationalHuman ?Rights in  Context: Law Politics
and Morals, 2nded., by Henry J.,Steiner, Phillip Alston, Supra n.60, p.326.
89 Rosenbaum, Supra n.92,p.22.
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1.17.2  Positivism
In the era of legal positivism Bentham held that rights could be
evaluated by reference to the principle of utility and thereby shifted the basis
of rights from morality to positive law.  He and others in analytical tradition
such as Austin, Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart transformed natural rights into positive
legal rights.90
Positivism dominated the legal theory during the nineteenth century
and continued to be accepted in the twentieth century.  According to the
Positivists, the source of Human rights lies in the enactment of a system of
law with sanctions attached to it.  Classical positivists deny an a priori source
of rights and assume that all authority stems from what the state and officials
have prescribed.  This approach rejects any attempt to discern and articulate
an idea of law transcending the empirical realities of existing legal systems.91
For positivist the law is actually laid down; it is a command.92  It has to
be kept separate from the law that ought to be.93 Hence the source of rights –
human rights is to be found only in enactments of a system of law. According
to Austin, it is by virtue of sanctions that expression of desire not only
constitutes commands but also imposes an obligation or duty to act in the
prescribed way.
H.L.A. Hart has a refined approach of this philosophy.  Hart finds that
Austin's analysis confuses, having an obligation to do something with being
90 Ibid, p.23.
91 J.L. Kaul,(ed.), Human Rights,(NewDelhi: Regency  Publications,1995), p.7.
92 Jeremy J., Shestack, supra n.28, p.79.
93 Per John Austin.
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obligated to do it.  He points out that whether someone has obligation on
particular occasion is independent of the likelihood of his incurring the
threatened evil on the particular occasion . . . what is required according to
Hart, are rules that confer authority or power on persons to prescribe behavior
and to visit breaches of the prescriptions with the appropriate evils.94 For Hart,
the rules may be primary and secondary rules, and they constitute the core of
legal system. Hart finds the authority of the rules of law in the background of
legal standards against which the government acts, standards that have been
accepted by the community. He supports a concept of law which allows the
invalidity of law to be distinguished form its morality.95 This is the difference
between natural rights philosophy and positivist philosophy.
1.17.3  Marxist Theory
Marxism is concerned with the nature of human beings. Marx regarded
'the law of nature' approach to human rights as 'idealistic' and 'historical'. He
saw nothing 'natural' or 'inalienable' about human rights.  In a society in which
capitalists monopolise the means of production, he regarded the notion of
individual rights as a bourgeois illusion.96 Thus, Marxism sees a person's
essence as a potential to use one's abilities to the fullest and to satisfy one's
needs.97  In a capitalist society protection is controlled by a few, hence it can
not satisfy those individual needs.
94 To need to distinguish  lawas it 'is' form what it 'ought' to be is theme that haunts
positivists-see, e.g.J.Austin,"The province of Jurisprudence and theuses of
Jurisprudence"(1954), H.Kelsen,"Principles and International Law",(1952)cited in Meron,
Supra n.28,p.79.
95 GoldingMartin, Philosophy of Law,(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1975),p.26.
96 See H.L.A. Hart,"the Concept of Law," 1971,pp.206-207 cited in Meron,Supran.28,p.81.
97 Meron, Ibid.
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Marxist concept of rights of individuals is distinct from the rights of the
society as a whole. Marxists hold that only by achieving the upliftment of the
society or community, the higher freedoms of individuals can be achieved.
Thus even satisfaction of basic needs of individuals is contingent on
realization of social goods.
Since the ultimate goal is the realization of communism and law is an
instrument whose aim is to teach citizens, it imposes observance of social
duties.  This is because in the communism there would be no class, if there
are no class conflicts or conflict between interests of Government, and
people, there should be no rights. Yet they have it through the state, the
people grant themselves certain rights not as a matter of expediency by self
interested right ruling class, but as a product of collective will f the people.98
As Berman points out, rights thus are conferred in the limited sense, in order
to encourage one to be loyal, hardworking, well disciplined and a virtuous
citizen.99 Thus, according to Marxism, only legal rights granted by the state to
a limited extent exist to fulfill the obligation of the state.
Marxists recognition of rights stems from its view of individual as
indivisible from the social whole; it is only by meeting of the will of the whole
that the higher freedom of individual can be achieved. Thus, even satisfaction
of basic needs can become contingent on realization of societal goal.
98 Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1944, at 135,(D.Struch
ed.1964).
99 Richard Dean, "Beyond Helsinki,the Soviet View of Human Rights in Internatinal Law",
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 21, (1981), p.59.
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The whole history suggests that the concept of human rights is not new
and it existed in all civilization known to the world in one form or the other.
These rights were called 'natural rights' or 'rights of men' or 'duties of the king'
by different philosophers but the aim of all those was the same, that is to
protect and provide certain basic rights.100
1.17.4  Sociological Theory
The sociological approach as far as human rights are concerned,
directs attention to the questions of institutional development aimed at
classifying behavioural dimension of law and society, focuses on the problems
of public policy and identifies the empirical components of human rights in the
context of social  process.101
For human rights theory, a primary contribution of the sociological
school is its emphasis on obtaining a just equilibrium of interest among
prevailing moral sentiments and the social and economic conditions of time
and place.102 One of the leading sociological thinkers, Roscoe Pound pointed
out that 'during the nineteenth century the history of law was written largely as
a record of an increasing recognition of individual rights.'  He further pointed
out that in the twentieth century "this history should be written in terms of a
continually wider recognition of human wants, human demands and social
interests."103 He did not try to give value preference to these interests. His
guiding principle was one of "social engineering", that is, the ordering of
100 Berman,"Human Rights in Soviet Union," Harvard Law Journal,Vol.II,1965,pp.340-341.
101 Gurjeet Singh & Dinesh Kumar, "Human Rights-A Historical Perceptive", Indian Socio-
Legal Journal 2005, Vol.XXXI,p.44.
102 Naikar L.D., Supra n.57, p.31.
103 Jerome, J., Shestack, Supra n.28, p.84.
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human relations through politically organized society so as to secure all
interests insofar as possible with the least sacrifice of the totality of interests.
This approach is useful in the understanding of the scope of human rights and
their correlation with demands. It takes into account the realities of the social
process; and how to focus on rights in terms of what people are concerned
about and what they want.
However, one difficulty with the sociological approach is its lack of
focus on how rights are interrelated or what the priorities should be; how a
normative conclusion about rights can be empirically derived from factual
premises such as the having of interests.  This made Llewellyn to note that "a
descriptive science in the social field is not enough104 Nevertheless this
approach sharpened the perceptions of the values involved and the policies
necessary to achieve them.
1.17.5  Theories Based on Justice
If law is a system of rules, then some aspects of 'procedures' and of
'formal' justice may be inherent in it.105  When justice is used as the measure
of the law, the assumption is that law could be made to conform to justice;
'justice' in this context stands for a substantive moral criterion sometimes
called 'distributive justice' or more recently 'social justice'.  The law ought to
distribute rights and duties in a certain way, and if it does not it is unjust.  Thus
the object of justice is proper distribution of social goods106 This theory of
204 Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence, 1959 cited in Meron, Supra n.28, p.84.
205 Llewellyn, Book Review, 28 U Chi. L. Rev. 174(1960) quoted by Jerome J. Shestack, in
Meron, Supra n.28, p.85.
206 Naikar L.D. Supra n. 57, p.39.
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human rights based on justice is advanced by Prof. John Rawls.  According to
John Rawls, the chief exponent of this theory,107 "Justice is the  first virtue of
social institutions."  The role of justice is crucial to understanding human
rights. Human rights are an end of justice.
For Rawls, the principles of justice provide a way of assigning rights
and duties in the basic institution of society and also define the appropriate
distribution of benefits and burdens of social cooperation.  The general
conception of justice behind the principles of justice is one of fairness is found
throughout in theories based on justice.  The concepts of fairness and justice
help to determine all social primary goals, such as liberty and opportunity,
income and wealth, and the leases of self respect which are to be distributed
equally unless an exception is made for the benefit of least forward.108
1.17.6  Theory Based on Equality of Respect and Concern
The basic premises of this theory propounded by Dworkin is that
governments must treat all their citizens with equal concern and respect.  He
proposes the 'right to treatment as an equal to be taken as fundamental under
the liberal conception of equality'109 Dworkin has affirmed the utilitarian
principle that 'everybody can count for one, nobody for more than one.' He
even advances the idea of state intervention in order to achieve social
welfare.  In this view, "a right to liberty is too vague to be meaningful."110 but
107 Ibid, p.40.
108 John Rawls, A theory of Justice, (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press,1971).
109 Dr. Kapor S.K., Supra n. 21, p.4.
110 Naikar L.D., Supra n.57, p.48.
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there are certain specific liberties, such as, freedom of speech, freedom of
worship, rights of association and personal and sexual relation require special
protection against government interference.111 Dworkin holds that if these
liberties were left to a utilitarian calculation or an unrestricted calculation of
general interest, the balance would tilt in favour of restriction instead of
general interest. The liberties thus must be protected against external
preferences and must be given a preferred status.
Dworkin's theory of human rights seems to be similar to the rights n the
natural law tradition. He minimizes the tension between liberty and equality,
by retaining both the benefits of rights theory without the need for an
ontological commitment and the benefits of utilitarian theory without the need
to sacrifice basic individual rights.
1.17.7  Theory Based on Dignity
Dignity of person or human dignity is an expression of a basic value
accepted by all.  The expression human dignity finds place in many of the
international instruments112 on human rights and freedoms. Human rights
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.
In one sense dignity is the intrinsic worth of human person.  The worth
of every person should mean 'that individuals are not to be perceived or
treated merely as objects of the will of others.' The ideal that human rights are
derived from the dignity of the person has two corollaries.  The first corollary is
the idea that basic rights are not given by authority and therefore may not be
taken away; the second is that they are rights of person, every person.113
111 See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth,1977),p.273.
112 Dr. Kapoor, S.K. Supra n.21, p.5.
113 Preamble of UN Charter;UN Declaration of HumanRights and the Helsinki Accords etc.
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This way dignity is private or individual. In the other sense, dignity is
collective; "prescribed by social norms".114 Dignity here means the particular
cultural understanding of the inner moral worth of their human person and the
person's political relation with the society.
Thus, this theory regards protection of human dignity as a paramount
objective of social policy.115 This is a value policy oriented approach based on
protection of human dignity.  The demands for human rights are demands, for
wide sharing in all the values upon which human rights depend for effective
participation in all community value processes.  There are eight such
independent values as basis for human rights like; respect, power,
enlightenment, wellbeing, health, skill, affection and rectitude.116  This theory
based on dignity envisages that members of the community should participate
in democratic distribution of values.  The ultimate goal here is to ensure a
world community in which there is democratic distribution of values, and
where protection of human rights is the paramount objective of social policy.
In all these and some of the other theories, a common feature, that
appears by and large is the attempt to balance rights of individuals i.e., human
rights with the societal interests.  This aspect is more clearly visible in the
revived natural law philosophy.117 For instance, John Rawls argues for equal
liberty and arrangement of social and economic inequalities for the greatest
114 Oscar Schacter, "Human Dignity as a Nrmative Concept", 77 Am J. International Law,
1983 p.848.
115 Rhoda Howard, "Dignity Community and Human Rights", in Naim (ed.), Human Rights
in Cultural Perspective, 1992, p.61.
116 Vide, Mc Dougal Lassell and Chen, Human Rights and Public Order: the Basic
Policies of International Law of Human Dignity, 1980.
117 See Kapoor S.K., Supra n.21, p.5.
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benefit of the least advantaged; with a 'just savings principle; while John
Finnis makes a fine blend of basic values and practical reasonableness in
formulating his natural rights theory, Dworkin proceeds from the postulates of
political morality, thus, the jurisprudential basis for a balanced and
comprehensive concept of human rights is strongly laid in all these different
theories.
1.18  Position of Human Rights in India
Many reasons account for the contemporary international concern with
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Some of these are deeply rooted in
historical experience and are part of man's struggle for the realization of all his
human values.118  The enjoyment by individuals everywhere of their human
rights is a prerequisite to peace, security and progress of any society or state.
In the modern world of "community of states", the human rights obligations of
states exist at three levels.  First119 and foremost, states human right
obligations exist in the fundamental law of the land, the Constitution. . .Under
the Indian Constitution, Parts-III and IV define the nature and scope of Indian
State's human rights obligations.120 Indian Constitution, republican and
democratic in nature, is created or consented by the 'people' making them the
ultimate sovereign. None, even the highest executive authority in the state is
above the law.  Dr. Justice Anand concisely made this point clear when he
stated that "the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land which
establishes the judiciary and empowers it to eliminate those acts of the
118 Dr. Patil, J.S. & Dr. Patil, C.S., Supra n. 11, p.3.
119 Moses Moskowitz, Supra n.46.p.157.
120 As the second is specific obligations under various statutes and the third is
International Human Rights under treaties.
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legislature and / or actions of the executive as one found to be
unconstitutional.  The courts are the guardians of the Constitution framed by
'we the people of India'… The accountability of the judges is therefore not only
to their conscience but also to the people in whom the ultimate sovereignty
vests.  It is therefore imperative that their vast power is used in public interest.
. ."121  These two general but cardinal principles of the Constitution are the
basis of human rights obligations of the Indian State.
The human rights under the Indian Constitution are divided on the
ground of enforceability in the courts under the Part III and Part IV of the
Constitution. Otherwise, the rights in both Parts are equally fundamental.
They are complementary of each other because together they constitute the
human rights regime including respectively the civil and political rights and the
social and economic rights.122 Together they have been called the conscience
of the Constitution.123
India became independent in 1947, had its Constitution adopted in
1950, with provision guaranteeing basic human rights to the people in the
form of fundamental rights. Prior to independence it signed the United Nations
Charter and then after independence the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948.
Though India emerged as an independent nation form colonial rule in
1947,  the  struggle  for  independence  which  had proceeded  in  the  three
121 Handbook on Human Rights for Judicial Officers, NIHR,(Bangalore: NLSIU,2000),p.3.
122 Justice, Dr. A.S. Anand, "Protection of Human Rights-Judicial Obligation or Judicial
Activism ?"  (1997) 7 SCC (Jour) at 24.
123 V.N. Sukla, Constitution of India, 10th ed., by  M.P. Singh,(Lucknow: Eastern Book
Company 2001). P.19.
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decades before 1947 had the seeds of what later came to be recognized  as
fundamental rights.124 Though prior to the period during which India had gone
under colonial rule, fundamental rights were not known in India, during the
struggle for independence and after independence, there was recognition, on
the part of the constitution makers as also on the part of the populace at large,
of the need for some provision in the constitution for fundamental rights.125
1.18.1  Evolution of Dundamental Rights in India
1.18.1.1  During Freedom Struggle
The idea of fundamental rights originated in the nineteenth century.
During the British regime in India, the Indian National Congress started the
agitation for the recognition of civil rights. However, the constitutional
recognition of the fundamental rights came in the year 1895. Perhaps the first
explicit demand for demand for fundamental rights  appeared in the
Constitution of India Bill, 1895126, in which several rights were
incorporated.127  Thereafter, the Indian National Congress was expressing the
wishes of the people of India through various Bills, testaments, schemes,
reports and resolutions.128 The demand for rights was revived in the
beginning of the twentieth century.  A series of Congress Resolutions adopted
between 1971 and 1919 repeated the demand for civil rights and equality of
status with English men.  The resolution called for "equal terms and conditions
124 G. Austin, The Indian Constitution : the Corner Stone of a Nation,(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1966), p.50.
125 R.A. Jahagirdar, "Human Rights-the Indian Experiment", Justice E.S. Venkataramaih
(ed.), Supra n.76, p.92.
126 Ibid., p. 93.
127 See, B.Shiv,The Framing of India's Constitution: Select Documents, Vol.I,(New Delhi:
the Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1996), pp.5-14.
128 E.g. Art.16 of the Constitution of India Bill, 1895.
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in bearing arms", for a wider application of the system of trial by jury; and for
the right of Indians "to claim that no less than one half of the jurors should be
their own countrymen."129  This right of equality is one of the most important,
basic, human rights.
By the mid twenties, the demands of the Indians "no longer aimed at
establishing the rights of Indian vis-à-vis Englishmen, a goal that was to be
achieved through the Independence Movement; the purpose however was to
assure liberty among Indians.130  The Commonwealth of India Bill 1925 was
another demand by the Indian National Congress for fundamental rights.131
In 1927 the appointment of the Simon Commission impelled the Indian
National Congress to set up a committee to draft a constitution on the basis of
a declaration of rights.  The committee132 thus set up in 1928 suggested that
fundamental rights should be incorporated in the future constitution of India.
The Nehru Report133 declared that the first concern of Indians was to secure
the fundamental rights.  The Report said : "it is obvious that our first care
should be to have our fundamental rights guaranteed in a manner which will
not permit their withdrawal under any circumstances."134
Next development was the Karachi Resolution for the adaptation of the
fundamental rights by the congress session in 1931, "in order to end the
exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include the real economic
129 B.L. Hansaria, Right to life and Liberty under the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of
Article.21,(Bombay : N.M. Tripathi Pvt.Ltd.,1993), p.4.
130 Resolution of 1917: Chakrabarthy and Bhattacharya, Congress in Evolution, (Calcutta:
The Book Co.Ltd., 1940), p.19
131 G. Austin, Supra n.143, pp.53-54.
132 Art.8 of the Bill embodied several fundamental rights.
133 Motilal Nehru was the Chairman of the Committee.
134 It incorporated Fundamental Rights.
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freedom of the starving millions.135 Subsequently, in all the three sessions of
the Round Table Conferences that preceded the making of the Government of
India Act, 1935, discussions were held on the subject of Fundamental Rights
and the Indian leaders made concerned efforts for the inclusion of Bill of
Rights in the Proposed Constitution Act.136.
The next stage of development was the appointing of Sapru Committee
by an all Parties Conference in 1944-45.  The Sapru Committee with Sir Tej
Bahadur Sapru as its chairman published its report in 1945 recommending
that the declaration of fundamental rights was absolutely necessary.  Sapru
Report gave a standing warning to all, that what the Constitution demands
and expects is perfect equality between one section of the community and
another in the matter of political and civil rights, equality of liberty and security
in the enjoyment of the freedom of religion, worship, and the pursuit of the
ordinary applications of life.137  The Committee envisaged  justiciable and
non-justiciable rights but did not suggest which all rights should be included in
the future constitution.  The issue was left to framers of the Constitution.
The British Cabinet Mission in 1946 envisaged a Constituent Assembly
for framing of Constitution of India.
1.18.1.2  Constituent Assembly and Fundamental Rights
The Constituent Assembly's first ever meeting on 9th December 1946
was a fulfillment of long cherished hope, and it symbolized the
135 G. Austin op cit. p.55.
136 Chakrabarthy and Bhattacharya, op cit, p.28.
137 P. Sarojini Reddy, Judicial Review of Fundamental Rights,(New Delhi : National
Publishing House, 1976), p.10.
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commencement of great task of framing the Constitution of India.  In
furtherance of this task, the Constituent Assembly on 24 January 1947 voted
to form the Advisory Committee, on adoption of a resolution moved by Pandit
Govind Ballabh.138 Advisory Committee in turn set up five sub committees on
Fundamental Rights.
The Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee was faced with a problem of
balancing the individual liberty vis-à-vis social control.  The former being
necessary for fulfillment of individual's personality and the latter for the peace
and security of society.  The members found that although there was some
disagreement on technique,  there was little difference on principles.  The
members of Sub-Committee quickly decided that the Fundamental Rights
should be justifiable, that they should be included in the Constitution and they
decided what form these rights should take and also included within the rights
the legal methods by which they could be secured. Therefore, Assembly
passed Fundamental Rights which are divided into seven parts having close
resemblance with human rights enshrined in various international human
rights document.139
1.18.1.3  Post Constitutional Period and Human Rights
The historical and political developments in India made it inevitable that
a Bill of Rights or Fundamental Rights, as well as call them, should be
enacted in our constitution.140  Part-III of the Constitution embodies those
138 Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and others, "Constitutional Proposals of the Sapru Committee",
The Sapru Report, Delhi, p.260.
139 CAD Vol.II, p.325.
140 G.S. Bajwa, "Socio-Political Dimensions of Human Rights in India-A Retrospective
Study:,in B.P. Singh Sehgal(ed.), Human Rights in India-Problems and
Perspectives,(New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1996), pp.61-62.
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rights. The rights embedded in this part and ensured as effective guarantees
against the state action.141 In has been aptly observed that 'enshrining of
these rights makes our constitution sublime.'142  The observations of Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar on the object and purpose of  Fundamental Rights in the
Constitution were very clear when he said :
"The object of the Fundamental Rights is two-fold. First, that every
citizen must be in a position to claim those rights. Secondly, they must be
binding upon every authority. I shall presently explain what the word authority
means – upon every authority which has got either the power to make laws or
the power to have discretion vested in it."142
The promulgation of the Constitution on 26th January 1950 was a
watershed in the history of the development of human rights in India.  The
Preamble, the Fundamental Rights, the Directive Principle of State Policy
together provides the basic human rights to the people of India.144 (C)ourts
too have played a positive role in incorporating and enforcing the rights
available at international level into the Indian law, through judicial
construction. The Supreme Court of Indian in particular through judicial
interpretation has widened the horizon of human rights in India.145
Since 1950 the civil and political rights have been adopted in the
Constitution and they have been made enforceable through the judicial
141 H.M. Seervi, Constitutional Law of India, 4th ed., Vol.I,(Delhi :Universal Book
Traders,1997), p.347.
142 Dr. Ram Rajput, "Fundamental Rights", in M.Hidayatulla, ed., Constitutional Law in
India, Vol.I, (New Delhi : Arnold Heinemann, 1984), p.150.
143 A.K.Gopalan V. State ofMadras, AIR 1950, SC. 27.
144 C.A.D. Vol.II, 1948-49, p.610.
145 State of Human Rights in India 1,(2000)(NewDelhi:Indian Institute of Human Rights),at
p.6
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process. Still there are quite a few human rights which touch the people at the
grass root level but have not been received sufficient attention. While a
number of human rights covered under Part-III of the Constitution as
justiciable fundamental rights, others are covered under Part-IV, which are
mere directive policies not justiciable.  In case of the enforceable rights also it
was felt only the rich and well to do who could take advantages of the judicial
process.  Bhagwati, J., has aptly remarked that : "it is absolutely essential to
get out of the obsession with the grandiose concept of human rights and
come to the grass root concept of human rights.146
Further India has signed the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, 1996 and the International Covenant on Economic, social and
Cultural Rights, 1966. In 1979 she satisfied the Covenants too.  Another
important development  in the area of human rights in India is the enacting of
the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, to provide for the constitution of a
National Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commission in
States and Human Rights Courts for better protection of human rights and
matter connected there with or incidental thereto.
'Human Rights', under the Act, means the rights relating to life, liberty,
equality and dignity of life, guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the
International Covenants and are enforceable by court in India.147
This apparently covers the rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
those embodied in the International Covenants. This is Noorani has aptly
146 K.C. Joshi,"Universalisation of Human Rights of Women: Supreme Court Sets Pace,"
AIR 2001 J. at 61.
147 P.N. Bhagwati, "Human Rights and Democratisation of Remedies," Ind. Bar Rev.,
Vol.10(4) 1983, p.586.
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remarked, "a cosmetic fraud"148 For the qualification that follows "and are
enforceable by courts in India" take way the rights under the Covenants
altogether. So, unless the rights under the Covenants are enforceable by
Indian law, they would be of no relevance to the human rights commission. An
international treaty can have no direct effect on domes6ic law unless
implemented by legislation. The net effect of the qualifying expression is to
take away one hand what is offered by another. However, this is not going to
exempt India from international obligations as a state party to the
Covenants.149
This situation reveals the fact that provisions of the Constitution
incorporating human rights as enforceable fundamental rights and making the
courts custodian of these rights becomes very much important.
The Fundamental Rights of the Constitution are, in general,  those
rights of the citizens, or those negative obligations of the state not to encroach
on individual liberty, that have become well known since the late eighteenth
century and since the drafting of the Bill of Rights of the American Constitution
for the Indians, no less than other peoples, became heir to this liberal
tradition.150 In keeping with this tradition the Indian Constitution guarantees
certain fundamental rights to individuals.  These fundamental rights are
divided into six parts: the right to equality, the right to freedom, the right
against exploitation, the right to the freedom of religion, cultural and
educational rights and the right to constitutional remedies.
148 Section 2(d) of Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.
149 A.G. Noorani,"Rights and wrongs-A Commission and Many Omissions", p.39,
Frontline, August 1993, cited by Noor Mohammad Bilal, "National Human Rights
Commission- A Shackled Watchdog", K.U.L.R., Vol.I, Dec. 1994, p.133.
150    Ibid.
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A fundamental right, as defined in the Constitution, differs from a non-
fundamental right in one vital aspect : a fundamental right (subject to the
qualifications defined in the Constitution itself) is inviolable, whereas a non-
fundamental right possesses no such charactleristic.151 Fundamental rights
are limitations on the powers of the legislature as well as the executive.  They
are designed to discipline the state and review all those actions which
threaten or transgress fundamental rights beyond the permissible limits
defined by the Constitution.152  The real enforcement of the right  in case of
every contravention must also be possible in the constitutional scheme.153
The mode of redress should be appropriate in the facts of the case.
Therefore, the Constitution provides special jurisdiction under Art. 32, a
provision which was made under Part-III of the Constitution itself to enforce
these fundamental rights. The Supreme Court under Art.  32 and High Courts
under Art.226 are under a duty to grant relief for violation of a substantive
fundamental right.
The framers of the Constitution of 1949 wanted to incorporate a
guarantee of fundamental right so that they might impose limitations on the
arbitrary exercise of power by any organ of the state. 154  This object has
been  secured  in  the   Constitution  in   several  ways   under  Article-12 155,
151 G. Austin, Supra n.143pp.55-51.
152 V.N.Shukla,Constitution of India,10thed,by M.P.Singh(Luck.Eastern Bk Co,2001)p.A-42.
153 B.P. Jeevan Reddy and Rajeev Dhavan, "The Jurisprudence of HumanRights", in David
M. Beaty (ed.) Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Comparative Perspective,
(London : Martinus Nijhof Pub.1994), p.178.
154 G.L. Wazir "Right to Compensation under Public Lw in India : A Basic Human Right and
an International Commitment", Legal News and Views, July, p.15.
155 CAD Vol.III, P. 612.
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Art.13(2)156, Art-32 157 and Art 245(1).158
Inclusion of human rights recognized under the international
instruments in the Constitution reflects India's spirit to promote and guarantee
human rights and  fundamental freedoms without distinction.
For sometime now, the courts in India have started relating the
fundamental rights in the constitution to the International Human Rights. For
example, many a time while interpreting provisions of fundamental rights
under the Constitution the Supreme Court has expressly referred to
international instruments on Human Rights.159 In Chairman, Railway Board v.
Chandrima Das, the Supreme Court has referred to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, when it observed: "the applicability of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and principles thereof may have to be read if
need be, into the domestic jurisprudence."160
The concept of fundamental rights thus represents a trend in the
modern democratic thinking. The enforcement of human rights is a matter of
major significance to modern constitutional jurisprudence.161 This, the courts
156   Art.12 as a Key to part III say that the Fundamental Rights will be enforceable against all the
organs  of the state.
157   So far as legislature is concerned Art.13(2) says that "The State shall not make any law which
takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of
this clause shall to that extent of the contravention be void; even in the absence of Art.13, Court
has always the power to declare an enactment, to the extent it transgresses its limits invalid, see
Gopalan V. State of Madras(1950) SCR, also 88, also State of Punjab V. Ram Lubhaya Bagga,
AIR 1988 SC 1703.
158    Art.32 provides that a person who complains of violation of his fundamental rights may move the
Supreme Court (High Courts under Art.226) for the issue of appropriate direction, order or
writes.
159  Under Art.245(1)-the opening words "subject to the provisions of this constitution," ensure that
the otherwise plenary powers of the legislature are subject to the limitations imposed by the
fundamental rights guaranteed by Part IIIof the Constitution
160   E.g. Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India,AIR 1978 SC 597;M.H.Hoskot V. State of
Maharashtra,AIR 1978 SC 1548;(1978) 3 SCC 544; Randhir Singh V. Union of India,AIR 1982
SC 879; Madhu Kishwar V. State of Bihar;AIR 1996 SC 1864;(1996)5 SCC 125; D.K. Basu V.
State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610; Vishaka V. Stte of Rajasthan(1997)AIR SCW
3043;(1997)6 SCC 241;Apparel Export Promotion Council V.A.K.Chopra,AIR 1999 SC
6251;(1997)1 SCC 759;Chairman Railway Board V. Chandrima Das, AIR 2000 SC 988;(2000) 2
SCC 465 etc.
161 Chairman, Railway Board V. Chandriama Das, AIR 2000 SC 988 at 997.
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have made through the public interests litigation cases.
Initially, the attitude of judiciary in India towards the Directive Principles
was not favourable and it had nullified many important legislations embodying
socio-economic reforms.162  With the passage of time, however, there has
been a shift in the attitude of the judiciary towards socio-economic rights
contained in the Part-IV of the Constitution, as the court felt the need for
change in its earlier outlook.163
Under the Indian Constitution Directive Principles of State Policy and
jural postulates (achievable goals).  Until recently the Directives were not
considered seriously by the courts because of the strict legalistic positive
approach adopted by them.  The recent technological approach of the court
provides the basis for the meaningful understanding of the human rights.164
The Supreme Court started seeing these directive principles as a basis for
meaningful enforcement of fundamental rights and thus the scope of right to
life and personal liberty under Art.21, in particular, was widened.  This trend is
also seen in a number of public interests matters decide by the courts.
1.19  Conclusion
Human rights, available to every person for the reason that he is a
human being, compelled the concern of international law from World War-II
onwards. However, these human rights, which go to make life with dignity
162 M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 5th ed.,(New Delhi : Wadhwa and Company,
Nagpur,2003),p. 969.
163 See State of Madras V. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226.
164 State of Bihar V. Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952, SC 252.
165 Dr. D.S. Prakasa Rao,, "Human Rights- Ideology and Practice-Indian Perspective",
Journal of Indian Legal Thought, Vol.I, 2003, p.62 at p.68.
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possible found place in ancient civilizations, be it Babylonian or Vedic times.
At the international there is the U.N. Charter; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948; Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 amongst other instruments which
compel the member nations to create an environment in municipal spheres
wherein the human rights of the individuals can be meaningful.
In the modern form, human rights found expression in Magna Carta of
1215, American Constitution of 1787, French Declaration of Rights of Man of
1789 followed by a host of other countries which have adopted a controlling
constitution organizing the liberty of the individual within the constitution.
India could not deviate from this trend of providing for a constitutionally
entrenched bill of human rights.  Rightly, it guaranteed long list of these
important human rights under Part-III of the Constitution titled "Fundamental
Rights."
Different theories have been evolved regarding nature of human rights.
All these theories are in agreement about the inviolable and inalienable nature
of them.  These rights operate as limitations upon the authority in order to
secure life with human dignity. Human rights being classified into three
generations viz,: first generation, second generation and third generation,
address different dimensions of human life and activity.
The thread of morality is interwoven in human rights, for different
religions have evolved and nourished principles for protection of human rights.
Diverse theoretical bases have been evolved to support human rights.
Although each of these is subjected to criticism, each one is imbued with
rationale which cannot be so easily dismissed. In the present day scenario,
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theories based on natural rights, justice and dignity appear to be most
acceptable.
In India, the ancient concern towards sanctity of human beings is
echoed in the Constituent Assembly debates. The human rights are provided
constitutional foundation.  The preambular promise of securing justice, liberty
and equality along with dignity to every individual elaborated in the parts
relating to fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy make the
commitment of the Constitution to human rights manifest.  This commitment is
further reinforced by the fact that India is a party to all major international
human rights instruments and has enacted domestic laws for the realization of
human rights.
CHAPTER-II
EXPORT OPINION IN INDIA
 It is in short a general rule, that the opinion of witnesses possessing
peculiar skill is admissible whenever subject matter of inquiry is such that
inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct
judgment upon it without such assistance, in other words, when it so partakes
of the character of a science or art as to require a course of previous habit of
study in order to obtain a competent knowledge of its nature.1  The opinions of
skilled witnesses cannot on the other hand be received on a subject which
does not require any peculiar habits or course of study in order to quality a
man to understand it.2  Witnesses are not permitted to state their views on
matters of moral or legal obligations, or on the manner in which other persons
would probably have been influenced had the parties acted in one-way rather
than another.3
 The opinions of witnesses on scientific matters are admissible in
evidence not only where they rest on the personal observation of the witness
himself and on facts within his own knowledge, but even where they are
merely founded on the case as proved by other witnesses.  But witness in
England can not be asked his opinion respecting the very point which the jury
is to determine.
 The opinion of an expert on facts proved or admitted is only relevant
when  the  court  has  to  form  an  opinion on a point of science or art, expert
1   Taylor on Evidence, Paras 1418-19.
2   Ibid, para 1419.
3   Ibid, para 1421.
opinion will differ even on admitted or proved facts, but when the facts are not
admitted the court will have first to come to a conclusion on the evidence as to
what facts have been proved and then apply to such facts the various expert
opinions which have been offered; the line where there no longer remains a
point of science or art is not always clearly defined.4
 As a general rule, the opinion of a witness on a questions whether of
fact or of law, is irrelevant.  A witness has to state the facts which he has
seen, heard or perceived, and not the conclusions which he has formed on
observing or perceiving them.  The function of drawing inference from facts is
a judicial function and must be performed by the court. If a witness is
permitted to state not only the facts which he has perceived but also the
opinion which he has formed on them it would amount to delegation of judicial
function, which is not warranted by law.5  To this general rule, however, there
are some important exceptions, which are enacted in Sections 45 to 51 of the
Indian Evidence Act.
 It should be noted that all language necessarily involves inferences of
one kind or other, and it is not every inference of a witness which is excluded
as "opinion."  In all supposed statements of act, the witness really testifies to
the opinion formed by the judgment upon the presentment of the senses."6
There are matters on which it is naturally impossible for any witness to give
positive evidence of facts which he observed.  He must, if he says anything at
all, speak as to his opinion or belief, on matters which are essentially matters
4 Monesseh Jacob Shafurji Homusji 10 Bom., LR, 1004.
5 State of Mysore  V. Sampangiriramiah, AIR 1953 Mys., 80, Baswant Rao Bajirao V. King
Emperor, AIR 1949 Nag.66.
6 Woodroffe : Evidence 9th Edn., pp. 142-43.
of opinion or are so complex or indefinite that he can only form a general
opinion on them.  Thus, on question of identity, condition, age, appearance or
resemblance of person or things, on the general character of the weather or
the general conduct of a business or of persons during a certain period, or the
general character of a meeting alleged to be seditious, clearly only evidence
of opinion can be given and would in most cases be received similarly, a
witness can testify to the value of a house or to a person being in possession
of certain property but it is doubtful if the witness will be permitted to say that
a person is the "owner" since "ownership" is a question of legal inference to
be drawn by the court from the facts proved in the case.
 Section 45 is exhaustive of the matters on which expert testimony can
be given, though the expression "Science or Art" would include almost all
branches of human knowledge requiring special study, experience or training.
In order that a witness may be competent to depose as an expert, he must be
shown to have made a special study of the subject or acquired a special
experience therein. An expert is a person who has special knowledge and skill
in the particular calling to which the inquiry relates.7 In law, and as applied to
a witness, the term "expert" has a special significance and no witness is
permitted to express his opinion.  Unless he is an expert within, the meaning
of Section-45.8
 The term 'expert' is not confined to professional men.  'Expert' is one
who, by experience, has acquired special or peculiar knowledge of the subject
of which he undertakes  to testify and it does not matter whether such
7 Lawson on Expert Testimony, 2nd Edn., p.229.
8 Bal Krishna Das V. Raddhevi, AIR 1989. All. 133.
knowledge has been acquired by study or scientific works or by practical
observation.9
 In Lord Abinger V. Ashton,10 Jessel M.R. described 'expert' as
remunerated witness available on hire to pledge oath in favour of the party
who has paid for him.  First and last, the court is an expert of experts and can
need no opinion evidence of an expert in order to determine whether
hammering of steel plates by hammers up to 4 pounds creates a terrific noise
or not.11
 In Bouvier's Law Dictionary experts are said to be "persons instructed
by experience."
 An expert is, from derivation of the word, one instructed by experience,
and to become an expert one requires a course of previous habit or practice
or of study, so as to be familiar with the subject.12
 The term expert seems to imply both superior knowledge and practical
experience in the art or profession, but generally nothing more is required to
entitle one to give testimony as an expert than that has been educated in the
particular art or profession."13
 An expert in order to be competent as a witness, need not have
acquired the knowledge professionally, it is sufficient, so far as the
admissibility of the evidence goes, if he has made a special study of the
subject  or  acquired experience therein.  But it  is  the duty of  the  judge  to
9 Rice V. Lockett, 8 DLR 84.
10 (1873) 17 Eq 358 at, pp.373-74
11 GothanConstruction Co. V. Amulya Krishna Ghose, AIR, 1968 Cal.91.
12 Nelsen Sun V. Mutual Assurance Co.,71 Ny.453.
13 Phipson's Evidence, 9th Edn., p.400
decide whether the skill of any person in the matter n which evidence of an
expert-opinion is offered is sufficient to entitle him to be considered as
expert.14
 It would be impossible to give an exhaustive definition, and that the
question whether a particular witness is or is not an expert, giving evidence
strictly as such, will frequently be a pure question of fact.15
FOREIGN LAW
 In England, the ordinary mode of proving a point of foreign law is to call
a witness specially skilled in that law; but in India it may either be proved
under Section 45 expert testimony, or in the manner laid down in section 38
Viz., by the production of official books or reports of the rulings of the courts of
the particularly country or by foreign judgements.16 Foreign law is a question
of fact, 17 with which courts in India are not supported to be conversant,
opinions of experts in foreign law are, therefore allowed to be admitted.  But
where foreign law is laid down in a particularly elaborate code which is
available, it is unnecessary to call expert witness on the point of foreign law
concerned.18 Hindu Law or Mohammedan Law as administered by the courts
of India is neither 'foreign law' nor 'science or art, but is the law of land, and
the opinions of witnesses,  however, learned they may be in that law, are
irrelevant.19 But Jewish law is foreign law.20
14 Oli, Alias Abdul Kader, In Re 1976, Law Weekly
15 Granger V. Attorney General (1957) NZLR 355
16 Sugan Chand Bhikam Chand V. Magni Bai Gulab Chand,AIR 1942, Bom.185.
17 Khoday Gangadara Sah V. Swaminadha Mundali, 92 IC 112.
18 Palaniapa Chettv V. Nagappa Chettiar, 123 IC600
19 Masjid Shahidganj V. Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee,AIR,PC 116.
20 Ezekil Jacob V. Joseph Jacob, AIR 1946, Cal.90
 A person whose knowledge of foreign law is desired solely from study
without actual practice is incompetent.21  It is not enough to show that the
witness in fact knows the foreign law, he must be one who, from his position
or training, is supposed to know the law.22 The witness who is called to prove
a point of foreign law must be either a practicing lawyer or holder of some
official position which requires a knowledge of that law.  A foreign judge,
barrister or solicitor practicing in the courts of his country is competent,23 but
not a mere resident of the foreign country, not specially conversant with the
law.24
 The English Law on the subject is stated by Taylor Thus :
 Law being a science, the existence and meaning of the laws, written
and unwritten, and the usages and customs of foreign states may and indeed
must be proved by calling professional or official persons to give their opinions
on the subject. Before the judges can discover and declare the meaning of a
foreign document, he must obtain, through the medium of skilled witnesses,
first, a translation of the document, secondly, an explanation of any term of art
used in it, and thirdly information of any special law, or on any peculiar rule of
construction, of the foreign state affecting it.  Aided by these lights, the court
then proceeds to put a judicial construction upon the instrument."25
21 Bristow V. Sequeville (1850) 19 LJEx.289.
22 Perlak Petroleum V. Deen (1924) 1 KB 111.
23 Phipson : Evidence 7th Edn. P.377.
24 R.V. Maguib (1917) K  359.
25 Taylor on Evidence, Vol.II Sec.1423-25(pp.27-30)
 An expert in foreign law is called to state what the law of a foreign state
on a particular points is e.g. an advocate of the Scottish Bar is often called as
a witness in English courts to explain the law of Scotland on any particular
point that arises.  But if the law is laid down in a particular elaborate manner in
a Code, it becomes the duty of the court to interpret that code as best as it
could but it is not entitled  to rely on any outside opinion, however eminent, as
to the interpretation of that Code.26
 No foreign law becomes part of the law of India merely by the
circumstances that is to be applied by the courts in India.  Such foreign law
remains a foreign law and consequently under Section 45 of the Indian
Evidence Act, expert evidence is admissible in respect of such foreign law.27
Expert in Science or Art :
 The word "Science" has been defined in the universal dictionary of
English Language as great proficiency, dexterity and skill based on long
experience and practice. Chambers' Twentieth century Dictionary defines
'Science' as knowledge ascertained by observation and experiment.  The
same dictionary describes 'art' a branch of learning; and it, therefore, is wide
enough to include every subject other than science.  Yet, it is impossible to
say that gambling is either science or art, within the meaning of Section 45
Evidence Act.28.
26 N.P.L. Palaniappa Chetty V. N.M.K. Nagappa Chetiar,AIR 1930 Mad.146.
27 Field : Export Evidence, 3rd Edn., p.18.
28 Harilal Gordhan V. Emperor AIR 1937 Bom.385 at p.386.
 Stephen is of the view that the expression "science or art" should
receive a liberal construction and must be taken to include all subjects on
which a course of special study or experience is necessary to the formation of
an opinion.29 This construction, which is a correct one, would permit a person
having special knowledge or experience of a trade 'handicraft', 'profession' or
other pursuit to depose about matters concerning his particular vocation, and
thus mechanics, artisans and other workmen would be competent expert
witness in matters relating to their trades.30 To determine whether a  particular
matter is of scientific nature or not, the test to be applied is whether the
subject matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons, are unlikely to
prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it without the assistance of
experts, and whether it so far partakes of the character of a science or art as
to require a course of previous habit or study in order to obtain a competent
knowledge of its nature.31
 Telephony is a science and the witness's knowledge of telephone
engineering places him in special position and makes him competent to
express an opinion upon articles and matters which are generally used in the
telephone department.32
 Asstt. Mint Master of a Mint is a competent witness in questions
relating to coins and instruments of coinage.33
29 Stephen Digest, Art 49.
30 Monir, Principles and Digest of the  Law of Evidence,9th Edn., p.647.
31 Taylor on Evidence p. 1418, Mahadeo Dewanna V. Vankammubai, AIR 1948 Nag. 287
32 Bachraj Factories Ltd., V. Bombay Telephone Co.,
33 Gilli V. King Emperor, AIR 1925 Oudh 616.
 An excise officer who is able to distinguish liquors is an expert.34
 An Excise Inspector is an expert within the meaning of Section 45 of
the Evidence Act because he would have tested lacs of samples of liquor test
conducted  by him was sufficient to establish that what was in possession of
the accused was illicit liquor.35
 A surveyor or broker will be allowed to depose as an expert when the
court is to form an opinion as to the value of property.36
 Evidence of a partner in firm of licensed gold dealers about purity of
gold based on touchstone method and of an officer of the customs
department who was an M.Sc. in Chemistry with 23 years experience in the
Department as an analyst was admissible.37
 The opinion of actuaries or accountants familiar with the business of
life insurance as to average duration of life with respect to the value of
enmities' and those of naturalist as to the ability of fish to overcome the
obstacles in a river are admissible.  The opinion of an expert in forestry as to
the probable object with which certain plantations have been laid out and so
also with other branches of science is admissible.  The opinions of artists, as
to the genuineness or merit of a work of art ,those of engineers as to the
cause of abstraction to a harbor, those of engravers as to the impressions
from a seal or the possibility that a will was written over erased pencil marks,
34 Ram Karan Singh V. Emperor, AIR 1935 Nag. 13.
35 S.C. Batta V. State of U.P., AIR 1974, SC  639.
36 Secretary of Stte V. Sarla Devi Choudhary, 1924 Cal. 548.
37  M.G. Venugopalam V. E.V. Goindan  1976 Cr. LJ 165.
those of officers of Fire Brigade as to the cause of fire, those of a military man
as to the question of military practice, those of Post Office Clerks as to Post-
marks, those of ship-builders, marine surveyors and engineers as to the
strength and construction of a ship are admissible.38
EXPERT'S EVIDENCE :
 Under the Evidence Act, hear say evidence is inadmissible and expect
opinion can have no higher value than hearsay evidence.39 Statements made
by persons not examined in court are only admissible in evidence if they fall
within Section 32 of the Evidence Act or could be used for the purposes of
contradiction or corroboration when the person making them is examined
under Section 145 or 157 of the Evidence Act.  Sections 56 to58 of the
Evidence Act provide that facts admitted need not be proved. Chapter IV lays
down the requirements of oral evidence Section 60 provides that oral
evidence must in all cases whatever be direct and if the oral evidence refers
to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the
evidence of person who holds that opinion on those grounds. Expert's
evidence can not be an exception to this rule unless the statute so provides,
as in the case of chemical Examiners Report etc., under Chapter-XII of the
Criminal procedure code. Unless, it can be shown that these documents fall
under any particular provision of the Evidence Act, they can not be held to be
admissible.
Under Section 45, an expert has to state his opinion in court and must
be examined and cross examined like any other witness. 40  The expert may,
38 Phipson's Evidence, 10th Edn., Sec. 1287, p.82.
39 Field's Expert Evidence, Third Edn., p.32.
40 Balkrishna Das V. Radha Devi, AIR 1989 All. 133
 while giving evidence refer to any professional  treatise or any memorandum
which he may have prepared at a time when the facts on which his opinion is
based were fresh in his memory,41 though the memorandum itself is not
evidence and no facts can be taken from it.  If the expert whose opinion is
intended to be proved is dead r can not be produced without an unreasonable
amount of delay or expense, his opinion may be proved by the production of
any treatise commonly offered for sale.42 the court itself may, on all matters of
science or art, resort to well-known scientific work.43  An expert may be
examined on commission under chapter III of the Criminal procedure Code or
under Order XXVI or order XXXIX Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code.  The
deposition of a medical expert taken and attested by a Magistrate in the
presence of the accused or taken on Commission, and the report of a
Chemical Examiner may be treated as evidence without calling the medical
expert or the Chemical Examiner as a witness.44 Apart from these statutory
provisions, however, a report, certificate or a letter of an expert cannot be
considered as evidence, if its author has not been produced in court to prove
it.45
It is not the province of the expert to act as Judge or Jury. The real
function of the expert is to put before the court all materials, together with
reasons which induce him to come to the conclusion, so that the court,
41 See 159 Evidence Act.
42  See 60
43  See 57.
44 Secs.609-620 Cr P.C., Tulsiram Kanu V. State AIRA 1954, SC 1.
45 Bhoore Singh V. Karan Singh AIR 1935 All.142, Coral Indira Gonselves V. Joseph Prakar
Iswarich, AIR 1953, Mad. 858.
although not an expert, may form its own judgment by its own observation of
those materials.46 A court is not surrender its own opinion to that of experts
who are called before it but with such help as the experts can afford the court
must form its own opinion on the subject in hand.47
A plain reading of Section 45 Indian Evidence Act leaves no doubt that
the party seeking to adduce evidence of expert, should in the first instance
show to the court from the evidence of such witness that the witness is skilled
in the particular science and then only such a witness is called on expert.48
Experts should bring their technical and scientific knowledge to bear
upon the matter which is referred to them for their opinion.  It is not sufficient
for them to give some indications which can be observed even by a layman.49
Under Section 45 of the Evidence Act when the court has to from an
opinion upon point of science, the opinion on that point of persons specially
skilled in that science is a relevant fact.  The evidence as to whether a paper
which continues incriminating material against the accused has been torn out
from another copy is an information connected with forensic science. It is
possible for an expert, if he is one to examine and say, as to whether a sheet
of paper on which the questioned, documents is written come from a
particular copy or not.50
46 Delhi Administration V. Pali Ram AIR 1979 SC. 14.
47 In re :  An Advocate, AIR 1935 Punj. 178.
48 Central Excise Department, Bangalore V. Somasundaran 1980 Cr. LJ. 533 (Karn.)
49 Ram Prasad V. State of Rajasthan, 1982, W.L.N. (U.C.)69.
50 Parag V. State of Rajasthan, 1981, Cr. LJ  1244, (Raj.)
CHAPTER – III
( EXPERT OPINION IN U.K. )
 In this chapter we shall examine the historical evolution and
development of expert evidence under the English Law.  In the beginning jury
were assisted by experts.  A salutary rule was that the facts upon which an
expert's opinion is based must be proved. The function of an expert is to
assist the Court.  The expert witness was not involved in the decision –
making process which was the domain of the presiding judicial officer.  We
shall also look into as to how to reconcile the rule against hear say and
admissibility of expert opinion.  What is the evidentiary value of expert
evidence and what are the subjects of expert testimony, will also be
examined.  It will enable us to point out the similarities and dissimilarities on
the subject of expert opinion in English and Indian Law.
EXPERT EVIDENCE IN ENGLISH LAW
 The courts have been accustomed to act on the opinion of experts from
early times.1  As long ago as 1553 SAUNDERS, J. said :
"If matters arise in our law which concern other
sciences or faculties we commonly apply for the aid of
that science or faculty which it concerns. This is a
commendable thing in our law.  For thereby it appears
that we do not dismiss all other sciences but our own,
but we approve of them and encourage them as
things worthy of commendation."2
1 See "Expert Evidence", by Hammelmann, 10 M.L.R. 32 (1947), and Learned
hand "historical and Practical Considerations regarding Expert Testimony",15
HLR 40 (1901).
2 Buckley V. Rice-Thomas (1554), Plowd. 118, at p.124.
 The above assertion was amply borne out by copious citations.  The
early expert was often a member of the jury, and there was no question of his
opinion being disregarded by that body. Expert witnesses began to play their
modern role in the eighteenth century.  In Folkes v Chadd3 Mr. Smeaton, the
famous engineer, was allowed to testify concerning his opinion whether an
embankment had caused the silting of a harbour.
"Mr. Smeaton understands the construction of
harbours, the causes of their destruction, and
how remedied.  In matters of science no other
witnesses can be called….Handwriting is
proved every day by opinion, and for false
evidence on such questions a many may be
indicted for perjury."4
 In Beckwith v. Sydebotham5, Lord ELLENBOROUGH allowed
shipwrights to testify concerning the sea worthiness of a ship.  He said that,
where there was a matter of skill or science to be decided, the jury might be
assisted by the opinion of those peculiarity acquainted with it in their
profession or pursuits as the truth of the facts stated in them was not certainly
known, their opinion might not go for much, but still it was admissible
evidence.  In cross-examination, they might be asked what they would think
on the state of contended for by the other side.  His Lordship was referring to
3 (1982), 3 Doug K.B. 157; 22, Digest (Ressue)567.
4   Per Lord Mansefield.
5 (1807), 1 Camp. 116.
a difficulty that is encountered in the reception of all kinds of expert evidence.
In the vast majority of cases, the witnesses will not have perceived the
occurrences with which the case is concerned. In Beckwith v. Sydebotham for
instance, the shipwrights had not examined the ship whose seaworthiness
was in issue, therefore their opinion had to be based on assumed facts It is for
the court to determine which party's version of the occurrences in issue is to
be accepted. Accordingly, every effort must be made not to call upon the
expert to give an opinion on the veracity of the ordinary witness is the case, or
the validity of any inference concerning the existence of a disputed fact.  This
can only be done by framing a series of hypothetical questions – a produce
which, however necessary it may be certainly complicates the issues in a
particular case.
 The facts upon which an expert's opinion is based must be proved by
admissible evidence. If he observed them, he may testify to their existence,
but, when the facts in question are dependent on ordinary human powers of
perception, the expert may be contradicted by a lay witness, as when a police
officer and a doctor give different accounts of the behavior of someone
accused of drunken driving when he was being questioned at a police
station.6  A doctor may not state what a patient told him about past symptoms
as evidence of the existence of those symptoms because that would infringe
the rule against hearsay, but he may give evidence of what the patient told
him in order to explain the grounds n which he came to a conclusion with
regard to    the  patient's  condition.7  A   valuer   may     express   his   opinion
6 Sutton V. Prenter, (1963) Od.R. 401.
7 Ramsay V. Watson(1961),108 C.L.R.624; Leis V.Gardner(1965) Qd.R.181; Leonard V.
British Colombia Hydro and Power Authority (1965),49 D.L.R.(2d)422.
concerning to a appropriate rent for particular premises even though he has
not go first hand knowledge of comparable rents, but he may not give
evidence about comparable rents of which he has not got personal
knowledge.8
The functions of expert witnesses were succinctly stated by Lord
President COOPER IN Davie v. Edinburgh Magistrates9 when he said :
"Their duty is to furnish the judge or jury with
the necessary scientific criteria for testing the
accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable
the judge or jury to form their own independent,
judgment by the application of these criteria to
the facts proved in evidence."
 The Court of Session repudiated the suggestion that the judge or jury is
bound to adopt the views of an expert, even if they should be uncontradicted
because, "The parties have invoked the decision of a judicial tribunal and not
an oracular pronouncement by an expert."10 This case reaffirmed the view
that an expert might adopt statements made in scientific works as part of his
testimony, and portions of such works might be put to him in cross-
examination. To this extent they may be used as evidence in the case, but the
judge is not entitled to form an opinion on the basis of other parts of the
book.11
8 English Exporters (London), Ltd. V. Eldonwall, Ltd.,(1973) I. All E.R. 726.
9 (1953) S.C. 34, at p.40.
10 Ibid.
11 Collier V. Simpson (1831) SC & P.73.
 No useful purpose would be served by an endeavour to enumerate the
matters which have been treated by the courts as requiring a sufficient degree
of specialised  knowledge to render expert evidence admissible.12  They
include medical and scientific questions, the meaning of technical terms,
questions of commercial practice or market value, the provisions of a foreign
system of law and the identity of a person's handwriting. If the court comes to
the conclusion that the subject of investigation does not require a sufficient
degree of specialized knowledge to call for the testimony of an expert,
evidence of opinion will generally be excluded.13
 It is for the judge to determine whether the witness has undergone
such a course of special study of experience as will render him expert in a
particular subject and it is not necessary for the expertise to have been
acquired professionally. In R. v. Silverlock,14 for example, for example, the
Court of for Crown Cases Reserved considered that a solicitor might be
treated as an expert in handwriting even if he had acquired his knowledge as
an amateur.  Most of the reported cases on the subject of a witness's skill are
concerned with evidence of foreign law. Specialisation is a matter of degree.
It is not necessary for a doctor to have specialized in studies concerned with
the rate at which the blood destroys alcohol before he can give evidence on
such a subject based on analysts' tables,15  and a stenographer who has
12 For a comparatively recent example see Re Pinion West Minister Bank, Ltd., V. Pinion
(1965) Ch. At p.98.(1964) 1 All E.R. 891 See also Scottish Shrine Line, Ltd., V. London
and Provincial Marine and Gen. Ins. Co.Ltd.,(1912) 3 K.B. 51 at P.70 and Carter V.
Boehm (1976), 3 Burr.1905.
13 United States Shipping Board V. The St. Albans(1931)A.C. 632; Clarke V. Ryan,(1960),
103 CLR 486. See also Transport Publishing Co. Pty.Ltd., V. Literature Board of Review
(1957) 99 CLR 111, Harradine V. Commissioner for Railways (1962)S.R.(N.S.W.)205,
Habessis  v.Australian  Iron & Steel Lt..,(1962) s.r.(n.s.w.)126.
14   (1894) 2 Q.B.766R.V. Bunnis(1964),50 W.W.R. 422 Cf.Clarke V. Ryan(Supra)
15 R.V.Somers,(1963)3 All E.R. 808.
familiarized herself with the contents of a tape-recording may be treated as a
temporary expert,16  but experience in driving does not make a bombardier an
expert on the subject of the capabilities of someone charged with drunken
driving,17  nor does and police officer's experience in investigating traffic
accidents make him an expert for the purpose of reconstructing a particular
motor accident controversial cases.
"NON-EXPERT OPINION : WHEN ADMISSIBLE"
 When "the facts from which a witness received an impression were too
evanescent in their nature to be recollected or too complicated to be
separately and distinctly narrated.18 a witness may state his opinion or
impression.  He was better equipped than the jury to form it, and it is
impossible for him to convey an adequate idea of the premises on which he
acted to the jury.
"Unless opinions, estimates and inferences which
men in their daily lives reach without conscious
ratiocination as a result of what they have perceived
with their physical senses were treated in the law of
evidence as if they were mere statements of fact.
Witness would find themselves unable to
communicate to the judge an accurate impression of
the events they were seeking to  describe."19
16 Hopes and Lavery V. H.M. Advocate,1960S.C.(C)104.
17 R.V. Davies,(1962) 3 All E.R. 97.
18. Nickisson V.R.,(1963)W.A.R. 114
19 See theobservtion of Lord CAMPBELL at the Hering of the Tracey Peerage(1943)10
Cl.&Fin.154,at p.177 of JESSEL,M.R. in Plimpton V. Spiller(1877),6 Ch.D.412 & Lord
Tomlin in British Celanese,Ltd. V. Courtaulds, Ltd.,(1935) 152 L.T.537 at P.543.
There is nothing in the nature of a closed list of cases in which non-
expert opinion evidence.
 Although the expert witness has not escaped criticism,20 he is probably
the best means, compatible with the adversary system of furnishing the judge
and jury with information of matters calling for expertise.  In their 17th Report
the Law Reform Committee considered, but did not recommend, an extension
to civil proceedings generally of the Admiralty practice under which the judge
sits with assessors, or the adoption of a regular practice of appointing experts
by the court; but the report contains a number of recommendations designed
to reduce controversy on matters of expertise and increase the usefulness of
expert testimony.  These recommendations are embodied in R.S.C. Ord. 38,
rr. 344-41 made in accordance with the provisions of s.2 of the civil Evidence
Act, 197221.  The broad effect of these rules is that practice to civil litigation
will be prevented from calling experts unless they have applied to the court for
leave to do so, and the court may order disclosure of the experts' reports to
the opposite party.  The range of controversy will thus be defined and, as s.t.
of the Act of 1972 enables hearsay evidence of opinion to be given, it is
possible to dispense with the actual calling of the expert in non-is admissible.
Typical instances are provided by questions concerning age, 22 speed 23
weather, handwriting and identity in general. Proof of handwriting is discussed
in Chapter but a word may be said here about the question of identification.
20 R.S.C. Amendment 1974.
21 GIBSON, J., cited in VII Wigmore, p.12.
22 17th Report of the Law Reform Committee,para-3.
23 R.V. Cox(1898) IQ B. 179.
 When a witness says, "that is the man I saw the  other day," pointing to
someone in court, or "that is the man  whose wedding I attended," pointing to
a figure in a photograph,24  "that is a copy of a picture of which I have seen
the original."25 There is clearly a sense in which it is true to say that he is
expressing an opinion. He is not simply narrating what he has perceived in the
past; but the perception on which his statements are founded cannot be
conveyed to the jury in the same way that the premises for or against an
inference of negligence  can be narrated. In Fryer V. Gathercole26. In order to
prove the publication of a libelous pamphlet to  friends of a female witness
she  was allowed to swear that she received a pamphlet from the  defendant,
lent it to friends in succession and put her name on it when  it was ultimately
returned to her.  She said that she believed the pamphlet returned by the last
borrower to be identical with that received from the defendant, but she could
not swear to this fact because it was possible that another pamphlet had been
substituted for the original. POLLOCK, C.B., disposed of an objection to the
effect that her evidence was mere opinion by saying :
 "There are many cases of identification where the law would be
rendered ridiculous if positive certainty  were required from witnesses."
 And PARKE, B, said in the course of the argument;
 "In the identification of person you compare in your mind the man you
have seen with  the man you see at the trial.  The same rule belongs to every
species of identification."
24 Road Traffic Regulation Act, 1967, S. 78-A.
25 R.V. Tolson (1864), 4F & F.103.
26 Lucas V. Williams & Sons (1892)x Q.B. 113.
 Every fact on which the identification is based cannot be satisfactorily
given in evidence.
 In some  cases a non-expert witness has been allowed to give
evidence of opinion  on a subject on which expert testimony would have  been
admissible.  Acquaintances of a person whose sanity is in issue may be
asked whether they consider him sane, but this is not so much a demand for
an  opinion as a compendious mode of ascertaining the result of the actual
observation of the witness."  Did the witness observe any action by the
accused characteristically associated with persons of dubious sanity ?
Similarly, in R.V. Davies,27 the Court Martial Appeal Court held that on a
change of drunken driving, a non-medical witness might state that he formed
the impression that the accused had been drinking but it was said that he
must state the facts on which that impression was based, and it was also held
that the witness ought not to have been allowed to add that he believed the
accused to be unfit to drive, although an  expert could have testified to this
effect.
 In R. v. Beckett,28 the accused was charged with maliciously damaging
a plate glass window worth more than five pounds.  The fact that the windows
was worth more then five pounds was an essential ingredient of the offence,
and it was held to have been proved by the statement of an assistant
superintendent of the post office who swore that the window was worth more
27 (1849) 13 Jur. 542.
28 (1962)3 All E.R. 97. See also Sherrard V. Jacob (1965) N.I., R.V. German, (1947)
4D.L.R. 68, Burrows V. Hanlin,(1930) S.A.S.R. 54; R.V. Mc Kimmie(1957) V.L.R. 93;
R.V. Spooner,(1957) V.L.R. 540; R. V. Kelly,(1958) V.L.R. 412; Attorney General
(Rudely) V. James Kenny(1960), 94 I. L.T.R. 185(77 L.Q.R.166); Blackie V.
Police,(1966) N.Z.L.R. 910.
than five pounds. In cross-examination it became clear that his evidence was
largely based on hearsay, but the Court of criminal Appeal upheld the
conviction on the footing that the case was proved by the witness's statement
of his personal opinion as to the value of the window.  The basis of the
admissibility of this evidence was not considered by the court, and the
decision is perhaps open to question on the ground that it raises insoluble
problems of degree.  Is it confined to non-expert opinion concerning the value
of common place objects ?  If so, what are common place objects M  Does it
only apply where the witness opines that the value of an article exceeds a
specified sum by a considerable amount ? If so, what is a considerable
amount ? But R. v. Beckett 29 was  cited in a South Australian case in which it
was said that the court may always act on non-expert opinion as to value
when no specialized  knowledge is required.30
 Expert witness : Not to involved in decision making process.
 The common law rule that an expert witness may not be asked the
question which the court has to decide is supported by the Civil Cases,31 but
several criminal cases suggest that it is being eroded, and it is only necessary
to consider criminal cases because s.3(I) of the Civil Evidence Act, 1972,
expressly provides for the admissibility of an expert's opinion on a matter in
29 Supra
30 Wise V. Musolino,(1936) S. A.S.R. 447. In some cases Judicial notice may be taken that
the value of an object exceeds the specified sum or evidence of its purchase price might
suffice.
31 See, for example, Sills V. Brown(1940), 9 C and P. 601, Rich V. Pierpont (1962), 3F and
F.35; NorthCheshire Brewery V. Manchester Brewery Co., (1899) A.C. 83 at p.85;
Haynes V. Domon (1899) 2 Ch. 13, at p. 24; British Celanese, Ltd., V. Scurtaulds
Ltd.,(1935), 152 L.T. 537, at p.543.
issue in civil proceedings.32
In R. v. Mason33 the defense to a charge of murder was that the
deceased had committed had committed suicide, and a doctor who had heard
the evidence was asked whether it was his opinion that the fatal wound had
been inflicted by someone other than the deceased.  The Court of Criminal
Appeal held that his answer was admissible as an opinion based upon an
assumed state of facts and, in R. v. Holmes,34 the same court decided that a
doctor called in support of the accused's pleas of insanity might be asked in
cross examination whether the prisoner's conduct after the crime indicated
that he knew the nature of his act and that it was wrong, although these are of
course the very points which determine the applicability of the M'Naughten
rules.  A doctor who has examined a motorist charged with drunken driving
may likewise state whether, in his opinion, the accused was so drunk as not to
have proper control of his car.35
 In Director of Public Prosecutions v. A and B C. Chewing Gum, Ltd.,36 it
was held that a child psychiatrist's evidence about the effect which "battle
cards" sold with packets of bubble gum would have on children of various
ages from five upwards ought to have been admitted on the issue, in a
prosecution under the obscene Publications Act, 1959, whether the cards
were likely to deprave and corrupt the children.  In the ordinary case jurors
32  Clause 43 of the draft Bill attached to the 11th report of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee contains provisions identical to those of S.3 of the Civil Evidence Act, 1972,
with the addition of substance sub-clause(43)(4)
33 (1911), 7 Cr. App. Rep. 67.
34 (1953), 2 All E.R.. 325; Bleta V. R.,(1964) S.C.R. 561.
35 R. V. Davies,(1962) 3 All E.R. 97.
36 (1968) I Q.B. 159: (1967) 2 All E.R. 504
and magistrates are as capable as anyone else of judging the likely effects of
a publication,37  but, where children are concerned, "any jury and any Justice
need all the help they can get."  Lord PARKER, C.J. pointed out that the
psychiatrist was not, strictly speaking, being asked the very question which
the court had to decide, but  he said of the prohibition on questions on the
ultimate issue :
"I cannot help feeling that with the advance of
science more and more inroads have been
made into the old common law principles.
Those who practice in the criminal courts see
every day cases of experts being called on the
question of diminished responsibility, although
technically the final question 'Do you think he
was suffering from diminished responsibility ?'
is strictly in admissible it is allowed time and
time again without any objection."38
 The common law rule, if there can still be said to be such a thing, is
based on the undesirability of allowing the expert to become involved in the
decision making process, although it is difficult to believe that a properly
directed jury would allow its functions to be usurped by an expert's answer to
the question it had to decide.  However that may be, the application of the rule
37 R.V. Calder and Boyars, Ltd., (1969) Q.B. 151; 1968 3 All E.R. 644; R.V. Anderson,
(1972) Q.B. 304, (1971) 3 All E.R. 1152.
38 Supra at p. 164
.
sometimes amount to nothing more than a play upon words. For instance, in
one of the early medical negligence cases, it was held that a doctor who had
been in court throughout the proceedings might not be asked whether he
though that the defendant was guilty of any want of skill, although he might be
asked whether anything he had heard suggested improper conduct on the
part of the defendant.39  The tendency to disregard the rule is apparent in the
Privy Council as well as in the English criminal courts.  In Lowery V. R.40,
Lowery and King were convicted of the murder of a girl of fifteen.  They each
admitted that they were present at the killing but alleged that it was done by
the other. It was held on Lowery's appeal that the Victorian trial judge had
acted properly in allowing King to call a clinical psychiatrist who had
interviewed both accused to sear that King was immature and emotionally
shallow and that Lowery was the aggressive personality, more likely than King
to have committed the crime.  Evidence of a very similar nature was held
inadmissible by the Supreme Court of Canada41 because it came too near to
answering the question the jury had to decide, but the Judicial Committee did
not even refer to the ultimate issue rule.
Non-Expert Witnesses :
 The existence of a particular issue may necessitate the reception of
evidence which is not that of an expert and yet is nothing short of a witness's
opinion concerning an expert and yet is nothing short of a witness's opinion
concerning  an  ultimate    issue in the case.  In Mansell V. Clements42 the
39 Rich V. Pierpont (1982), 4 F. & 35
40 (1974) A.C. 85, (1973), 3 All E.R. 662.
41 Lupin V. R. (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3rd)1.
42 (1874), L.R. 9  C.P. 139.
question on a claim for commission was whether a third party bought a house
from the defendant through the intervention of the plaintiff, an estate agent.
The judge put the following question to the purchaser : "Would you, if you had
not gone to the plaintiff's office and got the card, have purchased the house
7".  The answer was " I think not." On appeal it was held that a verdict in
favour of the plaintiff could have been justified without reference to the
question and answer,  but the judge was a member of the appellate court and
he maintained his view concerning the propriety of the question.
 Subject to the exceptional type of situation which has just been
mentioned, it would seem that, if non-expert opinion is in reality evidence of
fact given ex-necessitate in the form of evidence of opinion, there should be
no question of its inadmissibility because it deals with ultimate issues.  This is
borne out by the form of s.3(2) of the Civil Evidence Act, 1972, which suggest
that no change in the law as intended.
"It is hereby declared that where a person is called as a witness in any
civil proceedings, a statement of opinion by him on a relevant matter43 on
which he is not qualified to give expert evidence, if made as a way of
conveying relevant facts personally perceived by him, is admissible as
evidence of what he perceived."
 So far as criminal cases are concerned, the decisions on drunken
driving indicate a difference of approach between the English and Northern
Irish courts on the one hand, and the courts of Eire on the other.
43 "In this section 'relevant matter' includes an issue in the proceedings in question" (S.3(3))
 In all these cases there are two questions although they may be
phrased in different ways.1.  Had the accused taken drink ?  2. Was he unfit
to drive  through drink ? Factual evidence may be available with regard to the
first, but we approach the realm of opinion evidence when someone who did
not see the accused take drink deposes to his impression that the accused
had done so.  The second question can only be answered by opinion
evidence.
 We have seen that, in R. V. Davies,44 the Court of Criminal Appeal
allowed a non-expert who had not seen the accused take drink to answer the
first question in terms of his impression, but not the second, there is no doubt
that an expert, a doctor who had examined the accused, for example, would
have been allowed to give his opinion with regard to both questions.  The
Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the non-expert to give his opinion on the first
question because it was a compendious mode of stating the facts on which
the opinion was based, the fact that the accused had a lurching gait and
slurred speech etc.  The objection to the witness answering the second
question was stated to be that it involved the every point the court had to
decide.  In Eire, a non-expert has been allowed to give his opinion on both
questions,. On the first because the question whether a man was under the
influence of drink is, like question concerning identity a question which cannot,
be adequately answered by enumerating observed facts, the second because
it did not differ in this respect from the first.45 In the Divisional Court of
Northern Ireland, Lord MACDERMOTT would have followed the Irish practice,
44 (1962), 3 All E.R.97.  For a full citation of authorities See Note 35.
45 A.G. (Rudely) V. james Kenny (1960), 94 I.L.T.R.185.
but the majority preferred the English.46  According to Lord MACDERMOTT,
"As in the case of the inference that a person is under the influence of drink,
the inference that the same person was incapable of having proper control
may depend on the whole picture, on the conjoint effect of numerous facts
and circumstances which lead to a sound conclusion bu6 cannot be faithfully
or completely reproduced in evidence.47The majority view was based on the
courts' unwillingness to allow any witness to depose to ultimate issues, and it
treated the first question as a compendious method of ascertaining observed
facts.
WHY CERTAIN KINDS OF EVIDENCE OF OPINION ARE EXCLUDED :
REASONS FOR
 There seem to be two main and two subsidiary reasons for the
exclusion of those kinds of evidence of opinion that fall within the rule stated
at the beginning of this section.  The two main reasons are founded on the
general principle that evidence of opinion is excluded when its reception
would not assist, and might even mislead, the court.  In the first place it is said
that opinion evidence is irrelevant,48 and this is largely true of non-expert
opinion on a subject requiring expertise as well as opinion evidence
concerning the ordinary meaning of common-place words, although some
writers prefer to say that the evidence is insufficiently relevant to be
admissible.49  Secondly, it is said that the reception of opinion evidence would
46 Sherrard V. Jacob, (1965) N.I. 151.
47 Ibid  at p. 163
48 Goddard, L.J., inHillington V. Hewthora & Co., Ltd.(1943) K.B. at p.595,(1943), 2 All E.R.
at p.40.
49 Cowen and Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence, 169
usurp the functions of the jury.  This seems to be another way of stating the
view that in many cases the jury would be tempted blindly to accept a
witnesse's opinion, and that, in some cases, the witness might indicate what
factual evidence he accepted or rejected a – most undesirable thing for him t
do.  The latter danger can be avoided, at the price of some elaboration, by the
use of hypothetical questions requiring the witness to assume the existence of
certain facts; but the first danger cannot be eliminated so easily.  It is
particularly apparent when a witness is asked for his views concerning one of
the ultimate issues in the case, and accounts for the lengths to which the
courts have gone in discouraging direct questions with regard to these
matters.
 The two subsidiary reasons for the rejection of certain kinds of
evidence of opinion are the fact that a witness who merely speaks to his
opinion cannot be prosecuted for perjury, and the danger that the reception of
such evidence might indirectly evade other exclusionary rules.  The first
reasons is some antiquity,50 but, although Lord MANSFIELD had it in mind
when he said, in Folkes V. Chadd,51 that Mr. Smeaton could have been
prosecuted if he had willfully given false testimony, n great stress is placed
upon it at the present day.  As a matter of substantive law, the precise extent
of the proposition is debatable.   There is more force in the second reason,
but it has not been stressed by the judges.  The exclusionary rules most likely
to be indirectly infringed by the reception of opinion evidence are those
50 Adams V. Canon (1621), I Dyer 53 b.
51 (1782), 3 Doug. K.B. 157.
according to which irrelevant matter and hearsay are inadmissible.  A witness
can always be cross-examined on the grounds for his opinion, and, if these
appear to be irrelevant the evidence ban be ignored.  The relationship of the
opinion rule to the rule against hearsay calls for separate consideration.
EVIDENCE OF OPINION AND RULE AGAINST HEARSAY : HOW TO
RECONCILE ?
 The rule with regard to evidence of opinion originated in the same
doctrine as that to which the rule against hearsay can be traced – every
witness must be able to say that he had seen or heard that to which he
deposes. He must have been an "oyant" and "voyant",52 but the two rules, are
now quite distinct although the same item of evidence may occasionally call
for a consideration of both of them. For example, A. is prepared to swear that
he hard B., who witnessed a collision between cars driven by C. and D., say,
some time after the event that it was due to the negligence of D. A's evidence
would clearly infringe the rule  against hearsay if tendered to prove D's
negligence on his prosecution for careless driving, because a statement other
than one made by a person while giving oral evidence would be tendered as
evidence of the truth of that which was stated.  The evidence would also be
inadmissible because B.'s assertion was a statement  of opinion of a kind that
could not have been received if preferred by B, himself from the witness box.
If A had been at hand at the time of the collision, and he had heard B make
some exclamation concerning the negligent manner in which D was driving, it
is possible that he would be allowed to relate the statement as evidence of
D.'s negligence, although B. was not called as a witness.53  This is because
52 Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, 523-4.
53 Per Pollock, C.B. in Miline V. Leisler (1862) 7 H & N. 786, at p.796.
there may be an exception to the rule against hearsay covering exclamations
concerning an event made contemporaneously with its occurrence. So far as
the opinion rule is concerned, B's opinion was spontaneous, or impulsive, as it
was not the result of deliberation on his part; accordingly A.'s evidence as to
what B. said would probably be admissible.
 The leading case of evidence calling for a consideration of both the
hearsay and the opinion rules is Wright V. Doe d. Tathan54 which was
elaborately argued on three occasions between 1830 and 1833. The sanity of
a deceased testator named Marsden was in issue, and those who contended
that he was same when he executed his will tendered three letters written to
him by acquaintances at the time.  The writers of these letters had since died,
and it was contended that the documents ought to be received (a) because
they concerned business matters and showed that their authors regarded the
addressee as same, and (b) because Marsden displayed  his sanity in the
manner in which he acted on the letters.  They were rejected in the Court of
King's Bench the judges in the Exchequer Chamber were evenly divided and
majority of the judges advised the House of Lords that the letters were
inadmissible.  The judgment of the King's Bench was accordingly affirmed.
The second ground upon which it was contended that the letters should be
received was of no particular moment as it raised a question of fact.  Evidence
of the conduct of the testator is always admissible in such a case provided it is
relevant, but the majority view was that there was no sufficient proof that
Marsden had acted on the letters SC as to indicate a rational appreciation of
54 (1838), 4 Bing. N.C. 489. An analogous case is Backhouse V. Jones (1839(, 9 L.J.
C.P.99, where the statements were oral.
their contents.  The first ground upon which it was contended that the
evidence was admissible raised problems in connection with the rule against
hearsay and reception of opinion which have never since been so fully
examined. The letters indicated that the writers treated Marsden as sane,
therefore they were equivalent to an assertion of that fact, therefore they
infringed the rule against hearsay, and the majority of the judgments
proceeded on this  footing. If the writers of the letters had been called as
witnesses they could have been asked for their views concerning the
testator's sanity. However, it does not follow that a layman's opinion on such
an issue is admissible because the question is, as we have seen, merely "a
compendious mode of ascertaining the result of the actual observation of the
witness, from acts done, as to the habits and demeanour of the deceased."
Accordingly it is arguable that the letters had to be rejected both because their
reception would have infringed the rule against hearsay and also because
they were mere statements of opinion on a matter with regard to which an
ordinary witness's opinion, unsupported by details concerning his
observations, would have been inadmissible.  This seems to have been the
view of the majority of the judges, although it was only PARKER, B., who
gave much consideration to this aspect of the case. Wright V. Doe d.
Tatham55 has been discussed at this stage because the exclusion at common
law of convictions as evidence of the facts on which they were founded, when
those facts are in issue, in subsequent civil proceedings springs from a
55 The Common law if fully discussed in Cowen and Carter, Essays on the Law of
Evidence, Essay 6. There are valuable notes on Hollingcon V. Hewthorn & Co., Ltd., in
59 L.Q.R. 299 and 21 Canadian Bar Review 635. Reference may also be made to
courts. "the Effect of a Criminal Judgment on a Civil Action," 18 M.L.R. 331, (1955(, and
V. Wigmore, para 1671(a).
combination of the hearsay rule with the rule rejecting certain types of opinion
evidence.
OPINION OF EXPERTS
 The opinions of skilled witnesses are admissible whenever the subject
in one upon which competency to form an opinion can only be required by a
course of special study or experience.  Where the opinion of experts is based
on reports of facts, those facts, unless within the expert's own knowledge,
must be proved independently.55
 Experts give evidence and do not decide the issue. Thus in a criminal
case insanity is a question for the jury on the evidence.56  When the subject is
one upon the jury is as capable of forming an opinion as the witness, the
reason for the admission of such evidence fails, and it will be rejected.57 So,
also, when the court is assisted by Assessors58 as in Admiralty cases
involving questions of nautical skill59 in which cases, however, if the judge
differs from the Assessors, his view must  prevail.60  Addressors may also
assist the court in non-Admiralty cases.61 In all cases it is for the Assessors to
advise and the judge to decide.62 Assessors may be called on to assist the
55 Ramsdale V. Ramsdfale, 173 L.T. 393.
56 R.V. Rivett, 34 Cr. App. R. 87
57 Ramadage V. Ryan, 9 Bing. 333: CollinsArden Products V. Barking Corpn.(1943). K.B.
419. See also Concentrated Foods V. Champ(1944) K.B.342 at p.350; Broughton V.
Whittaker (1944), K.B. 269: (Distinguished the Collins Arden Products Case, Supra, See
also Clark V. Ryan (1960), 103 C.L.R. 486.
58 Judicature Act, 1925 S. 98.
59 The Kestrel, 6 P.D.182;The Sir R.Peel, 4 Asp.321;The Assyrian,63 L.T. 91.
60 The Beryl p P.D. 137; The Gannet (1900) A.C. 234 at p.236: The Australia V. The
nautilus (1927) A.C. 145; see also Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd. V. Southport
Corpn.(1956)A.C. 218.
61 Mercer V. Denne (1905), 2 Ch.538.
62 Ancorn V. C.W.S. 172 L.T. 248: Richardson V. Redpath Brown(1944) A.C. 62.
court in patent cases,63 and to assist the Lands Tribunal.64 Under the
pensions Appeal Tribunal Rules, 1943, r. 15, a pensions appeal tribunal can
consult a specialist and for that purpose can supply him with the appellant's
medical history.65
 In addition to the scientific evidence adduced by the parties, the court,
for its own guidance and information may (in cases other than criminal
proceedings by the Crown) and even without the consent of the parties66
order independent inquiries and reports to be made, or experiments to be
tried either in or out of Court67, by experts of its own selection, and may act on
such reports.68 So, in the Chancery Division, a judge in chambers, may in
such way as he thinks fit, obtain the assistance of accountants, merchants,
engineers, actuaries and other scientific persons,  the better to enable any
matter at once to be determined, and main act upon their certificates69, or he
may order photographs to be taken in the presence of both sides. 70 Although
an analysis is a matter of fact, the inference to be drawn from it is a matter of
opinion.  The Food and Drugs Act, 1955, s. 110 makes a certificate of
analysis evidence of the facts stated. Whether they are observed facts or
inferences from those facts.71
63 Patents Act, 1949 S.84(2), and Ord.37A, R.12.64.
64 Lands Tribunal Act,1949,s3(6)(b)
65 Jackson V. Minister of Pensions (1946), 2 All E.R.500.
66 Att. Gen V. Birmingham, etc. Board (1912) A.C. 788.
67 Macroni V. British Co., The Times, Dec. 15.1910
68 Administration of Justice Act, 1956, s. 15 and Ord. 36 A.r. 1 : See Re Edward's question
(1961) 1 W.L.R. 1285; Colls V. Home Stores(1904) A.O.179 at p.192: Badische V.
Levinstein, 24 Ch.D.156.Enderwich held regular.
69 Ord 55, r.19.
70 Hindson V. Ashby (1896), 2 Ch.1 at pp.22-22.
71 Mc Culloch H. Hannam(1951) 1 All E.R.402 n: See also Preston V. Fennell(1951) 1 KB
16:Maston V. Loney (1955) Crim. L.R. 778.
By Ord. 37-A. r.1, in any non-jury case  the master may on application
appoint an independent expert (called the Court Expert) to inquire and report
upon any question of fact or opinion not involving questions of law or of
construction. His report, if not accepted by all parties, is treated as information
furnished to the court which gives such weight to it as seems fit.  The expert
on due notice, may be cross-examined.  On giving notice, a party may call
one expert (or, by leave, two) at the trial on the issue which was referred to
the Court Expert. This would, of course, only occur when the Court Expert's
report is not accepted by all the parties.
 On the summons for directions, the master may order that expert
reports are to be agreed so as to save calling the experts, but he should only
do so if that is the better course in the particular case.72 Where an agreed
report of a medical man has been used at the trial, leave to call evidence on
appeal that he has changed his mind in the light of after, events will not be
granted.  Where the report has been agreed, something more must be shown.
It would be different  if the report had not been agreed. 73
 Where an expert has been so appointed he occupies a quasi-judicial
position and should not be sworn or examined as a witness. 74  nor should he
himself examine or cross-examine the witnesses, 75 nor act as Assessor when
he has already acted as Referee. 76   The reports of Court valuers under the
72 Proctor V. Peebles (1941),2 All E.R. 80.
73 Pursell V. Railway Executive(1951),1 All E.R. 536.
74 Broder V. Saillard, 24 W.R. 456; Hugo V. Larkins, 3 B.W.C.C. 228
75 Earwicker V. London Graving Dck Co.,(1916), 1 K.B. 970(C.A.)
76 Walliy V. Soutter, 59 S.C. 285 (C.A.)
Land Law (Ir.) Act, 1881, have, however, been held, in analogy to testimony
by expert  witnesses, impeachable by evidence that the valuers were biased,
mistaken or acting on erroneous principles proved, in the last case, by their
declarations that such principles were adopted by them.77 As to medical
inspection and reports is Nullity suits, see Rayden on Divorce, 8th ed. Pp. 525-
530 and as to the admissibility of Reports by judicial officers, Post 1418.
 Under the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, s.9 (d) (e), questions involving
prolonged examination of documents or accounts, or scientific or local
examination, may be referred to a special commissioner, whose report may
be acted on so far as the court thinks fit. 78, and  the court may also appoint
special experts to assist it is assessors. The report of a prison doctor, made to
the authorities, as to a prisoner's insanity, has been allowed to be read in
evidence for the prisoner, the doctor being too ill to attend and the Crown not
objecting. 79
 Reports may be made by probation officers in domestic proceedings in
the  magistrates,  courts under section 59 & 60 of the Magistrates, Courts Act,
1952, but justices are not entitled to consider such a report on the merits of a
case without disclosure to the parties or opportunity of cross-examination. 80
Reports may also be made in such domestic proceedings in respect of
children by probation officers or officers of local authorities at the instance of
the court. 81 In the Divorce Division in custody or access proceedings either
77 Gosford V. Alexander (1902), 1(C.A.)
78 R. V. Holt, 14 Cr. App. 152.
79 R.V. Rutherford, The Times, April 9, 1919.
80 Higgs V. Higgs (1941) p.27.
81   Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) Act 1960, s.4.
the judge in London82 on the parties where agreed may involve the assistance
of a welfare officer for an inquiry and report. 83 It is a general principle that
courts should act only on evidence given in open court. 84
COMPETENCY AND CREDIT
 The competency of the expert is a preliminary question for the judge
and is one upon which, in practice, considerable laxity prevails. Though the
expert must be "skilled", by special study or experience, the fact that he has
not acquired his knowledge professionally goes merely to weight and not to
admissibility.85
 Credit the fact that the expert was not in fit state of mind or health to
form a proper opinion, or is interested, or corrupt, or has expressed a different
opinion at other times, may be elicited in cross-examination or, if denied,
independently proved. 86  And when a theory advanced by an expert was very
extraordinary, he was allowed to be cross-examined by his own side. 87
 Value of Expert Evidence : The testimony of experts is often
considered to be of slight value, since they are proverbially, though perhaps
unwittingly, biased in favour of the side which calls them, as well as over-
ready to regard harmless facts as confirmation of pre-conceived theories;
82 Practice Direction, May 25, 1950.
83 Practice Direction, Nov.19, 1959. By the Matrimonial Proceedings(Children) Act, 1958 a
court must be satisfied as to the welfare of the child before granting degree : or that the
arrangements are the best in the circumstances.
84 Stone V. Stone (1949) p.165; McPherson V. McPherson (1936) A.C. 177: R.V. Bodmin
JJ(1947) K.B. 321.
85 R.V. Silverlock (1894), 2 Q.B. 766.
86 Alcock V. Royal Exchange Assurance, 13 Q.B. 292; Gosford V. Alexander (1902)
I.R.139.
87 R. V. Cook, 147 C.C.C. Sess. Pap. 466 Per Darling J.
moreover, support of opposition to given hypotheses can generally be
multiplied at will. 88   Indeed, where the jury accept the mere untested opinion
of experts in preference to  direct and positive testimony as to facts, a new
trial may be granted. 89  The court has accepted the evidence of a wife as to
the paternity  of a ten months child, in spite of the unanimous opinion of
several doctors. 90
 Subject of expert testimony : Science, art, Trade, technical terms,
handwriting, foreign law.
 It is duty of experts to limit as much as possible the contentions matters
to be dealt with. 91   The court can limit the number of experts to be called on
each side.
 Sciences and Art 92: The opinion of medical men (under which term
unqualified practitioners, hospital students, and dressers have occasionally
been permitted to testify,93  but the evidence of a research student in
toxicology is not admissible on a point of medicine), 94  are admissible upon
questions within their own province e.g. insanity, the causes of disease or
death, the effects of poisons, the consequence of wounds the conditions of
gestation,95 the effect of hospitals upon the health of a neighbourhood,96
88 Re Dyce Sombre, 1 Mac. & G. at p.128 per Lord Cottenham: The Tracy Perrage, 10 C
&F at P. 191 Per Lord Campbell : Abinger V. Ashton. L.R. 18/17 Eq.358 at pp.373-374,
per Jessel Mr. R.
89 Poynton V. Poynton, 37 I.L.T.S. 54, Aitken V.Mc Meckan (1895) A.C.310; of Newton V.
Ricketts, 9 H.L.C. 262 at p.266 of Clark V. Clark(1939),p.228.
90 Bowden V. Bowden 62 S.J. 105.
91
92
93
94
95
96
those of actuaries, or accountants familiar with the business of life insurance,
as to the average duration of life with respect to the value of annuities,97
those  of  naturalists as to the ability to of fish to overcome obstacles in a
river, 98  those of an expert in forestry as to the probable object with which
certain plantations had been laid out,99 and so with other branches of science.
The opinions of artists, art critics, museum, officials dealers, and restorers are
admissible as to the genuineness100 or merit 1 of a work of art; those of
engineers as to the cause of obstruction to a harbor2 those of engravers as to
the impressions from a seal,3 or the probability that a will was written over
erased pencil marks4  those of officers of a fire brigade as to the cause of a
fire, 5  those of military men as to a question of military practice, 6  those of
post-office clerks as to postmarks, 7 those of ship builders, marine surveyors
and engineers as to the strength and construction of a ship8  and when the
court is not sitting with assessors, those of nautical men as to the proper
navigation of a vessel. Where the exact place in a harbor that a collision took
place was sought to be fixed by evidence of land surveyors as to the position
to be deducted from photographs taken at the time,9 the Privy Council held
that the skill required for such a purpose was not that of a land surveyor and
that therefore they were not experts10 .
 Trade : Market value – "Materiality"  in Policies, etc.  the opinions of
shopkeepers are admissible to prove the average waste resulting from the
retail sale of goods, 11 those of persons conversant with a market to prove
market value; those of accountants to prove what losses are chargeable to
capital, 12 and those of business men to prove the meaning of trade terms. 13
So, though formerly doubtful, it is now well settled that the opinions of
underwriters are receivable as to what facts are "material" in a policy of
marine insurance.14  And the opinions of medical men are similarly admissible
as to what maladies are material in an insurance proposal.
 Technical Terms : Local foreign or technical terms (other than those of
English law) may always be explained by experts, unless they are equally
intelligible to ordinary readers;  thus, the opinions of engineers are not
admissible to show what matters are "delineated" upon statutory plans. 17 Nor
those of surveyors and  auctioneers as to the meaning of "nominal rent" in a
statute. 18
 Handwriting, Experts may, as we have seen, give their opinions upon
the genuineness of a disputed handwriting, whether ancient or modern, after
having compared it with specimens proved to the satisfaction of the judge to
be genuine, and they may also, without such comparison, but from their
general knowledge of the subject, give their opinion as to whether the writing
is in feigned or natural hand. 19  So,, their opinions are admissible as to the
problem date of an ancient writing, 20 or as to whether interlineations were
written contemporaneously with the rest of a document. 21
 On questions of handwriting, not only specialists, but post-office
officials, litho-graphers and bank clerks have been permitted to testify as
experts22,as well as a solicitor who had for some years given considerable
attention and study to the subject, and had several times compared
handwriting for purposes of evidence, though never before testified as an
expert, 23 but not police inspectors or constables merely as such. 24
 Foreign Law : Foreign law, which includes Scots and colonial law,
except on appeals to the House of Lords and Privy Council respectively, must,
unless ascertained under the statutory procedure be proved as a fact by
skilled witnesses, and not, as we as at one time held, by the production of
books in which it is contained, for the court  is not competent to interpret such
authorities. 25 So, where Irish law differs from English, e,g, as to the validity of
a marriage, Irish barristers have been called to prove it. 26 Foreign law, though
regarded as a question of fact, is to be decided by the judge alone.
 In foreign law the expert may be either a professional lawyer or a
person peritus virtue officii, i.e.the holder of an official situation which requires
and therefore implies legal knowledge, 27   or perhaps some other person who
from his profession or business has had peculiar means of becoming
acquainted with the law in question.28 The following have been held
competent: A foreign judge, barrister or solicitor practicing in the courts of his
own country, 29 an English barrister who, though not practicing in Malta, was
familiar with, and had been employed by the colonial office in reference to
such questions, as to Maltese law, 30 one who, though he had not practiced in
Rhodesia, was the reader in Roman – Dutch law at the Inns of Court, as to
Rhodesian law, 31  one who had studied Italian law in Italy and was counsel to
the Italian consulate here, as to Italian law. 32 One who, though not technically
entitled to practice in Uruguay, was qualified to do so and familiar with the law
there, as to such law33 . A Governor-General of Hong-Kong, though a non-
lawyer, was called as to the marriage law there, 34 and a colonial Attorney –
General, although a non-lawyer, as to the law of his colony.35  A Russian, who
though not a lawyer, was secretary to his father, who was one, gave evidence
as to Russian law, 36 but a rabbi or ecclesiastical assessor of the chief rabbi
who was acquainted with the law relating to Jewish marriages in Poland was
not allowed to prove the law as to such marriages in Russia. 37  A Roman
Catholic Bishop holding the office of co-adjustor to a vicar apostolic in
England, gave evidence as to Roman marriage law,38 and French - cosnul in
England as to the commercial law of French. 39  A Persian ambassador or
secretary of embassy, was called as to Persian law, 40  a Delgian merchant
and commissioner of stocks and bills of exchange, as to the Belgian law
affecting such bills.41 a Chilean Notary Public, as to Chilean testamentary
law,42  and an English merchant, trading in chile, as to the fact that a marriage
register is required to be kept by Chilean law.43  The following have been held
incompetent : Prussian law cannot be  proved by a juris consult at the
Prussian embassy, who has no practical acquaintance with such law, but has
merely studied it at a Saxon university,44 not by an English barrister, who has
studied it only in England.45  Nor can Canadian law be proved by an English
barrister, though he practices before the Privy Council in appeals from
Canada.46  Scots marriage law cannot be proved by a Scots Roman Catholic
Priest,47 nor by a Scots tradesman,48 not by a mere resident gentleman.49
The Mohamedan marriage law of Egypt cannot be proved by an Egyptian
who, though he resided there, was not specially conversant with such law.50
 Experts on the subject may refer to Codes and precedents in support
of their views; and the passages cited will then be treated as part of their
testimony.  And a witness as to the relevant law may add his opinion of the
effect of that law on a particular instrument, e.g. trust, before the Court.51
Moreover, where the evidence of the witnesses is conflicting or obscure, the
court may go a step further and examine and construe the passages cited for
itself in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.52
 Foreign law must, in general, be proved on oath, either orally or, in
some cases, by affidavit,53 and not by the mere certificates of experts though
this strictness has occasionally been relaxed.54  Moreover, previous decisions
upon the same point, and even between the same parties, are not admissible,
for being a question of fact it must be decided on evidence and not on
authority,55 in addition to which the law is continually liable to change.  An
interrogatory involving a question of foreign law will not be allowed unless the
party interrogated is shown to be an expert in such law.56
 Statutory Procedure to ascertain Colonial and Foreign Law.  By the
British Law Ascertainment Act, 1859, a case may be stated for the opinion of
the Superior Court in any of Her Majesty's Dominations Dominions to
ascertain the Law of that part.57  And by the Foreign Law Ascertainment Act,
1861, a similar case may be stated for the opinion of a court in any foreign
state with which Her Majesty may have entered into a convention for the
ascertainment of such law.  The latter Act is a dead letter, as no convention
has ever been made in pursuance of it. Foreign Custom or Usage : This may
be proved by any witness, whether expert or not, who is acquainted with the
fact,58 thus, any Jew is competent to prove a Jewish marriage custom.59
Facts : The testimony of experts is not confined to opinion evidence; they may
and frequently do testify to matters of fact specially cognizable by them, e.g.
the meaning of technical terms, the existence of a trade custom, or the
conditions revealed by an autopsy.  And they may of course prove ordinary
facts, nor as experts, but at ordinary witnesses.
SUBJECTS ON WHICH EXPERTS MAY NOT TESTIFY :
 The opinion of experts are not receivable on the following subjects :
Construction of Documents : Statutory Terms :
 Questions of construction, whether of domestic r foreign documents,
being matters of law and not of fact, belong exclusively to the court and the
opinions of experts thereon are in admissible  e.g. the construction of or
meaning of particular  terms in a modern statute,60 the construction of a
company prospectus,61 patent specification,62 covenant in restraint of trade,63
or statutory plan.64  On Construing foreign documents, the court will generally
require from exerts a translation of the language, an explanation of the
peculiar terms employed and information as to any foreign law or rule of
construction applicable to the case,65  For a case where the translation was
not proved and was found to be inaccurate in a respect which was immaterial
see Fakisandhla, Nkambule v. R.66
Processional Conduct:   the opinions of experts are not receivable upon
disputed points of professional duty.  Morality or etiquette: except so far as
they may be necessary to elucidate the rules of a particular profession.
English Law : Morals : Probability : Human Nature :
 Nor are the opinions of lawyers admissible to explain technical legal
terms, or matters of English law, though they may prove the proper cost of a
particular legal proceeding.67  And neither experts for ordinary witnesses may
give their opinions upon matters of legal or moral obligation, or general human
nature or the manner in which other persons would probably act or be
influenced.68  S, the opinions of cattle drovers and like are not admissible
upon the question of how an ancient to cattle in a railway truck must have
happened, 69  nor as to the prudence of an agistor putting horses to graze
amongst horned cattle70, nor are those firemen as to whether there was
anything to point to the fire having occurred accidentally, for this is not a
matter of scientific knowledge;71 nor those of jurymen as to what verdict they
would have given had the evidence been different.72
GROUNDS AND FORM OF THE OPINION :
 An expert may give his opinion upon facts which are either admitted, or
proved by himself, or other witnesses in his hearing, at the trial, or are matters
of common knowledge; as well as upon hypothesis based thereon.
 His opinion is not, in general, admissible upon materials which are not
before the jury, or which have been merely reported to him by hearsay.73  And
although on questions of professional skill he may state in a general form
what would be the proper course to pursue under the circumstances proved74,
he may not be asked what his own conduct would have been under such
circumstances.75
 The cases are conflicting as to how an expert may be asked the very
question which the jury have to decide; but the weight of authority appears to
be as follows: (a) were the issue involves other elements beside the purely
scientific, the expert must confine himself to the latter, and must give his
opinion upon the legal or general merits of the case76, (b) where the issue is
substantially one of science or skill merely, the expert may, if he has himself
observed the facts, be asked the very question which the jury have to
decide.77  If however, his opinion is based merely upon facts proved by
others, such a question is improper for it practically asks him to determine the
truth of their testimony, as well as to give an opinion upon it.78  the correct
course is to put such facts to him hypothetically, but not en block79 asking him
to assume one of more of them to be true, and to state his opinion thereon80,
where however, the facts are not in dispute, it has been said that the former
question may be put as matter of convenience, though not as of right.81
 In all cases in which opinion evidence is receivable, whether from
experts or not, the grounds or reasoning upon which such opinion is based
may be inquired into. This inquiry is usually reserved for cross examination
and is, in some cases, in admissible in chief: e.g. the proper question to a
valuer is, "what is the fair on market value ?"  In cross examination, but not in
chief, he may give his reasons as that neighbouring land had sold for so
much.82  So, witnesses called to impeach the genera reputation for veracity of
an adversary's witness may in cross-examination, but not in chief, state the
grounds of their opinion.83  And in cases where the police have a statutory
power to arrest or search on reasonable suspicion of felony, etc., though it
seems they may be asked  in chief whether they had reasonable grounds to
suspect the defendant, yet the particulars can only be elicited in cross-
examination.84  On the other hand, it is usual for medical witness to detail the
results of an examination before being asked as to their opinions founded
thereon, so, where a witness called to prove the handwriting of A had stated
in chief. "I think the handwriting is A's from its contents and other
circumstances," he was allowed to be asked in chief what those
circumstances were.85
 In addition to the above facts, although otherwise irrelevant, as well as
the results of experiments made either out of court with special reference to
the trial.86 or even before the court itself.87 may be given in evidence in
corroboration, illustration corroboration, illustration corroboration of the
opinion.  So, on cross examination the witness may be asked whether he has
not expressed opinions inconsistent with his present testimony; and if he deny
the fact it may being dependently proved.
Reference to textbooks :
 An expert may refer to test books to refresh his memory, or to correct
or confirm his opinion : e.g., a doctor to medical treatises,88 a valuer to price
lists : a foreign lawyer to codes, text-writers and reports.89  Such books are
not evidence per s: though if he describe particular passages as accurately
representing his views, that may be read as part of his own testimony.90 Still
less may counsel read them to the jury as part of his address.91
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CHAPTER- IV
IDENTIFICATION & RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRMINATION
 Under the U.S. Constitution the Fifth Amendment provides that no one
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
There has been much diversity of opinion concerning the privilege against
self-incrimination. On the one hand, it has been regarded as "one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself  civilized1 "Justice Field said :
"The essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own
guilt is obvious to everyone."2  On the other hand, the privilege was subjected
to a classic attack by Bentham and Charles Even Hughes recommended
serious consideration of its abolition.3
 The Fifth Amendment does not justify a person in refusing to testify
about matters which would merely impair his reputation or tend to disgrace
him.4  A divided court has held that where a witness or defendant has
voluntarily answered some questions, he may not refuse to answer related
questions on the ground of self incrimination.5
 Compatibility with the Fifth Amendment, there is a method of
compelling witnesses to testify against themselves. Under appropriate
statutory authority, the State can grant immunity from prosecution to persons
for any incriminating evidence they may give under compulsion, Immunity is
granted by court order on application of prosecuting officials, and if witnesses
1    Erwin N. Griswold: The fifth Amendment Today (Cambridge Mass : Harward Universdity
Press1955) R7.
2     Brown V. Walker (1895)
3     C. Herman Pritchett:The American Constitution(Tata-McGraw-Hill Publication 1977)p.443
4     Hale V. Honken (1906)
5     Brown V. U.S. (1958).
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refuse to testify after being granted immunity, they can be jailed for contempt.6
 In California V. Byers7  the Court ruled that a state hit and run law
requiring a motorist  involved in an accident to stop at the scene and give his
or her name and address did not compel self-incrimination.  United States v.
Dionisio8 ruled that the Fifth Amendment does not protect a person from a
court order to make a voice recording to be played before a federal grand jury
seeking to identify a criminal by the sound of a voice on a legally intercepted
phone conversation.  In Schemerber V Cafornia9 the court had upheld
compulsory blood tests for drunken drivers involved in accidents. U.S. v.
Wade10 had compelled a suspect in a line up to speak before witnesses to a
bank robbery the words used by the robber. Gilbert V. California11  had
approved the requirement that another suspected bank robber submit a hand-
writing sample for comparison with a note giving during the robbery to a bank
teller.
 In all these cases the suspect was required to give evidence that might
be incriminating, but their rationale was that the Fifth Amendment by its
reference to "witness" was intending to cover only "testimonial evidences, it
did not prevent the taking of evidence as to physical characteristics of
suspects. This is supported by Justice Holmes observation in Holt V. U.S.12
that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the use of physical or moral compulsion
6    United States V. Wilson (1975)
7    1971
8    1973
9    1966
10  1967
11  1967
12  1910
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to extort communication. . .not an exclusion of the body as evidence when it
could be material."
 The Fifth Amendment does not prevent the government from violating
an accused's claim of privacy for books or papers. Only personal compulsion
of the accused is forbidden.13 The Fifth Amendment" protects a person only
against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial
communications."14
 The rule of privilege against self-incrimination is enshrined in Article
20(3) of the Indian Constitution.  The origin of this doctrine lies in the protest
made  in the distant history against the inquisitorial methods of interrogation of
the accused persons.  These methods were in vogue in the continent and also
in England till 1688 and they permitted compulsory examination of the
accused to explain suspicious expressed against him and there was always
the danger of temptation to press him beyond a measure and to corner him or
browbeat him into making statements fatal to his interest. Modern legal
evolution and scientific development gave birth to a thinking that compelling
an accused to make prejudicial admissions violated basic human right of self
preservation and the privilege emerged in due course of time out of a desire
to protect human liberty and human dignity.  The principle enshrining it
guarantees a degree of security to the individual against being required to
make confessional statements to accusations leveled, leading to an unjust
trial and an ultimate miscarriage of justice. Bullying an accused to
compulsorily make self destructive disclosures as a source of proof of guilt
13   Johnson V. U.S. (1913)
14   Justice White in Fisher V. U.S. (1976)
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against him, is revolting to this concept and the investigative agency is more
encouraged to go about in the sun to hunt up evidence rather than to sit
pleasantly in the shade and rub chillies into a poor devil's eyes. Torture, use
of physical force and extortion of the suspects is even morally not justified and
this principle against self-incrimination just streamlines this moral belief into a
legal theory to discourage savagery and violation of individual privacy.
 Societal interests of crime detection and maintenance of law and order
had to be reconciled against individual dignity and over the years the courts
have tried to keep the privilege within the parameters of historic reality cool
reasoning and sound policy.
 Traditionally, the privilege was confined to oral and documentary
evidence alone but with evolution of science and technology, the question of
its applicability to medical and physical examination of the accused also
confronted the legal thinkers.
Wigmore15 answered this question as follows :
"The limit of the privilege is a plain one.  From the general principle it
results that an inspection of the bodily features by the tribunal or by witness
cannot violate the privilege, because it does not call upon the accused as a
witness, i.e. upon his testimonial responsibility. That he may n such cases be
required sometimes to exercise muscular action as when he is required to
take off his shoes or roll up his sleeve is immaterial, unless all bodily action
were synonymous with testimonial utterance; for… not compulsion alone is
the component idea of the privilege, but testimonial compulsion. What is
15 Evidence Vol. VIII 3rd Edn. (1940) p. 375.
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obtained from the accused by such action is not testimony about his body, but
his body itself. Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication,
written or oral, upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his
consciousness of the facts and operation of his mind in expressing it, the
demand made upon him is not a testimonial one. Moreover, the main object of
the privilege is to force prosecuting officers to go out and search and obtain all
the extrinsic available evidence of an offence, without relying upon the
accused's admissions. Now in the case of the person's body, it marks and
traits itself is the main evidence, there is ordinarily no other or better evidence
available for the prosecutor. Hence, the main reason for the privilege loses its
force. Both principle and practical good sense forbid any larger interpretation
of the privilege in this application."
The Supreme Court of India in two of its milestone decisions16  held
that the privilege as embodied in "Article 20(3) of the Constitution applied to
giving of evidence in court as well as out of court by a person accused of an
offence.  Is State of Bombay V. Kathi Kalu17  the question projected for
resolution was whether Article 20(3) of the Constitution was contravened by
compulsory obtaining of handwriting from the accused by the police during
investigation and by issuance of and court direction under section 73 of the
Evidence Act to an accused person present in court and by compulsory
obtaining of impressions of the plain palms and fingers of an accused by an
investigating officer in presence of a Magistrate. The court held that Article
20(3) of the Constitution was not contravened in any of the three situations.
16 M.P. Sharma V. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300; State of Bombay V. Kathi Kalu AIR
1961 SC 1808.
17   Supra
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Justice B.P. Sinha, the then Chief Justice of India, while interpreting the words
"to be a witness" as according in the language of Article 20(3) expressed view
of the bench as follows :
"To be a witness means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant
facts, by means of  oral statements or statement in writing by a person who
has personal knowledge of the facts to be communicated to a court or to a
person holding an enquiry or investigation. . . Self-incrimination must mean
conveying information based upon the personal knowledge of the person
giving the information and cannot include merely the mechanical process of
producing documents in court which may throw a light on any of the points in
controversy, but which do not contain any statement of the accused based on
his personal knowledge. . . when an accused person is called upon by the
court or any other authority holding an investigation to give his finger
impression or signature or specimen of his handwriting,  he is not giving any
testimony of the nature of a 'personal testimony'. The giving of a 'Personal
testimony' must depend upon his volition. He can make any kind of statement
or may refuse to make any statement.  But his finger impression or his
handwriting, inspite of efforts at concealing the true nature of  it by
dissimulation cannot change their intrinsic character.  Thus, the giving of
finger impressions or of a specimen writing or of signatures by an accused
person, though it may amount to furnishing evidence in the larger  sense, is
not included within the expression" to be a witness."
It may thus be observed that the Suprement Court's view on the point
was similar to juristic opinion of Wigmore.  The other conclusions of the court
in this case were as follows :
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(1) 'To be a witness' is not equivalent to 'furnishing
evidence' in its widest significance; that is to say, as
including not merely making of oral or written
statements but also production of documents or
giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
(2) Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or
palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing
parts of the body by way of identification are not
included in expression 'to be  witness'.
(3) 'To be a witness' means imparting knowledge in
respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or
statement in writing made or given in Court or
otherwise.
(4) 'To be a witness' in its ordinary grammatical sense
means giving oral testimony in Court.  Case law has
gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the
expression which may now bear a wider meaning,
namely, bearing testimony in Court or out of Court
by a person accused of an offence, orally or in
writing."
In the earlier case of M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra the
Supreme Court had laid down as follows :
"Broadly stated, the guarantee in Article 20(3) is against
'testimonial compulsion'.  It is suggested that this is confined to the oral
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evidence of a person standing his trial for an offence when called to the
witness-stand. We can see no reason to confine the content of the
constitutional guarantee to this barely literal import. So to limit it would
be to rob the guarantee of its substantial purpose and to miss the
substance for the sound as stated in certain American decisions.  The
phrase used in Article 20(3) is 'to be a witness.'  A person can'be a
witness' not merely by giving oral evidence but also by producing
documents or making intelligible gestures as in the case of a dumb
witness (see section 119; Indian Evidence Act ) or the like. 'To be a
witness' is nothing more than 'to furnish evidence,' and such evidence
can be  furnished through the lips or by production of a thing or of a
document or in other modes. . .Indeed, every positive volitional act
which furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsion
connotes coercion which procures the positive volitional evidentiary act
of the person as opposed to the negative attitude of silence or
submission on his part."
The Sharma's case was differently interpreted by the different High
Courts leading to a conflict in judicial opinion. Some of the High Courts took
the extreme view that compulsion of the accused for extraction of any bodily
evidence violated the privilege.18  The other High Courts contrarily made a
distinction between physical evidence that could be obtained without the
active cooperation of the accused and physical evidence  that could be
obtained by his active cooperation and held compulsion as to the former to be
18 Damodaran V. State, AIR 1960 Ker 29; Brij Bhushan V. State, AIR 1957 MP 632;
Bhaluka Behara V. State, AIR 1957 Ori. 172; Balraj Bhalla V. Ramesh Chand, AIR 1960
All 157.
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as not involving the violation of Article 2(3) but not compulsion as to the latter.
The Bombay High Court19  held the compulsory taking of blood from the body
of the accused to determine whether he was intoxicated did not violate Article
20(3) of the Constitution as the accused was only required to passively submit
to a process of  blood extraction and not to furnish active cooperation.  The
Calcutta High Court20 on the one hand in a case of handwriting held that the
privilege was violated as the accused was required to do positive volitional
act, while on the other hand21 .  It held that obtaining of a thumb impression
did not violate the privilege. The Punjab High Court22 held that the immunity
was  not contravened if the accused was required to stand up and to show his
face for the purpose of identification. It also held that finger prints, footprints-
photographs of the accused, for comparison with those found at the place of
occurrence of a crime did not lose their probative character even if they were
obtained involuntarily.
All these controversies disappeared by the Supreme Court judgment in
Oghad's case and High Court views contrary thereto stood overruled.
In India there is no constitutional safeguard as the "due process of law"
of the United States. Article 19 dealing with personal liberties does not include
obtaining of physical evidence from the body of the accused. Article 21 of the
Constitution deals with a concept of "procedure established by law" but that is
not  the  same  thing  as    the concept of "due process of law" envisaged by
19 State V. Boowant Ganpati, (1961) Bom LR 87.
20 Farid Ahmad V. State, AIR 1960 Cal. 32; Tarini Kumar V. State, AIR 1960 ?Cal 318; Badri
Lal V. State, AIR 1960 Raj 184-185.
21 Mool Chand V. State AIR 1961 Cal. 123.
22 Pakar Singh V. State AIR 1958 Punj. 294.
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American Constitution despite the recent trend in the Indian decisions.  Where
comparisons are made of fingerprints etc. the State must account for both the
specimen taken at the scene of the crime and the comparison specimen used
at the trial, in order of rule out mistake and substitution.
Section 51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code 1973, dealing with
search of arrested persons reads as follows :
"51(a) Whenever a person is arrested by a police
under a warrant which does not provide for the taking
of bail, or under a warrant which provides for the
taking of bail, but the person arrested cannot furnish
bail, and
Whenever a person is arrested without warrant or by
a private person under a warrant, and cannot legally
be admitted to bail, or is unable to furnish bail, and
The officer making the arrest or, when the arrest is
made by a private person, the police officer to whom
he makes over the person arrested, my search such
person, and place in safe custody all articles, other
than necessary wearing-apparel, found upon him and
where any article is seized from the arrested person,
a receipt showing the articles taken in possession by
the Police Officer shall be given to such person.
 (2)   Whenever it is necessary to cause a female to
be searched, the search shall be made by another
female with strict regard to decency."
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From a perusal of this section if is clear that shoes or wearing apparel
of the accused can be taken from him against his will for comparison and
Article 20(3) of the Constitution is in no manner violated.23  All accused
person can be validly required to place his feet into the previous tracks at the
investigation stage under Section 4 and 5 of the Identification of Prisoners
Act. There is, however, no provision in the Indian Evidence Act which confers
such a power to the Court at the trial stage. Section 73 of the Evidence Act
only mentions finger impressions and not footprints, but according to judicial
opinion expressed by American Courts there is no difference between finger
impressions and footprints and observations made with regard to one also
apply to the other.  The Indian law on this point has maintained a significant
silence.
The blood stained clothes of the accused could be seized from the
body of the accused without contravening Article 20(3)24. Where the accused
was charged with homicide and had surrendered to the Magistrate and the
blood stained clothes worn by him were seized upon the direction of the
magistrate by his clerk and peon, it as held that no compulsion had been
exercised against him.25
On the question of voice identification, it is submitted that there is no
provision in India which expressly gives power to a police officer or a court to
require an accused person to speak and it is not clear whether the general
power of investigation given to the police officers under Sections 155 to 157 of
23    In re Palani Goundan, AIR 1957 Mad 546, Nazir V. State, AIR 1959 MP 411. In re Palani
Moopan, AIR 1955 Mad 495.
24     Supra
25     In re Palani Moopan, AIR 1955 Mad 495.
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the Criminal Procedure Code, includes the power to require the accused to
speak worldly. In none of the cases  in which the voice of the accused was
obtained for comparison with the voice of the offender, this question was
raised.
This chapter has been undertaken to gauge the constitution ability of
the different types of examination of the body of the accused and carried out
by the police and the courts to require the accused to submit to the different
types of body examinations and tests. This constitutional  problem was more
similar to the problem in the United States where the concept had been
applied to medical examination of the accused person by police surgeons, in
the use of stomach pumps etc. In England this problem did not manifest itself
and so English authorities have not been referred in the chapter. A study of
this chapter would reveal that the statutory provisions relating to physical and
medical examinations of the accused are meager in India and there is no
comprehensive statute dealing with different kinds of examinations made
possible by scientific and technological advancement.  The provisions are
more of and general and sweeping nature, so to say.
The privilege against self incrimination is, it would be seem, an
extension of the right to personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.  This
right is based on eternal and imperishable principle of justice, which to quote
Cockburn, C.J. "Can never be violated, without lasting determent to the true
interest and well being of a civilized community."
The Constitution is a part of the great heritage of every Indian. Its
founding fathers wanted to ensure that even while India remained poor in per
capita income, it should be rich in individual freedom. The right guaranteed in
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Article 20(3) has to be read in a context that replenishes a faith in the liberty
and dignity of  the individual. It is good that the Courts in India have done so
and are ever-expanding the compass of Article 21.
E may now take-up specific problems relating to identification touching
the right against self-incrimination. Does it include the right to refuse medical
examination ?
On the point of an accused person's being compelled to undergo
medical examination for the purpose of investigation, Section 53,26 Cr. P.C.,
1973 stands as follows :
Referring to the case of Kathi Kalu The Rajasthan High Court in Mohd,
Ismail v. State of Rajasthan27 laid down :
26   Examination of accused by Medical Practitioner at the request of Police Officer (1) When
a person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence of such a nature and alleged to
have been committed under such circumstances that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of
an offence, it shall be lawful for a registered medical practitioner, acting at the request of
a police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector, and for any person acting in good
faith in his aid and under his direction, to make such an examination of the person
arrested as is reasonably necessary in order to ascertain the facts which may afford such
evidence, and to use such force as is reasonably necessary for that purpose.
(2)Whenever the person of  a female to be examined under this section, the examination
shall be made only by or under the supervision of a female registered medicalpractitioner.
Explanation – In this section and in Section 54 "registered medical practitioner" means a
medical practitioner who possesses any recognized medical qualification as defined in
clause (h) of section 2 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956), and whose
name has been entered in a State Medical Register.
Provisions thus have been made for facilitating effective investigation by authorizing an
arrested accused person to be examined by a medical practitioner if from the nature of
the alleged offence or from the circumstances under  which it is alleged to have been
committed, there is reasonable ground for believing that such examination may afford
evidence. A person who has been arrested but later enlarged on Daily may also be
medically examined under this section. Such examination is not hit by Art.20(3),
Constitution of India.
27 "In this Constitution Bench division, it was held that no testimonial compulsion under
Article 20(3) of the Constitution was involved in a direction to give specimen signature
and handwriting for the purpose of comparisons. Thus obtaining of specimen handwriting
of Mohammad Ismail for comparison with the questioned handwriting does not
contravene the Constitutional guarantee given by Art. 20(3) of the Constitution.
We, are therefore, of the view that even if the Judicial Magistrate No.I  Jodhpur had
illegally taken the specimen handwriting of Mohammed Ismail and they were compared
during the course of investigation, it does not amount to testimonial compulsion and the
fundamental rights of Mohammed Ismail under Art.20(3) of the Constitution are not
violated."
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In a case of alleged rape, evidence was given by the medical officer to
show that the injuries found on the body of the girl were consistent with her
having been raped. Also he was allowed to give evidence that he had
examined the accused and that he found injuries on both his shoulder blades.
Also there was an abrasion upon the frenum of his penis, which he said was
consistent with an injury stained when penetrating with difficulty the vagina of
a girl.  In appeal, the defense argued that argued that the medical evidence
had been wrongly admitted.
- Lord Williams, J. Observed :
"I am quite satisfied in my own mind that this evidence is not
admissible.  It  were permitted forcibly to take hold of a prisoner and
examine his body medically for the purpose  of qualifying some
medical witness to give medical evidence in the case against the
accused there is no knowing when such procedure would stop.  It is
to my mind quite contrary to the spirit of the law., that evidence
should be obtained in this way. It is argued that in this case the
accused was sent for examination to the hospital. He was not asked
whether he consented to such examination and a body of fifteen
can hardly he expected to know what his rights are in the matter.  In
such circumstances it is clearly incumbent upon the Crown to prove
that the accused consented, before such evidence is received. Any
such examination without the consent of the accused would amount
to an assault and I am quite satisfied that the Police are not entitled
without statutory authority to commit assaults upon prisoners for the
purpose of procuring evidence against them.  If the Legislature
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desires that evidence of this kind should be given, it will be quite
simple to add a short section to the Code of Criminal Procedure
expressly giving power to order such a medical examination."
Instances are not rare when the glands penis of an accused have been
examined to see if it covered by Smegma.  It means the secretion  of
Sebaceous glands, especially the cheesy Secretion, consisting principally of
desquamated epithelia cells, found chiefly beneath the prepuce.28 It may be
borne in mind if the glands  of the male organ and covered by uniform layers
of smegma it negatives the x theory of recent intercourse.  The necessity of
prosecution getting the male organ of accused examined emphasized to rule
out any defense on this score.29  In this case a small  female child was
missing, later her dead body was found inside the bathroom wrapped in
blanket dead. All these happened in the morning.  The underpants of the dead
child was missing.  Her vagina was lacerated and her hymen was ruptured.
From these symptoms Dr. Santani concluded that the girl was raped.  From
the  injuries, he  concluded that she died on asphyxia, probably due to
tracheal compression.
 As to Art.20(3) Constitution.
 A perusal of this Article clearly shows that two conditions are
necessary to attract this Article.
In the First place the person who is compelled must be
accused of an offence.
28   Dorland's Medical Dictionary.
29   Ram Kala V. Emperor AIR 1946 All 191.
125
Secondly that such accused must be compelled to give evidence
against himself.
The immunity against self incrimination extends the immunity to person
accused of offence not to witnesses.  The immunity is available when the
person claiming immunity is (4) accused of an offence, (b) is sought to be
examined as a witness, and (c) against himself.   Thus when complaint is
against six persons including the petitioner, but cognizance has been taken
not against the petitioner, then the petitioner cannot claim immunity, he can
be called as witness, because to be recorded.30
It is only when one is an accused person being accused of an offence
that the prohibition prescribed by Art 20(3) comes into operation. If a person
who is not an accused of any offence is compelled to give evidence and the
evidence taken from him under compulsion ultimately leads to an accusation
against him, Art 20(3) does not apply – nor is attracted.31
Bar of testimonial compulsion is applicable to accused person only. For
one's being an accused there must be accusation against him in the shape of
a formal charge and it can not relate merely to a stage of investigation when
no charge has been formally preferred against him as an accused.32
In Viran Wali v. State33  there being no material to show that at the time
when the appellant was examined internally by the lady doctor, there was any
accusation against her; Art.20(3) could not be invoked.
30   Damodar V. Panjrekar V. Rama Chandravaswami (1973) Andh, W.R. 299.
31   Joseph V. Narayana AIR 1964 S.C. 1552 see also Narayanlal V. Manek AIR 1961 SC 29.
32  Dastagir V. State of Madras AIR 1960 SC 756 : 1960 Mad. LJ (Cr)466 : 1960 Mad. LJ
(SC) 39 : (1961)1 Cr. LJ 666 : 1961 Raj LW 376 : ILR (1961) 1 Raj. 646
33   AIR  1961  J and K. 11.
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In the above case some time in the midnight the accused entered a
bathroom of a hospital and gave birth to a child and threw that child through
an opening in the ventilator. The lady doctor who saw the appellant sitting on
a bench without her trousers and bleeding profusely  from her private parts,
sought the permission of the Matron for her examination and on examination
found that she had given birth to a child.  On questioning, the accused  gave
out that she had given birth to a child which she had thrown out on the ground
through the ventilator, causing its death. The evidence of the lady doctor
which was subsequently treated as First Information Report was as follows :
"On my forced enquiry she confessed
amenorrhoea of about 5 to 6 months.  Then I requested
the Matron to give me permission for vaginal examination
as I believed she was unmarried. Matron permitted me to
do so. Then I requested her for vaginal examination,
which she refused strongly; but later on gave her consent
reluctantly."
It appeared from the evidence of the lady doctor that the accused had
resisted her examination but she had yielded after persistent requests.
The court was however, fully satisfied that at the time when the lady
doctor conducted the internal examination of the accused, she was not
accused of any offence as there was no formal accusation against her. It was
also pointed out that at the time when she was examined she had not made
her confession and, therefore, the doctor was not aware of any of the facts
which constituted an offence.
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Prior to insertion of Section 53 Cr. P.C. 1973 bolstered by the ratio of
state of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu34 there were decisions which frowned upon
medical examination of an accused for investigational purpose.  There are
now of historical interest only.  Thus in Sreemamrurthi v. Lakshmikantan35,
the Court below following the judgment of Mr. Justice Reghava Rao in
Polavarapu Venkatelshwarlu v. Polavarapu  Subhava,36 held that the party
could not be compelled to undergo medical examination.  The learned
Advocate for the petitioner drew the attention of the Court to Section 14 of
Indian Evidence Act and contended that under this section facts showing the
existence of any state of body are relevant facts and that he was entitled to
lead evidence.  The respondent's Advocate did not challenge the position.
The petitioner's Advocate did not draw the attention of the Court to any
specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the Indian Evidence Act,
for compelling the attendance of a party for medical examination.  Section
151, Civil Procedure Code, was next sought to be relied on, as conferring
power on the Court to pass such an order.  The Advocate for the respondent
contended that such an examination would offend the provisions of Article 21
of the Constitution which enacts that, "No person shall be deprived of his life
or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."
The following extracts from the judgment in Deoman Shamji Patel v.
The State37 may be usefully produced :
34   AIR  1961 SC  1808 : (1961) 2 Cr. LJ  856.
35   1955 An. W.R. 13.
36   (1951) 1 M.L.M.  580.
37   1959 Cr LJ  825 : AIR 1959 Bom. 284.
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Two interesting questions of law arise in the case. One is whether
police officers are empowered by law in the case of person suspected or
accused of an offence under the Bombay Prohibition Act, to take that person,
against his will, to a doctor for medical examination.  The second question
arises if the first is answered in the negative, and that question is, whether
such a person can lawfully exercise the right of private defense against the
force sought to be used in taking him to a doctor.
This being a criminal revision application the facts are no longer in
dispute.  The petitioner, who will be referred to hereafter as the accused, is a
resident of Satana in the Nasik district.  On the date of offence, information
was received at the Police station at Satana that the accused was behaving in
a disorderly manner in a public street under the influence of drink.  There
upon some police constables went to the spot and brought the accused to the
police station.  They tried to make a Panchnama about the physical condition
of  the accused, but could not get any Panches.  Then head constable Wagh,
who appears to have been in charge of the police station asked five or six
constables to take the accused to the local dispensary for his examination by
the medical officer.  On the way, the accused refused to go any further, and
resisted the attempt of the constables to drag him to the dispensary.  While so
resisting, he gave a blow to constable Thakurji and, another Constable
Madhav and made good his escape. He ran inside a house and chained the
door from within.  Some days later, he surrendered to the police. Two cases
were then launched against him.  One was for an offence under Section 85 of
the Bombay prohibition Act. He was acquitted in that case.  The other was for
an offence under Section 353, Indian Penal Code, of assault and use of
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criminal force to deter public servants from discharging their duty.  He was
convicted of the offence and the conviction was upheld in appeal. He has
come in revision from the order of conviction and sentence.
On behalf of the accused, Mr. S.G. Patwardhan has advanced a plea
which was not taken in the Courts below, but which is consistent with the facts
proved by the prosecution. Mr S.G. Patwardhan says that the action of the
constables in dragging or attempting to drag the accused towards the
dispensary was itself illegal, that the constables were obviously not doing their
"duty" while acting illegally, and that the conduct of the accused cannot,
therefore, constitute an offence as defined in Section, 353, Indian Penal
Code. Two reasons are urged by  Mr. Patwardhan in support of the plea that
the action of the constables was illegal. he says, in  the first place, that there
is no legislative connection which enables police officers in the course of
investigation to require an unwilling person to submit to medical examination,
so that the employment of force or show of force by the constables against
the accused amounted to use of criminal force or to assault, and was an
offence under Section 352, Indian Penal Code.  He says, secondly, that even
if such legislative sanction were shown to exist, the conduct of the constables
violated Clause (3) of Article 20 of the Constitution which provides that "no
person accused on any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself," and which was interpreted by the Supreme Court in M.P. Sharma v.
Satish Chandra38 to mean, in broad terms, that no person angst whom an
accusation has been made shall be required to furnish, by any positive
volitional act, any material which can be used as evidence against him.
38   1954  SCR  1977: AIR 1954 SC  300.
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Dealing with first part of Mr. Patwardhan's argument, we have been
unable to find any statutory provision which renders lawful the coercion
exercised or threatened by the constables in order that the accused may be
medically examined. The powers which may be exercised by police officers in
the course of investigation have been specified in several sections of the
Criminal Procedure Code, and  supplemental provisions in that behalf are
found in Chapter VI of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, and is so far as the
investigation relates to offences under the Bombay Prohibition Act, in Chapter
IX of the Act. Although no power as specially been conferred on investigation
officers to compel a person to submit to medical examination, the learned
Government Pleader argues that the power has been impliedly conferred by
Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That section provides that, in
certain circumstances, an officer in charge of a police station shall proceed, or
shall depute one of his subordinate officers to proceed, to the spot "to
investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if necessary to take
measures for discovery and arrest of the offender.."  Section 4(1) of the G.P.
Code provides that the word "Investigation" wherever it occurs in the Code,
includes all the proceedings under this Code, for the collection of evidence
conducted by a police officer."  The learned Government Pleader says that
when, in the case of a person suspected of an offence under the Bombay
Prohibition Act, a police officer proceeds to secure expert medical opinion
about the physical condition of that person, he conducts a "proceeding for the
collection of evidence," that proceedings therefore amounts to "investigation",
and that it is the duty of the police officer concerned to carry out the
investigation under Section 157 of the Code.  The learned Government
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pleader further argues that the Code does not purport to lay down all the
various modes in which investigation may have to be carried out in different
cases so that the expression "proceedings under the Code" occurring in the
above definition of "investigation" is not confined to specific proceeding
authorized by the Code, but extend all the proceedings which the Officer, who
is authorized to investigate a case, finds it necessary to adopt for the purpose
of investigation.  The argument in substance is that Section 157 of the Code
authorizes an investigating Officer to collect evidence in any manner that he
may find expedient, and that this authority overrides the rights and liberties of
the subject to the extent necessary for the purpose of investigation.
The short answer to this rather, specious argument is that Section 157
of the Code lays down some of the duties, and none of the rights of an officer
in charge of a police station.  That section has no relevance 'whatever' to the
consideration of the extent to which a police officer can act in curtailment of
the rights of the subject as regards his persons or his property.  Since a part
of the investigation in every case can obviously be carried out by doing what
an ordinary individual can do, the legislature did not find it necessary to lay
down, in a positive form, all things that may be done by an investigating officer
in collecting evidence.  But to the extent to which the Legislature found that a
curtailment of the rights and liberties of the subject was necessary for proper
investigation into offences, to that extent the Legislature has made positive
and specific provisions. Such provisions are found in the Criminal Procedure
Code as well as in other Acts. For instance, Section 51 to 58 of the Code
relate to search of arrested persons, Section 96 to 99 and Section 165 to
search of places.  Section 160 to 162 to interrogation of witnesses, etc.  If
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investigating Officers had a general overriding power to do whatever is found
necessary for investigation all these provisions would be redundant. The
learned Government Pleader suggests that these provisions have been made,
not by way of granting to investigating officers, some limited powers of
interference in the rights and liberties of the subject, but by way of imposing
limitations on the overriding power of the investigating officers to interfere with
such rights and liberties.  The argument is untenable, first because the said
section positively confer certain limited powers and do not purport to limit
some general power otherwise existing and secondly because in the absence
of positive legislative enactment a general power to interfere with individual
rights and liberties cannot be simply assumed.  Law on the contrary assumed
and this was so even before the commencement of the Constitution – the
existence of individual rights and liberties, and steps in for regulating those
rights and liberties in the interest of social living.
That the Code of Criminal Procedure has not granted to investigating
officers an overriding power such as is claimed by the learned Government
Pleader is further illustrated by the Identification of Prisoners Act passed by
the Central Legislature in 1920. The preamble of the Act shows that its object
was "to authorize the taking of measurements and photographs of convicts
and others."  Among other things the Act requires any person arrested in
connection with certain types of offences to allow his measurements to be
taken in the prescribed manner on the direction of a police officer.  The Act
also authorized Magistrates to direct measurements and photographs to be
taken of any person if that is expedient "for the purposes of any investigation
or proceeding under the Code of Criminal procedure."  Section 6 of the Act
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makes it lawful to overcome any resistance to the taking of measurements
and photographs under the Act, and also makes the resistance itself an
offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code.  The Act was passed
several years after the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it shows that the
Code did not grant to investigating officers a general overriding power to act in
curtailment of the rights and liberties of the subject for the purpose of
investigation.
A question was raised before us whether the accused in this case was
formally arrested in this case was formally arrested before he was sought to
be taken for medical examination.  We did not find it necessary to decide this
question because even if he was taken in custody, the police constables had
no legal authority to require him to submit to medical examination.  It is
obvious that the arrest and detention of a person under the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code do not deprive the person of such of his rights and
liberties as are unconnected with his confinement.
A view similar to the one which we are adopting in this case was taken
by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bhondar v. Emperor.39 It
was held in that case that it was not permissible under the Criminal Procedure
Code to take hold of  a prisoner case that it was not permissible under the
Criminal Procedure Code to take hold of a prisoner forcibly and to examine
his body medically without his consent for the purpose of qualifying some
medical witness in the case against him, and that any such examination
without the consent of the accused amounted to an assault.  It was further
39   AIR  1931  Cal. 601.
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held in that case that the medical evidence so obtained is not admissible, but
we are not required to express to any opinion as regards that conclusion.
It is thus clear that the police constables in this case were not doing
their duty in taking the accused against his will towards the dispensary and
that the accused cannot be convicted under Section 353 of the Indian Penal
Code.
In view of this conclusion, we do not find it necessary to decide
whether, as contended by Mr. Patwardhan, the act of the Police Constables
amounted to the exercise of testimonial compulsion and violated Clause (3) of
Article 20 of the Constitution.  That question may fall for determination if the
Legislature makes a provision requiring a person to submit to medical
examination so that the evidence so obtained may be used against him.
Direction to wife to undergo medical examination to as certain if he has
transmitted to herself general disease to prove husband's allegation of
adultery is not violative of her to testimonial compulsion.'
Now, we may take up another related question : Is an Order to blood
test in Criminal Cases violative of Article 20(3) ?   to be a witness against
himself. This Article does not enact any new principle which we had not
already inherited from the English system of Criminal justice.  It is
fundamental principle of the English system of Criminal Justice (which differs
from the inquisitorial procedure obtaining in France and some other
continental countries) that it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt and the
accused need not make any statement against his will.  The principle of
immunity for self incriminating evidence is based on the maxim, nemo enotur
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produce accusare seipsum (no main is bound to accuse himself) and thus
founded on he presumption of innocence which characterizes the English
system of Criminal trial.
The question whether compelling one to give blood sample is hit by
Art.20(3) Constitution of  India directly arose in Anil Anantro V. State of
Maharashtra.40  the court held relying on Kathi Kaslu ogad's Case.41 : By the
use of the expression to be witness in Article 20(3) of the Constitution, the
markers of the Constitution could not have intended to put obstacles in the
way of efficient and effective investigation into crime and of bringing criminals
to justice. Even otherwise mere examination of the person and taking of blood
sample in itself is not an incriminating circumstance and therefore it can not
be said that by more taking sample of blood a person is compelled to be a
witness against himself.
The Bombay High Court discussing the question thoroughly pointed out
that in a given case for the purpose of collecting evidence it might become
necessary to determine blood group of the accused. In case where the
bloodstained cloths are seized from the person of the accused and the
prosecution wants to connect the said evidence with the crime itself, then
obviously it becomes necessary to determine the blood group of the accused
and in that sense it could safely be said that taking of sample of blood is
necessary for affording evidence as to the commission of the offence.  This
might help even the defense to prove the innocence of the accused. In a case
where the identity of the accused is the main question for consideration and
40 1981 Cr. Law   Cr. L.J.
41 AIR  1961 SC 1808
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decision and a bunch of hair are found at the place of occurrence, then the
investigating officer can utilize that piece of evidence for the purpose of
establishing identity of the participant in the crime.  In the cases wherein
identification of the accused is in issue, the body of the accused with
identifying marks on it is a relevant piece of evidence for the purpose of
identification of the culprit. In some cases for this purpose collection of
specimen of hair of the accused may also become necessary. On the same
analogy taking the sample of blood might become necessary I order to
ascertain the facts which night affords such evidence.
As observed by Bombay High Court in State v. Sheshappa,42  there is
nothing brutal or offensive or shocking in taking blood sample under the
protective eye of law. Modern community living requires modern scientific
methods of crime detection lost the public go unprotected. Such scientific
tests are necessary for proving the guilt as well as innocence of the accused.
This is one of the well recognized methods adopted in the crime detection all
over the world. In this context a reference could usefully be made to the
following observations in Para 9 of the said judgment:
"We have pointed cut before that the section itself contains limitations
with regard to the procedure for extracting blood.  The question as to whether
the conviction of a person based on the result of the involuntary blood-test
taken after extracting blood deprived a person of his liberty without due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the American
Constitution arose for consideration in Breithaupt v. Abram.43  the petitioner in
42 AIR 1964 Bom. 253 : (1964), 2 Cri. L.J. 523.
43 (1957) 352 U.S. 432 : 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448.
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that case while driving a pickup truck was involved in a collection with a
passenger car. Some of the passengers of the car were killed and the
petitioner was seriously injured.  A pint whisky bottle almost empty was found
in the glove compartment of the truck.  The petitioner was, there, taken to a
hospital and while h4e was lying unconscious, the smell of liquor was
detected on his breath.  On a request by the patrolman, and attending
physician, while the petitioner was unconscious, withdrew a sample of about
20 cubic centimeters of blood by use of a hypodermic needle. Subsequent
laboratory analysis showed that the blood contained about 17% alcohol. The
petitioner was thereafter charged with involuntary manslaughter and in the
trial, testimony regarding the blood test and its result, was admitted into
evidence, despite the petitioner's objection.  This testimony included the
evidence of an expert that a person with 17% alcohol in the blood, was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.  Although he was convicted, the petitioner
did not appeal, but later he sought release from his imprisonment by a petition
for a write of habeas corpus.  It was contended that the conduct of the state
officers offended the sense of decency" and that it was "brutal" and
"offensive" and was therefore "shocking" to the "conscience." It was also said
that the conduct did not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and
decency.  This argument was not accepted by a majority of the Supreme
Court of the U.S. Justice Clark who delivered the opinion of the majority
observed as follows : ". . . there is nothing 'brutal' or 'offensive' in the taking of
sample of blood when done, as in this case, under the protective eye of a
physician. To be sure, the driver here was unconscious when the blood was
taken, but the absence of conscious consent, without score, does not
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necessarily render the taking a violation of a constitutional right : and certainly
the test administered here would not be considered offensive by even the
most delicate. Further more, due process is not measured by the yardstick of
personal reaction of the sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by
that whole community sense of "decency and fairness."  That has been woven
by common experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct. The blood test
procedure has become routine in our every day life. It is a ritual for those
going into the military service as well as those applying for marriage licenses.
Many colleges require such tests before permitting entrance and literally
millions of us have voluntarily gone through the same through a longer,
routine in becoming blood donors.
The majority opinion, therefore, was that a blood test taken by a skilled
technician is not such "conduct that shocks the conscience." The Court also
observed that this may not apply to cases where there is indiscriminate taking
of blood under different conditions or by those not competent to do so.  It was
"Modern community living requires modern scientific methods of crime
detection lest the public go unprotected."
Mr. Justice Clark in conclusion made the following very pertinent
observations :
"As against the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable,
even against so slight an intrusion as is involved in applying a blood test of
the kind to which millions of American submit as a matter of course every day,
must be set the interests of society in the scientific determination of
intoxication, one of the great causes of the mortal hazards f the road.  And the
more so, since the test likewise may establish innocence, thus affording
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protection against the treachery of judgment based on one or more of the
senses."
This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of U.S. even when the
challenge was under the Due Processes Clause. So far as our Constitution is
concerned, the Courts are not required to go so far and determine whether a
certain procedure established by law was brutal or offensive or shocking to
the conscience and was, therefore, unreasonable.  Infringement of personal
liberty of life, it in accordance with the procedure established by law is not
justifiable. In the prohibition Act, which, is brought on the statute book to
effectuate the policy of prohibition, the taking of blood is empowered to be
done only by a registered medical practitioner. It is thus under the protective
eye of the law.  It is intended to help the scientific determination of intoxication
and the results of the test may as well prove innocence as the guilt of the
persons.
Some what similar question fell for consideration of Rajasthan High
Court in Mahipal v. State of Rajasthan44 wherein the question posed was as
to whether that will violate the rights guaranteed by Arts. 20(3) and 21 of the
Constitution of India.
While negativing the contention based on provisions of Article 20(3) of
the Constitution of India, Shinghal J (as he then was) held that exposing the
hair or taking specimen thereof cannot be said to be furnishing evidence.
Then in Para's 10 and 11 of the said judgment it was observed as under :-
44 1971 Cr. L.J. 1405.
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"In this state of law, which should apply equally to our country there
can be no justification for the claim of the accused that the impugned order of
the learned magistrate denies them the privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by Article 20(3) of the Constitution.  This is a case in which the
question of the identity of the accused will be the main question for
consideration and decision.  And the recovery of some hair from the place of
occurrence has prompted the Investing Officer to make an effort to utilize that
piece of evidence for the purposes of establishing the identity of the
participants in the crime, if possible.  His efforts to make use of that material is
quite genuine for it cannot be doubted that, in the case of a person's body, its
marks and trails are the main evidence for purposes of its identification and
there is no reason why the Investigating Officer should be prevented from
making use of it when it is well settled that there is no protection against the
exhibition of the body of the accused.  The privilege against self-incrimination
does not extend to the use of defendant's body as real evidence.
Similar view has also been taken by the Allahabad High Court in
Jamshed v. State of U.P.45 wherein it was observed that –
" We are therefore of the view that there is nothing repulsive or
shocking to conscience in taking the blood of the appellant in the instant case
Magistrate or at any time during the period of his detention in custody that the
examination of his body will afford evidence which will disprove the
commission by him of any offence or which will establish the commission by
any other person of any offence against his body, the Magistrate shall, if
45 1976 Cr L.J. 1680.
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requested by the arrested person so to do, direct the examination of the body
of such person by a registered medical practitioner  unless the Magistrate
considers that the request is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for
defeating the ends of justice.
Question may rise as to whether this provision is violative of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.  The Law Commission after
considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Kathi Kalu v. State,46 has
expressed the  view that the decision has the effect of confining the privilege
under Article 20(3) only to testimony written or oral.47
Relaying on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Kathi
Kalu case it has been in order to establish his guilt. So far as the question of
causing hurt is concerned, even causing of some pain may technically amount
to hurt as defined by Section 319 of the Indian Penal Code. But pain might be
caused even if the accused is subjected to a forcible medical examination.
For  example, in cases of rape it may be necessary to examine the private
parts of the culprit.  If a culprit is suspected to have swallowed some stolen
article, an emetic my be used and X-ray examination may also be necessary.
For such purposes the law  permits the use of necessary force.  It cannot,
therefore, be said that merely because some pain is caused, such a
procedure should not be permitted."
That being the law, Cr..P.C. 1973 provides in Sections 53 and 54 as
follows :
46 AIR  1961  SC 1808
47 37th  Report p. 205.
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53. Examination of accused by medical petitioner at the request of police
officer :-
(1)    When a person is arrested on a charge committing an offence of
such a nature and alleged to have been committed under such
circumstances that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the
commission of an offence, it shall be lawful for a registered
medical practitioner, acting at the request of a police officer not
below the rank of sub-inspector, and for any person acting in good
faith in his aid and under his direction, to make such an
examination of the person arrested as is reasonably necessary in
order to ascertain the facts which may afford such evidence, and
to use such force as is reasonably necessary for that purpose.
(2) Wherever the person of a female is to be examined under this
section, the examination shall be made only by, or under the
supervision of a female registered medical practitioner.
 Explain : In this section and in Section 54 'registered medical
practitioner' means a practitioner who possesses any recognized
medical qualification as defined in clause (h) of  Section 2 of the
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956) and whose name
has been entered in a State Medical Register.
54. Examination of arrested person by medical practitioner at the request
of the arrested person :
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  When a person who is arrested, whether on a charge or
otherwise or otherwise, alleges, at the time when he is produced before
a held that Sec. 53 is not violative of Art 20(3) and that a person can
not be said to have been compelled "to a witness" against himself if he
is merely required to undergo a medical examination in accordance
with the provisions of Sec. 5348.
 The power to compel the accused to submit to medical examination is
hedged in various conditions. The object obviously is to balance the
conflicting interests of the individuals and the society.
 The medical examination contemplated by the section may take
various forms.  The expression "examination of the person" as used in Sec.53
can not be restricted only to the  examination of skin or what is visible on the
body itself.  The examination of some organs inside the body for the purpose
of collecting evidence may be come necessary and such an examination can
not be held to be beyond the purview of this section.  Examination by a
medical practitioner logically takes in examination by testing his blood,
sputum, semen urine etc.  It may include X-ray examination or taking
electrocardiograph depending upon the nature of the case.49
 The section itself permits the use of force as is reasonably necessary
for the purpose of medical examination of the arrested person.  Sometime
such a medical examination may cause pain and hurt to the  examine. It may
be that some discomfort is caused to the person the samples of whose blood
or semen are taken for medical examination, and if the process of taking such
48 Jamshed V. State of UP 1976 Cr L.J. 1680 (All),
49  Ibid
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samples is reasonable under the circumstances then the causing of
consequential discomfort to the parson is justified by Sec. 5350.
 Though the section lays down a conditions on that the medical
examination is to be done at the instance of a police officer not below the rank
of sub-inspector it does not debar other superior officers or the court
concerned from exercising the said power if it becomes necessary for doing
justice.51
 The medical examination contemplated by the section is in respect of a
'person arrested on a charge of committing an offence."  Even if an accused is
released on bail, he is still a person arrested on a charge of committing an
offence.52
 It may be useful to mention here some of the provisions of the
Identification of the Prisoners Act, 1920 which like the medical examination of
the accused under Sec. 53 Cr. P. C. are helpful in police investigation Sec.4
of the Act empowers a police officer to take measurements (including finger
impressions and foot print impression) of a person arrested in connection with
an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year or
more. Sec. 5 empowers the Magistrate to direct any person to allow his
measurement on photograph to be taken for the purpose of investigation
provided that such person at some time or other has been arrested in
connection with such investigation or proceeding.
These provisions on the basis of the earlier discussions in this chapter are not
violative of Article 20(3).
50 Ibid p. 47.
51  Ibid
52  Thaniel Victor V. State of Tamilnadu 1991 Cr LJ 2416(Mad)
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CHAPTER-V
IDENTIFICATION : ITS METHODS & EVIDENTIARY VALUE
 Identification (Late. Idem. The same), means the process of
establishing the identity of a person, or in other words, the determination of
his individuality, by proving that he is the man he purports to be, or, if he is
pretending to be some one else, the man he really is, or in case of dispute,
that he is the man he is alleged to be.
 The term identification means the proving that a person, subject or
article before the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or
reputed to be, and the word 'identity' may be termed as, to become the same :
to establish the identity of to make to be the same, to prove the same with
something described claimed or asserted. Identification is almost always a
matter of opinion of belief.1
 The evidence of identification figures a good deal in both criminal and
civil matters. Identity of persons, living or dead, known or unknown, of things
of handwriting of finger impressions and footprints, of photographs, of firearms
of blood marks, poisons hair, etc. play their part in establishing the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and in proof or disproof of the case of the parties in
civil matters.  In this respect there is both an evidence of fact and an expert
evidence. Evidence of fact consists of evidence of persons who have seen the
object before, and who compare this object with the object at the trial. That is
question of one's belief, of one's memory, as if it were a fact within one's
knowledge.  The expert witness has to merely state his opinion on the point
1Corpus Juris, Vol. 37. P. 237
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on which he is called upon to give his evidence.  But he cannot go on and
assert his mere opinion or belief as it were a fact within his knowledge.  In this
respect an expert witness is in a different position from a direct witness of fact.
The value of ordinary or non-expert oral evidence mainly rests on the
credibility of the witness his inclination or capacity for telling the truth, the
value of expert evidence rests of the skill of the witness the extent of his
competency for forming a reliable opinion.2
 So in identification we have two sorts of evidence, the evidence of fact
and the expert evidence. One is a question of observance and the cher of
competency. Evidence of fact is a question of one's impression and the
opportunity of forming any such impression.  If one has known a person from
before, the opportunity is all the time there, and the act of recognition from
former knowledge confines the question of identity merely to the credibility
that may be attached to the evidence of the witness.  But if it is a case of
seeing a stranger, the fact of identity becomes a hazardous matter and it has
been well said that even if the veracity of the witness is above all suspicion,
the evidence of identity based on personal impression should be approached
with considerable caution.3  Much really depends upon the opportunity the
witness had to forming his impression, and for how long the perception lasted
and in what circumstances.  The memory of the witness may be faulty.  The
trick of the memory, its conscious and unconscious activity also warp the
vision of the man. A witness may have been able to form his own impression
2 Emperor v. Sahadeve, 5 Cr. L5 228 : 23 NT.R.1
3 Gajadhar v. Emperor, AIR 1932 Qudh 99 : 9 OWN 32 : 33 Ce.J.J. 381 : 137 IC 79 : Luck
552 Sukhveer Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1978 Cr. LR (Rajl.) 581(586), 1978 Rail LW 239:
1978 WLN 291.
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About the object but still if he were to compare that impression of his with
others who too had been it his own impression will get mixed up with what
others tell him and so viable is the mind of man that in the end one can very
well adopt other's impressions and consider that impression to have been
truly formed and would swear about it in all earnestness.  Again claim minds
view a thing better than emotionally stirred persons.4  Dr. Hans Gross, in his
look on Criminal investigation, relates an incident where he himself was
present. It was the scene of an execution at which the executioner for one
reason or another wore gloves. After the execution the author asked four
officials who were present about the colour of the executioner's gloves, where
replied respectively, black, grey white, while the fourth stoutly maintained that
the executioner were no gloves at all.  Yet all four were in close proximity to
the scaffold, each replied without hesitation and all four were perfectly
confident that they made no mistake.  Thus excitement, or fear or terror
subverts the mind but there is another explanation also. The mind may be all
the time riveted on the object other incident that impressed one most, and
thus a close detachment will follow in his observing other matters even though
these happen simultaneously.  Suppose a number of persons have forcibly
got hold of a woman and are taking her away. The mind of the witness may
be riveted on the woman herself, her plight at the moment, her shricks, the
way the men are dragging her away, and all the time the conscious mind may
be revolving between all these matters.  The thought may occur to the mind
whether he should rescue the woman or not, the danger attached in
attempting any such rescue and after all, the woman may be the lawfully
4 Sukhveer Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1978 Cr.LR. (Rajl) 581:1978 Raj. LW 239.
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wedded wife of one of such persons.  As the mind revolves about such
matter, and one remains in an indecisive mood, the men escape with the
woman and get out of sight.  If asked to identify any such persons later on, the
witness may miserably fall in the attempt. His mind having been totally
absorbed in the woman herself and her plight the mind had no opportunity to
form any impression about their identity.  Again take the case of a person who
has seen a man come out of a house and has looked at him just as one is in
the habit of glancing at any passer by.  If that man later on turns out to be the
thief and the person who had been coming out of the house is a asked to
identify him, it is quite possible, rather probable, that he would fail in the
attempt.  Here although the fact was observed, the matter being of no
significance at the time, the mind could very well fall to bet the impression or
get only a faint impression.
 In the case of observance of fact we have also to take into account the
capacity and the capability of the witness to observe the fact.  His habits his
inclinatious and his prejudices too cannot be ruled out.  The question of
eyesight is  there, whether a witness has a normal eyesight or is short sighted
or long sighted. Some witnesses are colour blind and others moon blind.  The
nature of the man, how he reasons out the grasp of his senses or draws its
conclusions from the way the things, have appeared to him all make a
difference. An intelligent and a quick grasp will always be more; reliable than
the perception of a dull mind.  Similarly the grasp of an inquisitive or trained
mind  will make a difference.  The grasp of a woman about an ornament is
more sure than that of a man.  It is the instinct in the woman or her natural
bent of mind for such a thing that is responsible for such a difference. It is the
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interest that one feels for a sort of thing that helps the identification of it.  If the
mind does not feel interested in a certain thing, he cannot have the requisite
appreciation of it and as such his perception of it will be less marked than that
of a person who feels otherwise.  The training of the mind too plays its roll in
such matters.  A person with an artistic bent of mind will readily pickup the
distinguishing marks in a painting or a piece of sculpture and if asked to
identify it later on will do, it with an case, but a person who has no such bent
of mind has no training for the same will easily forget what he had seen of a
certain piece of art and will fail to identity if at a later occasion.  These are
thus all matters that make a difference and make the fact of observance so
very unsure at times.
 As against this observance off act and the factors involved,
identification with the help of an expert evidence depends, as already stated,
on the competency, both of the witness and the methods adopted.  The
impression that the finger print or the footprint leaves behind, the examination
of handwriting of blood marks, etc. all reacts to this question of competency.
Here also the training of the mind and the learning of the man are matters that
have their own value.  Science is making a huge progress these days in every
direction and naturally therefore the scientific and aid to identification is on
more sure lines today than it was thirty or even twenty years before.
Fingerprint is one science that is considered now to be absolute as an aid to
identification, but of other expert aid, as handwriting, etc. much controversy
still goes on about its true values and with that we have also to consider that
the expert evidence suffers from one main drawback and that is the
prejudices and preconceived notions of the human mind. The expert witness,
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howsoever impartial he may wish to be, is likely to be unconsciously
prejudiced in favour of the party which calls him.  He is there to support the
case of his own party and such is the nature of the human mind that the
greater the opposition, the more grows the impulse to support one's views and
thus the expert is unconsciously led to become a partisan. Prejudice, they say
feeds on the opposition that it needs, and it has also been said that experts
are proverbally, though unwittingly, biased in favour of the party which calls
them as well as every ready to regard harmless facts as confirmation of
preconceived theories.  Human minds work in such a way that reasons can be
multiplied both in favour as well as against a certain hypothesis and the expert
is not immune from such weakness of the mind.  When considering the expert
evidence, the courts have, therefore to keep in mind the limitations of the
expert evidence.
More evidence of identification in court in the absence of a prior
identification test is of very little consequence5 and then where a witness has
failed to identify an accused in the identification parade held for the same, his
identifying him later on in court is of very little value and that evidence has to
be discarded.6
The evidence of identification in court is not in admissible on the
ground that there is failure on the part of the prosecution to held an
identification parade.  But the court has to consider what weight or value may
5 In re Kamraj, IR 1960 Mad 125
6 Karuppa Valayan v. State of Kerala, AR 1960 Ker 238 : 1960 Cr. LJ 912 : 1960 Ker LT 396.
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be attached to the evidence of identification in Court.  The weight to be
attacked to such identification shall depend upon the facts and circumstances
of each case and no invariable rule can be laid down in this behalf.7
The evidence of identification of an accused for the first time in the
dock is inherent weak and more specially so when it is done after a lapse of
considerable time.  But where a direct witness has consistently identified the
accused,  both at the test parade and at the trial his identification may safely
be accepted, unless there are other circumstances indicating that the witness
has probably made a mistake.  But when the identification in court is not
supported by an earlier test, it is unsafe to act on that evidence in the absence
of exceptional circumstances such as a adequate descriptive particulars of the
accused given earlier by the witness which corroborate the identification.8
Sometimes an identification in court alone without a prior identification
at the identification parade, may carry conviction with the court.  There may
be special reasons for it as the Supreme Court says in Vaikuntam
Chandrappa v. State of A.P.9  the matter was discussed  in a case of the
Rajasthasn High Court in State  v. Shiv Singh.10  The accused had bought a
sword  from a Kabaria and next day he committed the murder with the sword.
The witnesses connected with the selling of the sword had gone to be the
police station and had seen the accused and identified him there. There were
also other reasons for which the court had come to the conclusion that the
7 Jasraj alias Jasija v. State of Rajasthan 1977 Cr. LR(Raj) 255(258).
8 State of Orissa v. Chaganlal Sundrka, 1977 Cr. LJ 319 (Orissa)
9 Air 1960 SC 1340 : 1960 CR. LJ. 1681.
10  AIR 1962 Raj.3(1962) 1 Cr. LJ 82 : 161 : Raj
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witnesses were not telling the lie.  The fact that there had been no previous
test identification was held to be no reason to discard their evidence in court
that the accused was the person who had bought the sword in question on a
day previous to the murder.  The identification of the accused for the first time
in court without prior test identification can be acted upon for convicting the
accused.11
The method of identification is essentially a method of comparison
Parke, B. remarked :
"In the identification of persons you compare in your mind the man you
have seen with the man you see at trial,12 Wigmore says, "Identity may be
thought of as a quality of a person or thing.  The essential presumption is that
two persons or things are thought of as existing and that the one is alleged
because of common features to be the same as the other.  The process of
inference operates by comparing common marks found to exist in the two
supposed separate objects of thought wit reference to the possibility of their
being same.  It follows that its force depends on the necessariness of the
association between the mark and the single object.  Where a circumstances,
feature or way commonly be found associated with a large number of objects,
the presence of the feature or mark in two supposed objects is little indication
of their identity, because on the general principle of relevancy, the other
conceivable hypothesis are so numerous, that is, the objects that possess that
mark are numerous, and therefore, two of them possessing it may well be
different.  But where the objects possessing the mark are only one or few, and
11Sanatan patra v. State, 1979 Cr. LJ (NOC) 72 (Orissa)
12 Wigmore's Evidence, Section 411.
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the mark is found on two supposed instances, the chance of the two being
different are nil or are comparatively small.  For simplicity's same the
evidential circumstances may thus be spoken of as a mark.  But in practice it
rarely occurs that the evidential mark is a single circumstances.  It is by
adding circumstance to circumstance that we obtain a composite feature or
mark which, as a whole cannot be supposed to be associated with more than
a single object."
The question of identification of living person is raised in Criminal
Courts in connection with absconding criminals, or persons accused of
assault, rape, murder etc.  It is frequently raised in Civil Courts owing to
fraudulent  personation practiced by people to secure unlawful  practiced by
people to secure unlawful possession of property of to obtain the prolongation
of a lapsed pension.  One frequently needs to identify oneself at a bank or
business house : he must assert his claim to a given passport or individual
cheque or ticket, issued to himself alone : he must frequency / frequently
prove himself the accredited representative of a firm or corporation, each
soldier or sailor need be indentified at the time of recruiting.
The bulk of serious crime is chiefly committed by those who have
previously been in the hands of the police. In England, in past times,
identification of criminals who had passed through the hands of the law was
compassed by branding, imprinting by a hot iron, or tattooing, with an indelible
sign such as Crown. Fleur de lys or initials upon the shoulder or other parts of
the body. The practice being long since abandoned, was in measure
continued in British army, when offenders, aglent military  "law" were ordered
by sentence of Court Martial to be marked with "D' for deserter and "B.C." for
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bad character.13 French deserters in the army formerly had likewise the letters
"T.F." (travaux forces) branded on them, and felons in England were branded
with "F". Branding in ancient times was almost the universal mode of
identification of the residivish.
For a long time the methods of identification continued to be most
imperfect, nothing better was devised than rough and ready methods of
recognition depending upon the memories of officers of law or the personal
impressions of witnesses concerned in the case, supplemented in more
recent years by photographs, not always a safe and unerring guide.  The
machinery employed was cumbrous, wasteful of time and costly. Detective
policemen were marched in a body to insect arrested prisoners in the
exercising yards of the prison. Accused persons were placed in the midst of a
number of others of approximately like figure and appearance, and the
prosecutor and witnesses were called in one by one to pick out the offender.
Inquiries with a details description of distinctive marks and photographs were
circulated far and wide to local police forces. Officials' police and prison
warders were dispatched in person to give evidence of identity at distant
Courts.14 In the course of time, as more strenuous efforts  were made for the
pursuit of criminals and old offenders were subjected to enhance
punishments,
 The introduction of better and more efficient means of identification
became essential, and to secure that desirable and various methods founded
on scientific basis, have, from time to time, been devised, adopted and tried
13 Encyclopaedia Britanica, Article 'Identification
14. Ibid
155
with more or less success. It needs no saying that today it has achieved
tremendous importance.
The first of these methods was that devised by M. Bertillon in France in
1983, based on the measurements of certain bony portions of the human
frame which according to him did not very between adolescence and extreme
old age.  In March, 1982 anthropometry, as Bertillon's system was called, was
introduced into Bengal and it gradually spread into other provinces of India.
But the method of classification adopted by this system was found to be
faulty.  So, in 1894 Galton's system of identification by finger prints was
introduced into India to supplement anthropology anthropometry, and for
some times after that the dual system prevailed.  In 1901, the system of finger
prints only, without being supplemented by measurements, was brought in.
The reasons that lead to general supersession of Bertillon's method of
identification may be summed up in its coutliness, the demand for superior
skill in subordinate agents and the  liability to errors not easy to trace and
correct.  A still more potent reason remained the comparative failure of
results. On the other hand, the advantages of record system of Galton Hency
method of finger prints were immense. By its means identification was prompt,
inevitable and almost absolutely correct.
There is perhaps no portion of evidence in regard to which witnesses,
Judges and Juries are required to exercise so much caution on this point and
failure to properly identify the accused have led to most serious and
deplorable results in the past.  It has not only consigned innocent parties to
prison and penal servitude but has also dispatched some of them to the
gallows and the gibbet.  "judges, however, able and experienced, are fallible,
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and evidence of identity, based on personal impression, is perhaps, of all
classes, of evidence the least to be relied on." The identification by a witness
of a person or thing is nothing but an exercise of his judgment based on
comparison of similarities and dissimilarities between two objects, and as
such, is apt to be erroneous in some cases.  The testimony of the senses
cannot be implicitly relied upon, even when the veracity of the witness is
above all suspicion.  Illustrations are too numerous to prove that what are
supposed to be the clearest intimations of the senses are some times,
fallacious, and some extraordinary cases have occurred of mistaken personal
identification.  An eminent Barrister, a gentlemen of acute mind and strong
understanding of the position of Sir Thomas Davenport, swore positively to
the persons of two men whom he charged with having robbed him in the open
daylight, but acknowledged his mistake on an alibi being proved and the real
robbers arrested sometime after.15
The resemblance between individuals is sometimes very closed, and
the likelihood of an identification being correct depends on many and various
peculiarities of the person identifying, the person identified and the time of
identification.  The identified may be either well-known to the identifier from
having been constantly seen by him, or he may have some striking physical
peculiarities, as a  Lisp of closed or closed eye, in which cases identification
may be easy and  correct. In other cases the identifier may have seen the
person identified only once, for a short time and at a distant period so that the
identification would be for more difficult.  There is also a great difference
between the skilled identifier such as a warder, or by a naturally observant
15 28 St. Tr. 819 (1784). See also East's Evidence.
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person and identification by a person naturally nervous, or perhaps over-quick
to identify from motives of revenge.  A Devonshire farm worker, Edmund
Galley had served twenty years in prison for murder in the middle of the last
century, when a declaration of dying woman freed him. He had been
convicted chiefly on her evidence.  She had told how she has actually seen
him struggle with, and kill, Jonathan May.   She had indeed seen May killed,
but it was not Galley, but another man, who had slain him.  She had
substituted Galley for the murderer out of spite, because he had once scorned
her.
 One of the most notable cases of mis-identification was that of the
French man Lesurques occurring in 1784 in the days of the Directory who was
positively identified as having robbed the Lyons Man and suffered death
protesting his innocences of the crime, which was afterwards brought home to
another man Duboseq. And this terrible judicial error proved to be the result of
extraordinary resemblance in statute, complexion and features between the
two men.
 Another curious case is to be found in American Records when a man
indicated in 1804 for bigamy as Hoag, who averred that he was really Parker.
There was marvelous conflict of testimony, even wives and families and
personal friends being misled, and there was a narrow escape from the
misidentification by a satisfactory proof of an alible.  Both the persons had
scars on the forehead, a lisp in the speech and a mark on the neck.
 The modern English case on the subject is that of Adolf Beck who had
been convicted both in 1896 and in 1904 by mistake for one Smith, who was
convicted both in 1877 and (after the release of Beck) in 1904.  The story of
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the strange confusion in the identity of these two men began in the year 1877
when the named James Smith was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for
obtaining money by false pretences from a number of women.  In 1904 Beck
was arrested on the complaint of a number of women who positively swore to
his identity as Smith who had again defrauded them.  There was a grave
miscarriage of Justice and Beck was sentenced to penal servitude.  The
terrible calamity which overlooks the victim in this case was due to mistaken
identity. He was believed by the prosecution to be Smith, the ex-convict.
When convicted, he was assigned by the prison authorities the latter and
number by which Smith had been designated, and it was not until the rearrest
of Smith after Beck's actual conviction that it became known that there was in
existence evidence conclusively negativing the identity of Smith and Beck.
Beck was than doubly pardoned and £ 500 compensation was awarded to
him by the Treasury.
 The most noteworthy of such cases standing out before all others in
English legal history, in respect of importance, complexity and the legal public
interest excited by it at the time, is the famous Tichborne case, which came to
an end in 1874 by the conviction, for perjury, of Arthur Orton, who had
misrepresented himself to be Roger Charles Tichbrne, saved from a
shipwreck by which he had in fact perished in 1854.  The Indian case of
Pratap Chand the claimant to the Burdwan Raj, resembled in many respects
the foregoing Tichborne case.  The pretender was tried at Hoogly in 1838,
and although many respectable witnesses including the Danish Governor at
Chinsura identified him as the real Prince, the case was proved against him.
In the old French cases of Martin Querre and Baronet, tried in1560 and 1764
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respectively the false claimants were confronted, at the last moment, with the
appearances of the real ones and the situation was saved.
 Such cases of disputed identity occur when a man goes away from
home for a number of years and finds on his return that difficulties are thrown
in the way of his resuming his old position.  He ventures to claim, as rightful
heir, title and poverty, but the home relatives failing to recognize him turn him
out as an imposter.  Occasionally such a person succeeds in establishing his
claim by proving his identity but very often he is treated no better than at false
pretender. As instances, mention may be made of some famous historic
impostures, such as Swerdis and Perkin Warbeck, and false Dometrius and
are the case of Martin Guerre referred to above which had been popularized
by Dumas in Lesdeux Dianes.  But probably no historic mystery ever raised
so large a crop of pretenders as the case of the luckless Son of Louis XVI of
France, upon whom broke the full fury of the French Revolution.  He became
the 'Dauphin' and is reported to have died in prison.
 Besides the identity of living persons, a Court of law has often to
decide questions on the identification of the dead.  This has been done by
means of the fragmentary remains of the human body.  For example,
skeleton, skull, teeth, etc.  as in the American case of Dr. Parkman, by means
of clothing and other weaving apparel of the deceased as in the cases known
as the Moat Mystery.  White Chapel Tragedy and the recent cases of Fanny
Hickman and Musst. Ihsaman (1923). In some remarkable instances an
imperfect  sort  of identification  has  been  effected after long internment.   As
examples, Guy cites the cases of the identification of the bodies of Charles I
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after 165 of the patriot Hampden after 185 years. The bodies of William
Rufus, Hency I, Richard, King John and Edward I have, at different times,
been more or less completely identified. The body of Raja of Benares, who
was slain in battle by Kutub in  589 of the Hijira, was recognized amongst
heaps of the slain by its artificial teeth which were fixed in by gold wires and
wedges. The scanty remains of the body of the Marchioness of Salisbury,
discovered in the ruins of the identified House, were also identified by the
jawbone having gold appendages for certificial teeth.
 The cease of mistaken identity in the living have their parallels in the
dead, as the following a case quoted by Guy from Beck's Medical
Jurisprudence will show.  A resurrection man was tried for raising the body of
a young woman from the ChurchYard of Stirling, nine weeks after death. It
was identified by all the relatives not only by the features but by the leg being
shorter than the right.  The jury was convinced that the lible was proved and
gave a verdict accordingly. "Now" says the author, "I am certain that it was not
the body of the woman who was taken from the churchyard of satirling, but
one that at least six weeks after the time libeled, was buried in the churchyard
of Falkirk, from which was taken by this man, who also took the other for
which he was tried : she also was lame of the left leg; thus, though guilty of
the offence laid to his charge, he was found guilty by a mistake of corpus
delicti."
 The identification of a dead body when it was found not long after
death can be easily none by some one who knew the deceased intimately.
But if putrefaction has set in, or an accident has disfigured or destroyed the
features, or only a skeleton be left the identification of the body comes within
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the province of the medical expert.  In India the identification of dead bodies
becomes at times very difficult owing to their rapid decomposition by heart,
and their liability to defacement when exposed to the revenges of beasts and
birds of prey.  The custom of rapid burial or cremation as also tends to cause
dead bodies to disappear in suspected cases of foul and murder before the
authorities concerned have ample and opportunity to have them properly
identified.
 The identification of things, like that of human persons, becomes also a
subject for determination in Law Courts. Most cases of identification of
persons are in fact cases of identification of things applied inferentially to the
establishment of personal identity.  Thus where it  was satisfactorily proved
that the clothes found on the body of the murdered man belonged to him and
were worn by him immediately before his disappearance, it was held to be
sufficient to find that the corpse was of that person although it was too the
imposed to be identified otherws.16  Identification of articles of property may
be established not by direct evidence alone but by means of numberless
circumstances which it is not possible to enumerate.  Where a stolen articles
is of ordinary make and there is nothing peculiar in it.  The evidence of the
complainant a person of  ordinary position, as to his identification is not
sufficient where it has been equally contradicted by a witness on the other
side.  In fact it is extremely difficult to identify articles of common occurrence
unless they have something peculiar about them.
16  8 Ind. Cas. 250 : 11 Cr. LJ 604.
17  15 Ind. Cas. 971 : 13 Cr. LJ 556.
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Thus the work of identification is be set with very serious difficulties
sometimes the evidence or of ordinary witnesses is sufficient to prove the
identity of persons and things, and on other and more important occasions the
evidence or persons specially skilled in the subject-matter of the particular
case is sought to establish the identity.  Sometimes direct evidence adduced
is deemed sufficient to prove the identity, but in a page number of cases
circumstantial evidence is the only kind of evidence available. Questions of
identity are required to be determined, as we have already seen in such cases
as when a scene is set up to an inheritance, or a man who has been robbed
has to identify the thief, or a witness an acquaintance; again, when a prisoner
makes his escape from prison and is retaken to custody it is of the utmost
importance that his identity should be first proved. For the purpose of
determining whether enhanced punishment should be inflicted on a person
who has been convicted of a certain offence identity of the person is required
to be proved to show if he had any previous conviction.  The question may
also arise where a dead body is brought from abroad is in the case of Dr.
Livingstone, an doubt exists whether the remains are those of the person of
whom they are alleged to be.
IDENTIFICATION PARADES
 OBJECT OF :
Objection of identification parades have been in common use for a very
long time, for the objection of placing a suspect in a line up other persons for
identification is to find out whether he is perpetration of the same.  This is all
the more necessary where the name of the offender is not mentioned by
those who claim to be eyewitnesses of the incident but they claim that
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although they did not know him earlier, they could recall his features in
sufficient details and would be able to identify him if and when they happened
to see him. The holding of test identification in such cases is as much in the
interest of investigating agency or the prosecution as in the interest of the
suspect or the accused. For while it enables the investigating officer to
ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the claim of those witnesses who
claim to have seen the perpetrator of the crime and their capacity to identify
him and thereby fill the gap in the investigation regarding the identity of the
culprit it saves the suspect or the accused from the sudden risk of being
identified in the dock by the self same witnesses during the course of the trial.
The line up of the suspect in a test identification parade  is therefore a
workable way of testing the memory  and veracity of witnesses in such cases
and has worked well in actual practice.18
 Identification of an individual on an affidavit by a counsel is a matter of
serious concern and the advocate concerned should not lightly endorse that
identification certificate without first satisfying himself about the identify of the
person concerned.  However, in dealing with such a case the court has to see
if it disclose any criminal intention on the part of the advocate identifying a
false person.19
 Where a witness identifies an accused who is not known to him in the
court for the first time, his evidence is absolutely valueless unless there has
been  a  previous  test  identification  parade  to  test his power of observation
18  8 Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 SC 1204; 1978 Cr.LJ 1137(1143).
19  Brijendra Kumar v. Prakash, 1984, Cr. LJ. 421.
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because the idea of holding test identification parade under section 9 of the
Evidence Act is to test the veracity of the witness on the question of capability
to identify and unknown person whom the witness may have seen only
once.20
 It is to give credence to the evidence of a witness who does not, know
the accused from before those identification parades are held, since without it
the evidence of a witness will have little value. The identification parades
belong to the investigation stage.  They are generally held during the course
of the investigation with the primary object of enabling the witnesses to
identify the parsons or the property, as the case may be, concerned in the
offence, who are not previously known to them.21  they are ordinarily held at
the instance of the investigating officer for the purpose of enabling the
witnesses to identify either the properties which are the subject matter of the
alleged offence or the persons who are alleged to have been concerned in the
offence. These parades serve to provide the investigating authority with
material to assure themselves if the investigation is proceeding on right
lines.22  this also serves to satisfy the investigating officers of the bona fides
of the prosecution witnesses and also to furnish evidence to corroborate their
testimony in court.23  The whole object behind an identification proceeding is
to find out whether the suspect is the real  offender or not.  One may confront
the witness with the suspect and find out whether he was the offender.  But
20  Ashfaq Ahmad v. State, 1981 ALL LJ 871.
21 Budhsen v. State of U.P., 1970 SCC(Cr.) 343, AIR 1970 SC 1321 (1970) 2 SCC 128.
22  Sheikh Habib Alia Tabarak v. State of Bihar (1971). 2 SCWR 46, Israful Seikh v. State of
Bihar, 1978 Cr LJ (NOC) 240 (Pat.).
23  Budhsen v. State of U.P. AIR 1970 SC 1321 UJ(SC) 689, 1970 Cr LJ 1149.
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there would be no guarantee of the truth of the witnesses' saying that he was
the offender. In order to have some guarantee of the truth, the witness is
confronted with the offender not standing alone but mixed with a number of
men of similar sizes and features.24
 Identification proceedings in their legal effect amount simply to this :
that certain persons are brought to jail or some other place and make
statement either express or implied that certain individuals whom they point
out persons whom they recognize as having been concerned in the crime.
The safe rule is to require corroboration of sworn testimony in the form of an
earliest test identification.25
 During the investigation of a crime committed by persons unknown to
the witnesses, the persons arrested on suspicion of their complicity in the
crime have got t be confronted by the investigating authority with the
witnesses so that they can find out whether they are the person who
committed the crime or not.  Before the investigating authorities send up a
case to court they must be satisfied that the persons arrested by them are the
persons accused of having committed the crime.  If they were known to the
witnesses, the witnesses would have given their names and that would have
established their identify, but when they were not known, their identity could
be established only if the witnesses on seeing them say that they are the
offenders. Since, it would be very easy for a witness who has little regard for
truly, to say that the person arrested on suspicious was the offender, he is
confronted with the suspect mixed with innocent men. If he has picked him out
24  Satya Narain v. State, AIR 19 All 385 at p. 394, see also..
25  State of Orissa v. Susanta Kumar Dey, 1979 Cr LJ (NOC) 52 (Orissa)..
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that would add to the reliability of his statement that he was the offender. This
is the primary object of identification proceedings.26  these parades are held
not for the purpose of giving defense advocates material to work on, but in
order to satisfy investigation officers of the bona fides of the prosecution
witnesses.27 The identification parades are held during the investigation stage
mainly to test the memory of the witnesses based upon first impression and
also to enable the prosecution to decide whether all or any of them could be
cited as eye-witnesses of the crime.28  Its relevancy is to show that the
witness was able to identify at the time and to exclude the idea that the
identification of the prisoner in the dock was an after thought of a mistake.29
 Where there was satisfactory evidence to prove that at least two of the
witnesses emphatically claimed from the very beginning of the incident that
they had noticed the culprit and had in fact described him and had claimed
that they could identify him, the holding of a test identification parade was
absolutely necessary.  The fact that such a parade was held within two days
of the arrest of the appellant, and was held by a Judicial Magistrate with all
the necessary precautions and arrangements, leaves no room for doubt that
the evidence of the test identification was of considerable importance. The
appellant know about that evidence from the date the parade was held and if
he wanted to demolish it, it was for him to do so by effective cross-
examination of the witnesses and / or by examining his own witnesses  in
rebuttal.  As  the  appellant  did  not  succeed in doing so it is futile to contend
26  Satya Narain v. State, AIR 1953 AII 385(394); See also in re Kamraj, 1960 Mad 125...
27  In re Sangiah, AIR 1948 Mad 113; 49 Cr. LJ 89; ILR 1948 Mad 667; (1947) 2 MLJ 252.
28  State  v. Ghulam Mohiddin, AIR 1951 AII 475; 1951 ALJ 437.
29  Rex v. Christie, 1914 AC 545(551), per Viscount Haldane, L.C.
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that we should reject this important piece of evidence  merely because the
prosecution did not lead evidence that the accused was kept 'Dapaice'.30
 No doubt substantive evidence against the accused is that which is
given in court by the identifying witnesses in the witness-box, yet test
identification  parades have their own importance in establishing the identify of
the culprit.  They provide a very good piece of corroborative evidence and
greatly enhance the credibility of the evidence of identification given in court.
Also identification parades serve the purpose of satisfying the investigating
the investigating authorities of the bona fides of the prosecution witnesses
and to have the assurance that they are on the right track.31  It has been held
that the identification parades are reported to for testing the power or capacity
of the witnesses to identify the person or thing they claim to identify. These
are tests designed to eliminate  false assertions as also to guard against
honest  mistakes.  When a person asserts that he had clearly seen the
accused who, though unknown to him by name and face, was yet one whom
he could pick out if he met him again, he is given a chance to prove his
assertion in a test designed for the purpose. If he is able to pick up the
accused in identification parade, his assertion gets added weight and if he
fails to do so and cannot reasonably explain his failure, his assertion is
considerably weakened.  This is the purpose that the identification parades
serve."32
30  Ramnathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 SC 1204 1978 CR. LJ. (1144), Karaidhan v.
State of Rajasthan, 1983 RLW 397; (1983) 2 Cr. LC 499 (DB).
31  State of Rajasthan v. Ranjita, AIR 1962 Raj 78 (FB)..
32  In re Narayan Singh, AIR 1965 MP 225..
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If the witnesses identify the suspects for the first time in the court, that
identification evidence cannot be easily accepted though it is substantive
evidence.  In order to lend assurance to the identification that may be made
by the witnesses in the court, identification parades are held earlier for the
witnesses to identify the accused concerned.33
 Since the accused remained in the hospital and was sent to jail
absence of the evidence of the medical authority of the jail authority that he
was kept  'baparda' before identification is also a circumstance against the
prosecution. It would be relevant here to note that G did complain before the
Magistrate that he has been shown to the witnesses earlier.  In these
circumstances, no value can be attached to the identification of the
accused.34
TEST IDENTIFICATN WHEN ACCUSED ALREADY KNOWN BUT  NOT BY
NAME :
Where however suspects are already known to the witnesses the
holding of test identification is all a waste of time and a fare.35
TEST IDENTIFICATION WHEN ACCUSED NOT KNOWN BUT NAMED IN
STATEMENTS UNDER SECTION 161, CR. P.C.
 The witnesses, who named the appellant as the murdered of the
deceased at the trial, did not known him since before.  No test identification
was held.  The naming of the appellant by the witnesses in their statement,
33   Ganesh v. State of Maharashtra, 1985 CR.LJ. 191.
34   State of Rajasthan v. Gajendra Kumar, 1981 CR LR (Raj) 586.
35 Dashiral Riang v. State, AIR Tripura 54L1964) 2 Cr LJ 585; State of Assam v. Haladhar
Bepari, 1980 Cr. LJ.737(Gauhati); Piarey v. State, 1982 UP Cr C.a2 Harihana Subhaiah
v. State of Karnataka, 1977 Cr. LJ. 1364 (1366) Karnataka.
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before the investigating officer cannot be relied upon as a substantive piece of
evidence for corroborating their statements subsequently made at the trial.
The statement made by a witness during the course of investigation cannot be
used for any purpose  other than that laid down by Section 162 Cr. P.C.  It
cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence to  corroborate the
prosecution evidence given at the trial. It could be used only for contradicting
the statements of the witnesses examined in the trial court.  In this state of
affairs the duty of the investigating agency was to arrange a test parade of the
appellant obviously because the object of holding test identification parades is
two fold, namely –(1) to satisfy the investigating authorities that; a certain
person, not previously known to the witnesses was involved in the
commission of the crime and the investigation was proceeding on correct
lines, and (2) to furnish evidence to corroborate the testimony which the
witnesses concerned tender before the court at the trial.36
TEST IDENTIFICATION WHEN ACCUSED NOT KNOWN BUT NAMED IN
THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT.
 There is serious lacuna where the appellant had not been put up for
test identification while he was not known to any of the witnesses examined in
this case from before. The same principle will apply even when the accused
was named in the first information report but was not known to the witnesses
from before.37
36  Rambahadur v. State 1977 (Cr. LJ. 1788 (1791); Rameshwar Singh v. State of Jammu
and Kashmir, AIR 1972 SC 102; 1972 Cr.LJ. 15.
37  Madhusudan v. State, (1980) 17 ACC 134 (136)...
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 It is quite possible to identify sport or recognize a person afterwards
even when he was seen for the first time on an earlier occasion, no matter
whether his name was known or unknown. However, it depends upon two
basic elements. First, sufficient or fair opportunity or means of recognition,
and secondly, the mental faculties to capture and retain the features of the
strangers.  These faculties very in proportionate degree from man to man.
The witnesses must depose about these elements, if the desires the court of
to accepted and act upon his testimony.38
OMISSION TO CONDUCT IDENTIFICATION PARADE :
 There is no provision in the code of Criminal Procedure for conducting
an identification parade.39 But there is nothing prohibiting it either.  The
substantive evidence at the trial is that of the witnesses in court.  The report of
the test identification parade, the proper stage for conducting which is at the
investigation stage, is useful only to corroborate that evidence.  On the basis
of the result of the identification test alone no court can convict an accused.
Therefore, without evidence at the test identification at the investigation stage
is useless.  If the evidence at the trial of the identification made at the time of
occurrence is reliable and convincing corroborative evidence of test
identification at the investigation is redundant. Cases where there is evidence
that the accused were known to the witnesses even before the occurrence are
instances where test identification is useless and unnecessary.  Therefore it is
not correct to say that in riot cases where several persons are, involved
38  Hasrat Ali v. State, (State of Assam, 1983 Cr. LJ. (NOC)(Gau.)
39  1974 Ker LT 328; See also Mokbal Ali v. State of Assam, 1984 Cr LJ (NOC) 45.
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omission to conduct an identification parade is fatal to the prosecution case.
IDENTIFICATION PARADES AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ACCUSED :
 The investigating officer gave out that as the accused had been caught
at the spot, there was no need to get his test identification done. The accused
had repeatedly been asking the authorities concerned to get his identification
test held but they rejected his request.  An accused may or may not have
legal right to claim for test identification and the holding of test identification
may or may not be rule of law but, it is a rule of prudence.  Test identification
parade must always be held when the accused definitely assets that he was
unknown to the prosecution-witnesses whether by name or by fare.  Even if
his assertion is found to be false no harm will be done if his test identification
parade is ordered to be held.  If in the identification parade the witnesses
succeeded in identifying him, the value of their evidence  would be
increased.40
 The identification test s usually adopted during the investigation of a
crime by the police, when the test witnesses are interrogated for the first time
and state that they had seen some persons committing the crime out do not
know their names and would be able to identify them if they could see them
again.  The identification test is a check upon their veracity.  These
proceedings are in the nature of tests and the courts regard them as record of
facts which establish the identification of anything of person  and which may
be relevant under section 9 of the Evidence Act.  The facts are to be proved
according to law and in the absence of such proof, the identification
40  Suresh Chandra v. State, 1979 A Cr R 385, Sabbir v. State of U.P. 1982 ALJ 629.
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proceedings are valueless, the fact is proved can be used both for purposes
of corroboration as well as for contradiction.41 Apart from the investigation
utilizing these tests for checking up their own evidence and affording the
courts latter on to rely upon them as corroborative evidence, the accused
may, in certain cases, demand the holding thereof.  Where the prosecution
has committed to hold a test identification, possibly on the theory that the
witnesses know the accused from before or for some other reason, the
accused may apply to the court for holding of a test identification to check up
the veracity of the witnesses who claim to know him from before. In a Lahore
case in Amar Singh v. Emperor,42 the court held that whenever an accused
disputes the ability of the prosecution witnesses to identify him, the court
should direct an identification parade to be held save in the most exceptional
cases. In another case of the same High Court reported in Sajjan Singh v.
Emperor43 the accused, before being sent up for trial applied to have the
veracity of the witnesses tested by means of an identification parade. The
request was however refused by the Magistrate to whom it was made.  The
application was sent first to the police for report.  It was reported that the
statement of witnesses showed that they knew the accused from before and
that the application had been made only for the purpose of delay.  The reason
of delay however was incorrect.  The application had been made more than
week before the proceedings came up so that it should have been possible to
arrange for a parade which would not have involved any delay. About the
41  State v. Ghulam Mohiuddin, AIR 1951 AII 475
42  AIR 1948 LAH 303 : 45 Cr. LJ. 98.
43  AIR  1945  Lah 48 : 46  Cr LJ 550...
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other reason that was given, the High Court thought that even to be unsound.
It held :
If an accused person is already well known to
be the witnesses, an identification parade
would, of course, be only a waste of tie. If,
however, the witnesses claim to have known
the accused previously while the accused
himself denies this, it is difficult to see how the
claim made by the witnesses can be used as a
reason for refusing to allow their claim to be
put to the only practical test.  Even if the denial
of the accused is false, no harm is done, and
the value of the evidence given by the
witnesses may be increased.  It is true that it is
by no means uncommon for persons who have
been absconding for a long time to claim an
identification parade in the hope that their
appearance may have changed sufficiently for
them to escape recognition. Even so this is not
in itself a good ground for refusing to allow any
sort of test to be carried out. It may be that the
witnesses may not be able to identify a person
whom they knew by sight owing to some
change of appearance or even to weakness of
memory. But this is only one of the facts along
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with any others, such as the length of  time that
has elapsed, which will have to be taken into
consideration in determining whether the
witnesses are telling the truth or not."
 The court further held that when such requests are refused and for no
valid reason the case would more often than not, end in acquittal, should any
serious question of identity arise during the course of the trial for the
witnesses claim to identify the accused will remain subject to a doubt which
might easily have been removed if their ability had been put to the test before
the trial. It is too late to do anything after the trial has begun, for by that time
the witnesses will have become accustomed to the appearance of the
accused in court.
 These cases of the Lahore High Court have been dissented from in a
case of the Madras High Court reported in re Sangiah44 and a case of the
Allahabad High Court reported in State v. Ghulam Mohiuddin.45 In the Madras
case the court held : "I am unable to find any provision in the code which
entitles an accused to demand that an identification parade should be held at
or before the enquiry r the trial.  An identification parade belongs to the stage
of investigation by the police.  The question whether a witness has or has  not
identified  the  accused during the investigation is not one which in itself is
relevant at the trial.  The actual evidence regarding identification is that which
is given by the witnesses in court. The fact that a particular witness has been
able to identify the accused at an identification parade is only a circumstance
44 AIR  1948 Mad 113 : 49  Cr LJ  89.
45 AIR 1951 AII 475 : 1951  ALJ  437...
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  corroborative of the identification in court.  If  the witness has not identified
the accused at a parade or otherwise during the investigation, the fact may be
relied  on by the accused, but I find nothing in the provisions of the Code
which confers a right on the accused to demand that the investigation should
be conducted in a particular way. Identification parade is a part of the
investigation and once the case has reached the stage of an enquiry before
the Magistrate, the investigation is at end all that takes place thereafter should
tae place in court and from part of the record of the case.  If a case is posted
for trial any test as to the ability or credibility of the witnesses should be
decided only in court and not by means of an identification parade, the
proceedings of which will not form part of the record of the court."  The court
however, held that if the accused makes a request that he be mingled with
other persons in the dock, and then P.W.'s may be asked to pick him up, that
request would be granted in due course.
 The Allahabad High Court in State v. Ghulam Mohiuddin46  also
proceeds on the same lines.  It held that in cases where the Magistrate takes
cognizance of an offence upon a police report or upon a private complaint, the
accused may inform the court that he is not known to the prosecution may
arrange for an identification parade for his identification, but he cannot ask the
court to direct the prosecution to arrange for such a parade; and the court
cannot make an order for the holding of a regular identification parade
obviously because there is no provision of law under which the court can
issue any such direction.  The court may, however, in such cases satisfy itself
46 AIR  1951 AII 475 :1951  ALJ 437.
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by asking the accused to stand among other persons present in court and
then call upon the witnesses, who appear before the court to identify the
accused and make note of the result of the record.  The argument that if no
test identification is held at the request of the accused and he has been thus
deprived of an opportunity to test the veracity of the prosecution witnesses will
mean a serious prejudice to him in his trial was held as not tenable. The court
held that one had to proceed on assumption that there had been no
identification proceedings in the case, and it is not permissible to speculate
what would have been the position if certain things might have happened.
 The above ruling was however explained in a later ruling of the same
court in Lajja Ram v. State,47 and it was held that provided it is not too late to
do so, the accused can challenge the prosecution to an identification parade
to falsify the claim of the eye-witnesses who profess to have known him and
although there is no law which could be said either to confer any right upon
the accused to throw such a challenge or to impose any duty upon the
prosecution to take up the challenge the prosecution that ignores that
challenge without justification would be doing it at its peril. When the accused
puts up a challenge that the witnesses do not know him and that in
identification test should be held unless the prosecution can nullify that claim
of the accused (e.g., by showing that even though the witnesses were not put
to the test of identification there is evidence aliunde which  establishes without
doubt that the accused was known to them, there would be an element of
doubt attached to the testimony of witnesses in case the identification test is
47 AIR  1955 AII 671 : 1956   Cr LJ  1547.
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not held and the benefit of that doubt would go to the accused.  The court held
that even if the prosecution failed in its duty to hold the identification at the
request of the accused the court concerned should order the holding of it if the
accused persists before it.
 The Patna view of the holding of identification parade at the instance of
the accused has   been categorically stated in a case Awadh Singh v. State,48
which view has been further endorsed in a case State v. Dhanpat.49  In the
former case court held. The accused may or may not have legal right to claim
for test identification and the holding of test identification may or may not be
rule of law, but it is a rule of prudence, no doubt, that in such cases test
identification parade should be held, especially when the accused persons
definitely assert that they were unknown to the prosecution witnesses either
by name or by face and they request the authorities concerned to hold the test
identification parade."  In the later case his Lordship was  pleased to hold as
follows : "It seems to me that Magistrates and Police Officers suffer from
some confusion on the question of holding a test identification parade. If the
witnesses do not give the name of any accused, they rightly think that it is
necessary to hold a test identification parade and a parade is almost
invariably hold.  Where, however, a witness gives the name of an accused as
one whom he had identified, they think that no test identification parade s at
all necessary. That is ordinarily correct; but if any accused holds out a
challenge and says that he will not be identified by the witnesses or makes a
48 AIR  1954 Pat 483 : 2 BLJ 23 : 55  Cr LJ 1546.
49 AIR  1960 Pat 582 : (1960) 61 Cr LJ  1650 : 1960 BLJ 511.
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 prayer that he should be put upon a test identification parade, such a parade
must always be held in order to meet the challenge. If it is not held, there will
always be a doubt in the mind of the Judge or the trying Magistrate that,
possibly, the witnesses may not have been able to identify the accused, if a
parade had been held.  This will mean failure of the prosecution case."
Elaborating the point, however further, his Lordship held that there must
however be one exception. If the accused is arrested on the spot and if he is
in custody from that time up to the date of his trial.  There can be no question
at all about his identity. If a parade is held, it will be only a test of the memory
of the witness, or witnesses concerned. It cannot possibly be a factor of any
importance on the question of identification because the accused all the time
remained in jail.
 Allahabad High Court in Asharfi v. State50 has held that if  the accused
requests the court for the holding of the test identification and the court
reasonably comes to the conclusion that there may be force in what the
accused contends, it should direct the holding of a regular test identification in
order that the witness's veracity may be tested. The court has ample powers
under section 311, Cr.P.C. to secure the evidence.
 The accused does not have a right to demand test identification after
the case has been committed to the Court of Session and even within 10 days
of the date of commencement of the trial. Especially when after filling this
revision he has secured an order for release on bail and has apparently been
released on bail, the Sessions Judge was justified in summarily rejecting the
50 AIR  1961 AII 153  : 1960  ALJ 595 : (1961) 1  Cr LJ  340.
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application on the ground that it was far too belated.51
 It has been held in a Punjab case52 that the accused cannot compel
the prosecution to hold their identification during the investigation, and there is
no law or procedure under which the Magistrate could pass such an order.
But if such a prayer is made by the accused and the prosecution opposes
such request, by so doing it exposes the witness of identification to a genuine
criticism that they would probably not be able to identify the offenders
correctly if the parade was held. Under such circumstances, therefore, it is
desirable that the identification parade of the culprits should be held if so
desired by the offenders.
 The accused said that he had been wrongly involved in the case and
the eye-witness could not possibly identify him.  The prosecution came forth
with the plea that the identification need not be held because the prosecution
with the plea that the identification need not be held because the prosecution
witnesses already knew him. If the prosecution-witness already knew the
petitioner and they were unable to identify him in an identification parade, and
there would be greater reason for discarding the testimony of such witnesses.
Denial of this right to the petitioner tantamount to stopping him from making
up a defense which he wants to set up in a criminal case.  It is against the
elementary principles of criminal law.  It is difficult to understand how a
request made on behalf of the accused person can be declined on a ground
like this. Had it been within the powers of the police and the  Magistracy to
control  the  defense  which  the  accused  wanted  to  lead,  then perhaps no
51 Sharif Ahmad v. State of U.P.1981 AII Cr.R. 151:1981 AII WC 268:1981 AII  Cr.C.232..
52 Tek Chand v. State, AIR 1965 Punj 146.
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person standing trial in a criminal case could get justice. The  order passed by
the Magistrate declining the request of the petitioner regarding the holding of
an identification can not be allowed to stand.53
 It is well settled now that when a particular accused claims
identification, it should normality be allowed in order to lend assurance to the
statements of the eye-witnesses of the occurrence and in order to corroborate
their statements from the result of the identification proceedings. The other
possibilities can also not be excluded that the stand taken by the accused
may be correct and that he might not be known to the witnesses from before
and hence their testimony could be put to a scrutiny as a result of the
identification parade being held and its result being obtained.54
DUTY OF MAGISTRATE HOLDING IDENTIFICATION PARADES :
 Deeping in view the purpose of identification parades the Magistrates
holding them are expected to all possible precautions to eliminate any
suspicion of unfairness and to reduce the chance of the testimonial error.
They must, therefore, take intelligent interest in the proceedings, bearing in
mind two considerations : (i) that the life and liberty of and accused may
depend on their  vigilance and caution : and (ii) that justice should be done in
the identification.  Those proceedings should not make it impossible for the
identificatifiers who, after all, have, as a rule, only fleeting glimpses of the
person they are supposed to identify. Generally speaking, the Magistrate must
53 Joginder Singh Alias Naginnder Singh v. Punjab State, (1973) 75 Punj LR 786 : 1974 CLR
588 : 1974 Cr. LJ 240..
54 Mohd. Yaqoob v. State, 1973 AII Cr. R 307 Suresh Chandra v. State, 1979 A Cr. C. 385
(388)
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make a notice of the every objection raised by an accused at the time f
identification and the steps taken by them to ensure fairness to the accused,
so that the court which is to judge the value of the identification evidence may
take them into consideration in the appreciation of the evidence.  The power
to identify, it may be kept in view, varies according to the power of observation
and memory of the person identifying and each case depends on its own
facts, but there are two factors which seem to be of basic importance in the
evaluation of identification.  The persons required to identify an accused
should have had no opportunity of seeing him after the commission of the
crime and before identification and secondly that no mistakes are made by
them or the mistakes made are negligible.  The identification to be of value
should also be held without much delay.  The number of persons make up
with the accused should be reasonably large and their bearing and general
appearance not glaringly dissimilar.55
IDENTIFICATION PARADES – ORECAUTIONARY MEASURE
 As identification parades are tests for criminating false assertions and
to guard against honest mistakes of the Witnesses, the courts require that
they should be held under conditions most conducive to their being fair tests
for elicitation of truth, such as, without undue delay, when the impressions are
fresh and the impressions are fresh and the other influences are less likely to
have operated, without giving an opportunity to the witnesses to see the
accused,  or   to   acquaint  themselves  with  his  features  with  the  aid  of
55 Buden v. State of U.P. 1970 Cr.LJ 1149 : AIR 1970 SC 1321 : 1970 SCC (Cr), Hari Singh
v. State of Rajasthan, 1978 Cr LR (Raj) 536 (538), see also Sudha Dehury v. State, 1982
Cr. LJ 500 (Ori).
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photographs, sketches, description or the like, by mixing the accused with
sufficient number of other persons, to eliminate chance identification, by
mixing the accused with persons of the same race, culture, age, height and
position in life, so that he is not easily picked out by reason of any of the
aforementioned characteristics, by allowing the accused to select his own
position with live, by concealing the distinguishing marks of the accused, if
any by not permitting the identifying witnesses on their leaving the parade to
communicate with others who are yet to identify by holding the parade free
from the influence of the police and the prosecuting agency.
 Identification may be either firstly by circumstantial evidence that is
body mark, scar, by the tone of voice etc. or by direct assertion, that is, by
pointing out in a parade specially held for this purpose.  There is chance for
error in both kind of evidence due to defective perception or imperfect
recollection.  It is essential that all possible precautions should be taken to
eliminate any suspicion of unfairness and to reduce the chance of testimonial
error.  The Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure, (1929) in
England considered the precautionary measures to be adopted at the time of
conducting identification parade.  These measures and directions have been
mostly adopted in India. They are;
" In arranging for a personal identification every precaution should be taken :
(a)  To exclude any suspicion of unfairness or risk of erroneous
identification through the
a. …witnesses attention being directed to the suspected persons
paraded, and
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b. To make sure that the witnesses ability to recognize the accused
has been fairly and accurately tested, it is therefore desirable that
i)   The arrangements for an identification parade should be
made by an officer other than the officer-in-charge of the
case against the prisoner.  There is no objection, however, to
the officer-in-charge of the case being present.
ii) The witnesses should be prevented from seeing the prisoner
before he is paraded with other persons and have no
assistance from photographs or descriptions,
iii) The accused should be placed among persons who are as
far as possible of the same age, height, general appearance
and position in life.
iv) The accused should be allowed to select his own position in
the line, and should be expressly, asked if he has any
objection to the persons present with him on or the
arrangements made. If he desires to have his solicitor or his
friend present at the identification, this should be allowed.
v) The witnesses should be introduced one and on leaving
should not be allowed to communicate with witnesses still
weighting to see the persons paraded, and that the accused
should be allowed, if so desires, on being informed on his
right, to change his position after each witness has left.
vi) All unauthorized persons should be strictly excluded from the
place where the identification parade is held.
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vii) Every circumstance connected with the identification should
be carefully recorded by the officer conducting it, where the
accused or any other person is identified or not.
 It is necessary that the accused person who it may be necessary to put
up for identification, should be warned at the time of their arrest, that it may be
necessary to put them up for identification and that they should keep their
faces covered and to take them to the police station in that state.  In the police
station, the look up in which they are kept should be covered with a Purdah so
that no one is able to see their faces.  When they are taken to court or to Jail
their faces should be covered. In Jail also no outsider should be allowed to
see their faces. All these precautions should not only be taken but should be
proved to have been taken.57
 Where no precautions is necessary to ensure reliability of identification
at test parade was taken no reliance can be placed on the test identification
parades of the identification later on before Magistrate or the Sessions Court
and the evidence in that respect must be excluded from consideration, while
judging the guilt of the appellant.58 the value of identification at a test parade
depends to a very large extend on whether the identifying witness had any
opportunity between the occurrence and the test identification parade to see
the suspect.  If as is usual, the suspect remains in custody after his arrest, the
opportunity of the identifying witness seeing him is reduced to a minimum, if,
however, the suspect has been let out on bail the opportunity of the identifying
57 AIR  1955 Tripura 19 : 1955 Cr LJ 1292.
58 AIR  1958 Tripura 30 :  1958 Cr LJ 1549.
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witness seeing him is considerably increased. Where the accused was on bail
for a considerable period, the omission to point out this circumstances to Jury
is a serious misdirection which vitiates  Judge's charge.59  The accused and
two other persons who were put up for identification had their ears bored. At
this identification parade although twenty five men were mixed, amongst
those who were mixed there were only ten person who had their ears bored.
No steps were taken to cover up the bored ears so that the witness had really
to pick out three men, out of the thirteen.  It was held that in view of this small
number of under trials with bored ears who mixed at the parade the
assurance which flows from the mixing of large number was not available in
the case.60
 It is the duty of every magistrate who holds identification proceedings
to see for himself  whether any accused person for identification has such
visible marks on him which are likely to facilitate the identification of the
accused.  There is no duty whatever on the accused person to specifically
bring it to the notice of the Magistrate that he has a certain identifying mark.  It
is the duty of the Magistrate to satisfy himself and not for the accused to point
out to him his duty is to be performed.
IDENTIFICATION : EVIDENTIARY VALUE :
The evidence of mere identification of the accused person, is not
substantive evidence and is a weak one, such an evidence, to carry
conviction, should be clear as to how and under what circumstances the
accused was picked out by the witness.
59 AIR  1951 Cal 377 : 52 Cr LJ  492, see also 1858 Cr.LJ 698.
60 AIR  1958  All 616 : 1958 C..
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It is true that the substantive evidence of a witness is his statement in court,
but the purpose of test identification is to test that evidence and the safe rule
is that the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the identity of the
accused who are strangers to the witnesses, generally speaking, requires
corroboration which should be in the form of an earlier identification
proceedings, where an  identification parade was held within two days of the
incident, with all due precautions and arrangements by judicial Magistrate, the
identification evidence of the witnesses assume considerable importance, and
this importance would not be reduced by the mere objection that the
prosecution did not prove that the accused was kept "Ba Parda" wherein a
murder charge against several accused under section 302 read with section
34, an identification parade consisting of forty six persons in which there were
seven suspects and eye an witness while picking out nine persons made
there correct identifications and made six mistakes, no reliance could be
placed on such an identifications by the witness even though he was
disinterested and it could not be used as corroboration of the evidence of
another interested eye-witness. Where an eye-witness failed to pick out an
accused both in the identification parade as well as in the committing
Magistrate's court, it would be entirely incorrect to relay upon his belated
identification in the sessions court.61  In a murder case involving several
accused holding of identification parade by the Investigation officer for his
"Personal satisfaction" without any attempt to get a magistrate to hold a test
identification is a grievous error of judgment on the part of the investigating
officer.
61 AIR  1960 SC 1340 : 1960  Cr LJ 1621.
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A conviction in a capital case cannot be based on the subjective
satisfaction of  the Investigating Officer but on evidence which satisfaction /
satisfies certain well recognized objective tests.62  The accused were known
to the witnesses before the occurrence.  Though there was bright moonlight,
these witnesses had the opportunity of seeing there fleeing strangers for a
very short time.  These accused persons also had no distinctive appearance
or infirmities which would fix their features indelibly upon the minds of these
witnesses. The first information report and the dying declaration did not
contain even a description of these accused. The identification parade had
been held  practically fifteen months after the date of occurrence.  It was held,
that in the circumstances it would be unsafe to rest the conviction of the
accused upon the identification evidence.63
At an identification parade there is always a possibility of mistaken
identifications. All that is required in such cases is cautions approved in which
judicial maturity, strict adherence to the rule of prudence, judicial and
pragmatic approach to evidence together with experience in human affairs are
the guiding factors.  The State of v. Shankar Alias Raju.64  Identification be
seeing the back is at best a treacherous one.65  It is the identification of an
accused by a witness in the Court of Session or before the committing
Magistrate in the presence of the accused that can be substantive evidence of
identification.  If that is wanting a case the mere fact that in a previous test
identification parade he was able to identify  him  and  he  admitted  this  fact
62 AIR  1960 Andhra Pradesh 545 : 1960 Cr LJ  1402.
63 AIR  1960 Mad 125 :1960  Cr LJ  38.
64  Ibid
65 AIR
188
during the deposition in Court would not make it substantive evidence.  Such
a piece of evidence  would be very weak.66 Where certain witnesses were not
made to identify the accused in the test identification parade their subsequent
identification of the accused at the time of the trial in the Sessions Court will
not be of any material importance.67
On the question of the identification the evidence against the accused
is excellent where it was formed that each of the accused was correctly and
consistently pointed out by at least four of the eye-witnesses of the Crime.
These witnesses had also pointed out the accused before the court and sworn
that they saw them taking part in the dacoity.  The  witnesses further declared
that they had never seen these persons before the dacoity and the
identification parade. There was bright moonlight and the robbers and their
victims had seen each other from very close quarters.  It is clear that the eye-
witnesses had every chance to marking features of the accused.  Accordingly
the evidence on the test to identification was deserving of very high value.68
The fact that every one of the identifying witnesses was not able to identify
every one of the accused in the case does not detract from the evidence of
those witnesses who identified particular accused.69  Normally the result of
identification proceedings in which a particular accused is pout up must alone
be taken into consideration in deciding the value of identification of a
particular witness  with  respect  to  that  accused,  other  test  identifications,
66  AIR
67  AIR
68  AIR  1956  AII 163 : 1959 Cr LJ  358.
69 1958 Raj LW 527.
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provided they were held within a short period of the test under consideration,
can be taken into account solely for judging the memory and power of
observation of the witness concerned.70
The evidence of Test identification parade cannot from the basis of
conviction.  It is not a substantive piece of evidence.  The purpose of I.I.
Parade is to test the statement of the witness made in court which constitutes
substantive evidence. Where there is no such substantive evidence at all as
to the identity of the properties, the earlier identification parade cannot be of
any assistance to the prosecution.71
The test  identification by a witness which is not a substantive piece of
evidence but can only be used as corroborative evidence cannot be of much
evidentiary value.  The identification parades are of little value to the
prosecution and there is no question of the accused having been prejudiced
by the late identification parades.72
The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial
for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The
evidence in order to carry conviction should ordinarily clarify as to how and
under what circumstances he came to pick out the particular accused person
and the details of the part which the accused played in the crime in question
with reasonable particularity. The purpose of prior test identification, therefore,
seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is
considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the
70 AIR  1961 AII 153..
71 Krupa Sindhi Mallick v. State (1978) 46 CUT LT  260 (265)
72 Rajkishore Singh and others v. State of Bihar 1971 SCD 62 : 1971 SCC (Cr.) 73.
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sworn testimony of the witnesses in court as to the identity of the accused
who are strangers to them in the form of earlier identification proceedings.
There may, however, be exceptions to the general rule, when, for example,
the court is impressed by a particular witness, on those testimony it can safety
rely even without corroboration.73
If a person is identified by one and not by some, there is not set off and
it cannot be deemed that he was identified by none.74
1)  The substantive evidence with regard to identification of the accused
is the statement of a witness made in the court.
2) Since such evidence from its very nature is inherently of a weak
character t is a safe rule of prudence to look for corroboration in the
form of earlier test identification unless a particular witness in such as
his testimony can be safely relied upon without such corroboration.
3) Test identification belongs to investigation stage and is generally held
during investigation in order to satisfy the investigating officer of bona
fides of the witnesses and to provide corroboration later at the trial.
4) Such test identification should be held without much delay and the
witness must have had no opportunity of seeing the accused after the
commission of the crime and before test identification.
5) The number of persons mixed with the accused should be  reasonably
large & their bearing  & general appearance not glaringly dissimilar, &
6) The identification is statement of a witness either express or implied
that the person point out by him was concerned in the crime;
73 Jagnya and 24 others v. State of Rajasthan 1980 Cr LR (Rajl) 261.
74 Kartar and others v. State of Rajasthan 1978 CR LR (Raj.) 348 : 1978 Raj Cr. C. 318.
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7) Any person can conduct a test identification but the conducted by a
police officer, it would be governed by section 162, Criminal Procedure
Code but if conducted by a Magistrate, then by section 164 Criminal
Procedure Code.
8) If a person is identified by some and not identified by some others,
there is no set off and it cannot be deemed that he was identified by
none.75
The evidence of test identification is at best supporting evidence. It can
be used only to corroborate the substantive evidence given by the witness in
court regarding identification of the accused as the door of the Criminal Act.76
The identification of the accused in court without anything else should
not be taken into consideration in order to convict him.  The value of
identification of a person for the first time in court is valueless.77
APPRECIATION AND EVALUATION OF IDENTIFICATION EVIDENNCE BY
COURT :
 The identification of persons not known from before is a weak
type of evidence is admitted on all hands,78 but somehow the courts feel
inclined  to  convict  on  that  evidence  when  they  feel  that  the  witness  to
75 Kartar v.State of Rajasthan,(1978)3 RCC 318(323), Budhsen v. State of U.P. AIR 1970 SC
1321 : 1970 CR. LJ. 1149 : Asharif v. Stali AIR 1901 AII 153 : See also R. Parameshwar
Menon, v. State of Maharashtra 1982 CR LR (Mah) 39 State of U.P. v. Boota Singh 1982
SC Cr. R 205 : 1982 SCC (Cr) 115 Bijoy Kumar Mohapatra v. State, 1982 SC Cr. F.205 :
1982 SCC (Cr) 115 : Bijoy Kumar Mohapatra v. State, 1982 Cr.LJ 2162 (Orissa) (DB)
Adesh Kumar v. State 1986 CR. LJ 233 : 1985 DLJ 126.
76 Kishan v. State of Rajasthan 1981 CR LR (Raj) 217.
77 Laxmidhar Raut v. State (1982) 53 Cut LT 342 1982 Cut LR (Cr.) 71,
78 Shri Ram v. State (1976) 1 SCJ 15 : AIR
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identification is honest, and he had good opportunity to observe the offender.
All the case-law on the point would show that the courts require at least two
such honest witnesses before they would convict the man and that two when
the evidence of any such witness is corroborated by his previous identification
of the awarded in the identification parade held with all necessary precautions
and without unnecessary delay where the witness had committed no mistakes
or very nominal mistakes.  This they call a rule of prudence.
 The power to identify varies according to the power of observation and
memory of the person identifying and each case depends on its own facts, but
there are two factors which seems to be of basic importance in the evaluation
of identification evidence.  The persons required to identify an accused should
have no opportunity of seeing him after the commission of the crime and
before the identification and no mistakes are made by them or mistakes make
are negligible. The identification to be of value should be held without much
delay.79
 There is no absolute rule that if a witness identifies all suspects
correctly, his evidence is necessarily bad and should not be relied upon.80
 But what can the necessary precautions avail when the witness has
seen the accused already  before the identification parade, i.e. sometime after
the commission of the offence and before the accused is put up for
identification ?  If the witness has so seen his man, he should be able to pick
him up in the parade, precautions or no precautions. What is the remedy
them ? The witness has simply to state in court that he saw that the particular
79 Sidha Dehuany v. State, 1982 Cr LJ 500 (Ori.).
80 Bhullan v. State, 1981 AII Cr. R. 208 : 1981 AII WC 376.
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accused in his house etc., and  he along with others, Gay, committed the
dacoity. That there was a full or half moon, or the lamp was burning or that the
culprits raised the with of the lamp, and in that light he could fairly observe the
man. Some time the allegation is made that the culprits burned the thatch, etc.
in the house and so there was sufficient light. Now the witness is all honest
except perhaps for the fact that he denies the allegation about having been
shown his man by the police. What was the exact state of light at the time is
difficult to adjudge at times, and then the existence of any sort of light can be
introduced in the police statement, and that too if these statements are written
on a plain paper as from no part of the pages of the special diary, which
statement later on can be put n the mouth of the witness in court. But even
with all the light at time the observation of the man may have been faulty.  He
may have seen the man only hardly.
But even with the bet of light the man may have go scared, or
confused, his mind may have been working elsewhere, and then to observe
all and sundry at the time when the offence is being committed in really a
difficult matter, rather very difficult, if not impossible.  In the day-time even
when a number of men are  jointly committing an offence against someone or
more, say beating him or them, it is hardly possible to see everybody's face
and even if one has seen their faces to retain the impression of all of them in
the mind.  Now in a court of law, the man may say that he saw the man or
man committing the offence at his place and there was light enough for him to
see their faces. The court may be inclined to believe him because for one
thing the commission of the offence may be a fact beyond dispute and the
presence of the witness at the time may also be beyond dispute.  The witness
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has also picked up the man at the identification parade hold with all necessary
precautions. To all intent and purposes the witness would seem to be honest
especially if he sticks to his previous statements say made by him before the
police and the committing Magistrate and does not unnecessarily ramble
about.  The evidence of identification is complete and the accused would be
convicted because all said and done the police had shown the accused to the
witness. The court had been honest in assessing the value of identification
evidence which had passed the test of prudence.
The courts are after all presidents over by human beings and mistakes
are therefore possible. But it has always to guard against the fact that false
witnesses do not get the certificate of truthfulness and those telling the truth
are not rated as liars and this certification one way or the other is more
possible in a case of identification.  The courts have to be doubly circumspect
apart from the fact that while no guilty person escapes, no innocent man
should also suffer.
Whether a witness is honest or not, it is always a matter for harm
discernment and in these days when there is hardly any incentive left to speak
the truth, the courts are put to a very hard strain, and then while assessing the
value of identification, this strain is bound to be still harder.  The reason is that
there is no sure guide to judge whether the witness had a close observation of
the offender and that even after close observance, he retained in his mind the
clear impression of him.  Apart from that there is no instrument so far invented
which can judge the capability or the capacity f the witness to receive and
retain a certain impression.  The witness says, "I saw such and such a person
and my mind retained the impression, by the help of which impression,  I pick
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up the man among a host of other persons in the identification parade."  A
tight cross-examination may dispel certain doubts, but the witness was on the
spot and he observed the man, so far he is right and no cross-examination
can dislodge him from that position, if the witness really sticks to absolute
truth in that respect.  How his mind was working at the time or how far he got
the impression is the witness's own job to narrate and he may pass that test.
Many things no doubt help the cross-examination and the situation in every
case is always changing but still a witness who has been on the sport and had
really observed the man may pass the test and be rated a fully truthful, and
that for the face that although he had not been able to receive the impression
of the man's features fully and was even losable to retain it, he was shown his
man by the police later on. Now what is the remedy for that sort of situation?
A very pertinent statement as a guide to assess the value of
identification evidence occurs in a case of Allahabad High Court in Anwar v.
State.81  the learned Judges have observed :
"In assessing evidence of identification, it is, neither, possible nor
desirable to lay down any hard and fast rules, for there is an infinite variety of
situations and circumstances in which a witness gets an opportunity of seeing
the culprits, but still we are of the opinion that some general guiding principles
can be stated.  The trial courts are repeatedly making the mistake of following
a rule of thumb when they assess the evidence of identification and they do
not subject it to the tests of prudence. It is one of the basic principles of
criminal law that a fact or circumstance should be proved against an accused
81 AIR  1961 AII 502 (1961) 1 Cr. LJ 22 : Akbar Ali v. State of U.P. 1982 ACC 315, Vijay Alias
Brij Mohan v. State, 1981 Chand Cr C. 81 (Delhi).
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before it can be relied upon and used against him.
"A fact is held to be proved only when it fulfils the definition of the word
'proved' given a section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act.  The evidence of
identification is as much subject to this definition as any other kind of
evidence, but it  seems to us that in assessing the evidence of identification,
the trial courts do not apply the tests provided in this definition.  It is true that
an absolute certainty is not need but the court has to test the evidence with
prudence and accept it only when it is so highly probable  that its truth can
safely be accepted.
"What is the approach of prudence ?  Prudence, in our opinion,
requires that the court should approach the evidence with the reasonable
doubts of an intelligent person and accept it only if reasonable doubts of an
intelligent person and accept it only if those doubts are removed. This does
not mean distrusting the evidence. But only subjecting it to reasonable test.  It
certainly excludes from its, orbit the blind faith of a true believer, for prudence
and credulity do not go together.  It is this second kind of approach which is
coming to our notice frequently in dacoity cases.
What in essence is the evidence of identification ?  At its best it is the
recognition of a stranger's face seen momentarily during the stress and
excitement of an incident in touch-light or such other artificial light after a
lapse of several days or months, as the case may be, and the identifier claims
that he carried this image all this time in his mind and when he went to the
identification parades the image in his mind corresponded with the features of
a suspect in parade whom he accordingly picked out.  It can therefore be
accepted only if the court is satisfied on the following points :-
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(1) That witness had at least a fair, it nota good opportunity of seeing
the dacoits.
(2) The identification parade was held within a reasonable time of the
incident.
(3) The power of observation of the witness is reliable.  This should be
tested from two angles:-
(a)  That when the parade was held, the witness was really tested
and it was not made too easy for him to pick out the suspect.
Questions like these arise.  Were sufficient number of persons
mixed with the suspect or not ? Were proper precautions taken
against his distinctive marks or not ? Was the identification
parade a genuine test or a farce ?
(b) That the witness did not commit so many mistakes which would
make a reasonable persons doubt his capacity for observation.
(4) The statement of the witness that he did not know the suspect from
before is believable.  Such circumstances, for example, that the
accused lived in the adjoining village or on account of relationship,
business he occasionally came to the village of the witness, should
be considered in connection with this point.
(5) That the witnesses were not given an opportunity to see the
accused after their arrest.  The most important point in this
connection is whether the investigation conducted in the case
inspires confidence or not.
The moment  the court finds that the investigation is tainted, it should
be on its guard.   While small delinquencies may not destroy the evidence of
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identification, but where there are major delinquencies and the investigation is
highly tainted, it would be against the rule of prudence to accept the evidence
of identification.  Once the investigation becomes tainted the evidentiary value
of the police records is gone and they cannot be relied upon.  In such a case
the fact that investigation agency was hostile to the accused and this could
have been a reason to implicate him falsely also becomes important."
Identification : appreciation on basis of situation :
Identification very much depends in the situation in which a witness as
placed at the time of the occurrence.  The dacoits were bursting crackers and
flashing torches as they moved  about. They were armed with lathis and guns,
some of them broke in open the door of the bedroom of the deceased (killed),
dragged his wife outside and kept watch on her.  They threatened her to give
out where the valuables were.  Someone gave out that they had returned on a
previous occasion and this time they would not go without the treasure and
unless that was given, they would kill the family members. She said in her
deposition. "The man who was watching who had worn dhoti tightly like a
pant. The two men who assaulted my husband had similarly worn dhoti and
pagree.  The other dacoits were standing at different places inside the house
and I did not mark whether they had worn pant or dhoti."  The dacoits were
variously dressed some with full pants, some with half pants, and shirts, some
were wearing dhotis and some had pagrees on.  All the valuables were in the
bedroom and therefore all the lights would be by and large focused into the
bedroom. The man who would be focusing the torches would not be seen but
the persons coming within the range of the light can very well be identified.
The dacoits were persons of the district, speaking Oriya and as such not
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utterly strangers either in look, behavior talk, dress or physiognomy. The
evidence was consistent that they had made a prior abortive attempt at
dacoity in the house.  She was consistent in her statement that it was S and R
who attacked her husband and it was B who kept a watch on her and who
also removed the ornaments from her person and it was again B who had
given her the threat and stated that they would not go disappointed this time
as on the previous occasion. In this situation all her attention would be on the
dacoit who watched her, removed her ornaments and those who attacked her
husband. It was not a fleeting sight that she got of them.  The occurrence
must have taken about half an hour if not an hour as deposed to by witness.
During all this time her only concern would be on the three persons, one
watching her and the two attacking her husband in the bedroom.  She did not
mince matters or ex-0aggregate but confined her statement to the these
persons whom she had earlier identified in a test identification parade.  Her
identification of the three persons put up for identification by her was
challenged as being due to the fact that they had been previously shown her
but it was a suggestion only without any evidence to support it. It was held
that there was nothing to disbelieve her statement that she had identified not
all the dacoits but only these three. Her statement and identification could be
accepted without corroboration.82
Appreciation of evidence, when the witness has a defective eye sight :
In Gaya Rai v. State of Bihar,83 a criticism was leveled against the
evidence as regards identification on the ground that the witness in question
82 State of Orissa V. Chhaganlal Sudarka, 1977
83 1969  UJ  (SC) 470.
200
had defective eyesight and could not have identified the accused. It was held
that ordinarily t would be difficult to accept the claim of a person to have
identified 22 persons at the dead of an Amavasya night but there can be no,
no doubt that the culprits had to light their torches to take their aim with the
guns at various persons and in that light the culprits, who were well known to
the witness could easily be identified. Besides the shooting of eight and
inflicting of quite a large number of injuries with cutting weapons was bound to
have taken some time however quick the culprits may have been and this
would have afforded sufficient opportunity to the witness to identify them.
Besides they all had to go up by a ladder one by one and it was as if a
number or persons had climbed on the roof top from all sides in which case it
would have been difficult for any person on the roof top to note correctly the
assailants who had collected there.84
Appreciaton of evidence of identification in dark night :
Evidence of identification of a stranger based on a personal impression
should be approached with considerable caution. Identification made at night,
during the occurrence, such as dacoity when blows are struck and people are
terrorized, is regarded generally of very little value, and as often said such
evidence is unreliable. Such an evidence should be entirely above board and
should command confidence.85
The court must always be cautious when accepting the evidence of the
identification by persons who have been victim of such incidents particularly at
night.  There may be mistakes where there are strangers.  There are other
84 1969  UJ (SC) 470
85 Sukhveer Singh V. State of Rajasthan, 1976 Cr LR (Raj) 581 (586).
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considerations which may vitiate the identification.  The factors which are
bound to very from the case to case according to the circumstances of each
case must no doubt be considered very carefully while scruitini/ing the
evidence of the identification. But merely because caution and scrutiny is
needed, in such cases, he evidence of identification cannot be totally
disregarded on the ground that the victim of a dacoity must have been
frightened; and the fright would destroy his capacity to identify his assailant.86
It was contended in a Rajasthan case that when acuity is committed
and guns are fired by the dacoits, people become panicky and they cannot be
expected to clearly identify the dacoits.  It may be said that if it depends on
the circumstances of each case and the courage of individuals.  It may be true
in some cases that some people may become panic stricken and try to run
away from the scene of occurrence and many may not be able to identify
correctly the miscreants but when the witnesses did not fall panic stricken
rather they have faced dacoits with courage and even the young ladies beat
and injured them fatally so that one of them died at the spot and the other was
so badly injured that he could not properly run away and was caught and
brought back and died subsequently, this contention, hardly holds water.87
In Heera Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh88 the contention raised was
that it was drizzling and it was dark and therefore it was impossible for the
witness to identify the assailants'.  The Supreme Court held that there is no
evidence that it was  total darkness. There is no suggestion that it was
impossible for the witness to identify the assailants . It cannot be held that it
86 Parmeshwar Tadiwel V. State of Maharashtra, 1978 Cr. LR.(Mah) 39 (47).
87 Hazara Singh V. State of Rajasthan, (1978)3 RCC 299 (233-34).
88 1970 SC  Cr  R  530.
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was not possible for the witness to identify the assailants.  It cannot be held
that it was not possible for the witness to identify the accused persons.  There
was visibility which was not obscured by the drizzle.  The witness knew the
accused.  It was not pitch dark.  It was the eight day of the first phase of the
moon. The time was about 8.30 p.m. Further the place of occurrence was at a
place where the darkness would not be much because of the proximity of the
place to the temple and the house. It was not impossible for the witness to
identify the accused.  The distance was short.  The visibility was not abnormal
on the eight day of the first phase of the moon and no one was accurate about
the time except it was early evening.
Identification marks whether to be disclosed by witnesses to Magistrate
conducting identification :
The witnesses had sufficient opportunity and time to see the
miscreants and formed their impression in their minds and on the basis of that
they were able to identify the appellants. In the circumstances it is not
necessary to expect that the witnesses should have seen some specific
marks of identification of the appellants  and must have informed the
Magistrate as to details of such identification marks and on the basis of such
marks, they would have been able to identify the appellants it was only in the
evening that the occurrence took place and it was not dark night by then, so
that their identification can be doubted.89
Admissibility of evidence of Magistrate conducting identification. In
Harnath Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh,90 the supreme court held that a
89 Hazara Singh V. State of Rajasthan, (1978)3 RCC 229 (233); Manzoor V.State of U.P.
1982 Cr LR(SC) 134 ; (1982) 2 SCC 72 : (1982) Cr LC 601 (SC)
90 (1970) 2 SCJ 293; AIR 1970 SC 1619 : (1970) 2 SCA 198 : 1970 MPLJ 616 : (1969) 2
SCR 289 : 1970MPWR 360 : 1970 BLJR 417; 1970 LJ (Cr)593.
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Magistrate when called upon in a case to conduct verification proceedings
should confine his attention only to the steps to be taken to ensure that the
witnesses were able to identify certain persons, alleged to have been
concerned in the commission of the crime or to identify certain things which
were said to be the subject – matter thereof. The code of Criminal Procedure
does not sanction his transgression of this limit and recording of other
statements which may have a bearing inn establishing the guilt of the accused
except in accordance with section 164 of the sad code.
In the aforesaid case, the Magistrate gave evidence to the effect that
he was a Naib Tehsildar on the date on which he had executed the
proceedings of identification parade of three accused including the appellant.
He also stated that he had the power of a third class Magistrate. After stating
how the parade was conducted, he recorded statements in support of the
identification of the three accused by different persons. He also purported to
give evidence of what the witnesses had said after identifying a particular
accused. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the Magistrate had
purported to record statements made in the course of investigation, the entire
evidence of the Magistrate including the record of the identification
proceedings became inadmissible because the he was a Third class
Magistrate no powered to proceed under section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. It was held  that it is not possible to accept this argument. The
Magistrate was called upon only to contact the identification proceedings. He
was not required to record any confession to interrogate witnesses to alicit
any other facts or call upon them to make any statement beyond mere
identification.  The statements in column 7 would therefore be inadmissible in
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evidence. This would not however be applicable to the record under column 5.
The High court did not refer to the statements in column 7 at all. It would,
therefore, be clear that the judgment does not suffer from the infirmity
complained of and the appeal was rejected inter alia, holding that a Magistrate
is not precluded from deposing to relevant facts if no statute  precluded him
from doing so either expressly of impliedly. Nether the Evidence Act not the
Code of Criminal procedure prohibited a Magistrate from deposing to relevant
facts within the meaning of section 9 of the Evidence Act.
Whole investigation should be held to close scrutiny –
So we have considered over here the main matters to be considered
when assessing the value of identification. The matters like holding of test
identification and at an early stage, precautions to be taken threat, effect of
mistakes committed there, the packing out of the accused by the witness in
court also, are matters of abstract proof, but matters as nullify the effect of
holding of test identification like the witness having seen the accused before
or having known from before the such as require the genuine will and
sympathy of the court to understand and the case.  Test identifications
become a force when the police had shown their victim to the witness before
hand, or if the witness knew the accused  from before, and the court's duty
therefore in assessing the value of identification is not merely to stress the
precautions etc., in test identifications or whether it was a genuine test or not,
but also to see if the investigation had been such that it could have shown the
accused to the witness before the identification or was capable of so showing
him or in any way helped him in picking out his victim at the time of test
identification. Whether the witness had the opportunity to observe his man at
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the time of the occurrence, whether he had a close view of him and for how
long as to make it possible for him to retain the impression of him are also no
doubt very important matters that world help the court in coming to the
conclusion whether the police had played some mischief or not. But apart
from that, the whole investigation from beginning to end becomes a matter for
scrutiny when assessing the value of identification. If the police had been
unnecessarily detaining the man. If it had the opportunity to show the man to
witnesses, if it had been detaining the main too close to the place of
occurrence, if they had been creating opportunities for the witnesses to
observe the accused before the tax test identification that would be sufficient
to raise a suspicion against the bona fide of the investigation.  Suspicion may
also arise in various other ways, for example, if an accused has very peculiar
features and those features were not stated in the first information report or in
the police statements., which reason would suggest, must have been stated if
the witnesses had observed the man.91 There are other diverse matters
which can raise a suspicion and since the nature and scope of every case is
different, it is difficult to enumerate then and to  state how one can check up
the malpractices of the police.
In Haasnu Khan v. Emperor,92 the trial court had convicted the
appellant Hasnu on  the evidence of the approver supported by the evidence
of one identification witness.  The appeal court held that they evidence would
be sufficient to maintain the conviction but it held;
91 Anwar V. State AIR 1961 1961 All 50.
92 AIR 1926 Oudh 26.
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" I am not prepared to accept it because certain
structures were made by the learned Judge
with reference to the conduct of the Sub-
Inspector Latif Uddin during the Investigation.
For this reason the confession of the appellant
has not been relied upon by the learned judge.
I feel very suspicious when an investigation is
not  carried out in good faith. It may be that this
appellant was how in to the identifying  witness
prior the identification.  When a police
investigation with respect to any particular
accused person is tainted, a court will have
great hesitation in believing the prosecution
evidence as it is very difficult to know where an
investigating officer who has been detected in
fabricating false evidence will stop in such
fabrication."
Their Lordships of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State v.
Ramdayal have stressed the fact although there is no hard and fast rule that
oral evidence of identification ought never to be accepted without
corroboration, however, bearing in mind its inherent defects, the necessity for
corroboration should be present in the mind of the  court, and where the
circumstances in the case disclosed any necessity for it, it should be sought
for. Their Lordships held further that the evidence of identity must be
thoroughly scrutinized, giving benefit of all doubt to the accused, but if after a
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thorough scrutiny, there appears to be nothing on record to suspect the
testimony of the identification witnesses, the court ought not to feel shy of
basing a conviction on such evidence alone, because of the bare possibility
that there could be honest, though mistaken, identification.
In the above case, one witness had admitted in cross-examination that
he had seen one accused in the police station some two months before the
test identification.  The trial court had acquitted the accused as it thought the
identification evidence could not be taken on its face value of this. In the
appeal y state their Lordships considered this aspect of the case, but they
were of the view that this lapse on the part of the witness was not material.
This part of the judgment as reported in the case reads as follows :
"It was contended that the witness had seen
the respondent at the police station two months
before the identification parade in Sagar Jail ,
which made his test identification of this
respondents as well as his identification in
court quite unreliable. It appears that what is
objected to is the witnesses seeing the
respondent some time (one or two months)
before the test identification parade, which it
may be argued, may have affected or replaced
his original impression. We may at once make
it clear that there was no suggestion in the
cross-examination of the witness that the
respondent had been shown to him by the
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police in order to persuade him to falsely
identify him in court or in the test identification
parade, except in the statement of the
respondent himself.  We do not think that this
would make his honesty suspect on that score,
even if he had at first, denied having seen him.
And then could his bare seeing the respondent
at the police station affect or replace his
original impression ? We thing not, if anything,
this identification itself would be one more
circumstance corroborating the subsequent
identification of the respondent in court.  The
argument is not that the respondent was not at
the police station when he is alleged to have
been seen by the witness which fact, if
established, could have shown that the witness
had once made a mistake in his identification;
by simply he had, if fact, seen him at the police
station, which fact by itself establishes nothing
in favour of the respondent unless there was
proof of the fact that he had been shown to the
witness by the police. We therefore, fail to see
how this admission in the cross-examination of
the witness makes his identification evidence
suspicious or unicliable.  In any case there is
209
no similar suggestion so far as the other
respondent is concerned nor can this criticism
be applicable to the other two identification
witnesses. In our opinion, there could be no
reason for discarding their evidence against
the respondents on this score."
Their lordships in the above case did not discuss how the witness
happened to be at the police station when the accused was confined there.
Again, the fact remained that the witness had seen the accused  in the police
station while he was in custody or may be when he was a suspect.  In any
case, it was the bounden duty of the police to keep the man baparda as they
say, and which  fact, i.e. that they had kept the accused baparda as they say,
and which fact, i.e. that they had kept the accused baparda till the
identification parade had been held, must had been alleged and proved by the
prosecution. If so, the investigation agency have failed to do its duty.  Along
with that it is very strange that the police should not have known that the
witness of identification and observed the accused in the thana and it would
be pleading very hard for the police to say that they were not to blame for it.
Investigation therefore had blundered somewhere and with all respects to the
police it had blundered purposely and the witness had been given the
opportunity to see the accused after the arrest.  When the witness had seen
the accused in the police station there was no sense of holding the
identification parade afterwards. In the matter of identification this previous
picking up of the accused in the test identification is all that matters, and if the
police advertently or in advertently allows the witness the opportunity to see
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the accused before hand it has achieved everything. How would the court
then come to the conclusion that the witness had not minutely observed the
accused as to have retained a clear impression of him.  The chance are that
the witness would pass the test of truthfulness before the court and the
accused would be convicted, which would not have been possible if the police
had not let its witness see accused before the identification. So this question
of seeing the accused before the test identification is of paramount
importance and is a matter that vitally affect the prosecution case.
Investigation from that point f view either it is trained or not becomes a matter
for scrutiny in every case and when once the clue is found that it is not above
board, it should not only affect the one identification that is tainted  but every
other evidence also, because as held in the Oudh case in Hasnu Khan v.
Emperor, there is no knowing where the investigation will stop in its
manocurving.
Personal identification : Cross-examination :
Some of the witnesses saw the assailants running away some of them
chased the accused persons.  These witnesses, when they were examined
during the course of investigation did not give any identification marks of the
accused.  Strangely enough these witnesses identified accused in an
identification parade. In all cases involving personal identification, there is
invariably abundant material present for founding cross- examination. It
depends on variable inconstant factors, such as eye-sight, climatic conditions,
visibility and illumination, facial or bodily peculiarities, the  possibility of a
duplication of those peculiarities in other persons, ability of the identifier  to
describe accurately the mannerisms by which he is able to distinguish the
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particular person from others of similar build, the ability of that person to etain
a clear mental vision of the person he has seen, the length of time between
the identifier seeing the suspect and the identification parade, the possibility of
external influences (photographs, newspaper descriptions, conversation with
other witnesses etc.), s well as the actual  conditions under which the
identification parade is conducted.93
It will be proper t reproduce all extract from the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Muthuswami v. State of Madras.94  Their
Lordships held :
"Next come the identification parades held on the 1st and the 4th
November. The appellant was identified by each of the three eye-witnesses
who have been called.  We consider it would be unsafe to accept this
identification two and a half months after the event. It is true the murder was
committed in the middle of the day but it is equally true that the three
witnesses saw the assailants for a very brief interval of time, even if the story
about them waling by in single file ten minutes after the occurrence is tide. It
would be a remarkable feat for even one witness to do this but we find it
impossible to believe that no less than three were able to do so.  The fact that
they did pick out the appellant and his co-accused at the parade is of course
beyond dispute but it seems evident to us that the suspect must have been
pointed out to them before and that of course destroys the value of the
investigation, and once we get that far, suspicion is at once cast on the
genuineness f the confession."
93 Anneppa V. State of Karnataka, 1978 Cr LJ 462 (465)(Karn).
94 AIR 1954 SC : 55  Cr LJ 236.
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So, this is what the highest court in the realm states about identification
and also how  tainted investigation may spoil the value of the evidence in the
case.
Statement of the person identifying the accused - In Sampat Tatada
Shinde v. State of Maharashtra,95 it was observed :
'The evidence of test identification is. . .at best, supporting evidence.  It
can be used only to corroborate the substantive evidence given by the
witness in count regarding identification of the accused as the dean of the
origin Act.  The earliest identification made by the witness at the test
identification parade, by itself, has no independent value."
It is clear that the substantive evidence which is to be given by the
prosecution witness is that the accused was the doer of the criminal act.  It is
not enough for the witness to prove that he identified certain persons at the
test identification parade. It is further necessary to say that those persons
whom he identified at the test identification parade, were the doers of the
crime.
The Supreme Court in Caetano Pleadade Fernandes V. Union Territory
of Goa, Daman & Diu,96 held that ordinarily the person who is supposed to
have identified the assailants at the test identification parade must himself
give evidence in regard to the identification.  If he does not himself give such
evidence and leaves it to the officer holding the identification parade  to do so,
the defense would be deprived  of an opportunity of cross-examination for the
95 AIR  1974 SC  791.
96  AIR 1977 SC 135 at pp. 140, 141.
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purpose of showing that the  witness had an opportunity of seeing the
accused before they were brought for identification. In any event, the
evidence in regard to identification at the test identification parade is at the
highest corroborative piece of evidence and if the evidence of the identifying
witness suffers from serious infirmities and cannot be accepted, the evidence
in regard to identification by him at the test identification parade cannot
improve the situation.
We may conclude the discussion by stating that the evidence of
identification merely corroborates and strengthens the oral testimony in the
Court which alone is the primary and substantive evidence as to identity. As
was observed by the Supreme Court in Hasib V. State of Eihar.97
"The purpose of test identification is to test that evidence, the safe rule
being that the sworn testimony of the witness in Court as to the identity of the
accused who is a stranger to him, as a general rule, requires corroboration in
the form of an  earlier identification proceeding.
97   AIR  1972 SC 283.
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Chapter-6
VARIOUS KINDS OF METHOD
The evidence of identification figures a good deal in both criminal and
civil matters. Identity of persons, living or dead, know or unknown, of things of
hand wiring of finger impressions and  footprints, of photographs, of firearms of
blood marks, poisons hair, etc. play their part in establishing the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and in proof or disproof of the case of the parties in
civil matters. In this  respect there is both an evidence of fact and an expert
evidence.  Evidence of fact consists of evidence of persons who have seen the
object before and who compare this object with the object at the trial.  That is a
question of one's belief, of one's memory as if it were a fact within one's
knowledge.  The expert witness has to merely state his opinion on the point
on which he  is called upon to give his evidence. But he cannot go onand
assert his more opinion or belief as it  were a fact within his knowledge.  In this
respect an expert witness is in a different position from a direct witness of fact.
The value of ordinary or non-expert oral evidence mainly rests on the
credibility of the witness his inclination or capacity for telling the truth, the value
of expert evidence rests of the witness the extent of his competency for
forming a reliable opinion.1
1 Emperor V. Sahadev, 5 Cr  Lj 228  : 23  NJR-1.
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Gynaecology, the Supreme Court held that :
"this reason was not sufficient to reject her
testimony. . . the witness may not have
specialized in gyanaecology. . .that branch of
medical science which treats of the functions
and diseases peculiar to women but her
knowledge of midwifery as an obstetrician was
poored to be of high order in case itself.2
 An expert in mental disease is a competent witness in cases involving a
question of insanity.3  Value of medical expert testimony – In Lachman Singh
v. The State their Lordships of the Supreme Court held after considering the
other evidence in the case that the finding of the doctor did not necessarily
effect the prosecution case as to the time of the occurrence and the necessity
for full data to reach a proper conclusion based upon the condition of the
digestion was emphasized.  In Doddamani  v. State4 the High Court held that
the opinion stated by the medical officer was at best an opinion and could not
be taken as contradicting the positive evidence of the witnesses as to when
the deceased at his fast meal and when he was stabbed.In Mukand v. State
the Rajasthan High Court held that the medical estimate did not negative the
other evidence about  the time when the victim was belaboured5. Expert
evidence should be approach with considerable care
2 Baldev Raj v. Urmila Kumar, 1979 SC 879 (pra 4)
3 Deorao v. E. 1936 N 321
4 Lachhman Singh v. State 1962 Cr. Lj 863.
5 Mukanda v. State, 1957 Cr LJ 1137.
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 and caustion6.  An expert witness is naturally biased in favour of the party
who calls him; however impartial he may wish to be, he is likely to be
unconsciously prejudiced in favour of the side calling him.  Besides an expert
is often called by one side simply and solely because it has been ascertained
that he holds views favourable to its interest7.In these courts instances not
infrequently occur in which medical men, not of standing or distinction, give
medical certificate for instance, for the purpose of obtaining the adjournment of
a case of grounds which after investigation  turn out to be wholly insufficient to
justify the exemption of a witness from attendance, thereby forsaking their
position as men of science in order to oblige a client. But complaisance and
the pursuit of science go ill together8.  The evidence of a medical man of other
skilled witness, however eminent, as to what he thinks may or may not have
taken place under a particular combination of circumstances, however
confidently he may speak, is ordinarily a matter of mere opinion.  Human
judgment is fallible, human knowledge is limited and imperfect. Now and
previously unobserved phenomena which till they have been recorded, are
supposed to be impossible are constantly being noticed9.
6 Panchu Mondal v. E. 1 CLJ 1187
7  Diwan Singh v. E. 144, IC331: 1933 L 561 : 34  CR LJ 735 : Hari Singh v. Lachhmi Devi,
59 IC 220 1921 L 126; but see Lila Sinha v. Bijoy Potap Deo Singh 87 IC 534 : 1925 C
768 where page J. observes.  There appears no reason why a scientific witnesses
should not be a witness of one or more or all of the parties to a legal proceeding. To a
professional man, it matters not which party calls him as a witness. What is of concern
to a medical witness is the accuracy of the scientific opinion which he expresses.
8  Lila Sinha v. Vijoy Pratap Deo Singh 87 IC 534 : 1925 C 768 per page J.
9  Gupta v. E. 1 R 290 : 76 IC 425 : 1921 P.17: 25 CR LJ 185 : Hari Singh v. Lachhmi Devi
59 IC 220 1921 L 126; Q.  v. Ahmad Ali, 11 WR Cr 25.
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 The positive evidence in the case is that of eyewitnesses who have
seen the occurrence.  The evidence of an expert is merely an opinion which
may lend corroboration to the direct evidence. But where there is a glaring
inconsistency between the direct evidence and medical evidence in respect of
the entire prosecution story, that is undoubtedly a manifest defect10. Nagative
evidence of medical board cannot efface positive evidence of doctor11.  The
medical evidence does not itself rove the prosecution case. Its value is only
corroborative. It can prove that the injured could or could not  have been
caused by the injuries12. Where there is a conflict between the medical
evidence and the oral testimony of witnesses, the evidence can be assessed
only in two ways.  The court can either believe the prosecution witnesses
unreservedly and explain away the conflict by holding that witnesses have
merely exaggerated the incident, or rely upon the medical evidence and
approach the oral testimony with caution testing it with medical evidence. The
first method can be applied only in those cases where the oral evidence is
above reproach and creates confidence.  Where the evidence is not of that
character and the medical evidence is not open to any doubt or suspicion, the
only safe and judicial method of assessing evidence is the second method.13
The opinion of an expert  witness, not based on any well defined inexorable
laws of nature, cannot be taken as decisive, especially where there is direct
evidence opposed to it.  If the opinions of equally competent expert witnesses
10  Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, 1977 SC 2274 (Para 5)
11  Munir Ahmad v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1989 SC 705.
12  Sunil Chandra Roy v. State 1954 C  305.  Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, 1983
SC 484 (para 12).
13  Thakur v. State, 1955 A 189.
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conflict on a particular point, the court ought to accept that opinion which is not
in conflict with the direct evidence.14  A court is not entitled to discard the
direct evidence of credible and unimpeachable witnesses deposing to things
observed with their won eyes, merely on the opinion of a medical witness.15
Where there is testimony of a considerable body of trust-worthy and
respectable witnesses who were able to observe facts and draws inferences
for themselves the opinion of medical men as to what should have been the
probable state of the testator should not outweigh and prevail over such
testimony.16 Where there is strong direct evidence of murder having been
committed at a certain place, but no blood is detected by the chemical
examination of the earth, leaves and grass taken from the alleged place of
occurrence, the Chemical Examiner's report that no Blood was detected in the
earth, leaves and grass sent to him for examination is not sufficient to rebut
the strong  evidence as to the place of occurrence.  It is general condition and
state of health of a person in issue and it is sought to prove that he was unable
to write on account of a disease, isolated extracts from medical works ought
not to be preferred to the evidence of a medical man examined with reference
to the symptoms deposed to by the witnesses. Textbooks are admissible but
their use without the assistance of experts might lead to error, hence, if they
are used to contradict an expert, the passages relied on in them should be put
to him.17  The opinion of the medical man who did not observed
14  Pleydell v. E. 96 IC 641 : 1926 L 313 : 27 Cr LJ 977. Piara Singh v. State of Punjab
1977 SC 2274 (para 6)
15  Siddubai Rudragauda Desai v. Nilapagauda Bharmagauda, 83 IC 616 : 1924 B 457 :
Q.E. v. Wazir Ali, 9 AWN 74; Ghulam v. Crown, PLD 1950 L 90, Manga v. State of
Haryana 1979 SC 1194 (para 2).
16  Haseenulla Sheikh v. E. 83 IC 485 : 1924 C 625 : 2 Cr LJ 5.
17 Grande Venkata Ratnam v. Corporation of Cal.
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the fact himself but based his opinion on the facts deposed to by other
witnesses is not of much weight when compared with the evidence of  the
doctors who personally attended the patient.18 The expert should put before
the court all the materials which induced him to come to his conclusion so that
the court may form its own judgment on those materials.19 The opinion of a
court, it self untrained in medicine and without expert assistance, on questions
of medicine is valueness.20  the opinion of a doctor is entitled to great weight
but it may be discarded if there are good grounds for doing so.21  the opinion
of a medical witness, however eminent he may be, must not be read as
conclusive of the fact which the court has to try.  Such opinion may be invited
in exceptional circumstances where there is no dispute as to facts or their
interpretation, but it must be considered by the court as nothing more than
relevant.22  See notes to this section under the heading "value of expert
testimony in general." Use of the evidence of a medical Expert-
 When a medical man is called as expert, he is not witness off act, and
his evidence is not direct evidence of how an injury in question was caused.
He only gives the opinion as to how that injury in all probability was caused.
The value of such evidence lies only in the extent to which it supports and
lends  weight  to  the  direct  evidence  of  eye-witnesses,  or  contradicts  that
18 Hari Singh v. Lachhmi Devi, 59 IC 220 : 1921 L. 126; in the goods of Gopessuar Dutt 39,
V 245 13 IC 577 Baswantrao Bajirao v. E. 1949 N 66.
19  Titli v. Jones, 56 428; 153 IC 733 : 1934 A 273 : See also Baswantreo Bajirao v. E. 1949
N 66 : 50 Cr LJ 181 : ILR 1948 N 711.
20. E.V. Purna Chandra Ghosh 83 IC 63 : 1924 C 611
21
22 Nagindra Bala Mitra v. Sunil Chandra Roy, 1960 Cr LJ 1020.
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evidence and removes the possibility that the injury in question could take
place in the manner alleged by those witnesses.  If the evidence of an eye-
witness as to how an injury was caused is disbelieved by the court, the
question of corroboration to that evidence does not remain, and in such a case
the evidence of a medical expert as to how that injury could be caused ceases
to have any significance.  A medical witness who performs a post-mortem
examination is a witness of fact though he also gives opinion on certain
aspects of the case. The value of his evidence does not lie in merely serving
as a check upon the testimony of eye-witnesses. It is also independent
testimony because it may establish certain facts, quite apart from the other
oral evidence.  Quite often, it is direct evidence of the facts found upon the
person of the victim, and it is wrong to say that it is only opinion evidence.  For
example, from the marks of tattooing found on the body the expert can say
about the range from which a shot was fired, and from the depth and size of a
wound he can speak about the nature of the weapon used and the force which
was employed.
It is the duty of the prosecution, and no less of the court, to see that the
alleged weapon of the offence, if available is shown to the medical witness and
his opinion invited as to whether all or any of the injuries on the victim could be
caused with that weapon.  Failure to do so many sometimes, cause aberration
in the court of justice.23
23 Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P. 1976 Cr LJ 1883 1976 SC 2443 (para 8) Kartarey v. State
1976 Cr LJ 13 1976 SC 76 (0ara 25).
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Medical opinion on the nature of injuries –
A medical witness should merely describe the nature of the injury it is
not his province to say whether the injury is grievous or not.24
Medical Evidence – Injury report is an admissible piece of evidence in proof
disproof of the theory of accident.  Eye witness account credible. Medical
opinion pointing to alternative possibilities. It is not accepted as conclusive.
Medical opinion as to age :
Medical evidence as to the age of a person merely renders probable or
improbable the other evidence in the case as to that person's  age.25  Although
such evidence is various but it is not by it else sufficient to fix exact age.26
Where a doctor forms his opinion as to the age of a person, judging by his
appearance, his voice and his teeth," no weight can be attached to such
evidence.27  However, it has been held that the ossification test is no doubt a
surer test for determining age. But the opinion of a doctor as to age based on
other factors should not be brushed a side merely because he did not conduct
the ossification test.28  It cannot possibly be said that a doctor's opinion as to a
person's age is not entitled to any greater weight than that of any other person.
Even if the indications from which laymen is not in a position, as a medical
man is, to examine a person with a view to discovering the presence
24 1885 AWN 296. The practice is against this view.
25 Sripal Singh v. Jagdish Narayan, 56 IC 313.
26 Bishnath Prashad v. E. 1948  ( 1 : 48 Cr LJ 542 : 23)  IC 144.
27 Mahomed Syedol Arriffin v. Yesh Qoi Gark, 43 LA 256 : 39 IC 401 : 1916 PC 242; see
also E. v. Qudrat, ILR 1939 A 871 : 185 IC 271 : distinguished in Abdullah v. Mst.
Zulekha PLD 1950 Peshawar 19.
28. Anam Swain v. State 1954 Orissa 33 : 1954 Cr LJ 132.
222
or absence of those indications.29 Medical evidence as to age cannot stand
against the evidence of municipal register of births.30
 When the age of a person in respect of whom an offence has been
committed is in question the only sure proof of that person's age in the birth
certificate.  However a birth certificate is often not available in this country, and
for the purpose of arriving at its conclusion as to the age of a person, the court
has to rely mainly upon the opinion of the medical expert, together with such
other evidence as may be available, such as, the testimony of near relatives
and of persons who are present at the birth. If the opinion of a doctor as to the
age of a person is based upon careful physical examination of the person, and
the recognized pointers and indices for determining age, such as, the stage of
ossification, and that evidence is supported by the evidence of relatives, and in
the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses nothing has come out
which throws a doubt on their testimony, the court would be justified in relying
upon such evidence for the purpose of determining the age of a person.31
 It has been pointed out in Chathu v. Govindan Kutty, that on the
question as to the age of a girl alleged to be taken from the custody of the
father, the Magistrate was not right in preferring the opinion of the radiologist
to the positive evidence furnished by the Municipal birth resister, the school
admission  register  and   the   evidence of  the girl's father, particularly when
29 Nasrullah v. E., 147 IC 759(2), 1934 0 32 35 Cr LJ 498; but see E. v. Qudrat, ILR 1939
A 871: 185 0 IC 271.
30 Mr. Zaitoon v. E. 1949 S 132.
31 Sidheshwar Ganguly vs. West Bengal, 1958 CJ 273.
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medico-legal opinion is that owing to variations in climatic, dietic hereditary
and other factors affecting the people of different stage of India, it cannot be
reasonably expected to formulate a uniform standard for the determination of
the age by the extend of ossification and the union of epiphyses in bones.32
 According to the Supreme Court, "it is notorious and one can take
judicial notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological
examination is two years on either side.33
Opinion of experts – post mortem report Evidentiary value as to age of injuries
– Doctor's evidence regarding the age of injuries cannot be of much reliance if
he has failed to mention the age in the report, Besides it is difficult for a doctor
to give the exact age of injuries.  Hence court cannot fix the time of occurrence
on the basis of opinion of the doctor.34
Medical report or certificate – medical certificates are inadmissible being the
worst form of hearsay evidence 35 so that a medical report or certificate may
be evidence of its contents, it must be proved by calling and examining its
writer.36  As to the practice of giving false certificates to litigants for the
purpose of obtaining adjournments, see the reports of page J., in Lila Sinha v.
Bijay Pratap Deo Singh.37
Doctor's endorsement regarding soundness of mind –
32 1959  Cr LJ 637.
33 Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary Govt. of J & K 1982 SC 1297
34 Basudeo Mahto v. State 1970 pat LJR 376.
35 Sris Chandra  Nandy v. Sm. Annapurana Ray 1950 C 173.
36 Ahila Manaji v. E. 47 B 74 : 84 IC 643 1923 B 183 : 20 Cr LJ 359;
37 87 IC 534 : 1925 C 768
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Evidence of medical experts endorsement of Registrar under section 35,
Registration Act as to soundness of mind executants of deed of adoption
including, opinion of medical expert.  Failure to give direct or a evidence under
section 60 through medical expert was alive.  I Opinion of medical expert
cannot be considered. 38 Expert evidence as to mental condition of a person –
where the medical officer of the Mental Hospital, who is called to give evidence
as to the unsoundness of mind of the accused, admits that he is no in a
position to state as to what was the mental condition of the accused on the
date of the occurrence (offence) nor as to whether the accused was suffering
from any such disease prior to that date and his opinion is only a conjecture or
presumption based on the facts heard by him, no weight can be attached to it
as it cannot be held to be the opinion of an expert.39
Workmen's Compensation Act-Medical evidence is opinion evidence
and it is only with regard to the physical aspect of the injuries that the opinion
of a medical witness is relevant and admissible as the opinion of an expert.
But in cases dealt with under the workmen's compensation Act, medical
opinion is value less to adjudge the loss of earning capacity, which alone
would be the crucial issue in the case.  The  utmost that a medical witness can
give is to give the percentage of the loss of the normal physical  capacity or
power; but it has no relation to the loss of physical capacity.  It is therefore
wrong to treat his evidence not only as relevant but as decisive on the
question of the loss of earning capacity.40
36 Ahila Manaji v. E. 47 B 74 : 84 IC 643 1923 B 183 : 20 Cr LJ 359;
37 87 IC 534 : 1925 C 768
38 Smt. Gopi v. Madanlal, AIR 1970 Raj. 190
39 State v. Jose Gasper Nauraha 1971 Cr LJ 36
40 Kalidas v. Mondal, AIR 1957 Cal 660 662
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Accident – Loss of expectation of Life – Proof Medical Evidence – Admissibility
– Loss of expectation of life is an item of damage only when injuries sustained
are such which lead to the curtailment of the normal expectation of life of
injured person.  When the injured person himself such as plaintiff, some
evidence possibly of medical must be led if he claims damages for loss of
expectation of life to show that the injury has shortened his normal expectation
of life. Medical evidence in such cases will be speculative and like other sworn
testimony may turn out to be incorrect and therefore, some caution may be
necessary before accepting their evidence.41
Chemical Examiner's report – In an Allahabad case it has been ruled,
perhaps too broadly that the Chemical Examiner's report is not evidence of
any fact whatsoever as the Chemical examiner is not examined on oath and is
not subjected to cross examination.42 This broad proposition has not been
subscribed to by the Lahore High Court.43 In view of the clear provisions of
section 510 Cr. P. Code, which makes such report admissible it has been held
by the Supreme Court that in ordinary circumstances there would be nothing
wrong in taking  reports of the chemical Examiner and the Imperial Serologist
on record without examining these persons as witnesses, as permitted by the
Criminal Procedure  Code.  When, however there is difference of opinion mere
production of reports is not sufficient.44 the Chemical Examiner must
41 Vinod Kumar v. Ved Mitra 1970 MPLJ  306 : 1970 Lab LJ 504.
42 Happu v. E. 146 IC 1089 A 837 : 35 Cr LJ 280.
43 Aishan Bibi v. E., 15 L 310 : 152 IC 206 : 1934 L 150 : 36 Cr LJ 11
44 Tulsiram Kanu v. State 1954 SC 1 : 1953 SCJ 612 : 1954 Cr LJ 225.
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State in his report the grounds of his opinion, so that the report may take the
place of his viva voce testimony in court..45 Chemical analyst is not expected
to know the difference in legal parlance.46
Differing reports from Chemical Examiner and Imperial Serologist –
Duty of Prosecution – when there is a difference of opinion in the reports of the
Chemical Examiner and the Imperial Serologist, the duty to explain the
difference is on the prosecution and the mere production of the report does not
under the circumstances, prove anything which can weigh against the
appellant. The effect of the first document, which itself shows two different
results is practically nullified by the second document.  In this unsatisfactory
state of the evidence, the Session Judge was right in holding that both in the
matter of the production of the axe and on the question of blood being found
on the axe, the evidence is unreliable and cannot be considered as evidence
to prove the guilt to the appellant.47
Hypothetical questions: A witness deposes as a pure expert when he
offers his opinion on a pure questions of science or art.  But the opinion of an
expert is always based on facts which either the expert noticed himself or
which are stated by the witnesses at the trial.  When, therefore, a person state
his opinion as well as the facts which he noticed and on which his opinion is
based, his opinion is pure expert testimony; his statement concerning the facts
on which that opinion is founded is not the statement of an expert but
45 Gajrani v. E. 144 IC 357 : 1933 A 394 : 34 Cr LJ 754 :
46 Ramsinh v. State, 1952 RLW 269.
47 Tulsiram Kana v. The State 1953 SCJ 612 1954 Cr LJ 225.
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that  of an ordinary witness.  If however, the expert did not himself notice the
facts on which opinion has to be formed they have to be proved by other
evidence and the expert can be asked to state his opinion only on the
assumption that the court considers those facts as having been proved in the
case.48  In such cases, therefore, the question must always have a
hypothetical form and the expert should not be asked to give his opinion as to
existence, or otherwise of the facts stated by the to other witnesses, since it is
for the court to decide whether or not those facts have been established.  A
medical man who has seen, and made a post mortem examination on, a
corpse can state the number, the position and the extend of the injuries which
he has noticed and can also offer his opinion as to the manner in which those
injuries must have been caused and as to the cause of death.49  In describing
the number, position and extend of the injuries, he is not deposing as an
expert; but the opinion which he has formed as to the weapon by which those
injuries must have been caused and as to the cause of death is pure expert
testimony.  If, therefore, the medical man has not himself examined the corpse
and noticed the injuries the condition of the corpse and the nature of the
injuries have to be proved by other evidence; and the medical man could be
asked his opinion as to the cause of death and as the manner in which the
injuries must have been received, on the assumption that the condition of the
corpse and the nature of the injuries are correctly described by the other
48 United States Shipping Board v. The Ship 'St. Albans', 131 IC 771 : 1931 PC 189,
Rawat Sheo Bahadur Singh v. Beni Bahadur Singh 51 IC 419; see also Secretary of
State v. Sara Devi Chaudhrani, 5 L 227 79 IC 74 : 1924 L 548 but see in the goods of
Gopessuar Dutt, 39 C 245 : 13 IC 577.
49 Raghuni Singh v. E. 9 C 455.
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 witnesses.50  As expert should not be asked questions which involve
determination of the truth of otherwise of the facts stated by the other
witnesses.  Thus, the question "you have heard the evidence in the case, state
your opinion as to the cause of the death of the deceased" is an improper
question since the answer to it involved a determination of the question
whether the facts, e.g., the position the number and the extent of the injuries
and the general condition of the corpse, described by the other witnesses are
true or not.  Similarly the question "You have heard the evidence for the
prosecution and the defense; state whether in  your opinion the prisoner at the
time he committed the act, was of an unsound mind." Is an improper
question.51 But a medical man who has been present in court and heard the
evidence may be asked whether the facts, assuming them to be true, show a
sane or insane mind.52  The opinion and conclusion of a skilled person
approved facts are receivable in evidence, provided the witness has made a
social study of the subject or acquired a special experiment / experience there
in.  The question in such cases is whether the witness is skilled, whether he
has adequate knowledge.53   Hypothetical questions to an expert – An expert
is entitled to answer all hypothetical questions put to him.  The only safeguard
which the court must apply is that the hypothesis is correctly put to the
expert.54
50 RaghuniSingh v. E. 9 C 455 Q.E. v. Mehar Ali Mullick 15, C 589, see Mehr Ilahi v. E. 12
IC 93 : 12 Cr LJ 485, where two surgeon  gave their opinion as to the cause of death on
post mortem symptoms described by a third surgeon.
51 See in the goods of Gopessuar Dutt 39 C 245 : 13 IC 577 : where it is remarked that it is
better that the expert should hear the evidence as to which he is asked his opinion than
that he should give his opinion on a copy of the deposition.
52 In re Sankoppa Shetlry, 1941 M 325 : 194 IC 332 42 Cr LJ 558 42.
53 United States Shipping Board v. The Ship "St. Albans" 131 IC 771.
54 Bai Diva v. S.C. Mills 1956 Bom. 424
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 Hand wring experts: Handwriting is a useful test of identity.
Experiments and observation have disclosed the fact that there are certain
general principles which may be relied upon in questions pertaining to the
genuineness of handwriting. For instance, it is asserted that  in every person's
manner of writing there is a certain distinct prevailing character which can be
discovered by observation and being once known can be after wards applied
as a standard to try other specimens of writing, the genuineness of which is
disputed.  Handwriting, not withstanding it may be artificial, is always,  in some
degree, the reflext of the nervous organization of the writer. Hence, there is in
each person's hand wring some distinctive  characteristic which as being the
reflect of his nervous organization, is necessarily independent of his own will,
and unconsciously  forces, the writer to stamp the writing as his own.55 By
nature and habit individuals contacts by nature and habit individuals contract a
system of forming letters which gives a character to their writing as distinct as
that of the human fact. 56 Manifold as are the points of difference in the infinite
variety of nature in which one man differs from another, there is nothing in
which men differ more than in handwriting.57
 Competency of handwriting experts – Under this  section it is only the
opinion of a person specially skilled in questions relating to the identity of
handwriting, which is relevant.  It is, therefore, for the party, who produces and
person as an expert witness, to show that the witness posses the requisite
skill.58 An expert is no more than a person possessing peculiar skill
55 Rogers on Expert Testimony, 290, 292 cited in Woodroffe, Ev., 9th Ed. 449.
56 Lawson Expert and opinion Evidence 2nd Ed. 327-28.
57 Cockburn, CJ, in his address to the jury in Tichborne Trial quoted in Woodroffe, Ev, 9th
Ed. 449.
58 Chet Ram v. Jogi Ram 127 IC 368 : 1930 L
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and knowledge upon the subject matter that he is required to give an opinion
upon.59  What degree of study training or experience amounts to peculiar skill
is very difficult to define and no hard and fast rule can be laid down.  Any
person who, from his circumstances and employment, possess special means
of knowledge, has given the subject particular attention and is more than
ordinarily conversant with its details will be considered specially skilled for the
purpose of this section. "Writing engravers, lithographers, tellers cashiers and
other officers of banks, post office officials, book-keepers and cashiers of
commercial houses 60 have been permitted to testify as experts."  In an
English case, a solicitor" who had for some years given considerable attention
to the subject and had several times compared handwriting for purposes of
evidence, though never testified as an expert."61 was held competent; and in a
Bombay case, a solicitor himself studied a disputed will for 128 hours and
satisfied the court that the will was forgery,62 it should be noted, however, that
the higher or lower qualifications of an expert merely affect the weight and not
the strict relevancy of his opinion.
 Modes of proving handwriting – Hand writing may be proved on
admission of the writer, by the evidence of some witness in whose presence
he wrote.  This is direct evidence and if it is available the evidence of any other
kind is rendered unnecessary. The Evidence Act also makes relevant the
opinion of a handwriting expert (section 45) of one who is familiar with the
59 Lawson, Expert and opinion Evidence, 2nd Ed. 453.
60 Moodroffe, Ev. 9th Ed. 450
61 R. V. Silverlock, (1894) 2 Q3 766
62 Dahibai v. Soonderji Damji, 31 B 430
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one  to identity  it ?   That at once raises  the question  as  to when  two  things
may be of the same make, but if the one is new and the other old, the similarity
will be gone.  Similarly weight makes the difference.  One may recognize one's
dress by its cut, or measurement or by the colour of the cloth or by the material
it is made of A cow or a buffalo or any other animal may be recognized by the
peculiar way of its behavior, or by any special mark on their body, or by some
recognizable feature of theirs or by their colour, etc.  In fact, no two animals
can be absolutely similar as no two persons are and it is also a matter of
common knowledge that herdsmen put on a special mark on their herd  of
sheep or goat such as tearing their ears at a certain place to distinguish them
from other herds. Articles of common use may be  distinguished one from the
other by their wear,  or by their weight, or by some mark or some feature of
theirs, but if they are same in all, respects, it would be impossible to say which
is one's and which of the other person. Articles made by machine or even when
made by hand as are of the same pattern would really defy and distinction if
they are similar in weight or wear, etc.  If in identification t4sts such articles are
picked up, it is because other articles mixed with them have not been very
similar or something to distinguish them has helped the witness in one way or
the other.
The facts of no two cases can be similar.  In the case of State of
Orissa v. Dhammali,63 some  of  the  ornaments  were recovered from the
house of the accused had been mentioned in the F.I.R. and although
63 (1964)  1 Cr LJ 602 : (1964) 6 OJD 12,
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no proper test identification parade had been held, the witnesses  had
identified them in court as belonging to the complaint. It was also a fact that
these articles were of common make, but they had been recovered from the
house of the accused in suspicious circumstances and in court the
identification by witnesses had not been challenged and neither had the
accused claimed them as bellowing to her.  In such circumstances, it was held
that the more fact that no test identification  parade was held or that the
ornaments did not bear any special identification mark was no ground to reject
the prosecution evidence as to the ownership of the complaints.
As against this case in Ram Sanahi v. State, 64 the article alleged to be
stolen was a dhoti, which was of an ordinary type and a thing of common use.
The accused had claimed it to be his own and it was admitted by the
prosecution witnesses that there was no distinctive mark about it and it was a
new one. The High Court declined to convict the accused n this basis although
the dhoti had been identified by the witnesses at a test identification parade
without any mistake.
The recovery of a blood-stained Lathi and Dhoti from the accused in
itself would be insufficient to find the accused guilty for murder.65
In a case where gold and silver ordainments belonging to the parents
are identified by none other than the daughter herself, such identification
cannot be brushed aside merely on the ground of delay of about four months.66
64 AIR 1963 All 308 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 1 : 1963 ALJ 61.
65 Smt. Kunjami Bheema v. State of M.P. 1984 Cr LJ 1374 (MP): 1975 Cr. LJ 1102 (SC)
and 1954 Cr LJ 910 (SC), relied on.
66 Dusasan Bhoi v. State of Orissa, (1981), 52 Cut LJ 125, 1981, Cr LJ 1452.
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WASHERMAN'S MARK :
The identification on of a shirt from the washerman's mark upon it could
be relied upon from the washerman's identification of the mark without any test
identification before a Magistrate.  It was held that no test identification was
necessary because what was identified from memory was a mark which he had
himself put upon the shirt which was like identifying our own handwriting.  It
was the mark which the washerman always put on. The Supreme Court's
acceptance of similar identification was referred to and relied upon.67
PREVIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF ARTICLES AS CORROBORATION :
The established position of law is that the evidence of Test
Identification Parade cannot form the basis of conviction. It is not substantive
piece of evidence.  The purpose of T.I. parade is to test the statement of the
witness made in court which constitutes substantive evidence.  Where there is
no such substantive evidence at all as to the identity of the properties, the
earlier identification parade cannot be of any assistance to the prosecution.68
The evidence that the witness in court has picked up certain article which he
identified in court as his own, in a previous identification parade is considered
on  all hands as evidence of corroboration.  It is so considered because the
courts believe  that  the  person  was  able  to  pick  up his article in the test
67  State of Assam V. Upendra Nath Raikhowa, 1975 Cr. LJ. 354  : Kanda Padayachi  V.
State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 66 : 172 Cr LJ 11.
68  Krupasindhu mallik V. State, (1978) 46 CUT  260 (265)
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identification as he was associated with it.  Test identifications prove the
bonafieds of the man that he had been associated with the thing or own it and
it helps the courts to come to that conclusion. It is also for that reason that
strict precautions are enjoined in the conduct of the test identifications, and it
is also therefore very necessary as in the case of identifications of persons to
scan the whole of investigation and how the prosecution has handled anything
or article as is late or put up for identification.
There is however, one lacuna with this test identification of articles or
things and it is that the accused is not kept present when such identification is
held.  In fact, such evidence is used in Court when it is procured behind his
back.  All would really depend upon the man holding the identification test.
For one thing, therefore the person holding the identification should be above
board and should make a very full record of the proceedings.
IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFICATION :
 Identification of the deed is quite necessary is criminal matters; that
facilitates the proof of murder. But if there is no recovery of the dead body of
the proof of identity is not forthcoming, that does not absolve the accused of
the act of murder.  The Allahabad High Court held in a case in Empress v.
Bhagirath,69 that it is not imperatively essential in order to justify a
conviction for murder that the corpus delicate should be forthcoming.
69
ILR  3 All 383.
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This case   was  followed by a Madras case  in  Re  Maya Basuva.70 In this
Madras case their Lordships quoted a  passage from Archbold's Criminal
Pleading. Evidence and Practice, which sums up the position in such matters.
Sir H de Villiers, C.J. said :
"I never understood the law as to the corpus delicti to go so far
as to hold that where witnesses swear that they saw the person
shot by means of a gun, and where they was the deceased
actually dying, a jury may be called upon to say that there is no
proof of death whatsoever. I have  always understood this rule
as to corpus deliciti to apply to those cases in which death is
relied upon from the fact of the disappearance of the deceased."
 When the deceased was known to the witnesses and had seen the
deceased in the Company of the accused persons, and when he had seen the
dead body as well, then the witnesses ought to have identified the dead body.
His statement does not appear to be truthful when he states that out of the
fear he did not identify the dead body.  Non-identification of dead body rather
casts a doubt in version given by him that he show the deceased in the
Company of the accused persons.71
PHOTOGRAPH :
 If a dead body is found, the first thing would be to find out its relatives
and friends who can successfully identify it. If, however, the identity of the
dead body is untraceable, photograph must be taken of it and preserved for
70 AIR  1950  Mad  452 : 51 Cr LJ  1068
71 State V. Rudia, (1985)I Crimes125.
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 future identification. Soderman in his book on Modern Criminal Investigation
writes :
 "All unknown dead bodies should be photographed in the same manner
as a criminal, i.e. front view and profile. "For photographing purposes it is
necessary to have the face of the dead person appear as natural and with as
lifelike an expression as possible because of the difficulty encountered by
most persons in recognizing a dead relative or friend from a post-mortem
photo-graph.  The eyes are in most cases shut, or if open, they are sunken
and converted with a grey film.  There is no contrast between the colour of the
skin and the lips and finally the rigid, unnatural appearance of the face gives
the impression of something unreal.  In order to make the face more lifelike,
the appearance of the eyes and the lips should be improved. Numberous
methods have been proposed for this purpose. Generally a mixture of equal
parts of glycerin and water is inserted in the eye sockets with the aid of a
syringe with a fine tip.  The eyelids are then raised. The lips are covered with a
mixture of carmine in alcohol which is applied with a small brush.  If the body
has been submerged in water for a long time and the skin is already partly
gone the face can be given a more natural appearance by powdering it with
talcum which is gently messaged over the flesh and the remaining skin.
Rubber gloves should be used for this purpose.
"If putrefaction is so far advanced that large portions of skin
and flesh have disappeared, one may be able to reconstruct
the face even in seemingly impossible cases. The
putrefaction ceases when corrosive sublimate solution is
used as an external wash. Plastelina, clay or cotton fixed with
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colloidion and covered with the proper shade of was may be
used to replace the load flesh.  As the eye-sockets are
generally empty, glass eyes are inserted.  The missing hair is
replaced by a wig and the face is made to assume its natural
colour with make-up."
 Charles C, Scott. In his book on photographic  of the dead in all
cases irrespective of previous identification.  The learned author writes.72
"Photographs of the corpses of the crime victims and the
unknown dead should always be made with idea of showing how
the persons in question looked when alive.  From the evidential
standpoint, such photographs are invaluable for identification
purpose for every if it were convenient to bring a corpse into the
court-room, in most instances the body would be less valuable
for identification purposes than a properly taken photograph.
This is true because it is often difficult to recognize even  an
intimate friend by viewing his corpse.  The recognition is
especially difficult when the face is badly mutilated or partial
decomposed.  Then, too, the more fact that the corpse is supine,
instead of standing or sitting may impede identification.  On the
other hand, a good legal portrait of a dead person often may be
recognized readily because it stimulates life; the more life like it
is, the more valuable it is for identification purpose. This work
should always be carried out as soon as possible
72 Pages 240 and 241.
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after the body is found.  Each stage of decomposition lessens
the chances of obtaining a lifelike portrait. Soon after death, it
may be possible by skilful photography alone to secure a
good likeness but as decomposition progresses, the need for
artificial reconstruction of the features may arise."
FEATURES :
 With the dead as well as with the living   there are certain
features of the body that help in the identification of it. In the
chapter on "Identification of persons known from before."  We
have already dealt with this matter. Some of these features, such
as age, sex, occupation marks, wats and tattoo marks, finger-
prints and teeth, assume quite an importance when dealing with
the case of dead body whose identity is untraceable.  They may
even give a definite clue to the identity of the dead.  The case of
James Smith who was identified with the help of a tattoo mark on
his forearm has already been cited in the previous chapter when
dealing with the identification of persons known from before.
This was a case where the catching of a shark brought to light
the identification of the missing men. The shark had vomited the
forearm    which  bore  a  tattoo  mark and on inquiry  it  was
possible to fix the identity of the missing man from the presence
of the tattoo mark.  The cases of teeth as helping in the
identification of the dead are variously cited in books on Medical
Jurisprudence.  The case of
Pages 240  and  241.
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R. V. Ross,73  as given in Taylor, gives as interesting reading.
This was a case of close identity between two women, one
supposed to be murdered and the other found in hopelessly
exhausted condition in immediate neighbourhood of the place
where the first woman was supposed to be done to death.  The
prisoner when questioned had replied that the woman supposed
to be murdered and the other found in a hopelessly exhausted
condition in immediate neighbourhood of the place where the
first woman was supposed to be done to death.  The prisoner
when questioned had replied that the woman supposed to be
murdered was the same as was found in the immediate
neighbourhood.  The most interesting things was that there was
a similarity of names too and both the woman were the native of
Ireland, their ages and occupation even coincided. The
identification rested on two factors, first the relatives of the
murdered women had sworn that the body found in the
exhausted condition was not that of the deceased, and secondly
the presence of incisor teeth in the woman supposed to be
murdered, while the medical evidence deposed that the other
woman whose body was found in an exhausted condition must
have lost her incisor teeth long before death. Taylor relates
another case of identity from teeth. A man was charged with the
murder of a woman with whom he had cohabited 14 years earlier
73 C.C.C. December, 1831.
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and who had disappeared.  A dentist stated that for night
before the woman was missing, he extracted the first molar
tooth on the left side from the lower jaw. When the exhumed
jaw was shown to him, this tooth was absent, and he affirmed
that was the place where he had extracted the tooth.  He was
thus able clearly to identity the skeleton as that of the missing
woman.
Cases occur where only fragments of the body are
found or bones are produced by the prosecution alleging the
to be of the victim of the crime.  In such cases the first point
in identification must be to determine that the fragments or
the bones are of human origin.  Having determined that, they
must be carefully inspected to ascertain whether they all
belong to one body or whether there are any incongruous or
duplicate parts. Taylor writes that when fragments are found,
the sex, age, stature and general development of  the body
should be investigated and a careful search made for marks
of identification as from sears tattoos, fractures, hair, etc. ?
The means employed to separate the fragments (saw knife,
etc) should  be elucidated and whether they have been
carefully  disarticulated or roughly hacked apart. The line of
incision should be the subject of special study, for it may
prove definitely that certain parts belong to the same body.
The parts found should be fitted together as accurately as
possible. When its isolated bits are found at different times,
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they should be carefully preserved in formalin.  It should be
further ascertained to what treatment the parts have been
subjected, for example whether they have been boiled, burnt
or treated with chemicals. If vital organs or large vessels are
available it should be noted whether injuries have been
inflicted which might have caused death and whether any
injuries found were inflicted before or after death.  If the head
is available the teeth may afford most valuable assistance in
identity.74  in a Madras case in In re  Chinna Sami,75  the
deceased had lost one tooth on the left side in the upper row
and similarly one tooth on the right side in the lower row.
Again his left toe was bent inwards,  and all these three
marks of identification were present.
BONES RECOVERED :
When only what is found are the bones, naturally the great majority of
points of identification that have already been dealt with are not available,
but a great deal of information may be obtained by a careful and minute
examination of anything found.  It all depends upon the nature of the bones
that are recovered and whether they are large in size or only pieces.  The
first and foremost thing would be to ascertain whether the bones are
human.  Having ascertained that one may proceed further and the medical
science maintains that  the  bones  are  capable  of  yielding  information
74  Coxon Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 5th Ed.(1987), Paras 128,129, 150.
75 AIR 1960 Mad  462.
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on certain matters of identification such as whether the bones are of a child
or of adult of male or female, the probable stature of the person, his race,
how long have the bones been, do they represent one or more bodies.
The bones may furnish even evidence of the cause of death, and one may
even locate fractures or other peculiarities on the person from the
examination of the bones.  It is reported in medical books that the body of
one Dr. Livings tone was identified by means of an old fracture of the
humorous. Taylor states in his book on Medical Jurisprudence that in
general the past existence of fracture is easily determined in an exhumed
bone by the appearance of a knot or ridge, or in some cases by a thick
deposit of bone where union has taken place ; moreover the narrow canal
is likely to be obliterated at the point of fracture.
Evidence of identification of the dead bodies or the bones may be
often available or strengthened by the discovery of certain articles of
clothing or jewellery etc., found along with or in such circumstances as to
be easily associated with it.  When found, these should be carefully
preserved and examined, and similarly hair, if found, should be preserved
and examined for identification purposes.
In Ram Lochan v. State of West Bengal76 a skeleton said to have been of
the deceased was discovered at the instance of the accused.  A question
involved was of the identification of this skeleton and this rested on three
distinct lines of evidence :
76 AIR 1958  SC  1074 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 170
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1.   The statement of the accused to the police under section 27 of
the Indian Evidence Act which led to the discovery  of the
skeleton;
2. The identification of the clothes, shoes etc., which were found on
or near the skeleton as those which were worn by the deceased
at the time he last left the house;
3. A photograph of the deceased superimposed on the photograph
of the skeleton.  The Court had to consider the admissibility in
evidence of the superimposed photograph as means of
identifying the skeleton as that of the deceased.
The process adopted for taking the superimposed photograph was
explained by the witness concerned, the Assistant Chemical Examiner.  He
had state; "He first got a photograph of the deceased. This was
photographed, the negative being taken on a quarter plate and the
negative was enlarged. He got the skull and as the skull was broken in
some parts the bones were pieced together and an enlarged photograph of
the skull as reconstructed was taken.  The negative of this was enlarged to
the same size as the negative of the photo of the deceased with the angle
and position of the two being identical.  The two negative were then
superimposed. For the superimposition the technique employed was that
the ground-glass of the camera was taken out, the negative of the
photograph alleged to be of the deceased was placed on it, Prominent
markings, the negative were carefully jotted down on the ground glass, the
markings being the following viz.,nasion nasomental line, malar bones with
prominences and two outer canthuses and two inner  canthuses or the two
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eye-balls and the inner ends of the supraorbited ridges.  Thereafter the
ground-glass was fitted in the camera, the skull was so orientated that all
the points of the skull came in exact position with the markings made on
the ground-glass, then the two negative were placed by aligring in such a
way that all the points as  mentioned above corresponded on a sensitive
bromide paper, under an enlarger."  This superimposed photograph
showed the shape and contour of the bones of the face underneath the
face as it looked when the deceased was alive, and the prosecution sought
by means of this documents to establish the identity of the skull as that of
the deceased, or in any event to dispel any positive argument for the
defense that the skull was not of the deceased.
The court held that this process and the photograph were
admissible under section 9 of the Evidence Act.  The outlines of the skill
which was seen in the superimposed photograph showed the nation
prominences, the width of the jaw bones and their shape, the general
contours of the cheek bones, the position of the eye cavity, and the
comparison of these with the contours, etc., of the face of the deceased as
seen in the photograph served to prove that features found in the skull and
the features in the bones of the face of the deceased were identical or at
least not dissimilar, and all this evidence would be clearly within section 9
of the Evidence Act.
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Decomposition of body after three days of death, could not result in
fracture of ribs.77
IDENTIFICATION OF DEAD BOY IN A STATE OF DECOMPOSITION
It was contended that the body was in an advanced stage of
decomposition and was not identifiable.  The best person to throw light on this
aspect of the matter was the medical officer who conducted the autopsy.  But
no question was put to him on this point.  The very fact that the medical officer
found marks of injuries from which he could definitely opine about the cause of
death shows that the decomposition  was not so advanced as to defy
identification.   Furthermore, the clothes and the shoes which were found on
the dead body were identified by Lok Chand and Nihal Chand as the same
which the deceased was wearing on the day of his appearance.78
The contention was that the dead body was not capable of identification
and the clothes were so much damaged that no identification of any kind was
possible. It was further urged that the identification of the shoes and the
spectacles can also not to be accepted as the witnesses failed to specify any
distinguishing features in respect of them.
It was held that it is not possible to accept this contention.  There was
skin on the dead body and out of the clothes which were also exhibited in the
court, the shirt was not so damaged and there is no reason why the
identification of the clothes made by the widow and the son should be
disbelieved.  The testimony of the widow cannot be discarded solely on the
77 Ratna Munda  V. State, 1986  Cr LJ1363 (Ori).
78 Har Dayal v.  State of U.P., 1976 Cr. LJ 178: AIR 1976 SC 255 : 1976 CR LR (SC)
185 : (1976) 2 SCC 812, 1976 SCC(Cr) 317; 1976 SC Cr R. 249.
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ground that the poor woman could not give any distinguishing mark of
identification.79
If direct evidence of  the witnesses to the  occurrence is satisfactory
and reliable, it cannot be rejected on hypothetical medical evidence .  Unless
medical evidence rule out of the possibilities of the injuries in the manner
deposed, to by the prosecution witnesses, the evidence of witnesses to the
occurrence is not to be discarded.80
DOCTORS are experts in their own right and when they examine a
person and give opinion it does not normally mean that their opinion is not
correct.81
TIME OF DEATH :
Estimating time of death time medical data cannot be considered
absolutely reliable from the point of view of time.  Accuracy is inversely
proportional to the time elapsed since death to the time of the post-mortem
examination. This shortcoming is due to many variable factors which intervene
and prevent the medical office to arrive at exact conclusion and give a definite
opinion.82
It is not a satisfactory way of disposing of the evidence of the medical
witness by discrediting it on the ground that his statement did not agree with
the opinions expressed in the text books by authors on medical jurisprudence
79 Jujhar Singh V. State of Rajasthan, 1976 WLN 288, State of Rajasthan V. Babu
Ram1982 Raj. Cr. C. 180 (DB).
80 Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai V. State of Gujarat (1983)1 Crimes 625, 1983 CR LJ
822(SC)and Punjab Singh V.Stateof Haryana,AIR 1984 SC1233: 1984 Cr LJ
921:(1984)1 Crimes 859;Sarbeswar Malik V.State,1986 CR LJ 1721.
81 State (Delhi Administration)V.Sube Singh,1985 CR LJ 1190:(1984)2Crime 109.
82 Harish J. Mal V. State, 1982 Cr LJ 2123 (Delhi).
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without bringing such extracts to his notice.83
EXPERT TESTIMONY :
Corroboration of Expert testimony is made relevant by section 45 of the
Evidence Act and where the court has to from an pinion upon a point as to
identify of hand writing, the opinion of a person "specially skilled" in questions
as to identity of handwriting" is expressly made a relevant fact.  There is
nothing in the Evidence Act, as for example like illustration (b) to section 114
which entitle the court to presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit
unless he is corroborated in material particulars, which justified the court in
assuming that a Handwriting expert's opinion sunworthy of credit unless
corroborated.  The Evidence Act itself in section 3 tells us that a fact is said to
be  proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either
believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent  man
ought, under that it exists. It is necessary to occasionally remind ourselves of
this interpretation clause in the evidence Act lest we set on artificial standard
of proof not warranted by the provisions of the Act.  Further under section  114
of the Evidence Act the court may presume the existence of any fact which it
thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of
natural events, human conduct, and public and private business in their
relation to facts of the particular case.  It is also to be noticed that section 46 of
the Evidence Act makes facts not otherwise relevant, relevant if they support
or are inconsistent with the opinion of experts, when such opinions are
relevant. So, corroboration may not an variably be insisted upon before
83 State V. Aru Pradhan, 1985 Cr LJ 161, following Kusa V.State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC
559 :  198 CR LJ  408.
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action on the opinion of a handwriting expert and the need be no initial
suspicion.  But on the facts of a particular case, a court may require
corroboration of a varying degree. There can be no bard and fast rule, but
nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert supported by
unchallenged reasons on the sole ground that it is not corroborated. The
approach of a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting expert
should be proceed cautiously, probe the  reason, for the opinion, consider all
other relevant evidence and decide finally to accept or reject it.84
In Nit Yananda Majhi v. Sipra Das,85 the High Court succinctly
observed that the observation of the Subordinate Judge that absence of any
indication in the said medical certificate that the defendant was unable to
move during that period if fatal to the plea of illness, does not appear to be
sound and justifiable.  No Medical Officer indicates in the certificate the exact
condition  of the patient.  The evidence of the Doctor has been illegally
discarded by the Subordinate judge.
IDENTIFICATION BY HAIR :
Microscopic examination can help in deciding where the hairs came
from.86
At times it is found that hair is left by the criminal at the scene of the
crime  or upon the victim or suspect and  it  can be used  as  contact  or  trace
evidence. Sometimes few strands of head hair are found on clothing but still
84 MurariLal V. State ofMadhya Pradesh, (1980) 12 ACC 11 (Sum).
85 AIR 1986 Ori. 102.
86 B. Mahadeva Rao V. V. Vasoda Bai, 1962 Cr. LJ 438 : AIR 1962 Mad. 141.
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some may be found to the hands of a victim of assault and in cases of rape,
public hair may be transferred from offender to the victim and vice-versa. In
matters of accidents of motor vehicles, some of the victim's hair may be found
on the vehicle involving in the accident.
Hair is important as trace evidence and much research has been
carried out to identify hair as having come from one individual.  As a matter of
fact, it was hoped that hair would have the specificity of finger prints but this is
not so. Nevertheless, the examination of hair has sufficiently advanced in
recent years for scientists to provide a great deal of information from the kind
of examination.
Samples of hair are taken as an exhibit from homicide victims, hit-and-
run victims and  from person who have been assaulted. Not only the sample of
head and public hair are taken but sometimes eyebrows, moustache or beard
and body hair are also taken.
A sample suspected to be hair must be differentiated from a natural or
synthetic fibre and it must also be identified as human hair or animal hair.
Human head hair differs in micro scopic appearance from animal hair.  Natural
or synthetic fibre  have an entirely different look and appearance from animal
or human hair. Hair from different parts of the body i.e. head, public, eyebrow
can be separately identified and there are also difference between some
ethnic groups.  Sexing and identification of the owner's blood group is also
possible. Variation in head hair of any individual are sometimes of such nature
that it is not possible to fix the age of the individual from its examination.  The
87
K.K. Jatav V. State of Gujarat, AIR 1966 SC 821 : 1966 Cr LJ 605.
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identity of the source of hair becomes more specific if greater number of hair
are available for examination.
The question that court must attempt to answer may be summarized as
follows :
1. Is the object hair or some fibre ?
2. If a fibre, what kind of fibre ?
3. If hair, is it human hair or animal hair ?
4. If human hair, from what part of the body did it originate ?
5. If human hair, is it male hair or female hair ?
6. If human hair what is the blood group ?
7. Is the hair identical with the hair of the victim or suspect ?
8. What are the special features of the
(a)  Ethical origin of the hair.
(b) How and when cut or uprooted ?
(c) Whether dye is present, etc.
(d) Whether any adherent foreign material present ?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS :
 Section 45 Evidence Act deals with expert opinion which is admissible
in matters of science, art, trade, handwriting, finger writing and foreign law and
the courts are not in a position to form any opinion without the aid of experts.
Post Office officials, Lithographers and bank  clerks are qualified as experts
and experts are permitted to refresh memory with reference to accepted works
on their respective subjects.  An expert is a person who distinguishes  himself
in the expertise of a subject and it qualified to furnish an pinion thereon.
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Section 46 is to be read along with Section 60(I)  of the Evidence Act and is an
exception to the general rule that evidence of collateral facts cannot be
received.  Even an expert is open to corroboration or rebuttal.  Section 60 is
based on the principle that the best evidence should come forward and it
requires that the oral evidence should be direct and positive.  Direct evidence
consists of a straight approach to the main issue while indirect is known as
circumstantial evidence or inferential evidence. Section 60 permits citing of
books of Science as evidence if the author is dead or condition under section
32 of the Evidence Act is satisfied.
Blood Stains :
J.P. Modi in this Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology has
introduced the topic on blood stains thus :
Blood stains may be found on one governments or on the persons
of the suspected assailant or of the victim, as well as on weapons, tools,
clubs, articles of furniture, leather goods, stones, plaster, earth, mud, grass
etc.  In fact every conceivable article is collected and forwarded by the
police for the detection of blood in the stains which may be of various kinds
and shades of colour.
The examination of all kinds of stain in this country is left entirely with
the Chemical Examiners attached to the State Government and the Sarologist
at Calcutta, who is also the Chemical Examiner to the Government of India.
According to the existing order of  the Government of India, the State
Chemical Examiner should, in the first instance, examine the article to see if
the suspected stains are due to blood or something else.  If he is satisfied that
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they are due to blood, it is his duty to forward the cuttings where blood was
actually detected or the entire article, if thought necessary, to the Chief
Serologist for serological tests. The police of the trying Magistrate should, on
no account, forward any exhibit having suspected blood stains direct to the
Imperial Serologist.  In a case of homicide where an individual is arrested on
suspicion, the medical officer is often asked by the police not only to examine
the nails of the arrested individual but to cut the nails carefully, to collect them
together and to keep them properly  packed and sealed in his custody till he
receives intimation from the trying Magistrate to forward the same to the
Chemical Examiner.  But is must be remember that no medico-legal value is
attached to the evidence of blood found on or under the nail parings, in as
much, as human nails are used for scratching purposes and, therefore, if a
pimple, an eczematous patch, ringworm, lichen or prickly heat or any other
skin disease is scotched, he nails will naturally draw blood which will remain
inside them.  Moreover, there is great possibility of drawing blood from the
living tissue whether the nail paring is performed by a sharp instrument or a
blunt instrument, and the blood thus drawn will contaminate the instrument
which will convey it from one finger to another.  In the case f K.S.V. Ujagrah
Singh and others tried in the High Court of Lahore it was held that the
evidence of blood stained nails was not only of no value but might be
extremely dangerous to innocent persons, giving such evidence as
corroborating an approval of as circumstantial evidence connecting an
accused person with homicide might lead to the miscarriage of justice.
Nevertheless, the American Courts Martial at Ipswitch in England  on January
19, 1944, convicted one Leatherbery of having murdered Hailstone by
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throttling from the evidence of  the presence of human blood found under his
finger nails.
All investigating police officers are instructed to dry thoroughly all
articles of clothing, etc. having suspected blood stains before sent to be
medical officer for transmission to the Chemical Examiner. Exposure to the
open air for a couple of hours will be sufficient in dry weather.  During before a
fire may be necessary in the rains, but when doing so, great care should be
taken that the articles of clothing are not  scorched. Unless the clothing is dried
thoroughly putrefaction is likely to set  in and render recognition of the origin of
stains either difficult or impossible.  The investigating officers are also required
to forward the entire garment or weapon to the Chemical Examiner along with
history giving all relevant information about the medical-legal aspects of the
case and the section of the Indian Penal Code under which the case has been
registered.  If the stains are on larges and heavy articles, such as doors, cart
yokes,  furniture etc., or  on walls floors and other places which cannot be sent
entire the stained   portions should be cut of sawn out as far as possible and
sent to the Chemical Examiner.
The Magistrate conducting the inquiry in a criminal case is authorized to
make a reference to the Chemical Examiner for chemico-legal problems
involved in the  case, and the medical officer is required to prepare and
dispatch to the Chemical Examiner  the articles having suspected blood stains
which require chemico-legal investigations. When such articles are brought by
the police, it is the first duty of the medical officer to see that the articles tally
with the descriptions supplied by the police.  If the description is not given, he
should, before transmitting them to the Chemical Examiner, describe very
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minutely all the features of the articles, e.g., the size, colour and consistence
of the clothing, as well as the number, situation and pattern of the stains
present. After completing the examination, he should label each article
separately, and pack them in a sealed packet t be for warded for  chemical
analysis of receiving intimation from the trying Magistrate.  This precaution is
necessary to enable him to identify them subsequently in Court that those
were the articles which he was asked to forward to the Chemical Examiner.
On receiving the parcel, the Chemical Examiner should not and record
the nature of the packing and compare the seal impression affixed to the
parcel with the facsimile impressed on the forwarding letter.  He should also
obtain a certificate from the Magistrate permitting him to cut out portions of the
stains or to destroy the articles, if necessary, for purposes of examination.
Without such a certificate, any examination by the Chemical Examiner is an
irregular procedure involving probably legal complications.  After the
examination is over, the articles should be packed carefully and sealed in the
presence of a gazetted and kept in strong room until they are required for
production during the trial of the case.  If not required by the court, they are
destroyed usually after six months.
The points that are usually required to be determined regarding stains
on an articles sent for examination in cases of alleged wounds, rape and
unnatural offences are :
1.  If the stains are due to blood or any other substance.
2. If they are due to human blood
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(i) Examination of blood stains :
The examination of blood stains are carried out by the
following five methods :
(a)   Physical examination : The physical examination f blood is carried
out for the following purposes :
(i) Determination of the age of the stain.
(ii) Assertaining whether the stain is of arterial or veinous blood.
(iii) Whether the blood stain is of the blood of  menstruation,
abortion, parturition or heamatemesis.
(iv) Whether it is from assailant to victim.
(v) Whether it was shed before or after death.
(b)  Chemical examination : the following chemical tests are applied for
the detection of blood stains :
(1)  Guailacum best :  (Van Deen's, Day's or Schonbein's test ) :
On the pieces f the stains when a few drops of old turpentine,
ozonic or hydrogen peroxide solution is added a beautiful
blue colour appears immediately, if the stain is due to blood.
(2) Benzidine test : This is a very delicate test.  This test is done
with the help of benzidine solution and hydrogen peroxide
solution.  This test never fails to detect blood even in every
old, decomposed stains with every sort of dirt.
(3) Kastb-Meyer test : (Phenolphthalein test ): his test is done
with he help of hydrogen peroxide solution and mixture of
phenolphthalein. His is an extremely delicate test.
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(4) Leucomalachite Green test : This is done with he help of
leucomalachite green and distilled water.  It is good when
blood is mixed with oil, ash, pain, fruit juice etc.
(c) Microscopical examination : his is useful no only for he detection of
the red blood corpuscles but also for the recognition of pus cells;
epithelial cells, bacteria, faucal matter, etc., which are, sometimes,
found mixed with blood in the suspected blood and other stains.
The presence of squamous epithelial cells from the vagina or
columnar cells of the uterus in blood stains may indicate the
menstrual source of the blood.  Similarly, the epithelial cells of the
respiratory tract with a large number of pus cells for food particles
with sarcinae and other  bacteria will help the examiner in
expressing his opinion as to the gastric source of the blood.  The
size, appearance, and other histological features of the red blood
corpuscles may also reveal the origin of the blood. Skill in
micrometry is, therefore, essential for such work.
Several solvents have been recommended to dissolve out
the blood stain for extraction of the red blood corpuscles for
microscopic examination but the best of this   purpose is Vibert's
fluid, which is obtained by mixing two grammes of sodium chloride
and half a gramme of mercuric  chloride in a hundred cubic
centimeters of distilled water.  A small piece of the stain should be
cut out and soaked in a watch glass with two or three drops of
Vibert's fluid for held of an hour.  It should then be teased out with
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needles and examined under the high power. In the absence of
Vibert's fluid, normal saline serves the purpose fairly well.
Some clots of blood or stains on a dyed cloth are not easily
dissolved by these solvents.  In such cases a dilute solution of
ammonia will give much better results.  Stains on leather or some
kinds of wood containing tannic acid are not acted upon by any of
these solvents and a two percent solution of hydrochloric acid is
required for affecting the right amount of softening for proper
microscopic examination.
In the case of stains on a rusty weapon, stone, plaster, mud
or earth, they should be scraped with a knife and dissolved in a
watch glass or test tube for examination.  When  investigating blood
stains on a knife it often happens that there are no stains on the
blade or on the handle but only in the joint.  It is, therefore,
necessary in such a case to dismantle the parts of the knife for
finding out the suspected stain.  The blood stain is generally found
inside the grove in the handle of  the knife and not on its blade
which is washed carefully by the assailant.
A drop of the blood stain solution thus obtained, placed on a
slide and viewed  under the microscope, may reveal the presence of
the red blood corpuscles which are circular, binoculars, non-
nucleated discs in all  mammalian except camels, in which  the red
blood corpuscles are oval, biconvex and non-nucleated. In birds,
fishes, amphibian and reptiles, they are oval, biconvex and
nucleated. These corpuscles can only be detected and identified by
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one with considerable experience in microscopy and micrometry,
and that too only when a stain is quite fresh, say about twenty-four
hours old, and when a  small fragment of a clot is available. In old
stains specially on a cloth the red blood corpuscles become
shrunken, disintegrated and unrecognizable, especially during the
hot weather in India.
(d) Spectroscopical examination : The following procedure is
recommended for the detection of blood stains on rusty weapons
and red coloured fabrics.
A small portion of the blood is taken on a glass with a ten
percent solution of caustic potash, a little glucose powder is added
and is covered with a cover slip.  The glass slide is then warmed
over a small flame, when the stain assumes a bright red colour and
gives the characteristic haemochromogen bands.  The  red dye on
fabrics is usually bleached by this procedure.
The reduction into haemochromogen may also be brought
about the Takayama reagent as described before or by an alkaline
solution consisting of a 4 grammes of sodium hydrosulphite, 10 cc.
of potassium hydroxide (10 per cent and 2 cc. alcohol) which is said
to be cleaner and much more efficient.
The spectrum of haemochromogen or of cyanhamo -
chromogen is quite enough for purposes of identification and
expression of a definite opinion about suspected blood stains. It is
not necessary to examine any more spectra of acid or alkaline
haematin, haematogrphyrin, etc. For practical purposes one
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chemical test viz., the benzidine test, and a confirmatory spectro-
scopic test for haemochromogen or cyanhaemochromogen, are
quite sufficient for a definite opinion, and these are the principal
tests usually employed in the laboratories of the State Chemical
Examiners.  For every old scanty stains where there is not sufficient
material for repeating the examinations, the Chemical Examiners
are required, by the order of the Government of India, to forward the
stains as they are, to the Chief Serologist, Calcutta, for identification
of blood and for determination of its origin by the serological test.
(e) Biological Examination : This is under taken for the purpose of
determining  whether the blood of a particular stain is derived from a
human being, from a lower mammalian animal or from a bird.
Blood Grouping :
The blood group of a person is determined by the characters which it
contains. It must contain at least one character of each set, and the characters
are inherited according to fixed rules.  A child cannot have a character which
he does not inherit from one or other of his parents.  The technique of this
blood grouping has been developing with the passage of years.
The value of the test is however, limited.
The tests have their limitations, they may exclude a certain
individual as the possible father of a child but they cannot possibly
establish paternity.  They can only indicate its possibilities.  Another man
with the same group as the father could be responsible for the child in
question.
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The negative finding is definite while positive finding indicates a
possibility only.
Thus (a) in a special case it may be possible by the test to disprove
the alleged paternity of a particular person. (b) In no case will it be possible
to prove by the test the paternity of a particular person. (c) Whether the
special case of (d) will be available for such disproof depends on the
probabilities of that case and the chances of it occurring vary from 1 in 2 to
1 in 17.  The progress of science will be doubt make it possible from time
to time to increase the range of the cases that afford decisive proof, both
negative and affirmative.  Already, by judicial decision or by statute, the law
has accepted the use of blood-group composition to evidence paternity
negatively of course, only when testified to by a qualified expert.
The law on the subject in various countries is briefly highlighted
here.
In India there is no special statute and there is no provision either in
the Criminal procedure Code or in the Evidence Act empowering courts to
direct such a test to be made.  Evidence Act which provides for a blood
test being made of a minor and his mother when the father is disputing the
legitimacy of the minor and holds that if the parties are unwilling to submit
to such a test the court has no power to direct them to submit themselves
to such a test.
Article 20(3) of the constitution enacts that no person accused of
any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.  This
article does not enact any new principle which we had not already inherited
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from the English system of criminal justice. It is a fundamental principle of
English system of criminal justice (which differs from the inquisitorial
procedure obtaining in France and some other continental countries ) that
it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt and the accused need not make
any statement against his will.  The principle of immunity from self-
incriminating evidence is based on the maxim, nemo tenetur  prodere
accusure seipsum (no man is bound to accuse himself) and thus founded
on the presumption of  innocence which characterises the English system
of criminal trial.
Extent of applicability of principle in other countries is also being
given for better understanding of the subject.
The provision against self-incrimination has been held to be subject
to the following limitations :
(a) It is open to the accused to waive the privilege. But if he
waives the privilege and gives testimony on any point, he
must give the whole of it;
(b) Where an accused has been pardoned or otherwise given
immunity from prosecution, he may be compelled to give
evidence. But before the accused may be so compelled, he
must be given complete immunity;
(c) The immunity is merely from giving evidence against the
consent of the accused. The prosecution is not debarred from
exhibiting the person of the accused to the juicy, comparing
his fingerprints, photographs etc. Nor does the immunity
prevent production of testimony that blood was discovered on
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the body of the accused after alleged crime or marks and
bruises were found upon accused's shirt being taken off his
body.
The permissibility of identification by finger, palm and
footprints and the taking of accused's pictures after arrest,
blood and urine tests, use of emetic  stomach pump or similar
device for extracting ornaments swallowed, etc. requiring
suspect or accused to wear or trying on particular apparel or
requiring defendant in criminal case to exhibit himself or
perform physical acts during trial and in presence of Jury are
not hit by the immunity conferred by Article 20(3) and do not
offend the due process clause.
In short, while accused cannot be compelled to produce
any evidence  against himself, such evidence can be taken or
seized provided of course such taking or seizure is legally
permissible.
(d) A corporation being an artificial person, is not entitled to this
immunity but cannot be directed to produce its books causing
suspension of its business, unless there is good reason for
the order.
The present clause (3) of Article 20 follows the language of the Fifth
Amendment of the American constitution, but the rule laid down in our
constitution in narrower than the American Rule as expanded by
interpretation.  Thus, it will be seen that three things are necessary to
constitute the requirements of the clause, viz., (i) an accused person; (ii) his
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being compelled to be a witness and (iii) such compulsion being against
himself. In other words the prohibition operates when an accused is sought to
be forced to deposed against his innocence. For a more detailed discussion
on the subject kindly refer to chapter.
Bearing these principles in mind, the compulsory direction by the
Magistrate in a proceeding under Section 125, Cr. P.C. to the defendant to
give his blood for blood test being made cannot be supported. It would be
different if in a criminal case where the defendant is an accused if blood is
seized from him by authority of the person entitled to do so by the police
before the matter comes to Court and by the Magistrate or Judge after the
matter comes to Court for purposes of comparison, elimination and
determination with alleged blood stains for instance of the accused on clothes
etc.  found at the scene and said to contain his blood stain.  But in a quasi-civil
matter as under Section 125, Cr. P.C. it would be quite different.
Maintenance proceedings are not criminal proceedings.  The object of
maintenance proceedings is not to punish the husband or parent.  The
Magistrate's power to make an order is discretionary.  On the other hand, the
object of criminal procedure is always punishment; the convicted offender is
made to undergo evil which is inflicted upon him not for sake of redress but for
the sake of example. The other distinctive attribute of criminal procedure is
that the sanctions, punishments of criminal procedure are remissible by the
crown or State. In these quasi-civil matters where private parties are arrayed
against each other, the claims must succeed or fail to the measure in which
the burden of proof, is discharged.
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Though the defendant in Section 488 (now 125, Cri. P.C.) proceedings
cannot be forced to give his blood for blood test, the only consequence of his
refusal will be that it will be taken into consideration along with other
circumstances in evaluating the evidence against him. (Subaya Gunder v.
Bhoopala Subramaniam.)88
Blood Samples :
 Dr. Alfred Swaine Taylor89  had dealt which collection and preservation
of the blood samples :
"In practice at the present time, when a person is
apprehended because he or she has failed a roadside
breathalyzer test, then a blood or urine sample is collected
at the police station, following a further breathalyzer test.
Blood or urine selection is a matter for the person
apprehended. In case of a urine sample, the first urine
voided is rejected and the next urine collected is the
sample that is sent to the appropriate Home Office
Forensic Science Laboratory.  The collection of the second
urine sample is a perfectly reasonable procedure is that it
is the sample of urine that was most recently in equilibrium
with the current blood concentration. Without the diuretic
effect of a large amount of water plus alcohol – a in the
normal beer consumption – then it is possible that
88 1959 Cr. LJ 1087 : AIR 1959 Mad. 396.
89   Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence : Edited by A. Keith Ment
Churchill Livingstone, Edinburth, London, Melbourne and New York 1984 on page
401.
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the urine sample currently contained within the bladder
may have been diluted with the urine from a period prior to
that when the last alcohol consumption had started, and
the second urine sample is the more significant one from
the point of view of most recently  consumed alcohol.  The
second urine sample cannot contain any alcohol from a
previous about of high alcoholic consumption, involved in
the story 'I had a lot to drink last night.'  Again the taking of
two urine samples ideally removed any possibility of there
being any factors operating against the accused persons."
"The blood sample, which must always be taken by a registered
medical practitioner, can not in any way, because of sampling time
differences, be unfair to a defendant. Residual alcohol in the blood from a
previous about of his consumption is still in equilibrium with the brain and the
clinical behavior of any person correlates with the concentration that is
affecting the brain."
The taking of the blood samples itself has been subject to some
disasters, for example, in those cases where a person's arm, prior to the
collection of blood from the antecubital fosse has been swabbed with alcohol.
In hospital cases, this occurs where a junior hospital causality officer under
pressure to obtain a quick blood sample, has swabbed a patient's arm with
ethyl alcohol prior to taking the sample,  These cases are particularly easy to
spot in hospital as the alcohol concentration thereby reported invariably
exceeds the fatal limit.  Although such cases have been noted in the writer's
laboratory in the past, more  recently the use of swabs containing isopropyl
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alcohol or more commonly dry  swabbing (or none at all) has now ensured that
such problems have passed into toxicological folk lore."
"Where contamination with a large quantity of isopropyl alcohol occurs
then a gas chromatographic trace of such a sample is easy to detect. Cases of
isopropanol consumption itself have been reported; however, these are rare
and are either suicide attempts or occur amongst a group of consumers who
are not likely to be found in the car driving population."
"Collected blood samples are divided between two glass containers
containing sodium fluoride as preservative. These containers are sterile and
must be filled via a septum cap that is rigidly retained by a metal ring.  It is
important that any independent laboratory making a blood alcohol analysis
should remove the blood from the container using the method whereby it was
filed, i.e. with a hypodermic needle and syringe for collection. This means that
the metal retaining ring is unmarked in any way. Any attempt to withdraw the
blood sample by removing the ring ensures that the latter is destroyed and
marks of interference with the ring are likewise obliterated.  Any analyst who is
without such needles and syringes would be advised to keep a large store
handy.  In the case of urgent request for analysis, the analyst should make a
particularly through examination for the security of container before damaging
it, on opening. The vials are now retained in a plastic 'Securitainer' which
cannot be opened unless the retaining seal is broken. Again before any
analysis is performed by an independent analyst, it is advisable to pay
particular attention to the containers.  Several containers arrived in the
author's laboratory where independent analysis has been refused because of
strange marks that have appeared on both the plastic and the metal retaining
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ring.  The first container to be examined by the independent analyst in the
brown envelope holding the plastic container for any signs of 'deterioration' in
the envelope seal.  Opening the envelope is best performed by a simple
straight scissor cut about one third along the length of the envelope. In this
way the seal of the envelope.  In this way the seal of the envelope, either at
the side or the top are not interfered with in any way and that, if necessary,
such seals are still available for examination in the author's laboratory, in
which it was subsequently demonstrated beyond that container had been
opened and samples had been interfered with; however, no such cases have
been found since the combined septum-vial and plastic 'Securitainer' have
been in operation."
Preservation of Samples :
The two preservation, sodium fluoride and phenyl mercuric nitrate, have
been used in blood and urine, respectively, alcohol and  stabilizers.  The
sodium fluoride perform the function of enzyme inhibition and prevention of
clothing of the sample. Phenyl mercuric nitrate has the properties of bacterial
inhibition.  Although it is reported that both these compounds together do not
inhibit activity, no problems of this nature had been recognized by Dr. Taylor.
Though in comparison to the normal forensic science laboratory. Dr. Taylor
was largely concerned with an alcohol sample work load not exceeding
hundred samples per week, which was very much smaller than the lowest
work load of a Home Office Laboratory.
The clotting of blood samples have been reported as producing
inaccurate alcohol results in that the uneven red-cell : plasma distribution
means that the resulting remaining liquid sample could somehow manage to
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yield an alcohol determination in excess of the original whole blood.  A little
credence is possibly lent to this idea by the fact that instructions for dissolving
or disposing of the clots are contained in each official blood  sample envelope
i.e., the restoration of a total l9iquid sample the clotting ensure the attainment
of the 'correct' blood alcohol level. Even though there are ground for assuming
that the alcohol determination plasma water is not the same as that in whole
blood, because the two components of blood, plasma and red-cells contain
different amount of the protein, these assumptions ignore the practicalities of
the situation, in fact there is no significant difference between  the two. In Dr.
Taylor's laboratory it was shown that in a range of differently preserved blood
sample (taken fresh in the laboratory from the normal healthy volunteers),
producing either plasma serum or whole blood, give that is practically the
same answer.  This means that there is no practical difference to the separate
alcohol determinations whether the sample is completely clotted (i.e., thus
producing serum), or as a plasma from whole blood produced via fluoride,
lithium heparin or EDTA-treated blood. The small clots that seldom occur in a
perfectly well preserved sample of blood can sometimes prove to be a
problem if automatic sampling, and dispensing are employed, because of the
possibilities of  clogging the apparatus. However, duplicate determinations of
the same sample quickly reveal this sort of error, for the highest precision it
should be stated that automatic sampling and dispending are essential.
If the fluoride has not prevented clot in it can not also be acting as a
preservative.  The question of production of alcohol in blood samples taken
from live and apparently well persons, is in Dr. Taylor's opinion an entirely
different phenomena to the production of alcohol in non-preserved post
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mortem samples of blood and also the question of production of alcohol in the
body (Post mortem is another field of study).  There is no with antiquated
example  of  a properly preserved sample of blood taken from a living person
and stored in a refrigerator at 4° C that has demonstrated to produce alcohol
to such a level as to nullify the findings of a blood alcohol determination to any
significant extent.
Two questions of production of alcohol in blood samples that have
received a great deal of attention are :
(1) The production of alcohol in the body of a deceased person that
remains several days at normal or elevated temperatures prior to
post mortem examination (the Moorgate Tube disaster), and
second the production of alcohol in samples left exposed at
ambient temperatures.
Samples 2 days laters
A
30
A
Days
B
Later
C
1 21 47 35 17
2 5 22 29 39
3 6 16 31 4
4 NIL 112 137 145
5 NIL 32 37 14
6 262 230 212 192
A = GLC (1) 20% SP – 2100 8.1% Carbowax 1500;
B = GLC (2) PEG 400 ; C = enzymatic alcohol.
 Although it is certain that unpreserved sample of the blood allowed to
remain for several days in a normal laboratory not refrigerated will produce a
peak in a gas chromatographic trace that will sometimes appear in the position
of ethyl alcohol, 17.4 gives some small idea of the complexities of the
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problem.  The blood alcohol concentrations listed in the table are all genuine
figures taking from a train crash of a few years ago.  The evidence presented
left no doubt that only one of the person involved had been drinking  and this
is demonstrated in the first column.  The other levels are those which could
normally be seen in unpreserved samples i.e. post mortem production of the
alcohol in the body.  The second series of columns represents the subsequent
production of 'alcohol' in the samples allowed to remain at ambient
temperature over a munch and their subsequent analysis using three different
methods of 'specific' ethyl alcohol determination. Two separate gas
chromatographic columns were employed along with the enzymatic
determination of alcohol using a perchloric acid deprotoinised sample.  The
production of alcohol in the samples (and it is certainly not established that it is
all alcohol) certainly accorded with the bacterial contamination in each blood
sample.  What can be deducted to some extent from the small sample is that :
(1) The problem of alcohol production is such a heterogeneous
mixture as normal human body is very complex, and
(2) Other substances apart from ethyl alcohol are recorded in the
gas chromatograph as ethyl alcohol (or the two separate gas
chromatographic columns would be much closer in agreement).
In cases where the enzymatic alcohol determination gives a large
figure then the gas chromatograph, it may mean that substances are produced
in the samples that inhibit the enzyme alcohol dehydrogenase. This thesis was
the samples that inhibit the enzyme alcohol dehydrogenase.  This thesis was
treated by adding further quantities of pure ethyl alcohol solutions in order to
test the recovery rate.  The recovery rate exceeds 92 % in the case of samples
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added to whole blood and those added to the perchloric acid deprotienised
material exceeded 90 %. Again it must be stated that this study represents a
very small statistical sample and any concludrawn can only be noted as
pointers for future work.
The question of ethyl alcohol production within the body after death is
a phenomenon that is recognized by forensic toxicologists the world over.
This is a problem that in fact most toxicologists will have recognized and
accepted that in 'old post-mortem samples', cases that have remanded for
many days do in fact produce peaks in a gas chromatographic trace that
appear in the position of ethanol. Most workers in the field have now
recognized that these peaks and many other can occur in samples where the
person under investigation has been a teetaler for many  years. Levels of
'reported alcohol' generally are in the range of 20 = 30 ,g/100 ml of blood.
These levels have been suggested as arising from the actual sugar., or
glucose, content in the body, although there is no evidence for this, and
'Blackmore has shown that alcohol can be produced from a wide range of
endogenous molecules in the body and that an immediate supply of glucose is
unnecessary.  What ever the merits may be of a particular case, to decide if a
deceased person has been drinking or not when the blood level is found to be
low, less than 40 mg/100 ml of blood, cannot be decided on the blood level
alone. If a urine sample is available and the level correlated with the
corresponding blood level, then a case for consumption becomes stronger.
Urine is a far more reliable biological fluid for deciding in cases of whether a
small  amount of alcohol has been consumed or not.  Urine samples, obtained
from patients having a positive glucose reaction that are allowed to remain at
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ambient temperature in a normal laboratory, have not shown any evidence of
alcohol production.  Further more, the urine of patients with evidence of urinary
tract infections to which glucose has  been added in 'diabetic mellitus' mounts
have in Dr. Taylor's laboratory failed to produce a significant level of ethyl
alcohol when measured using two separate gas chromatography columns.
The specific determination of alcohol in the blood can have a considerable
bearing on determining the cause of death in the case of a 'quarry suicide', in
those cases where the level of drug determined  is in the overdose but not in
the fatal range.  For example, a low overdose level of an intermediate or fast-
acting barbiturate drug can so very  easily become a fatal level, if the blood
alcohol level that is determined can be shown to have been the result of
alcohol consumption before death  and not merely the post mortem production
of alcohol.  Again, high overdose levels of the benzodiazepine drugs are very
rarely established as being the cause of death in the case where it is clearly
established that those particular compounds can be shown to be the only ones
that have been taken. However, in the presence of even a relatively small
amount of alcohol (corresponding perhaps to that maximum level of alcohol
that can be produced endogenously then benzodiazepine drugs in some
overdose quantity can prove fatal.  The use of the expression 'can prove fatal'
is meant to cover those cases where an overdose of such drugs are
consumed without any real intention of taking one's life, a 'cry for held' case.
However, sometimes alcohol consumption, the 'courage catalyst' to the
attempt, can transform such a dose into a fatal combination.
Another fluid that deserves a great deal more attention than it has had
in the recent past is vitreous humour. In a few case examined thus far from
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such cases of 'drinking or not', the vitreous humour appears to be an excellent
source of information.  Recommendations for its correct preservation are as
yet still required.  Dr. Taylor favours simply the use of small fluoride
containers. This is not to imply that ordinary fluoride-preserved to be the best,
but that most toxicologists throughout the world will have examined so many
samples contained in fluoride bottles that we are aware of the pitfalls and
problems associated with these samples.
Blood alcohol level and alcohol consumption :
So much has been written about this subject that it would not be
profitable to repeat again the problems of relating amount consumed to a
particular blood or urine alcohol level.  However, these remarks are confined to
those subjects that have been discussed, sometimes at great length, with
members of the legal profession. Curry points out that the main problems in
any calculation relating consumption to blood alcohol figure, is that one is
always dealing with an accurate chemical assay and trying to correlate that
with an estimate sometimes from a person whose memory may be slightly
impaired by alcohol, and who reports to consuming, for example, two points of
brown ale, one wodka and martini, two 'Manhattans' and two glasses of wine.
How can any assessment be made of this consumption in terms of the
classical point of beer or single whisky for 11 stone or 70 kg. average male ?
In the laboratory experiment were carried out in alcoholic consumption with a
wide variety of drinks and a  variety of glasses.  The material pointed about
glasses was that it affects greatly the quantity of a 'single' drink actually
delivered. For example, a recent  in French enabled the US scientist at first
hand to compare a 'Manhattan' made in the U.S.A. and France.  Although both
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were prepared with the same ingredients the 2½  Times the volume of the
French one.
A glass of wine, poured at random in a series of wine glasses in the
laboratory, showed that the volume varied from 76 to 134 mo.  The different
wines could, even on a conservative selection, vary from nearly 7-14 % of
alcohol, in order words; one person's glass of wine could contain almost as
much as four times the alcohol of another 'glass'.  Measures of whisky poured
at home are usually double the quantity that is given as single whiskies in a
public house, for example.
In one very interesting biochemical laboratory experiment a group of
people to partake drinks available were invited whilst using at lease two non-
drinkers to note the consumption of the others and warning the participants to
remember what they had consumed. In the main, poor memory correlated very
closely with subsequent blood alcohol level i.e. the higher the alcohol of drink
that they had consumed.  Oddly people below the level of 80 mg/100 ml gave
the best estimates of the consumption that they had previously.
In the calculation of time of consumption and blood alcohol level, it
was found that during a large number of alcohol tolerance tests performed with
100 ml of a 70% proof spirit, and with a series of experiments conducted with
randomly  consumed alcoholic drinks, that must subjects, following fasting for
at lest 8 h, reached their alcohol peak between 30 and 72 min.  timing of the
peak greatly increased with the quantity  and type of food in the stomach.  For
example, a heavy meal containing a lot of fat often delayed their alcohol peak
for several hours and that the level of alcohol was very much lower than if no
food whatsoever had been taken. Whatever the timing and height of the peak
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of alcohol in the  blood,  all the people tested oxidized the alcohol in their livers
at a mean rate of 17 mg/100 ml/h.  The range was 13-19 mg with by far the
majority between 16-17 mg.  This figure was constant whether dealing with
near-tee-totallers or hardened rugby players. There was no co-relation
between the mean oxidation rate and the gammaglutamyl transpoptidase
enzyme activity (GT). The latter enzyme has been used as a guide to the level
of social drinking and an excellent guide to the prognosis of the allegedly
cured 'alcoholic.'
We cannot find any biochemical basis for the expression 'ability to
hold one's liquor,' in that the oxidation rate is any faster. Six people, who were
obviously alcoholics, arrived for testing with small amounts of alcohol in their
blood (usually less than 35).  They had no other biochemical signs of
disordered liver function. These small amounts of alcohol were present in quite
of the fact that very specific instructions had been given, not to consumer any
alcohol during the previous 12 h.  Once feature noticed in this group was
totaller group.  It is possible that this is due to impaired absorption of alcohol in
the group of alcoholics.  Alcoholics as a group tend to be leas fit than normal
social drinkers, though whether this is due to the actual consumption of alcohol
or their concomitant poor dietary habits is outside the scope of this
dissertation. It is not surprising, however, that some alcoholics exhibit signs of
mal-absorption.
Drugs and Driving :
In a few cases, very low alcohol levels have been found in blood
samples taken from persons whose driving has not satisfied a particular police
officer. It may well be worthy of consideration in fact as to how some of these
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people managed to produce a significant reading on the roadside  'Alcotest.'
Firstly these may have been several hours between the roadside breathalyzer
and the taking of the blood sample. An actual blood alcohol reading of 15 mg/
100 ml plus 2 h of explation (assuring the peak was reached) could mean a
blood  alcohol at the time of driving of 52 mg/100 ml. this is just within the limit
at which some 'Alcotest' kits have given positive results in the author's
laboratory.  However, some blood samples have contained in as little as 5
mg/100 ml; this level would have required an oxidation of 17 mg/100 ml of
blood for an interval of 3 h plus the unfortunate combination of a very low
threshold 'Alcotest' kit.
Aside from these anomalies of subsequent blood alcohol finding and
breathalyzer screening, some of these 'odd 'blood samples have been further
examined for the level of particular drugs, especially if the suspected person
has exhibited signs of clinical intoxication, or has been in possession of that
particular drug.  They drugs have covered a wide range on therapeutic agents,
sedatives, anticonvulsant and  physhotropic drugs, as well as, in the extreme
case, narcotic drugs, Further prosecutions have been brought against several
persons for driving under the influence of drugs, with attempts being made to
correlated particular drug level to a certain clinical state.
Because of the variation in metabolism, conjugation and excretion of
different drugs, it would be a very difficult exercise to attempt to correlate the
urine level of a particular drug (or its metabolites) with that of any level of
driving skill.
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Blood tests in matters of disputed Paternity :
According to A.S.  Taylor in Taylor's Principle and practice of Medical
Jurisprudence blood group has been accepted by the court in cases of
disputed paternity for more than 50 years.
Exclusions of paternity fall into two classes :
First order exclusion :
 When the child possesses a blood group gene that is absent in both the
mother and the purative father, e.g. Table-6.1. In this example, the B blood
group gene present in the child cannot have come from the mother or the
purative father, so he is excluded from paternity.
Mother  Child  Purative Father
                        0     B         0
Second order exclusion :
 Where the purative father is homozygous for a blood group gene, which
he must pass on to all his children, but the gene is not present in the child in
question, e.g. Table. In this example, the purative father has only N genes to
give, but the child has no N gene, so non-paternity is indicated.
Mother  Child  Purative Father
                       MM    MM         NN
No problem arises with first-order exclusion but unsupported second-
order exclusion can pose problems as very occasionally persons have been
found who lack any representation at one or other of the blood group local.
Thus the absence of both known Duffy alleles, Fy and Fy, is not uncommon in
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Africans, so here the finding of child Fy   ( a | b) and purative Fy ( a B \ ) of
vice versa is not even suggestive of non-paternity. The occurrence of these
so-called 'silent alleles' has been described in a number of blood group
systems but in Western Europeans they are so unusual that they can be
considered as rare mutants. The Family Law Reform Act (1969) recognizes
the need to disregard the minute possibility of error through the unpredictable
occurrence of mutation and defines excluded as 'excluded subject to
mutation.' Apart from cases involving African subjects we have not
encountered an apparent second-order exclusion of maternity other than
where there was a possibility of an interchange of babies.
(i)  Non-exclusion of paternity :
Where no exclusion of paternity is obtained it is of value to the court to
be provided with some indication as to the likelihood of paternity.  Great care
must be taken with such evidence as false conclusions can easily be reached
if a blood relative of the alleged father is involved or the parties come from an
isolated community in which in breeding may have occurred, may have
occurred, resulting in a gene uncommon in the general population being more
frequent.  Any statistical approach to this problem may be misleading. The
method most acceptable, estimates the likelihood that the mother has named
by chance a man who is not excluded and where the blood groups fit this or
that well with paternity.  Taking the case where it is shown that the alleged
father, together with say 10 % of men in the community, could be the father,
then although this represents a large number of possible fathers in the
community, the mother stood a 90 % chance of being shown to be wrong if the
man she was naming where not the actual father.  With the present range of
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tests over 90% falsely accused men will be excluded from paternity so that a
non-exclusion result in itself must be of some positive evidential value to the
mother.  Even where the proportion of other possible fathers is shown to be
large, the case of the mother is not weakened, as this means only that the
child has received common blood groups from its father rather than a rare
group or rare combination of groups that would strongly support her case.
The method most widely accepted in this country is called the
'percentage method' which measures the usefulness of tests employed' which
measures the usefulness of tests employed in relation to the particular case
being investigated.  The calculation shows the percentage of men in the
community who have blood groups compatible with paternity, a figure of say,
less than 4% could be taken as pointing to actual paternity.  The basis of the
calculation is the frequency of the various groups in the population so it is
essential that the ethnic origin of the parties be known as blood group
frequencies can vary markedly between different populations. In the case of
certain populations very limited data is available so no calculation should be
attempted.
(ii) Blood group systems used in paternity cases :
As stated by Race G. Sanger, before any blood group system can be
employed in the investigation of pat4ernity problems, certain criteria must be
met :
(1)   The blood group must be simply in herlted and the mode of
inheritance known with certainty.
(2)       It must be adequately developed at birth or soon after.
(3)       It must be permanent throughout life.
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(4)       It must be unaffected by climate, age, disease or by any other
environmental or genetical condition.
Other considerations include the stability of the blood group in the blood
sample, the relative usefulness of the system, the availablility and cost of the
necessary reagents to perform the test and the amount of blood required to
allow testing.  This last requirement applies to small babies in particular, as
the amount of blood that can be taken easily is usually limited to about 1 ml.
The blood group systems currently employed can be listed under four
major headings :
(1)   Red cell antigens ;
(2)   Serum protein polymorphisms
(3)   Red cell enzyme polymorphisms;
(4)   HLA system.
(iii)  Red cell antigens :
The grouping of antigens present on the red cell is the oldest of the
techniques used by the serologist and until about 25 years ago only these
tests were available for use in paternity problems.  The range of tests has
remained roughly the same and normally includes the following systems :
ABO, MNS, Rhesus, kell, Duffy, Lutheran and Kidd.
Serum protein polymorphisms :
Since the discovery in 1955 by Smithies & walker of a genetic variation
in the x 2 globulin fractioh of human serum which they called haptoglobins, a
number of other serum proteins have been shown to be genetically
polymorphic.  Of these the group specific component, Ge, also found in the x
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2 globulin fraction, the Gm and Km antigens located on the immunoglobulins
and the Aganatigens found on the betalipopropiens are routinely tested. Two
other systems, the third component of complement, C3 and a recently
discovered transferring polymorphism, TFG, are not yet used routinely but are
available for use in difficult cases.
(iv) Red cell enzyme polymorphisms :
A large number of enzymes are present in the red cells and have been
investigated for genetically inherited variation.  This has proved to be the most
rewarding field of study in the last 20 years and numerous polymorphic red
cell enzymes have been discovered.  They are usually demonstrated by the
technique of starch gel electrophoresis, the same technique that Smithies
used to distinguish the haptoglobin types.  A hacmolysate is prepared from the
red cells and subjected to electrophoresis.  After separation of the enzyme
proteins, according to their electrical charge, the bands of enzyme activity are
located by applying to the surface of the gel a reaction mixture containing
those substances required for the enzyme catalysed  reaction to protein and a
stain that will reveal the regions of enzyme activity.  A list of the red cell
enzyme polymorphism currently used is shown in Table A.
A relatively new technique is iso-electric focusing. Here the enzyme
proteins are separated according to their isoelectric points in a pH gradient
established by applying an electric field to a mixture of amphoteric buffer
substances. This has revealed further variants in the phosphor glucomutase
system. Using the conventional starch-gel electrophoretic method, three
phenotypes can be demonstrated; this number is increased to 10 when
isoelectric focusing is used thereby increasing the chance of exclusion by this
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system from 14.5 to 24.5 %The examination of other red cell enzymes and
serum proteins by isoelectric focusing currently used and new polymorphisms
may be discovered.
HLA system :
The  HLA system consists of a series of antigens present on the
lymphocytes.  The chance of including a falsely accused man using a
comprehensive most attractive system for use in paternity problems but a
number of practical difficulties limit its usefulness.  Quite a large sample of
blood (approximately 5 ml) is needed in order to isolate a suitable lymphocyte
fraction, which would present testing on many samples obtained from small
babies.  Another drawback is the short life span of the lymphocytes so that
many samples received by post are unsuitable for testing. The initial cost of
acquiring the necessary antisera and ancillary equipment is high and to
ensure accurate results the investigator must have wide experience of HLA
testing.
(v) Chance of exclusion of non-fathers :
Table –'A'
System % Individualchance of
exclusion
% Combined
chance of
exclusion
Red cell antigens 17.6 17.6
ABO 3.12 44.1
MNSS 28.0 59.8
Rhesus 28.0 59.8
Kell 3.3 61.1
Duffy 4.8 63.0
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Lutheran 3.3 64.2
Kidd 4.5 65.8
Serum Proteins
Haptoglobins 18.1 72.0
Group specific components (Ge) 15.9 76.5
Ag 14.2 79.8
Gm 1 Gm 2 7.8 81.4
Km 1 4.1 82.2
Red cell enzymes
Phosphoglucomutase (PGM) 24.5 86.6
Red cell acid phosphatese (EAP) 21.0 89.4
Gluamate pyruvate transminase
(GPT)
18.7 91.4
Esterase D (ESD) 9.0 92.1
Adenosine deaminase (ADA) 4.5 92.5
Adenycate kinase (AK) 4.2 92.8
Glyoxalase 1 (GLO) 18.0 94.1
Total combined chance of
exclusion
94.1
TABLE
1969 1979
% Cases showing exclusion
Average number of exclusions per
case
2.1 2.6
% Cases showing non-exclusion 75 78
% Cases where non excluded
possible fathers were 4 % or less
of the population
9.2 38.5
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Change of exclusion :
Table 6.3 shows the average chance the non-father has of being
excluded by routine tests employed by a specialist laboratory.  This figure of
94% shows that the non-father would be unlucky not to be excluded, but there
is a considerable element of chance.  There are cases in which it is accepted
that one of two men is the father, but neither is excluded.
Between 1969 and 1979, nine additional system were added to the
range of systems investigated but, as is shown in Table 6.4, the percentage of
men show not to be the father did not increase but the proportion of cases in
which other possible fathers was shown to be below 4 % increased from 9 to
39%. No range of tests will exclude all non-fathers but these figures suggest
that the present range of tests approaches what can usefully be employed to
be cost-effective.
Chemical examination of seminal stains :
The examination of seminal stains may be carried out by the following
methods :
(i) Physical
(ii) Chemical
(iii)  Microscopical
(iv) Biological
Physical examination :
 Semen, when fresh, is a viscid, albuminous fluid of a faint grayish-
yellow colour, possessing a characteristic odour and containing spermatozoa,
epithelial cells, lecithin bodies, etc. When dry  semen gives a stiff, starchy feel
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to the cloth and produces slight deepening of the colour with the
disappearance of its odour.  In fabricated cases of rape or sodomy which are
not uncommon in this country a solution of starch or white of egg is used in
producing stiffening of the cloth which looks like a seminal stain on dirty, and
coloured garments.  In fact, dry seminal stains have no reliable distinctive
characteristics, when examined with the naked eye.  Under certain conditions
stiffness may disappear if the garments are not properly dried in the open air
before they are packed for dispatch for medico-legal investigation. It is
believed that in the presence of moisture certain bacteria act upon the protein
constituents of semen, digest the dried protein constitutents of semen, digest
the dried protein and thus destroy its stiffness. The bacteria not only remove
the albuminous matter but also disintegrate the spermatozoa beyond
recognition. It is, therefore, necessary that the police and medical officers
should thoroughly dry the garments having suspected  stains before they are
sent to the chemical Examiner.  They should also be careful not to fold of twice
cloth on the stain portion to prevent damage to spermatozoa.
 Invisible and softened seminal stains on cloth can be rendered quite
distinct by properly filtered ultra-violet rays which produce a bluish
fluorescence on the stains, provided the cloth is clean and not dark coloured.
More often than not, the victim's sari or underwear, coming as it does usually
from the poorer classes, is so dirty that ultra-violet rays are not very helpful in
searching for seminal stains.  It may also be noted that a bluish fluorescence
is not specific for seminal stains and may be seen in some other albuminous
materials.  The stiffening of cloth, if due to starch, pus, sputum, leucorrhoeal
discharge etc. may be proved by the presence of starch, granules, pus cells,
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squanous and other epithelial cells and different kinds of  bacteria under a
microscope; these will also indicate the source of the stains.
Chemical examination :
 The chemical examination of seminal stains consists in the application
of (a) Florence test and (b) Barberios' test.
(a)  Florence test : This is known after the name of Dr. Florence of
Lyons, who first introduced  it.  It is based on the formation of characteristics
crystals of choline periodide, when a solution of a seminal stain is treated with
Florence's reagent containing iodine, 2.54 grammes, potassium iodide, 1.65
grammes, and distilled water, 30 cc.  It is not absolutely necessary to stick to
this formula. In fact a slightly weaker mixture acts equally or better according
to some workers.  A mixture consisting of 5 per cent of iodine and 8 per cent of
potassium iodide in distilled water is used in our laboratory; with satisfactory
results. It keeps well for at lest three months.
The following technique for Florence test has been found quite
satisfactory and may be recommended for general application :
The stained portion is snipped off with a pair of
scissors and divided into small bits which are soaked
in a watch glass with a small amount of water
acidulated with hydrochloric acid (about 0.1 percent
solution or one drop of strong hydrochloric acid in 44
cc.  of distilled water) for about half an hour. A wet
piece is transferred to a slide, is carefully teased with a
pair of dissecting needles and is allowed to evaporate
almost to dryness.  A drop of Florence's reagent is
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added and a cover glass is placed over the specimen
which is then examined under a microscope.
 If a stain be seminal, dark brown crystals in the form of monoclinic
prisms or rhombic plates, often crossed or grouped in clusters, appear
immediately at the contact of the two solutions and then gradually throughout
the specimen.  The crystals resemble hacmin crystals in shape, size and
colour.  In dilute solutions the crystals are smaller and may appear as needles
or thin black rods of the usual rhombic plates. In scanty  stains three, four or
more pieces of wet specimens may be taken from the watch glass, teased on a
glass slide and then squeezed between the thumb and index finger to obtain as
much of the extract as possible. It is then evaporated and proceeded with as
before.
(b) Barbarios' test : This is also a useful chemical test for the recognition
of seminal stains and is believed to be specific for human semen. It is
performed by soaking a piece, 1 cm. x 1 cm., of the cloth having seminals
stains in a 2.5 per cent solution of trichloracetic acid in a tapered centrifugal
tube for about an hour.  The tube is then centrifuged and the clear supernant
fluid is added to an equal amount of a saturated aqueous solution of picnic
acid on a glass slide, when yellow crystals considerably I size and shape are
seen under a microscope.  These crystals may be described as (1) needle-
shaped crystals arranged single, in crosses  or in stars, (2)  lenticular crystals
resembling Charcol-Leyden crystals with a refrangent line at their long axis, (3)
crystals with irregular outlines, and (4)  crystals with feathery appearances.
The relation is  probably due to the prostatic secretion, as a positive reaction is
given by semen in which there are no spermatozoa. Seminal stains, as old as
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six years, are stated to have responded to this test, but we noticed  that a stain
of two and a half years' standing failed to give a positive reaction.  In fact, we
obtained negative results with this test even in some fresh stains where the
Florence test was strongly positive.
 The chief purpose of examining seminal stains under a microscope is to
detect the presence  of spermatozoa, which are usually associated with
eputhelia, faccal matter, starch granules, pus cells, cloth fibres, etc.  In rare
cases spermatozoa may be found with thread worms or their ova which infest
the female genitals.  A medical jurist is rarely required to examine a fresh
specimen of semen, although he may be called upon to find out living
spermatozoa in the vagina, if a female is brought to him soon after in alleged
rape.  A drop of ucus is removed from the vagina by means of a glass rod, is
placed directly on a slide, and  is diluted will a drop of normal saline.  It is then
covered with a cover glass and examined under the high power of a
microscope, when mobile spermatozoa, if present, will be seen.  Dried
seminal stains cannot be examined to easily.  They require suitable solvents
for bringing out spermatozoa under the microscope.  A solution containing one
drop of hydrochloric acid in 44 cc.  of water is considered the most suitable for
obtaining the suspensions of spermatozoa from  dried stains on fabrics. A ten
per cent solution of glycerine in water or in normal saline has been suggested
as a useful solvent, but it is regarded as unsuitable for making dry specimens
on slides for staining.  To suit the climatic conditions of Upper India Dr. Hankin,
late chemical Examiner to the Government of the United and the Central
Provinces, elaborated a method for detecting spermatozoa in seminal stains.
The method consists in boiling the stained fabric in a tannin solution before
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dissolving it in a solution, fabric is then placed on a slide,teased with dissecting
needles and stained with carbol fuchsin, when it is examined with a medium
power lens.  This method is too long and complicated to be of any use in a
laboratory where a large number of seminal stains are examined  every day.
Biological examination :
 This test has evidently a bright future, and is likely to be of much
practical value in those cases where it has to be determined whether a
seminal stain is of human origin or derived from an animal.  It must however,
be remembered that the bacterial action which producers disintegration of
spermatozoa in seminal stains in the tropics is equally effective in
decomposing or digesting the protein constituents of semen which, acting as
the antigen, produce antibodies.  Such seminal stains with their completely
disintegrated protein constituents cannot possibly give a positive precision
reaction and, therefore, offer the greatest difficulty in giving a definite opinion.
 The a group specific agglutinogens, when present, occur in a highly
concentrated form in the  seminal fluid and it may be possible to ascertain the
group of the individual by performing  the test for detecting the presence of
these agglutinogens in the seminal stains in the same manner as with blood
stains.
CHEMICAL EXAMINATION OF POISON AND DRUGS :
(i)  Inorganic poisons :
 Poisons are organic and inorganic.  The inorganic poisons are metallic
and non-metallic.
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(a) Metallic poisons
(i) Ascenic : For a criminal purposes the most common form of
Arsenic poisons are arsenic oxide or white arsenic.  After taking
this diarrhea with colic pain sets in.  Even a grain and a half is a
fatal does.
(2) Antimony : Tartar-emetic, potassium antimony tartarate, is
usually associated with cases of poisoning.  Antimony potassium tartarate on
being heated on a piece of platinum foil can be differentiated from arsenic
since the former becomes blackened and leaves a dark residue of charcoal
and metallic antimony.
(3) Bismuth : Bismuth salts when added to a large volume of water
give white precipitate and they are not precipitated by dilute sulphuric acid.
(4) Mercury : The symptoms for this poisoning are progressive
anemia, gastric disorder, salivation, nausea, vomiting of blood stained
tenacious mucus under diarrhea.
(5) Lead : This poison gives a metallic taste in the mouth, nausea,
vomiting of matter stained with blood.
(6) Thallium   :  there is stimulation of the heart, colic diarrhea, etc.
(7) Copper : Copper sulphate or blue vitriol has been used for the
purpose of murder or suicide.
(8) Zinc :  Zinc sulphate is irritantmand zinc chloride is corrosive.
The former presents a symptom of pain in the abdomen and violent vomiting,
sever purging, etc. and the latter destroys the membrane of the mouth, throat
etc.
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(9) Tin :  Tin salts cause gastrointestinal irritation, pain, vomiting,
diarrhea, cyanonis.
(10) Iron  : Sulphate of iron has been used in poisoning cases.  The
symptoms are vomiting, thirst, restlessness and collapse.
(11) Manganese : Symptom of poisoning are lassitude, drowsiness,
parkinsonism and disturbance of gait and speech.
(12) Cadmium : The poisons are the insoluble sulphate, and soluble
chloride and carbonate.
(13) Barium :  The poisons are the insoluble sulphate, and soluble
chloride and carbonate.
(14) Borax : Symptoms are malaise, nausea, hiccough, vomiting,
diarrhea, skin eruption, etc.
(15) Potassium : the nitrate causes pain in the stomach, vomiting,
purging etc. The bromide causes nausea, vomiting and colic.
(B) Non-Metallic poisons
(1)   Sulphuric acid : there is violent burning pain extending down the
throat and the body is bent.
(2)    Nitric Acid : The symptoms resemble to those of sulphuric acid.
(3)   Carbolic Acid  : Hot burning sensation, delirium, giddiness, nausea
and vomiting are symptoms.
(4)   Phosphorus : Symptoms are pain in the stomach, garlic taste in
mouth, vomiting, burning sensation in throat and esophagus
accompanied by great thirst.
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(5)   Carbon monoxide : Inability to move or to call for assistance is
produced.
(6)    Prussic Acid : Eyes glistening, pupils diluted, limbs flaccid, skid
cold, convulsive breathing, are the symptoms.
(ii)  Organic poisons :
(1) Chloroform : Causes vomiting, coma and death.
(2) Aniline : Causes nausea, headache, dizziness, roaring in the
ears, etc.
(3) Belladonna : Symptoms are feeling of dryness in mouth and
throat and talking becomes difficult.
(4) Strychnine : Symptoms are feeling of restlessess and
suffocation, trembling convulsions, hands are clenched, the
head is kerked backwards, etc. the lips are livid, and there is
great thirst.
(5) Dhatura : This grows as a wild plant by road sides and in fields
all over India.  It is used in India for producing insensibility to
facilitate robbery etc. Unconsciousness and hallucination occur.
(6) Curare : this is the active portion obtained from species of
strychorios oculus and other plants growing in South America
and elsewhere.
(7) Harish or charas : Bhang consists of the dried leaves of
cannabis sative now omitted from the pharmacopocia, charas is
the resinous exudates of the plant and corresponds to Hashish
as sold in Egypt.
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(iii)  Analysis of poisons :
Toxicology : In the science of the analysis of poisons.  An equipped
forensic science laboratory is required for this purpose.  According to C.R.M.
Cuthbert, the expert has to work under the circumstances narrated below :
 In cases of death where poisoning is suspected much of the work in the
first instance even before the post mortem examination takes place will
depend on the pathologist, for the circumstances attending the death may be
sufficiently suspicious to point to poisoning as possible cause of death.
 The pathologist, when he conducts his examination, will have a report
of all the circumstances of the death, the duration of the illness and the
symptoms from the on set of the illness to the time of collapse and death.  He
will also be informed of the time when first was last taken, with details of any
meals, particulars of all medicines prescribed, times when medicines were
given with details of amounts. He will also require to know whether there was
any evidence of vomiting or purging, convulsions, delirium or clutching at
imaginary objects, deep sleep or signs of tingling of the skin r throat.  Every
such information would be of immense value to the pathologist and analyst as
any one of these signs might well suggest a certain group of poisons or
exclude other types. It may be of course that the pathologist will discover a
natural cause of death, but if not he will remove samples of viscera for fuller
examination.
 Meanwhile samples of medicine, etc.. will have been taken by the police
and in all cases of suspected poisoning one cannot str4ess too strongly how
important it is to label adequately every bottle of medicine or substance which
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is sent for analysis. Not only should the label show the date, it should and if it
is medicine the amount of medicine in the bottle. Any drinking receptacles
found near the deceased's body should always be properly labeled.
 The pathologist will see that the following organs are preserved for
toxicological examination in the following manner : (1) Entire stomach and
contents in one glass stoppered jar, (2) The Intestines in another receptacle.
(3) The liver in a third jar, (4) The kidneys in a separate jar. (5) The bladder
and the contents in another jar.  Any vomit or excreta passed prior to death are
of equal importance.  If certain poisons are suspected then special samples
are taken, for instance muscle tissue may be taken for one particular group of
poisons, whilst in other groups, such as morphine  poisoning, the brain should
be preserved. If arsenic is suspected portions of hair and finger and toe nails
are necessary.  In the latter type of case the error of sending too little hair is
usually made as sufficient hair to fill the palm of the hand should be submitted
to the laboratory and whole nails are much more satisfactory than clippings.
 No preservative of any kind should be added to any of the specimens,
for specimens may have been ruined for chemical analysis by sealed adding
formalin. All jars containing  specimens must be adequately sealed and
properly labeled.  The labels should show the name of the deceased, the
contents of the jar, date of death and date of the post mortem examination.
Such samples should not be taken and sent by rail or post by the investigating
officer, for it is important that the officer should attend the analyst's laboratory
in person and should bring with him a full report of all the circumstances by his
personal attendance.  He will be able to answer on the spot any questions
which the analyst will probably wish to ask him.
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 The actual testing of poisons presents no great difficulty to a qualified
analyst, but  considerable experience is required in separating poisons from
viscera and in purifying them before testing.  The methods of testing for
poisons are the same in whatever substances the poisons may be found, but
the preparation and extraction previous to testing varies considerably with
each type of poison.  It is quite impracticable to give all the possible variations
in the methods of separating poisons from different materials.  It is also
unnecessary to give the individual tests for each poison for no one but a
qualified chemist would ever handle this class of work and he would, if the
necessity arose, consult, one or more of the text-books on this highly
specialized subject. It can be said, however, that the medical man classifies
poisons according to their physiological action, that is, the symptoms which
accompany their administration.
 The chemist, on the other hand classifies them according to origin and
method of extraction and identification.  Thus, we find during an analysis of
viscera for poison, the chemist will divide, the samples into four equally
weighed portions.  For instance, a stomach requires to be passed through a
mincer, then weighed and divided into four portions, the last operation being
necessary owing to the entirely different methods of extraction of the four main
divisions of poisons.  These divisions are as follows :
1. Volatile poisons : Such as chloroform are separated by distillation.
Consequently a portion of the stomach to be tested for this would be put
into a flask and connected to a still.  The resultant distillate would
contain the volatile poison.
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2. Non-volatile poisons : which include many synthetic drugs, are
separated from tissue by solvents.
3. The metallic poisons : such as arsenic, antimony, mercury, copper and
lead are separated by destroying the tissue buy oxidation.
4. The fourth sample is used to extract such things as oxalic acid which
could not be separated by the other three methods.
Bodies which are buried decompose more slowly, but the rate of
decomposition is  according to the dryness of the grave.  In wet conditions the
tissue is gradually saponified, a condition known as adipocerous.  The other
form of change is that of mummification, but this only occurs if the body is
buried or concealed  in a very dry place and even so, it is not often that
complete mummification occurs in this country under four to five years from
time of burial.
Certain organs purify quicker than others.  Thus one finds that the brain,
stomach liver and intestines purify quickly  whilst the heart, lungs and kidneys
putrify slowly.  Another factor affecting the rate of decomposition is the
condition of the body at the time of death, for fat bodies decompose less
quickly than those who die of a chronic illness.  The presence or absence of
air is also a most important condition for whilst air promotes decomposition,
lack of air retards putrefactive changes. From this it will be seen that prior to
an exhumation it is not possible to know in what condition the body will be
found. It is a question of wait and see.
Poisons are classified according to the chief symptoms which they
produce on the body, as follows :
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(1) Corrosives : Strong acids and alkalies.
(2) Irritants : (a) Inorganic.
Non-metallic : Phosphorus, Chlorine, Bromine, Iodine.
Metallic : Arsenic, Antimony, Mercury, Copper, Lead, Zinc, Silver
etc.
(b) Organic : Vegetable :  Castor oil, seeds, croton oil, Madar, Aloes
etc.
Animal : Cantharides, snake and insect bites, etc.
(c)   Mechanical : Diamond dust, Powdered glass, Hair etc.
(iii)   Neurotics : ( Cerebral )
1. Affected the brain :
(a)  Somniferous : Opium and its alkaloids.
(b) Inebriant : Alcohol, Ether, Chloroform.
(c) Deliriant : Dhatura, Belladona, Hyoscyamus, Cannabis indica.
2. Affecting the spinal cord : (Spinal) Nux vomica, Gelsemium.
3. Affecting the heart : (Cardiac) Aconite, Digitalis, Oleander, Tobacco,
Hydrocyanic Acid.
4. Affecting the lungs : (Asphyxiants) Poisonous irrespirable gases,
e.g., Carbon dioxide, Coal Gas, etc.
5. Affecting the peripheral nerves : (Peripheral) Conium, Curara etc.
(ix)  The actions of  poisons :
 The causes which modify the action of poisons are four in
number :
1.  Quantity
2. Form
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3. Mode of administration
4. Condition of the body.
Quantity : The natural presumption is that a large dose of a poison will
produce death more rapidly by causing severe symptoms than a smaller one,
but, in some cases the evil effects are mitigated by vomiting excited by a large
dose of a poison, such as copper sulphate. Moreover, the action of a poison
varied with the quantity of its dose.  For instance, a very large dose of arsenic
may produce death by shock without causing irritant symptoms, while a
smaller dose than a lethal one may produce its therapeutic action as
happened in the case of the late Mr. Fulham of Agra, when he was being
poisoned by small dose of arsenic.  Similarly, oxalic acid when administered in
a large dose, produces a local corrosive action, and may result in
instantaneous death from shock, but in a smaller dose it may prove fatal by
acting on the heart, while in still smaller does it acts on the spinal nervous
system and the brain.
Form : Under this head will have to be considered (a) Physical state;
(b) Chemical combination; (c) Mechanical combinations.
(a) Physical state : Poisons administered in the form of gases or
vapours act at once and most energetically. Poisons in the form of  solutions
act much more rapidly than powders.  Poisons in the form of solids act very
slowly, because they are difficult to be absorbed and, in some cases, may
prove quite harmless.
(b) Chemical combination : The action of a poisons depends upon
the solubility or insolubility resulting from a chemical combination.  Thus silver
nitrate and hydrochloric acid are both strong poisons when taken separately
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but, when combined, from an insoluble salt of silver chloride which is almost.
Similarly, baryta  barium dioxide and sulphuric acid act as poison if
administered separately but, in combination from an insoluble salt, barium
sulphate, which has no poisonous effect on the system.  In the same way
strong acids and alkalis, when administered together, are rendered inert by
their neutralizing effect.
It should be borne in mind that certain poisons which are almost
insoluble in water may  become dissolved in the acid secretion of the stomach
and are then readily absorbed into blood.  For instance, lead carbonate, white
are insoluble in water are thus rendered sufficiently soluble for absorption
through the mucous membrane of the stomach.
(c)  Mechanical combination : The action of a poison may be altered
very much if combined mechanically with insert substances.  For instance, a
small dose of concentrated mineral acid produces a corrosive action, but the
same dose, largely diluted with water may be taken internally with impunity.  A
heavy poisonous powder, when mixed with water, will settle down at the
bottom of a vessel and the victim fails to take it; while it would have been
swallowed had it been taken with a fluid of nearly the same specific gravity as
that of the powder. For this reason arsenic is usually mixed with milk, tea,
coffee or cocoa when administered for homicidal purpose.  Alkaloids, when
taken with animal  charcoal, are rendered more or less insert.
Mode of administration : The rapidity of the action of a poison depends
upon the mode in which it is introduced into the system.  Thus a poison acts
most rapidly when inhaled in a gaseous or vaporous form or introduced into
the blood current by injection into a vein, by sub-cutaneous injection, or by
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application to an open wound.  Next in rapidity is the action of a poison which
is applied to a surface, next when introduced into a cellular tissue, and next
when applied to a mucous membrane.  The least rapid is the action of a
poison applied to the unbroken skin.  In this case a drug dissolved in oil acts
more rapidly than a watery solution.
A poison  injected into the stomach acts more rapidly than when
injected into the rectum, since the absorptive power of the stomach and small
intestine is greater than that of the large intestine and rectum.  If a poison is
climated as rapidly as it is absorbed, no poisonous symptoms are likely to
occur.  On the other hand, if the rate of absorption is greater than that of
climation the poison tends to accumulate in the system, and has a
commutative action; for example, mercury, lead etc. are cumulative poisons.
 Absorption by the stomach occurs more rapidly when the stomach is
empty than when it is full of food at the time of taking the poison.  In some
cases, however, absorption may be hastened if the nature of the stomach
contents is such as will dissolve the poison.  Thus, the action of phosphorus
will be hastened if oil is taken immediately after it is swallowed as it dissolves
in all oils, except turpentine.
 Finally, it must be remembered that some poisons, when administered
by the mouth, are quite harmless, although they are highly dangerous when
given subcutaneously.  Thus, snake venom, when swallowed into the
stomach, has no poisonous into the stomach, has no poisonous effect on the
body.  Curare when taken by the mouth, is practically inert, but it is highly toxic
if administered hypodermically.  Hydrogen sulphide is more poisonous when in
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haled into the lungs than when given in solution either by mouth or as an
enema by the rectum.
 Condition of the body : Under this head will have to be considered (a)
Age; (b) Idiosynerasy; (c) Habit; (d) State of health; (e) Sleep and intoxication.
(a) Age : Ordinarily, poisons have a greater effect at the two extremes
of age.  Certain drugs, such as belladonna and calomel, are
however better tolerated by children than by adult.
(b) Idiosyncrasy : This means natural susceptibility or tolerance of an
individual towards certain drugs, such as arsenic, mercury,
potassium iodide, tartar-emetic, opium, strychnine, etc, as also
towards various articles various articles of diet, such as shellfish,
pork, pulses, vegetables, etc., which may be harmful to others.
Thus, a medical dose of arsenic or mercury  may produce alarming
symptoms in susceptible persons while even a very large dose of
the same drug may be tolerated by other individuals without any
deleterious effects.  I have known half a grain of calomel to produce
in an adult acute symptoms of mercurial poisoning.  The same is the
case with certain kinds of food Hence the proverb "one man's meal
is another man's poison."
(c) Habit : By the long continued use of such drugs as opium tobacco,
alcohol, stray chine and ansenic people establish the habit of
tolerating very large doses which under ordinary circumstances are
liable to prove fatal.  Even infants and children who cannot best very
small dose of certain drugs such as opium etc., may be the
influence of habit be made to bear considerably large doses of
302
these drugs with comparative impunity. It should, however, be borne
in mind that the habit cannot altogether counteract the evil effects of
these poisons and that their habitual use is impair the constitution or
give rise to organic diseases.
(d) States of health: Broadly speaking a healthy and vigorous person is
less likely to succumb to the effects of poison than one who is
enfeebled by disease.  But in some disease larger does of certain
drugs may be given with impunity without causing any harmful
effects, for example, opium in tetanus, delirium tremens and mania,
and strychnine in paralysis, while in other diseases certain drugs
cannot be given in small doses without producing deleterious
effects, e.g. opium in granular kidney and apoplexy and mercury in
chronic Bright's disease. Similarly, digitals, tobacco or tartar-emetic
even in a small dose may produce symptoms of syncope when
given to a person having a weak or a fatty heart.
(e) Sleep and intoxication : During sleep all the bodily functions are
languid. Hence the action of a poison is delayed if a person goes to
sleep soon after taking it. The action is also retarded if one takes a
poison when in an intoxicated condition.
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE REPORTS OF CHEMICAL EXAMINER AND
SEROLOGISTS :
(a) Value of applicability of the report : It can hardly be open to the courts to
render Section 510, (now Section 293, Cr. P.C.) Criminal Procedure
Code nugatory by refusing to attach any weight to the reports of the
Chemical Examiner even though he is not examined. If they are not to
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have any weight, there would be no object in making them admissible
in evidence. The intention of the Legislative is that they should have
the same value as they would have if they were formally proved by
sworn testimony.  It is always open to the courts to call the Chemical
Examiner when this is deemed to be necessary in the interest of
justice.  He does not, as a rule, give any opinion as to the cause of
death, but merely reports the result of the chemical examination of the
substances sent to him.  It is for the court to determine the cause of
death after a consideration of such report together with the post
mortem appearance as deposed to by the officer who conducts the
autopsy and of the other evidence in the case.90
The word used in Section 293, Cr. P.C. is 'may'. The section
says that the report may be used as evidence in any enquiry, trial or
the proceeding under the Code.  But as seen earlier, the use of the
report has not been intended to be only a discretionary matter.  The
reports are invariably used and are admissible without proof. It is a
different matter that the court can summon the expert and examine
him if it thinks fit. (Vide Section 293(2), Cr. P.C.).
Under Section510, (now Section 293), Cr. P.C. it is the
original report that may be used as evidence without formal proof and
not a copy of such a report. The copy cannot be used in evidence
without proof.  The court can call upon the prosecution to produce the
original report where a copy is filed by the prosecution.91
90 AIR 1934 Lah 150.
91 State of Orissa v. Parvatisan, 1963(1) Cri LJ 310.
304
The report of the Chemical Examiner submitted to a police officer is not
inadmissible in evidence by virtue of Section 162, Cr. P.C.92
Upon information received, the Police Sub-Inspector raided the shop of
the accused on January 27, 1960, seized some bottles and sent them to the
Assistant Chemical Examiner attached to the State of Bombay for analysis.
The report was dated March 22, 1960.  Subsequently, as a result of Bombay
Reorganization Act, 1960, the Bombay State was bifurcated from May, 1960.
The offence was registered on May 11, 1960 and charge sheet was submitted
on May 27, 1960, in the State of Gujarat and, therefore, the report of Chemical
Examiner attached to the State of Maharashtra subsequent to the bifurcation
and at the time of the prosecution was not admissible.  It was held that the
prosecution commenced on January, 27, 1960, where the criminal law was set
in motion by the raid by the Police Sub-Inspector, when it was the State of
Bombay.  The Chemical Examiner attached to the Bombay State was
competent to give the report at the time.  The word "case" in Section 92(3) of
the Bombay Reorganization Act is wide enough to include the proceeding
commended by the raid and seizure, which stood transferred to the
corresponding officer of the Gujarat State upon bifurcation.  Therefore, the
report of the Chemical Examiner of the Bombay State as not inadmissible in
the prosecution of the accused which was continued in the Gujarat State  on
the ground that at the time when the report was put in evidence, the Chemical
Examiner was not attached to the State of Gujarat.93
92 Ukha Kalne v. State of Maharashtra, 1963 (2) Cri LJ 418 : AIR 1963 SC 1531.
93 State of Gujarat  v. Lasamal Manumal Mangalani, 1963(1) Cri LJ 533.
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The word "duly" appearing in Section 510, (Now section 293) Cr.P.C.
means "property".  This word only emphasizes the fact that the proof of the
identity of the article sent to the Chemical Examiner with articles examined by
him must be established.  Where, therefore, the report of the Chemical
examiner states that oleander poison was detected in the viscera and in the
residue of the Chatni (which was administered to the deceased), there is no
escape from conclusion that the articles were dully submitted for chemical
examination even though they are submitted by doctor and not by investigation
officer.94
Where the blood specimen was collected by a medical practitioner
before investigation and thereafter it was handed over to the police officer on
demand by him and ultimately submitted  to the Chemical 'Examiner for his
examination, it would be regarded a "duly submitted" within the meaning of
Section 510, (now Section 293), Cr. P.C.6
Evidentiary Value of the reports :
Although no hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the value to
be attached to such reports, a meager and cryptic report, to the effect that the
contents were duly examined with the result that arsenic in traces was
detected and a particular test was used, is hardly of any value.95
Report stating bald conclusions in positive or negative in the matter of
substance sent to Chemical Examiner is of no value.  It must state reasons for
conclusion and tests applied.96
94 Ukha Kalne v. State of Maharalshtra, 1963(2) Cr. LJ 321 : AIR 1965 Orissa 38.
95   Gaya Kanwar v. Emperor, AIR 1934 Oudh 62:35 Cri LJ 700.
96   RamPrasad v. State of Bhopal, AIR 1953 Bhopal 17 : 1953 Cri 702.
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It is not necessary that the report of the Chemical Examiner should
state the method adopted on the basis of which the result was arrived at.97
The court is not bound to accept and act upon the report given by a
Chemical Examiner as conclusive evidence of its contents.98
If the report does not contain reasons for arriving at a particular
conclusion or if the   report is not full of complete and does not disclose tests
or experiments performed by the Chemical Examiner, the probative value of
the report could suffer.99
The report of the Chemical Examiner as to the alcohol content in the
blood of the accused to enable the court to raise presumption under Section
66(2), Bombay Prohibition Act must show the tests or experiments performed
by him, the factual data revealed by such tests or experiments and the
reasons leading to the formation of the opinion from such factual data.
Otherwise the report could have no value as a piece of evidence.  It is not
enough for the Chemical Examiner merely to give his opinion as to what was
the concentration of alcohol in the sample of the blood analyzed by him.
Opinion is no evidence unless reasons in support of the opinion are given for it
is then only that the court can scrutinize the reasons and decide for itself as to
what weight should be attached to the opinion.  The burden is on the
prosecution to prove that the concentration of  alcohol in the blood of the
accused was not less than 0.05 percent, the prosecution cannot rely on the
failure  of  the  accused  to   apply   to   the   court   under   sub-section(2)   for
97    Bhaskaran  v. State, 1967 KLT 165.
98      Ibid.
99      State of Gujarat v. Lasamal Manumal, 1963 Gum. LR 270.
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summoning and examining the Chemical Examiner as to the subject matter of
the report.  The prosecution cannot rely on the presumption under Section
66(2) of the Bombay Prohibition Act and without the aid of the presumption,
prosecution must  obviously fail.100
 Where the accused are charged with "aconitine" poisoning ad the
"aconitine" is found in the vomits of the deceased just before  his death, it is
necessary that the Chemical Examiner's report should be clear about the
category of the aconitine because there are many varieties of the plant
aconite, that a large  number of them are poisonous and that some are not
which are known as "Pseudo aconitine".  The two types very in their chemical
composition but have certain toxicological resemblances which produce similar
pharmacological results.  It is also necessary to take the point of time of the
appearance of the symptoms of poisoning in relation to time of the alleged
poisoning because according to medical jurisprudence, and toxicology, in
cases of aconite poisoning, symptoms appear after three to five minutes.101
 The value of the opinion given by an expert depends, to a great extent,
upon the materials put before him and the nature of the questions that are put
to him.  The criticism that the expert speaks from an impregnable fortress
hardly holds good today.  Experts are always ready to explain the reason for
their opinion, and judges are entitled to attaché little for no importance to their
evidence if the explanations given are not satisfying.102
100 Suleman Usman Menon v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1961 Guj 120 : 1961(2).Cri LJ 78.
101    Kurura Magamma, AIR 1941 Mad 870 : 43 Cri CJ 596.
102   Sattar Khan, AIR 1939 Mad 283 : 40 Cri LJ 483..
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 The opinion of an expert has a corroborative value only and is useful for
ascertaining whether the direct evidence is true or not.  It is absolutely unsafe
to base a conviction on that opinion only, when there is no other evidence in
the case; for it can never be said with certainty that the weapon with which the
crime is said by the expert to have been committed, though found in
possession of the accused person was in his possession when the offence
was committed.103
Experts Evidence : Admissibility :
 The reports of the experts are not 'legal evidence" unless they appear in
court as witnesses and are examined by both parties in respect of their
opinion.104 However, Section 292 and 293 of the new Criminal procedure
Code (Act No.2 of 1974) exempt certain experts and their reports can be
admitted in evidence without am formal proof.
Examination of 'Expert on Commission on before Court :
 Examination of a witness (a handwriting  expert) before the Court trying
the case is much more satisfactory than an examination on Commission, and
whenever possible the witness should be called and examined before the
trying court.105
103 Mir Abbas Hayat Khan v. Emperor, AIR 1937 Pesh 99 : Cri LJ 234.
104      Tek Chand, J., Wadhawa v. Jai Kishan Das, (1928) 106 IC 493 : AIR 1923 Dab 427; 29
PLR 125..
105      Jackson A.J.C., Gondu v. Tulsi Ram, (1930) 120 IC 335 : AIR 1930 Nag 27.
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Admissibility of grounds of opinion :
 Under Section 51 of the Evidence Act when the opinion is admissible,
the grounds upon which it is based are also admissible.106
 It is not enough for the Chemical Examiner to merely state his opinion
that arsenic was detected.  He must state the grounds on which he arrives on
the opinion.  Whenever the opinion of an expert is relevant, the grounds on
which such opinion is based are also relevant, and an expert may give an
account of experiments performed by  him for the purpose of forming his
opinion.107
Admissibility of Mon-expert Evidence :
 In order to prove the handwriting or  signature of that person.108
Thumb Impressions taken in Court for Comparison purposes :
 The thumb impression of the accused on the deed in dispute was
compared with the thumb impression taken in Court by an expert.
 Held, under Section 45, ill. (c), Evidence Act, the opinion of the expert
formed by comparison of various thumb impressions referred to is admissible
in evidence.109
 "The question of the identity of a thumb mark is a question of face to be
decided by evidence as any other question of fact."
106  Bachelor, Heaton & Machleod, JJ. Government of Bombay v. Marwanji Muncherji Gana,
(1908)
107    Niamatullah & Bennett, JJ., Mst, Gajrani v. Emperor, (1933) 144 IC 357: AIR 1933 All
399 : 34 Cr LJ 754 : 1933 Cr C 664 (1933). A Cr C 113.
108    Jawala Prasad & Admini., JJ., Mt. Jasoda Kaur v. Janak Misser, (1925) ILR 4 pat 394 :
92 IE 1034 : AIR 1925 Pat 787 : 7 PLT 507..
109 Ghose & Duval, JJ., Supdt. And Remembrancer of Legal ? Affairs v. Kiran Dasi, (1926)
93 IC 72: AIR 1926 Cal 531 : 27 Cr LJ 79 : 30 CWN 373 : 6 CrI 108.
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I see no objection in law at all till the taking of the accused's thumb
mark, if the Judge thinks it relevant any time nor do I think that a conviction
based on comparison of the thumb-mark of the accused person with the thumb
mark on the document in question in the suit is the least objectionable."110
Admissibility of expert evidence Re : Typewritten matter :
 It is true that Section 45 makes no reference to type-writers, but
evidence as to the fact that the type-writers used in the typing of the various
exhibits have certain defects which are clear from the typing of these Exhibits
is evidence of the fact which can be competently given by an expert who has
had an opportunity of examining the documents. The Court is entitled to draw
its own conclusion as to the source and authorship of the documents from the
whole evidence in the case and is entitled to take into consideration the fact
spoken to by an expert witness that there were certain peculiarities in the
typing of the documents resulting from defects of the machines by which the
documents were typed.111
 The opinion of an expert to the effect that one document has been type-
written on the same machine as an other document is not admissible under
Section 45 of the Evidence Act.  As the section stands,  it does not include
such expert opinion. The court may ask the witness to explain points in favour
of the view whether the two documents have or have not been type-written on
the same machine but must come to its conclusion and not treat such
assistance as an expert opinion & relevant fact in itself.112
110  Schwalle, C.J. & Waller, J., Public Prosecutor V. Kandasawmi Thevan, (1927) ILR 50
Mad 452 : 98 : IC 99 : AIR 1927 Mad 696 : 27 Cr. LJ 1251 : 53 MLJ 597 : 27 MLW 184.
111     Thom, J. Manabendra Nath Roy V. Emperor, AIR 1933 All 498 : 1933 Cr C. 433.
112    Sulaiman, C.J. & Young J.,Thobwala S.B. V. Emperor (1933) 145 IC 481 : AIR 1933 All
690 (705) : 34 Cr. LJ 967 : 1933 ALJ 799 (825) : LR : 4 A 259 Cr.
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CHAPTER-VII
IDENTIFICATION OF THINGS, ARTICLES, DEAD BODY,
BLOOD, STAINS AND POISON ETC.
IDENTIFICATION OF ARTICLES:
 This substantive evidence of the identification of an article is its
identification at the trial. The test identification is only corroborative evidence.1
There is nothing in law that debars the court of law from believing a witness
when he says for the first time in the witness-box that a certain thing belongs
to him.2  But as with the identification of person this bare statement of the
would not receive much credence. In a case of the Nagpur High Court in
Motilal v. Emparor,3 on an objection being taken by the accused that the
identification of the ornaments was inconclusive for the reason that the
ornaments were not mixed with other similar ornaments, it was held by the
court that it were true that there has been an omission to take this step but
that would not make the identification inadmissible although it would detract
form the weight that would otherwise be attached to that evidence. The
reason as to why the witness is less likely to be believed in such
circumstances is not that he is telling a lie but the court treats it as
indisputable that the polices regard as the suspected article, will be much
more likely, however fair and careful he may be to assent to the view that the
thing he is shown corresponds to his recollection. This rule of credence
1 State of Rajasthan V. Nanee Ram, 1978 Cr LJ (NOC) 80 (Raj): 1977 WLN 227 : 1977
OLW 241.
2 Kamta Prasad V. Delhi Administration, AIR 1958 SC 350; Chimna V. State, AIR 1961 Raj
35 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 310.
3 AIR 1940 Nag 66 : 185 IC 310 : 41 Cr LJ 58 : 1939 NLJ 585.
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however is not so rigid as in the case of identification of person, because
there two things have to be weighed, first, the credence of the witness and
secondly, the question of observation of the person whom one had not much
opportunity perhaps to observe. But here in the identification of things if the
thing belonged to the witness or he was thoroughly acquainted with it, the
question remains only of credence. But where the thing is of much a common
type that anybody can possess it and there is no peculiar feature; about it,
even with the previous identification of it, the question of observation loses its
importance, the question remains only of credence. But where the thing is of
such a common type that any body can possess it and there is no peculiar
feature, it, even with the previous identification of it, the courts may disregard
the evidence of the witness.
 But whether the identification in court alone should be believed or not,
is a question of fact. The evidence given may be more reliable or the article
may be of such nature that the likelihood of the complainant possessing it
may be more certain than that of the accuesed.4
The Andhra High Court in In re Gundla Narayana 5 had to decide this
point. On an objection being raised that the identification of the articles in
court could not be believed because they were not put forth for identification,
the court held that it did not agree with that contention because in their
Lordships’ opinion identification in count assumes move importance.
Unfortunately, however, their Lordships, did not elaborate this point further
the nothing was stated way such as identification has better value.
4 Chimna V. State, AIR 1961 Raj. 35 : (1961) 1Cr LJ 310 : 1960 Raj LW 411 Mahboob V.
State of U.P.,1982 Cr LR 242.
5   AIR  1959 Andhrapradesh 387.
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 Where the witness frankly admitted that he was not an expert and that
he had no technical qualification in respect of property sent to him for opinion,
the opinion given by such person is not admissible in evidence.6
TEST IDENTIFICATION : OMISSION, A SERIOUS INFIRMITY :
 Where the investigation agency did not take care to get the article
identified prior to its identification in the court it is as infirmity as the
identification in the court does not get any support form prior identification.7
 In the first information Report, a doubt was cast that the accused was
staying with the deceased a day prior to the date of murder and therefore, the
might have committed that crime. It was also reported that certain articles were
found at the place of murder. Two witnesses deposed before the court that
they and seen articles with the accused a day before the murder, but these
articles were never put for test identification by these witnesses before they
were made to identify them in the court. The accused denied to have owned
these articles. In the absence or prior identification, it is difficult to accept the
testimony of these two witnesses to prove that these articles belonged to the
accused.8
INDEPENDENT PROOF OF OWNERSHIP :
 In corroboration the witness’s statement in court that a certain thing
belongs to him or to certain other person to this knowledge can come either
6 Nishit Ranjan Bhadra V. State of Assam, 1982 Cr. LJ 2253 (Gauh.)
7 Ramaialias Ramaiya V. State of Rajasthan 1978 Cr LR (Raj) 247 (250): (1978) 3 Raj Cr C
63; see also Jagan V. State, 1982 A Cr R 165 : 1982 (UP) CR LR 411 (Where it was held
that mere assertion in court by the information that articles produced in court were the
same which were taken away from him  in robbery, is not sufficient  unless his statements
corroborated by test identification proceedings).
8 Ramai Alias Ramaiya V. State of Rajasthan, 1978 Cr. LR (Raj) 247.
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by previous identification of it when the thing is places along with similar other
things and the witness is allowed to pick it up, by proof of its ownership. When
the report with the police is lodged, the weight, price, general appearance,
etc., of things is usually given, or if the ownership or possession can be
traced, mention is made of it in the report. This sort of thing or what is best,
the independent proof of ownership may be sufficient to carry scales in favour
of the prosecution. The independent proof of ownership is definitely a better
piece of evidence than the view media of identification. The thing or article
may have a definite make or a number, or the sale voucher pertaining to it or
the sale voucher pertaining to it or the bahi entry may be proved. In all
fairness to the accused, the evidence of identification must be regarded as a
weak type of evidence. The element of chance and then the police always
snatching the opportunity the show up the thing to the witness previously, rob
it of much of its value and then the proper conduct of identification is always a
problem.
NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN :
 When the police recovers an article or thing which it alleges to be of
suspicious origin, it seals it up in the presence of witnesses, and then sends
up the sealed packed to the court malkhana. Late on, this sealed packed is
opened by the person of the Magistrate when holding the identification or in
his presence. The usual way is to place the thing or article so recovered
among other similar things or articles and then call the witness, one by one,
who are asked to pick up the thing or article from among the other things or
articles. This process of identification is exactly the same as with the
identification of person. As far as possible, similar things or articles are to be
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selected to be placed along with the recovered property, and a good
proportion maintained between the thing to be indentified and these mixed
along with it so as to eliminate the element of chance.
Precautions must be taken to ensure that no witness who comes to
identify the thing does have the opportunity to see it before he comes to
identify it. If he can take the opportunity to see the article before hand, the
identification proceedings are reduced to a farce.
 The articles that are brought from outside to be mixed along with the
recovered article or articles should also be brought sealed before the person
holding, the identification, and as matter of fact it should also be ensured that
these articles have not been seen by the witness who come to identify the
suspected article or articles. For the purpose, the practice of examining the
person who brings these articles form outside should be followed with
advantage. It was held in a case of the Oudh Chief Court in Jangoo Singh v.
Emperor 9 “In the present case, however, the articles were brought by a man,
called Baldeo Prasad whom the Magistrate calls the ‘contractor’. This man
has not been examined as a Witness, and it is noted by the Magistrate that
the cover in which they were brought was not sealed. It is therefore not
impossible that the identification witness may have had a chance of seeing
the articles to be mixed before the proceeding.” This point as further
reiterated in a case of the Allahabad High Court in Subhan v. Emperor.10
According to the evidence of the Magistrate who held the identification, he
mixed the articles to the identified with other similar articles and other number
9 AIR 1945 Oudh 164 : 213  IC  163 : 45   Cr  LJ  689.
10 AIR 1950 All 180 : 51 Cr LJ 586.
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of articles mixed was equal to the number of articles to be identified.
According to the witness he mixed one rumal similar to Ex. I. The witness
admitted that the articles to be mixed had seen collected by one Baby Ram,
contractor, before being sent to him in a sealed packet and that be did not
inquire from this contractor whether the articles he had brought for mixing had
or had not been seen by witnesses. No attempt was made to examine Baby
Ram as a witness in the case so that he could state that the prosecution
witnesses for identification had had no chance to seen the articles which were
to be mixed. When were is no evidence to show that the articles to be missed
had not been seen by the prosecution witnesses for identification, it cannot be
said that identification proceedings actually held were genuine. To give
greater weight to the identification, the Magistrate holding the proceedings
ought not to content himself merely with mixing an equal number of articles
with the article to be identified, but the number of articles to be mixed ought to
be as far as practicable, at least two or three times the number of articles to
be identified.
 That the person who supplies the articles that the mixed with the
suspected articles that the mixed with the suspected articles, should
invariable be examined in the case to discountenance the fact that these
articles had not been seen by the witnesses, was negative by the Allahabad
High Court in the case of State v. Jhabhu 11 :
“It is said that the Naib Nazir of tehsil (who brought the
articles to be mixed) should also have been examined to
prove that these other articles which were mixed with the
11 AIR  1952  All 445 : 1952 Cr LJ 800.
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suspected articles had not been shown to the witnesses
before they were produced before the Magistrate.
For, had they been so shown, the identification
would lose much of its values. But the witnesses are not
residents of the place where the identification was held
and there is no suggestion in the evidence at all that
these articles had in fact been previously shown to the
witnesses. In the circumstances, my view is that it was
quite unnecessary to produce such evidence to prove the
negative / fact that these other articles had not been
shown to the witnesses before the identification
proceeding took place.”
 It is quite probable that on account of lapse of time, his memory faded
and he would not identify the person, who was arrested in this presence, but
his testimony does not have any room for doubt about the fact that a person
was arrested with chains which were also correctly identified before the
Magistrate and the court.12
What precautions are to be exactly taken to ensure a genuine
identification is always a matter of commonsense. No presumption attaches
to identification proceedings of property as of accused persons, and it is
always for the prosecution to establish affirmatively that every necessary
precaution was taken to ensure fair identification. The most essential
requirement is that the witnesses should not have had an opportunity of
12 Babu V. State of U.P. 1982 A Cr R. 211.
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seeing the property after the recovery and before its identification before the
Magistrate. For that purpose it is necessary to seal the property as soon as it
is recovered and to keep it in a sealed condition till it is produced before the
Magistrate. The police officers who take the sealed bundles to the than after
recovery and who take it to the Magistrate for identification proceedings
should be examined to prove that the sealed bundles were not tampered with
in any way. The sealed bundles should be opened in the presents of the
Magistrate conducting the identification proceedings and the should depose
about it. The property to be mixed with the property to be indentified should
also be sealed some days before the witnesses are called and the bundle
containing it should also be opened in the presence of the Magistrate who
should testify abut it in court. Against each article to be indentified it should be
noted whether it has the appearance of being new or old and of being used or
unused and the number of articles mixed with it should be noted against it
together with the fact whether they are new, old, used or unused. All these
matters should be entered in a memorandum, together with the result of the
identification by the Magistrate in his own hand and memorandum should be
produced in court to prove that such precautions were in fact taken.13
It has been held that where the property to be identified has not been
sealed at the time of the recovery, little value can be attached to the
identification proceedings held with regard to it.14
To give a genuine appearance to the identification proceedings the
police should never retain the property which is to be later on identified with it
13 State of V.P. V. Munni Dhimar, AIR 1954 VP 42 : 1954 Cr LJ 1819.
14  Chimna V. State, AIR 1961 Raj. 35 : (1961) I Cr LJ 310 : 1960 Raj LW 411.
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or in the police station beyond the barest time necessary to complete the
formalities about it, and it should send it as soon as possible to the court
malkhana. The police puts its own seal on the property when it recovers it and
late on if the property or the sealed packet containing it is allowed to lie in the
thana, there is nothing that can hinder the police from showing it to the
complainant or his witnesses. The seal being its own seal the police can
unseal the packet at leisure and seal it up again. It the police retains the
property at the thana unnecessarily, the defense can always put forward the
complaint that the property has been shown to the witness during the interval
and experiences has shown that such a complaint is seldom wrong.
Whenever the court finds that the identification proceedings have not
been fairly conducted or that witness may have had picked up the had seen
the articles once could have no difficulty in separating them from these
received from the tehsil. We regret that under the circumstances we are not
prepared to attach any value to the evidence if identify of such witnesses who
identified the articles before Mr. Mashihuddian Ahmad.”
Where the accused, the sole assailant of the victim, remaining in the
company of the eye-witnesses for a considerable time and caught hold of, in
no time, amed with the weapon of offence, stained with blood and with blood-
stained identity can arise, in such a case.15
In state v. Wahid Bux 16 at the time of identification chits were attached
to  only  such of  the  articles  as  were recovered from the possession of  the
accused but the Magistrate who conducted the identification proceedings was
15 KasamKhan V. State of Rajasthan, 1982  Cr  LR (Raj) 682 (DB).
16  AIR  1953 All 314 : 1953 Cr LJ 705 : 1952 ALJ 568.
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unable to say whether similar chits were placed on the other articles which
were mixed with suspected articles or things otherwise than from their having
been genuinely associated with it, it is never slow to reject this part of the
evidence. In an Oudh case in Bhagwan Din v. Emperor,17 the court held.
“As regards the evidence furnished by the other articles, the
value of it depends upon the value to be attached to the
identification evidence produced in respect of them. It is in
evidence that the said articles were shown by the sub-Inspector
in the course of his investigation to the witnesses produced for
their identification. This circumstance greatly discounts the
value of the testimony of these identifying witnesses. Mr.
Wasihuddin Ahmad Karmani, the Magistrate, who conducted
the identification proceedings has stated that he had been
supplied from the tehsil with a set of similar articles in order to
mix then with the articles in question which he had received
form the malkhana. He was or opinion that the articles were so
dissimilar that any one who the articles to be identified. The
court held that if no such chits were placed on the other articles,
it was very easy to pick up those articles with chits, and that it
no identification at all.
 In Nari Santa v. Emperor,18 the best identification was held at the
police  station and by two persons,  one a supply inspector  and  the  other a
medical officer. Both were new to the work and the only instructions they had
17 AIR 1934 Oudh 151 : 11 OWN  444 : 9 Luck 546 : 149 IC 195 : 35 Cr LJ 915.
18 AIR 1955  Pat  161 : 46  Cr LJ 613 : 219 IC 391.
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received for their guidance were the rules printed in the forms themselves as
also certain hints given by the police officers, more or less connected with the
investigation of the case. Before the first officer as many as 141 items were
put up for identification. The items were varied and numerous and it was not
made clear how four for five of each variet / could be mixed up with the
articles for going through the tests. It was also stated by the witness that on
each of the articles put up for identification some labels written in vernacular
were pasted to indicate the places form which they were recovered or seized
while no such labels were placed on the articles which were mixed up with the
suspected articles. For this reason as also for the reason that the things that
were put up for identification were of common use, with no special marks or
features and were not difficult to be found in the market, the court held that
the identification of the articles was not satisfactory.
Articles to be mixed to be similar or identical :
 The requirement of law is that similar articles are to be mixed for
identification. It is not required that the identical articles should be mixed.
Similarly for identification or a person, similar persons are mixed. No two
persons are identical but in the case of property it is possible to have identical
articles where they are made by machine. But in that case it will not be
possible even for the real owner to identify the lost article. The requirement of
law is satisfied if similar articles are mixed which would only mean that if there
are some prominent marks of dissimilarity they can be concealed; they are
required to be similar in the same sense as similar persons are to be mixed
up with the accused persons in test identification. A Contractor is expected to
bring the articles for mixing up on the basis of description given in the
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recovery memo. The articles need not be shown to the contractor for bringing
similar articles. The main object is that there should not be such prominent
marks on the articles about which an identifying witness could be informed
and such witness might be able to identify that article even if it did not belong
to him or her. The court has only to be satisfied with the aid of evidence of
identification that the article really belonged to that witness and he or she
could be able to identify simply because if belonged to him or her, without any
outside aid.”19
ARTICLES OF COMMON USE :
 That the things for articles are of common use with no special marks or
features or them and as are readily available in the market greatly detracts
from the value of its evidence of identification. The identifying witness should
not be disbelieved simply because no identification parade was held for yhr
articles and no reasons were formulated by the witness to specifically identity
them.20
 In the Patna case as stated above, the court held the evidence of
identification of articles as unsatisfactory for that reason also. This point was
also considered in two Allahabad cases in State v. Wahid Bux,21 and in
Subhan v. Emperor,22 and the identification evidence was held not be
satisfactory. It was stated in Gajadhar v. Emperor,23 that owners of articles
can easily identify then by their shape, by their feel, etc., which can readily
detected by them. But after all there must be something in the thing or the
21 AIR 1953 All 314 : 1953 Cr LJ 705 : 1952  ALJ  568.
22 AIR 1950  All 180 : 51 Cr LJ 586.
23 AIR 1943 Pat. 424 : 45 CR LJ 172 : 210  IC 21.
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 article by which the complainant or his witnesses claim to identify it. Even in
this Patna case, the learned Judges were constrained to allude to the fact that
the witnesses had given reasons why they could identify the articles. Long
association is of course a matter to be considered when the thing is of an
ordinary type, with no special marks or features about it and of common use,
it would be difficult to believe the witness on the score of long association
alone. If the accuser's status or way of living is also such as not to make it
importable for him to posses  it, he should not be convicted on the mere fact
that the complaint and his witnesses identified it in the course of identification
proceedings.  In Jangoo Singh v. Emperor,24 the  court considered all these
points in appraising the identification evidence and held that the appellant
Jangoo Singh to be entitled to acquittal. In a Lahore case in Vasal v. Crown,25
the articles that were recovered  were : white Gabrun Phuldar, white Doria
with   green thaka, white Gabrun with green stripes,Latha black, white Gabrun
with black line, Latha white without number, Latha white, Gabrun with lace
green coloured. Gabrun with black line, one bag of kapas. The complainant
had given no list of the articles at the time of the lodging of the report as in the
confusion resulting from theft, he stated he could not prepare the list. He,
however, gave evidence and identified the articles as belonging to him. The
court held that the articles were incapable of identification; they were of
ordinary character and any cloth merchant could stock them and sell them,
and hence it could not be stated with certainty that the articles belonged to
the complaint.
24 AIR 1945  Oudh 164 : 45 LJ 689 : 213  IC 163 : 1944 OWN 207.
25 AIR  Lah  495 : 92 IC 587 : 27  Cr LJ 290.
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The Orissa High Court in Sadasiv Das v. State26 observed that “women
may identify their necklaces even without marks of identification if they are
whole and unbroken, but they can never identify a piece of a necklace of
ordinary type if it is made into several pieces, each piece about 2 inches in
length.” But with all respect to their Lordship even about such necklaces, their
weight, their make for how long these had been worn, would help in their
identification. It would be really strange if necklaces of the same make weight
would be identified merely because the woman has worn it for some time. If
the other necklace which was placed with the one to be identified was also
neither now nor old was worn for some time, it passes one’s comprehension
how it would be identified. Of course it may not be possible for the wearer to
state any distinguishing marks with regard to nay of this things because there
are none such marks and still be able to identify them as has been stated by
certain High Courts, but still there must be something in the thing or the article
itself by which one could identify it. This point arose in In re Govinda Reddy,27
which followed in effect in the case of the Madras High Court in Public
Prosecutor v. Lingiah.28 Their Lordships held that small and even nice points
of difference distinguishing one thing form others of the same kind may
merely by the frequent sight of them make an impression on the mind. They
component parts of the thing and go to make the whole of which the mind
receives an impression, which impression may be of the general appearance
of the thing. This sort of impression is exceedingly common : a workman has
it of his tools and most other things they are frequently seeing handling or
26 AIR 1958  Orissa 51: (1958) 59 Cr LJ 534 L1958) 24 Cut LT 1.
27 AIR 1958 Mys 150;Sarveshwar Prasad V.State of MP.1977 Jab LJ 583(594);1977MP LJ 620.
28 AIR  1954  Mad 433.
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using. It occurs every day that by remembrance of their general appearance a
carpenter, mason or other workman recognizes his tools ; and dress jewellery
or other property is known by its owner. Undoubtedly animals and things may
be identified by those familiar with them. Their Lordships held that
observation teaches that such identification may be safely relied upon. But at
the same time a witness would not be able to formulate his reasons for the
identification since it is based upon general untranslatable impressions of the
mind. It would be latuous to discredit such identification on the ground that
reasons are not being formulated for them.
 Where the widow and the son of the decreased recognized the clothes,
spectacles and shoes the deceases was wearing at the time of Lis
disappearance, their testimony cannot be discarded merely because they
would not give any distinguishing mark, of identification. It is very difficult to
mention any distinguishing features of such articles. It is only the persons who
see these articles day by day that can say to whom they belong.29
So what is really meant is that the witness’s statement should be
believed at though he has advanced no reasons why it should be believed,
the only reason perhaps being that he has been long associated with the
thing of the article and does own it. When such reasoning is corroborated by
the previous identification of the thing or article in the test identification by the
witness, the courts consider it safe to rely upon it. But if in the test
identification, the articles mixed along with the article to be identified are
absolutely similar, how is writing of a person who is said to have written a
29 Jabbar Singh V. State of Rajasthan, 1977  Cr LJ (NOC) 200 (Raj.).
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particular writing. Thus besides direct evidence which is of course the best
method of proof, the law makes a relevant two other modes. A writing may be
proved to be in the handwriting of a particular individual by the evidence of a
person familiar with the handwriting of that individual or by the testimony of
and expert competent to make the comparison of handwritings on scientific
basis. A third method (Section 7) is comparison by the Court or admitted or
proved to be the writing of the person.30
 “Both under Ss. 45 and 47 the evidence is an opinion, in the former by
a scientific comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting
from frequent observations and experience. In either case, the Court must
satisfy itself by such means as are open that the opinion may be acted upon.
One such means open to the Court is to apply its own observations to the
admitted or proved writings expert but to verify the premises of the expert in
one case and the appraise the value of the opinion in the case…… ….. where
an expert’s opinion is given, the Court must see for itself and with the
assistance of the expert come to its own conclusion whether it can safely be
held that the two writings are by the same person.31 This is not to say that the
court must play the role of an expert but to say that the Court may accept the
fact proved only when it has satisfied itself on its own observation that it is
safe to accept the opinion, whether of the expert of other witness.”32
30 Fakhruddin V. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1967 MPLJ 473 : 1967 Mah LJ 571; State
(Delhi Admn.) V. Pali Ram, 1979, SC 14 (Para 23)
31 Smt. M. Srivastava V. Smt. S. Srivastava, 1988 ALR, 818.
32 Fakhruddin V. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1967 MPLJ 473 : 1967 Mah LJ 571; State
(Delhi Admn.) V. Pali Ram, 1979, SC 14 (Para 23)
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The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship
of the document and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. The evidence
relating there to may be direct or circumstantial. It may consist of the direct
evidence of a person who saw the document being written or the signature
being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or of the
signature by the of modes provided in Sections 45 and 47. It may also be
proved by the internal evidence afforded by the contents of the documents.
This last mode may be of value, where the disputed document forms part of a
link in the chain of correspondence, some links of which have already been
proved. In such a situation, the person, who is a recipient of the document is
in a position to speak to its authorship.33
The writing with which the disputed writing is to be compared must, if
not admitted, be proved to be genuine i.e., to be in the handwriting of the
person whose writing is in dispute, and the comparison must be made in open
Court.34 In addition to the mode of proving by expert testimony, a writing to be
forged or genuine, there are other modes by which the genuineness or
otherwise of a writing may be established. A document may be proved
genuine or otherwise by the evidence of person proved to be acquainted with
the handwriting of the alleged writer,35 or by comparing in court the disputed
33
Mobarik Ali Ahmed V. State of Bomnbay, 1957 Cr LJ 1346.
34
Khijiruddin V. E., 53 C 372; 92 IC 442: 1926 C 139 : 27 Cr LJ 266; Suresh Chandra Sanyal V. E.,
39 C 606 : 14 IC 753 : 13 Cr  LJ 239. In re Basrur Venkata Row, 36 M 159 : 14 IC 418 : 13 Cr. LJ
226, Barindra Kumar  Ghose V. E., 37 C 467 : 7 IC 359 : LJ Cr LJ 453, but  see In re Sithava Naik,
30 IC 751 : 16 Cr LJ 703, where it was held that it is not necessary that the comparison should be
made in Court and that it is sufficient if the documents are shown to the expert in court.
35
Section 47,Ganpatrao Khanderao Vijaykar V. Vasantrao Ganpatrao Vijaykar, 141  IC 747: 1932 B
588; Khijiruddin V. E. 53 C 372 : 92 IC 442 : 1926 C  139 : 27 Cr LJ 266; Jasoda Kuer V. Janak
Missir 4 P 394 : 92 IC 1034: 1925 P.  787; In the  matter of Chanda Singh, 18 PR 1015 Vr: 28 IC
722 : 16 Cr LJ 338; Shankarrao Gangadhar V. Ramji Harjivan, 28 B 58. The witness must shown is
acquaintance with the handwriting of the writer to make hisevidence relevant, JalahuddinV. E.,15
IC 979 : 13 Cr LJ 563.In re Basrur Venkata Row, 36 M 159 : 14 IC 418 : 13 Cr LJ 226.
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writing with some other writing admitted or proved to be genuine,36 but this
latter mode has been disapproved by experienced Judges,37 as a hazardous
and inconclusive mode of proof,38 and the practice of the Court itself acting as
an expert and pronouncing a document to be a forgery has been
deprecated,39 particularly when there is no evidence or allegation of forgery.40
Evidence relating to the dissimilarity of signatures, when the dissimilarity is
not that of a general character but merely of particular letter, it peculiarly
fallacious,41 and the Court is not competent judge of this matter. On the other
hand, if two signatures, when one is superimposed on the other, perfectly
coincide, it is almost a certain indication of the fact that one is forgery traced
form the other.42 The admitted abnormality of a signature is at least some
evidence that it is not the handwriting of the person who purports to have
written it. Where the character of the signature is such that Court is satisfied
that signature is not that of the alleged testator, there is nothing to prevent the
Court from acting upon its conviction and pronouncing against the document
36 Section 73: Ganpatrao KhanderaoVijaykar V. Vasantrao Ganpatrao  Vijaykar, 141 IC 747
: 1932 B 588; Khijiruddin V. E. 53 C 372: 92 IC 442: 1926 C 139: 27 Cr LJ 266; Barindra
Kumar Ghose V.E. 37 C 467: 7 IC 359 : 11 Cr LJ 453;Vembu Amal V.  Eskkia Pillai, 1949
M 419: 1949, 1  MLJ 71 : 1949 MWN 47,  See Balak Ram V. Buhammad Said, 77 IC 872:
1923 L. 695.
37    Galstaun V. Sonatan Pal, 78 IC 668: 1925 C 485, Batahu Jha V. Parmeshwar Rai, 64 IC
234,Suresh Chandra Sanyal V. E., 39C 606: 14 IC 753: 13 Cr LJ 289.
38
Rudragonda Venkangonda V.Basangonda Danappagonda, 1939 B 257; Major Stanley Hugh
Barker V. Mrs. Patricia Mav Barker, 1955 MB 103(FB), Latafat Husain V. OnkarMal, 152 IC 1042:
1935 0.41, Ambika Charan Barea V. NareswariDasi, 85 IC 525; 1925 C 145; Balak Ram V.
Muhammad Said,77 IC 872: 1923 L 695; Sarojini Dasi V.Haridas Ghosh, 49 C 235: 66 IC 774 :
1922 C12, Barindra Kumar Ghose V.E. 37 C 467, 7 IC 359: 11 Cr LJ 453.
39 Bibi Kaniz Zainab V. Mobarak Hosain 72 IC 748 : 1924 p. 284, Barindra Kumar Ghose
V. E,  37 C 467, 7 IC 359: 11 Cr LJ 453.
40 Galstaun V. Sonatan Pal, 78 IC 668 : 1925 C 485.
41
Galsltaun V. Sonatan Pal, 78 IC 668: 1925 C 485 but see Sarojini Dasi V. Haridas Ghose, 49 C
235: 66 IC 774: 1922 C 12.
42
 Woodroffe, Ev., 9th Ed. 450 citing Rogers, Expert Testimony, 290, 292, Hagan, Disputed
Handwriting, 91, 92.
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as a valid testamentary disposition, though, where witness have positively
affirmed that the testator did, in fact, execute the will in their presence, the
Court will be slow to hold the document to be forgery unless evidence is to be
found aliunde which tends to confirm the conclusion at which the Court has
arrived independently and form a consideration of the nature of the signature
by which the testator is alleged to have executed the will.43 See notes to
Sections 67, where different modes of providing handwriting are fully
discussed.
REPORT OF A HANDWRITING EXPERT :
 The mere report of an expert who has not been examined in Court,
which is not supported even by an affidavit is no evidence and is entirely
inadmissible ? But where a party has himself called for the report of an
expert, the report will be admissible against him, even if he has not examined
the expert as a witness in proof of their report.44
 A court is competent to compare the disputed writing of a person with
other which are admitted or proved to be his writings. It may not be safe for a
Court to record a finding about a person’s writing in a certain document
merely on the basis of comparison but a Court can itself compare the writings
in order appreciate properly the other evidence produced before it in that
regard. The opinion of a handwriting expert is also relevant in view of Section
45 of the Evidence Act, but that too is not conclusive. It has also been held
that the sole evidence of a handwriting expert is not normally sufficient for
43 Lila Sinha V. Bijoy Pratap Deo Singh, 87 IC 534 : 1925 C 768; See Sarojini Dasi V.
Haridas Ghose, 49 C 235 : 66 IC 774 : 1922 C. 12.
44    See above ..
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recording a definite finding about the writing being of a certain person or not.
It follows that it is not essential that handwriting expert must be examined in a
case to prove or disprove disputed writing.45
 “It is not province of the expert to act Judge or Jury. As rightly pointed
out in Titli v. Jones,46 the real function of the expert is to put before the Court
all the materials together with reasons which induce him to come to the
conclusion, so that the Court, although not an expert, may form its own
judgment by its own observation of those materials. Ordinarily, it is not proper
for the Court to ask the expert to give this finding upon any of issues, whether
of law or fact, because strictly speaking, such issues are for the Court  to
determine. The handwriting expert’s function is to opine after a scientific
comparison of the disputed writing with the proved for admitted writing the
regard to the points of similarity and dissimilarity in the two seats of writings.
The Court should then compare the handwritings with its own eyes for a
proper assessment of the total evidence.47
VALUE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON QUESTIONS OF HANDWRITING :
 It may be that normally it is not safe to treat expert’s evidence as to
handwriting as sufficient basis for conviction. It may be relied upon in
conjunction with other internal and external evidence relating to the document
is dispute.48 especially the opinion of handwriting experts.
45 The State of Gujarat V. Vinaya Chandra Chhotalal, 1967 SCJ(1) 821 (1).
46 ILR 56 All 428 : 1934 All 273.
47 State (Delhi Adm.) V. Pali Ram, 1979 SC 14 (Para 30).
48 Ram Chandra V. State of U.P. 1957 Cr  LJ 559.
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 It is now an accepted rule that it is unsafe to base conviction solely on
expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been university
acted upon and it ha almost become a rule of law, although it is unsafe to
treat expert opinion on handwriting as a sufficient basis for conviction, yet it
may be relied upon when it is supported by the items of internal and external
evidence.49 Expert evidence can never be conclusive because it is after all,
opinion evidende.50 Being opinion evidence it can rarely if ever take the place
of substantive evidence, and before acting on such evident it would be
desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence
or by circumstantial evidence.51 It would be risky to find a conviction solely on
the evidence of handwriting expert and before acting upon such evidence the
Court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence
direct or circumstantial.52 There can be no doubt that expert evident of
handwriting , being and infirm and cannot, of itself, form the basis for a
conviction.
  Commenting on the said observations in Magan Beharilal’s case,53
and the cases cited therein a Bench of the Supreme Count observed in Murai
Lal v. State of U.P.54 : “……. We do not think that observations were meant to
be observations of general application or as laying down any legal principle. It
was plainly intended to be a rule of caution” and to a rule of law as is clear
49 Ramchandra V. State of U.P., 1957 SC 381.
50 R Ishwari Prasad V. Mohd. Isa, 1963, SC 1728.
51 Shashi Kumar V. Subodh Kumar, 1964 SC 529.
52 Fakhruddin V. State of M.P. 1967 SC 1326.
53 Magan Behari Lal V. State of Punjab, 1977 SC 1091 : 1977 Cr LJ 711 (Para 7)
54 Murari Lal V. State of U.P., 1980 SC 531 (Para 10).
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form the statement ‘it has almost become a rule of law’. ‘Almost’, we presume
means ‘not quite’. It was said by the court there was a ‘profusion of
precedential authority’ which insisted upon corroboration and reference was
made to. Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., Ishwari Prasad v. Mohad Isa; Shashi
Kumar v. Subodh Kumar and Fakhruddin v. State of M.P.55 The Court
observed that none of them supports the proposition that corroboration must
invariable be sought before opinion evidence can accepted. There appears to
be some mistake in the last sentence of the above extracted passage
because we are unable to find in Fakhruddin v. State of M.P.,56 any statement
such as the one attributed. In fact, in that case, the learned Judges acted
upon the sole testimony of the expert after satisfying themselves about
correctness of the opinion by comparing the writings themselves. We do not
think that the observations in Magan Behari Lal v. State of Punjab,57 must be
understood as referring to the facts of the particular case. We are firmly of the
opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has
crystallised into rule of law, that opinion evidence of a handwriting expert
must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. But having due
regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting,
the approach, as we indicated earlier, should be one caution. Reasons for the
opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence
must be considered. In appropriate to case, corroboration may be sought. In
cases  where  the reasons  for  the  opinion  are convincing  and  there  is no
reliable evidence throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of a
55 1957  SC  381 : 1963 SC 1728 : 1964 SC 529 : 1967 SC1327.
56 1967  SC  529.
57 1967  SC  1091 : 1977 Cr LJ 711 (Para 7).
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handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a
matter which, in the ultimate analysis is no more than a question of
testimonial weight”.58
 In order to rely on the evidence of an expert the Court must be fully
satisfied that the witness is truthful and reliable and is fully adopt in the art of
identification of handwriting. In a case where certain signatures were in the
opinion of the expert forged, but the persons whose signatures they purported
to be appeared as witnesses and stated on  oath they were their signatures,
the expert could not be believe at all. 59
 According to the Supreme Court in Murai Lal v. State of Madhya
Pradesh60 “the argument” that “the opinion evidence of a handwriting expert
should not be acted upon without substantial corroboration.” “Cannot be
justified on principle or precedent ……... the expert is no accomplice”. There
is no justification for condemning his opinion – evidence to the same class of
evidence as that of an accomplice and insist upon corroboration. True it is
has occasionally been said on very high authority that it would be hazardous
to base a conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert. But, the
hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert, handwriting expert or any other
kind of expert, is not because experts, is general, are unreliable witnesses –
the quality of a credibility or incredibility being one which an expert shares
with all other witnesses – but because all human judgment is fallible and an
expert may go wrong because of some defect of observation some error of
58 Kanchan Singh V.State ofGujarat,1979SC1011 (Para 1)
59 1980 SC 531 (Para 10)
60 Kanchan Singh V. State of Gujarat, 1979 SC
334
premises or honest mistake of conclusion. The more developed and the more
perfect a science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion and the
converse if the science is less developed and imperfect. The science of
identification finger prints has attained near perfection and the risk of an
incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On the other hand, “science of
identification of hand writing is not nearly so perfect and the risk is, therefore,
higher. But that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert
as in invariable rule and insisting upon substantial corroboration in every
case, however the opinion may be bucked by the soundest or of reasons. It is
hardly fair to a expert to view his opinion with an initial suspicion and to rent
him as an inferior sort of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the
acceptability of the reason given by him. An expert deposes and not decides.
His duty is to furnish the judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing
the accuracy of his conclusion, so as to enable the judge to form his own
independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved
in evidence  Expert testimony in made relevant by section 45  and where the
court has to form an opinion upon a point as to identify of handwriting., the
opinion of a person specially skilled’ in questions as to identity of handwriting
is expressly made a relevant fact. There is nothing in the Evidence Act, as for
example like illustration (b) to section 114., which entitles the court to
presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated
in material particulars, which justifies the court in assuming that a handwriting
experts’s opinion is unworthy of credit unless corroborated. The Evidence Act
itself (Section 3) tells us that a fact is said to be proved when, after
considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exits or
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considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
exists.’ It is necessary to occasionally remained ourselves of this impression
clause in the Evidence Act lest we act on artificial standard of proof not
warranted by the provisions of the Act. Further under section 114 ….. the
court may presume the existence of any fact which it think likely to have
happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human
conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the
particular case. It is also to be noticed that section 45 …… makes facts not
otherwise relevant, relevant if they supported or are inconsistent with the
opinion of experts, when such opinions are relevant. So, corroboration may
not invariably be insisted upon before acting on the opinion of and
handwriting experts and there need to no initial suspicion. But, on the facts of
a particular case a court may require corroboration of a varying degree. There
can be no hard and fast rule but nothing will justify the reaction rejection of
the opinion of an expert supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole
ground that it is not corroborated. The approach of a court while dealing with
the opinion of a handwriting expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the
reasons for the opinion all other relevant evidence and decide finally the
accept of reject it.61
 An expert witness, however impartial he may wish to be, is likely to be
unconsciously prejudiced in favour of the side which calls him. The mere fact
opposition on the part of the other side is apt to create a spirit of partisanship
and rivalry, so that an expert witness in unconsciously impelled to support
61 Murari LalV/s.State of M.P. 1980  Sc  531.
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 the view taken by his own side. Besides it must be remembered that an
expert of is often called by one side simply solely because it has been
ascertained that the holds views v favorable to its interest62 of all kinds of
evidence admitted in a court, this is the most unsatisfactory. It is so weak and
decrepit as scarcely to deserve a place in our system of jruisprodence63. In
view of this infirmity of expert testimony, it is the settled practice of courts not
to base a finding merely on expert opinion.64 Conclusions based on mere
comparison of handwriting must, at best, be indecisive and yield to the
positive evidence in the case65. The opinion of an expert cannot be more
reliable than the statement of a witness of fact such as a petition writer who
had seen the party signing the document66. In the face of the overwhelming
documentary evidence providing execution of a document, the opinion of a
handwriting expert to the contrary is of no value67. Experts like lawyers, differ
in their opinion, and it is in the highest degree unsafe to rely on expert
evidence when the admitted facts lead to a conorary conclusion68. It is
extremely unsure to base a conviction upon the opinion of handwriting
experts without substantial  corroboration69.   A  comparison  of  handwriting
is   something hazardous and inconclusive and should be made with care and
62 Sadiqa Begum V. Ata Ullah, 144IC 497 : 1933
63 Indar Datt V. E., 132 IC 195 : 1931 L  408 32 Cr. LJ 818.
64 Saqlain Ahmed V. E. 1936 A 165 : 160 IC 264.
65 Kishore Chandra Singh Deo V. Ganesh Prasad Bhagat, 1954 SC 316.
66 Lal Singh Didar Singh V. Guru Granth Sahib. 1951 Papsu 101 See also Goverdhan Das
V. Ahmadi Begam, 1953 Hyd. 181.
67 Banbasi Store V. President of the Union of India 1953 A 318.
68 See Sheotahal Singh V. Arjun Das, 56 IC 879.
69   Sudhindra Nath Dutt V.The King 1952 C 422.
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 caution in the light of assistance that may be available in the matter shape of
parties concerned or other ways ensuring a right decision. No hard and fast
rule can possibly be laid down as to the best method of arriving at a proper
conclusion on the question of similarly of handwriting. But the most important
things to examine are the general characteristics, formation of letters, fixed
pen habits and mannerism. The identity or resemblance in handwriting has to
be found out on the value of the effect of various considerations arising from
individual characteristics and idiosyncrasies which have been embodied in
the technical language of express70. Mere resemblance between two writing
is not sufficient to create the conviction that they were written by one and the
same person71, since it is not difficult to forge the handwriting of a person in
such a manner as to make it impossible for even the most acute and
experienced Judge to Discriminate between the fare the true.72 There may,
however, be cases where the handwriting is of such a peculiar character that
the conclusion as to show that the documents to writings is evidence to show
that the documents are not in the handwriting of the same person73. The
evidence of handwriting expert need not definitely point out that anybody
wrote a particular thing. The expert is only to point out the similarities to the
court, which as to determine whether a particular writing is to be assigned to a
particular person74.  A  court  should not surrender its own opinion  to  that  of
70 Jitendra Nath Gupta V. E. 1937 C 99 : 169 IC 977  38 Cr LJ 818(SB) See also Shriniwas
Pannalal Chockhani V. The Crown, 1951 N 226 : ILR 1951 N 104.
71 Sarojini Dasi V. Haridas Ghosh 49 C 235 : 66IC 774 : 1922 C12 Batahu Jha V.
Parmeswar Rai 64 IC 234 : Lalta Prasad V. E. 51 C 355 : 11 Cr LJ 114 : Ambal Basgyam
V. Ramayya Padayachi.
72 Sarojini Dasi V. Haridas Ghosh 49, C 235: 66 IC 774 L 1922 C 12.
73 In re Basrur Venkata Row, 36 M 159 : 14 IC 418 : 13 Cr LJ 226.
74 Lila Sinha V. Bijoy Pratap Deo Singh, 87  534:
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experts who are called before it, but with such help as the experts can afford
the court must form its own opinion on the subject in hand.75 Where the trial
by jury the question of the reliability of the evidence of an expert in hand
writing is clearly one for the jury to decide76. The evidence of an expert in
handwriting is of little value when it is contradicted by that of another77 where
the signature examined by the expert is in a language which he cannot read
or write, his opinion is not of much value, and can be used merely as
corroborative of other evidence.78 Experts can also given their opinion as to
whether a writing is in a feigned or natural hand79, as to the probable age of a
document and as to whether interlineations were written contemporaneously
with the rest of a document80 what ever the value of expert testimony in
general may be, if a party wishes to produce an expert in evidence the court it
bound to call him81 on other hand since the evidence of a hand writing expert
is not of much value, no inference adverse to a party should be drawn from
the mere fact that the party did not call an expert to prove the genuineness of
a signature82. There is nothing in the Evidence Act to require the evidence
given by the expert in any particular case to be corroborated before it could
be acted upon sufficient proof of what expert states. Of courses the question
as to how much reliance a court would be entitled to place on the statement
75 Wakeford V. Lincoln Bishop, 1921 PC 168.
76  In the matter of U.P. an  advocate, 13 R 518:1935 R 178:156 IC 582:36 Cr LJ 1961 (SB)
77 Kishori Kishore Mishra V. E. 1935 C 208 : 156 IC 396 : 36 Cr LJ 921.
78 Mohammad Ziaullakhan V. Rafiq Mohammad Khan, 1939 O 213; Sadiqa Begum V. Ata
Ullah 144 IC 497.
79 Ram Sewak Sahu V. E. 1933 p.559:See also SaglainAhmad V.E. 1936  : 160 IC 264 :37.
80 6 Cox 163.
81  Re Hindmarch, LR 1 P &D 307.
82  Gobindjee Madhurjee & Co. Ltd., V. Smith, 43 IC 698 : 1928 p. 563.
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of any particular witness in any particular case must necessarily depend to on
the facts and circumstances of that particular case83. The opinion if a
handwriting expert should not be rejected because it is based solely on the
photograph84.
Opinion as to typewritten matters – Value of expert opinion as to
typing. The expert opinion was that the latter was not typed on the typewriter
then is used. It was typed on another typewriter. Such evidence is
inadmissible, not being covered by Section 45 of the Act85. A proven
specimen of typewriting may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of
comparison with disputed specimen. On the principles that where an
impression is made on paper, wood, leather, or any other plastic material by
an instrument or medical contrivance having or possessing a defect or
peculiarity the identity of the instrument may be established by proving the
identity of the defects or peculiarities which it impresses on different paper86.
The opinion of a witness that one document has been typewritten on the
same machine as another document is not admissible under section 45. The
court may ask the witness to explain points in favour of the view whether two
documents have or have not been typewriting on the same machine, but the
court cannot treat the witness’s opinion as expert testimony.87
83 Ladharam Narsinghdas V. E. 1945 S.4.
84  Shriniwas Pannalal Chockhani V. The Crown , 1951. N. 226.
85 Hanumant FIR 1995 V/s. State of M.P.
86 10 RCL  999.
87 Bachcha Babu V. E. 155 IC  369 : 1935 A 162.
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OPINION AS TO PRINTED MATTERS  :
 Where the question was whether a lottery tickets was forged, the
supreme court examined and discussed the opinion evidence of two experts
in the art of printing : and while with regard to one it observed that he
undoubtedly had the qualifications of and expert, his evidence did not clinch
the issue as to whether the ticket in question was forged one, with regard to
the other witness it observed that “Assuming arguendo” he had the necessary
skill, scientific knowledge and experience of an expert and his opinion was
admissible under S.45, then also it would be highly unsafe to condemn” the
lottery ticket in question “on his opinion al9one, as forged document. The
dissimilarities …….. on the basis of which he was characterized the number,
as a forged number, may be natural variations. His opinion does not
indebliberately exclude the possibility of the number of in question ……
having been printed in the ordinary course ……. In cross-examination he did
not rule out this possibility. His opinion that the questioned number …… had
not been printed with the same ink with when which then numbers on ……
and the lottery tickets were printed in their press cannot pass muster ……
The only reason ……… given by him, is that the ink used in printing the
questioned number ……. This variation in density of ink may be due to
innocuous cause. The witness never examined the ink chemically. This
circumstance pointed bout by the witness too precarious to be a safe basis for
a finding of forgery.81
81 Chatt Ram V. State of haryana, 1979 SC 1890 (Paras 22 and 24 ).
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FINGER IMPRESSION EXPERTS
 Thumbs Impression experts : The knowledge of finger prints is a
science and the evidence of persons conversant with the science is admitted
on principles similar to those governing the admissibility of the evidence of
experts in hand writing. Before the amendment of this section by Act v of
1899, evidence of persons skilled in question relating to the identity of thumb
impression was not admitted under this section; but the similarity or
dissimilarity of thumb impressions could be considered as evidence of identity
or otherwise under section 9 and 11 of the Act, provided the comparison was
made, and opinion on this comparison formed, by the court itself and not by
an expert82. The study of finger prints is now generally admitted to constitute
a science83, since it has been ascertained “that between birth and death there
is absolutely no change, say, in 699 out of the 700 numbers characteristics of
the marking of the fingers of the same person”84 and the similarity of finger
prints is looked upon as a very reliable best to identity. By those who have
made a study of the subject, there has never yet been found any case in
which the pattern made by any other finger of the same or any other hand28.
The term “finger impression” does not include palm impressions, but there
can be no doubt that the opinion of an expert on the identity of a palm
impression is admissible,85 as the comparison of palm impression also
constitutes a science.
82 Q.E.V.FaqirMohammed Sheikh etc. 1 CWN 33.
83   Diledad V. E., 113 IC 68 :1929 L 210 :  30 Cr LJ 52 E.V. Abdul Hamid, 32 C759.
84   Henry, Finger, Prints, 4th Edn. 16-19.
85   GangaSahai  Bhagmal  V. Molar 155 IC 799.
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Competency of finger print experts – No precise rule can be laid down
as to the qualifications which a person must possess to be able t depose as
an expert in the examination of finger prints There must be profession of
some special qualification by study of or experience on the part of a person
who lays claim to the position or character of an expert. A person who has
studied finger impressions for five months in a training school and thirteen
months in the office of the Inspector General of Police and who has examined
two or three lacs of impressions and himself taken thousands of impressions
is a competent expert witness.86
Value of finger print experts testimony – The evidence of an expert
should be approached with considerable care and caution, and the attention
of the jury must be drawn to the infirmity of such evidence.87 The argument in
finger print cases rests on a simple deduction form a number of observations
of the similarities and difference : between to finger prints in question, and
there is no reason why it should not be sure foundation for a conclusion, and
it may be a letter one than any based on direct evidence88. The comparison
of thumb impressions has become an exact science and the evidence of a
expert on this subject is entitled to considerable weight89.
 Indeed in Jespal Singh v. State of Punjab90 “the Supreme Court
observed that the science of indentifying thumb impression is an exact
science and does not admit or any mistake doubt.”
86 E.  V.Abdul Hamid 32 C 759.
87  PanchuMondal V. E. 1 CLJ 385.
88  Public Prosecutor V. Virammal, 46M 715 69 IC 374: 1923 M 178 : 23Cr LJ 694.
89 Diledad V. E.113  IC 68: 1929 L 210  L 30  Cr LJ 52.
90 1979 SC  1708 (Para 8)
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 The evidentiary value of identity afforded by the prints of two or three
fingers which contains even a few points of resemblance in the minutiae and
no points of disagreement is so great as to render it eoperfluors to seek
confirmation from other sources.91 Expert opinion as to the similarity of finger
impressions stands on and entirely different footing from expert opinion as to
the similarity of handwriting. No two human beings have the same thumb
marking, and in no difference whatever can be found between one mark and
another, the conclusion is irresible that the same thumb made both92.
Therefore, a conviction based on a comparison of the thumb impression on
the document in question is not open to any legal objection93, though courts
regard it unsafe to act on such evidence in the absence of other corroborative
circumstances.94 Courts should exercise great caution in arriving at a
conclusion by a comparison of thumb – impressions. The positive evidence of
witness to the transaction should not be lightly brushed abide95. The court
should be very chary in accepting the opinion of a finger print expert as to the
age of a thumb mark as fixing the date of a document when such date is
markedly opposed to the date which appeasers on the documents96 Section
73 of the act authorizes a court a specimen of this thumb impression for the
purpose of causing it to be compared by an expert, 97 or for the purpose of its
91  E. V. Sahedeo, 3 NLR 1.
92  Ganga Sahai-Bhagmal V. Molar, 155 IC 799 1935 L 147 : Diledad V. E. 113 IC 68 : 1929
L 210 : 30 Cr LJ 52: Ahmada V. E. 9 PR 1914 Cr  27 IC 208 : 16 Cr LJ 139.
93   Fakir Mohammad V. E. 60 B 187: 1936 B 151 37 Cr LJ 539
94  Harendra Nath Sen V.E. 133 IC 111 : C 441 : 32 Cr LJ 1001;Basgit Singh V. E. 6 P 305
: 104 IC 626 : 1928 P 129 : 28 Cr.
95 Harendra Nath Sen V.E. 133 IC 111 : 1931.
96  Baidya Nath Dutt V. Alef Jan Bibi, 70 IC 194. 1923 C 240.
97  Ramlakhan Panda V. Dharmdeo Misir, 97 IC 335.
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being compared by the Court with the disputed impression98. There is nothing
in the so-called science of finger prints, or the qualifications of an expert in it,
which need deter a court form applying its won magnifying glass or its own
eyes and its own mind to the evidence and verifying the results submitted to it
by the witnesses.99
It would, however, be risky for the court to form priat expert100. Neither
a court nor a Jury is bound to accept of an opinion of an expert in thumb
impressions without the corroboration of its own intelligence as to the reasons
which guided him in him conclusions101. It cannot be said that it is unable to
base convocation on the uncorroborated testimony of finger print expert. But
the court cannot delegate its authority to the expert and has to satisfy itself as
to the value of the evidence of the expert in the same way as it must satisfy
itself as to the value of any other evidence.102 :, The question of the identity of
thumb makes is a question of fact to be decided by evidence as any other
question of fact103 and therefore is trials by jury, eminently a matter for the
jury and not for the Judge104. In dealing with the evidence of a finger print
expert the court must be careful not to delegate its authority to a third party.
The court must satisfy itself that the accused is quality and cannot hold him
98 Public  Prosecutor V. Kandasami Theven, 50 M 462: 98 IC 99 : 1927 M 696 : 27 Cr LJ
1251.
99 Public Prosecutor V.  Kandasami Thevan, 50 M 462 : 98 IC 90 : 1927 M 696 : 27 Cr.
1251.
100 Public Prosecutor V. Viranmal, 46 M 715, 69 IC 374 : 1923 M 178 23 Cr LJ 694.
101 Bibi Zainab V. Anwar Khan, 1946 P. 104.
102 Basgit Singh V. E. 6 P 305 : 104 IC626 :1928 P. 129 :28 Cr LJ 850 : E. V. Abdul
Hamid,32C  759; Crown Prosecutor V. Gopal 1941 M 551.
103 Golam Rahman V. The King, 1950 C 66 :83 CLJ 387.
104 Panchu  Mondal V. E. 1 CLJ 385.
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guilty because the expert comes forward and says that in his opinion the
accused must guilty. The court must satisfy itself as to the value of the
evidence of the expert in the same way as it must satisfy itself of the value of
other evidence. The court has to rely on the expert upon to distinct points.
First of all on the question of similarity between the marks, which is a question
of fact on which the court can, and should with the assistance of the expert
satisfy itself, and secondly on point which is one of expert opinion, whether it
is possible to find the finger prints or thumb-impressions of the individuals
corresponding in as many points of resemblance as are shown to exists
between the impressions found in the case before the court and those of the
accused. When the expert tells the court that it is impossible to find so many
characteristics identical in the finger prints of two persons and when that
statement agrees entirely with what one has read on the subject in scientific
books, the court need not hesitate in accepting the opinion105 The impression
with which the admitted thumb impression are not clear but blurred, the expert
evidence cannot be treated as reliable and conclusive. 106
There is no gain saying the fact that a majority of finger prints found at
crime scenes or crime articles are partially smudged and it is for the
experienced and skilled finger print expert to say whether a mark is usable as
fingerprint evidence. Similarly it is for competent technician to examine and
give his opinion whether the identity can be established and if so whether that
can be done on light eight or even lass identical
105  E. V. Faquir Mohammad Ramzan, 60 B. 187.
106  See E.V. Abdul Hamid, 32 C. 759.
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characteristics in an appropriate case”.  The clear and categorical opinion of
the Director of Finger Print Bureau, only supported by adequate reasons was
accepted by the Supreme Court in that case of course, after scrutinizing the
same in some detail.107
 The opinion of an expert, which is admissible against an accused, is
the opinion given by him at the trial. The opinion formed by him before the
trial in another case is not substantive evidence, It is doubtful if such opinion,
recorded for the purposes of the previous suit, is at all admissible.108 The
experts should be required to explain to the court the reasons for his
opinion.109
 Where the expert gave no reason in support of his opinion and it was
not shown that he had acquired special skill, knowledge and experience in the
science of identification of finger prints, it one on a capital charge without any
independent corroboration, solely on the bald and dogmatic opinion of such of
such an expert even if such opinion is assumed to be admissible under
section-45. 109
The report of a finger print expert –  In  re  Govinda Reddy 110 it was
pointed out that the science of comparison of finger prints has developed to a
stage of exactitude, and it is quite possible for the court of compare the
impressions taken from finger prints of individuals with disputed impressions,
provided they are significantly clear and enlarged photographs are available.
107 Mohan Lal V. Ajit Singh, 1978 SC 1183 (Paras 44-46)
108 Ganda Mal V. E., 110 IC 810 : 1928 L 921 : 29 Cr  LJ 668
109 Crown Prosecutor V. Gopal, 1941 M 551 : 195 IC 183 : 42 Cr LJ 596
110 Mohmood V. State of U.P. 1976 SC 69 (Para 19)
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The identification of finger impressions with the aid of magnifying glass is not
difficult particularly when the photographs of the latent and patent
impressions are passed said by side. But courts of law must not play the role
of finger print expert when the point is issued is not the patent differences is
pattern visible to the named eye and which will rule out that the two
impressions for comparison are by the same digit but when by reason of
detailed counting of similarities the identity or the non identity of the two
impression for comparison have got to be established.  In such case the
court must insist upon clear evidence being led including that an expert. 111
The court must apply its own mind and find out with the explanatory help of
the expert and the counsel appearing on both sides whether the identity or
the non-identity spoken to by the expert is based upon sound reason. 112
The report of a finger print expert is inadmissible unless the expert is called
as a witness and is examined. 113 But if a party invites the opinion of a finger
print expert and the expert submits a report which is placed on the record,
but the expert is not examined as witness, the party inviting the opinion of
the expert will be deemed to have accepted the expert’s report as evidence
and will not be permitted to object its as admissibility in appeal. 114
111 Amar Singh V. Ganga AIR 1956 Bhopal 6
112   In re, Godavarthi, 1960 Cr. LJ 315.
113   Bhurey Singh V. Karan Singh 1935  A 142 : Wadahawa V. Jai Kishen  Das, 106 IC
493.
114 Dil Muhammad V. Sain Das, 100, IC 922 : 1927 L 396.
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Section 45 and 5
Evidence of thumb impression expert and Duty of Court -
Evidence of a thumb impression expert has an important bearing and is
bound to be a great value in determining the issue regarding the validity of a
document which purports to the bear thumb, impression of executants when
those thumb impressions is denied. It is matter of common knowledge that
science of finger print is more exact than that relating to handwriting. In case
of comparison of finger prints, the points of similarity and difference are easily
discernable and the courts must apply their mind properly to the evidence of
experts in such cases. The judges commit a gross error of law in not even
considering the evidence of such expert. 115
Evidence of foot print expert : Evidentiary value – It is unsafe to
convict accused solely on the opinion of foot-print impression is not an exact
science. 116
Footprints : The section does not include footprints within its ambit
as it does the finger impression. Notwithstanding, this evidence of a footprint
expert is admissible in evidence. 117 In a criminal prosecution a witness may
testify as to human tracks found upon the ground at the place of the crime,
and to what point they led and the size there of as they appeared to him, and
he may also testify as to the size, shape or any peculiarity of any track or
tracks that he may have seen the accused make after the commission of the
115 Hukum Singh V. Smt. Udham Kaur, (1969) 71 Pun. Lr 908.
116 Bhulakiram Kiri V. State, 73 Cal. WN 947, 1970 Cr. LJ 403 (Cal).
117 Ganesh Ggoi V. State, 1955 Assam 51.
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 crime. 118 The science of footprints is not exact.119 The science if it could be
so called, of footprints has not yet progressed very far. But there is no doubt
whatever that evidence of similarities of the impressions of the foot, shod or
unshod, given by a footprint expert, is admitted by the courts. Such evidence
comes under the head of circumstantial evidence.  It is not the opinion of the
expert that is of any importance, but the facts that the expert has noticed. A
person who has made a study of the prints made by the human foot is better
qualified to notice points of similarity of dissimilarity, than one who has made
no such study. He is able to lay these points before the court, and from his
evidence the court draws its own conclusion? The court is entitled to take into
consideration the evidence of a person who has seen a footprint and taken
the footprints of the accused and found that they are very similar.  Such
evidence is not, however, sufficient to bring home the offence to the accused
in the absence of further knowledge regarding the differences between one
foot and another. 120 The mere fact that foot marks are found which tally with
those of accuser’s shoes is not sufficient. There may be a large number of
shoes of the size of the accuser’s shoes. The evidence must go further and
shoes. The evidence must go further and show that the mark had some
peculiarity which was found in most other shoes.121  Evidence that there were
footprints at or near a scene of offence or that these footprints came from a
particular place or led to particular place is relevant evidence under section 7,
118 10 RCL  993.
119 Chandrama Prasad Chamar  V. State, ILR 1951  IC 539.
120 Mylaswami  Gounder . E.1937  M.951.
121 In re Ocmayan, 1942M 452 (2).
122 Bhikha Gober V. E., 1943 B 458 : 210 IC  362.
350
and  statements  as  to  these  facts  made  by  persons  skilled in identifying
footprints is admissible under section 45, Evidence Act. Whether a particular
tracker called upon to assist is or is not an expert in this art or science, is a
matter to be decided by the Court before reliance can be placed upon his
evidence.  But if it is  established to the satisfaction of the Court that the
tracker is person capable of distinguishing and identifying footprints, his
evidence should be given such consideration as it may deserve. 123
Before relying on the opinion of the expert in footprints as conclusive
evidence against the accused, the Judge should from his own opinion with
regard to the identity of the foot prints of the accused. 124 Evidence that a
tracker identified certain foot steps is admissible, not withstanding the
provision of section 162, Cr.P. Code. 125
Ballistics – Identification of fire-arm, bullets, etc.
General :
Ballistics is the science of the identification of fire-arm by means of a
bullet fired from the weapon, the fired cartridge and the weapon itself.  The
expert of ballistics may be required to give an opinion on any of the following
points :
1. To decide whether a bullet found at a scene of crime or taken from
victim’s body was fired from a particular gun.
2. To decide whether a shell case from a scene of crime had been
ejected or extracted from a given fire-arm.
123 Sadik  V  E.  1942  S  11.
124 In re Baliya Pullaya 1941 M 88, Fakir Chand V. State 1955 M.B. 119 (FB).
125 Mr. Mohd. V. E. 1940 C 168.
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3. To identify any given type of bullet or shell case.
4. To given an identification as to the type of weapon which had fired or
ejected a given bullet or shell case.
5. From an entry wound or mark on clothing to given an estimation of
range (such an estimate is only possible within certain limits.)
6. To give an opinion as to whether a given fire arm had been discharged
recently.
7. To give–opinion regarding the direction from which the short was fired.
8. To give an opinion on the condition of a fire arm.
A fire-arm may be defined as an instrument to propel a projectile by the
force of gases produced by combustion of the propellant, It generally consists
of:
a) Barrel
b) Grip of Butt
c) Trigger
d) Firing pin
e) Breech block
Barrel is a steel tube which may be long or short. Its promimal end is
called breach end and terminal end is called muzzle.  Gripe or Butt is the part
normally gripped in the hand. Trigger is the lever used for releasing the fire
pin to work and explode the cartage. Breech block accommodates the firing
pin.
A cartage consist of –
a) a cartridge case with a percussion cap
b) propellant (gun powder)
c) The projectile (bullets, pellets etc.)
d) wads, if any
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Cartridge case is the outer shell or covering generally made of bass. It
may also be made of cardboard or plastic with a brass base.
Percussion cap contains an amount of detonating composition known as
primer. The detonating composition known as primer. The detonation of
primer results in strong piercing flame which reaches the propellant i.e. the
gun powder or black powder.
The projectile contains bullets, pellets, lead shots etc.
Wad which is generally present in gun cartridges is made of cardboard
stout paper or plastic. It functions to separate the projectiles from the
propellant, to prevent the expanding gases from escaping and the creating
required pressure.
Explaining the principles of ballistics and mechanism, Russel, A. Gregory
says –
a) The firing pin on the fall of hammer first strikes at the cap of the
cartridge. An explosion takes place inside the cartridge and the bullets
or shots are expelled at a great speed through the barrel of the
weapon. At the same time the base of the cartridge is pressed back
against the breach face and the striker. The face of the breach and the
nose of the striker when viewed under the microscope, show many
irregularities such as file marks, rist pits, cavities and identifications
etc. which are individual and characteristics of that particular weapon.
The base of the cartridge will show all the characteristics in reverse.
That is, it will be a reverse mould of the breach and the tip of the
striking pin. If any empty cartridge case is forced at the scene of crime
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it can be compared with the cartridge fired from the suspected firearm
and if he markings on their bases correspond, it can be definitely
stated that the cartridge found at the scene of the crime was fired out
of the suspect weapon.
b) In a rifle, pistol or revolver, after the cartridge has detonated, the bullet
is driven through the barrel and is marked by the rifling inside the
barrel.  The rifling varies in the number of grooves, number of lands or
raised segments and in its direction of twist, these characteristics are
clearly seen on the bullet and are the reverses of what they are in the
rifling. If a bullets is found at the scene of crime or inside the victim’s
body and it is not too much distorted, markings on it can be compared
with the markings on the bullets fired as test bullets from the suspected
firearm.
c) In semi or fully weapons further clues as to the identity of a weapon
may be found. When the cartridge is pressed up from the magazine
clips the sides of the magazine may leave some tell-tale scratches on
the sides of the cartridges. After the cartridges have been fired it is
expelled by means of an extractor and ejector which many leave their
characteristic marks on the rim of the cartridge.  They can be
compared with the test cartridge firearm and will add greater weight in
establishing the identity of the weapon.
Gun short wound
They are caused by projectiles discharged from firearms and present
the characteristics of lacerated wounds. Their appearance very according to
the nature of the projectile, its velocity, the distances and the angle from
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which it struck the body.  They generally and cause two wounds, entry and
exit, the former being smaller.
Entry and exit wounds
According to Moli’s jurisprudence. “The wound of entrance is usually
smaller than the projectile from the elasticity of the skin and is rounded when
the projectile strikes the body at a right angle and oval when it strikes the
body obliquity the edges of the wound are inverted and ecchymosed.  The
wound of exit is often larger than the wound of entrance and its edges are
irregular and inverted but free from scorching and tattooing….. The edges of
the wound of exit may be very ragged and torn if the projectile was
discharged at close queries.”
Distance of firing
According to Modi’s Medical jurisprudence “If a firearm is discharged
very close to the body or the in actual contact, subcutaneous issues over an
area of two or three inches round the wound of entrance are lacerated and
the surrounding skin in usually scorched and blackened by smoke and
tattooed with unburnt grais of gun powder.  If the powder is smokeless, there
will be blackening of the skin but there may be a grayish or white deposit on
the skin round the wound. No blackening or scorching is found if the firearm is
discharged from a distance of more than four feet…..”
 According to Parikh’s Medical Jurisprudence “when a shot gun is fired
from distance close to the body up to about 2 yards or so, the usual close
distance firing phenomenon of scorching blackening and tattooing are
observed up to 1 yard the shot enters en masse; up to 2-3 yards the shots
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produces an entrance hole with individual pellet holes around the periphery,
beyond this, the shot dispersion is in accordance with the shot spread…..”.
Absence of blackening or tattooing would indicate that the firing did not
take place from a very close range. 126 spread of snot indiscrete distance of
more than 4 feet.127
The distance from which a firearm was discharged can be judged to a
limited extent. If black powder has been used, the distribution of the tattoo
marks made by the powder round about the would will give some indication
as to the distance of the weapon from the wound. This will vary according to
the calibre of the weapon and the make of the cartridge. If any empty
cartridges have been found on the scene of the crime, similar cartridges
should be tested in the suspect weapon and the distance judged by the
dispersion of the pellets or distance judged by the dispersion of the pellets or
distribution of unburnt powder marks, Black powder however is now rarely
used in cartridges. Modern smokeless powder leavys little markings of burnt
powder beyond eight to ten inches. Within this distance small particles of
unburnt powder may be found entangled in the clothing or at the wound of
entry. These may be of evidential value of they correspond to the powder in
the ammunition found in the possession of the accused.
Direction of firing:
According to Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence, a straight line between the
entrance and the exit wounds, when prolonged in front, should indicate the
line of direction.
126 Janak Singh V.State,1973SCC (Cri) 128; Subhash  V. State,1976 SCC(Cri) 483.
127 1974  SCC (Cri) 908.
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Calculation of time of firing:
The presence of carbon monoxide in the barrel will indicate recent
firing as it is detectable for a few hours only.  However, it may be found
present for a long time in long barrels. The time of the firing is determined by
qualitative quantitative spectrographic assessments.
 Hydrogen sulphide stays in the barrel for barrel for 2-3 hours if the
breach is not opened and 5-6 minutes if it is opened.
Microscopic view of different breach faces of firearms:
1) Single barrel breach loading guns
i) An impression on the cartridge head of the breach marks
left during the course of manufacture by tools.
ii) Black dots indicate depression left on the breach face of
a gun to accidental damage erosion etc.
iii) Oblong space on the breach face indicate portion of
breach depressed due to friction of the extractor.
2) Double barrel breech loading fund
The two breech faces of one D.B.B.L. gun will also not be alike in
their microscope details
3) Marks left by the firing pin, Breech Face, Extractor Ejector.
a) Shape and marks left by the firing pin on the cap.
b) Breech face marks on the cap.
c) Extractor and ejector hold marks on or near the rim of a
cartridge head.
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4) Extractors
Single Barrel bolt level gun – Double Barrel bolt lever gun.
 Auto loading automatic and rifled firearms.
5) Comparison of two cartridge (caps)
a) Cartridges fired from suspect gun.
b) Test cartridge fired from suspect gun.
6) Firing Pins
a) Round, but full of details
b) Conical, with its own individuality.
6) Ejectors
7) Ejectors
a) Ejectors
b) Firing pin
c) Breech block or Bolt head
d) Cartridge in chamber
e) Surface f the ejector
Ejector hoods in breech, blocks may have identifying marks.
8) Individualities of chambers  in  country made and cheap
variation of guns, pistols etc.
a) Pock pitting in barrel.
b) Protruding rivels in country made firearms.
c) Protruding ravels in dents in the chamber due to erosion or
corrosion or bad maintenance.
9) Extractor Marks on the neck cartridge.
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10) Rifling marks on Bullets
a. Right handed
b. Left handed
c. Marking on test bullet
d. Markings on bullet found on scene of crime.
· Match for comparison in a comparison microscope
· Duty of court in respect of the option of firearms expert
· Unless the date collected by the firearms
· Duty of court in respect of the opinion of firearms expert
Unless the dates collected by the firearms expert with respect to the
fire arms whereby an offence is committed be supplied or the enlarged photos
he has taken be produced so that the opinion of the expert may b verified by
the court, the court ought not to accept the opinion of the expert without
satisfying itself of the correctness of the same.
Note:The two broad division into which fire arms can be divided having been
mentioned, the judgment gives the reason why the pallets from a shot gun,
though can be measured, weighed and subjected to chemical analysis,
cannot establish the identity of the gun that fired them though in the case of
bullets from a rifle arm, the identification of bullets is possible with the help of
a microscope and expert’s service 128.
Cases -
When the victims wear several clothes, no scorching of wounds is
possible even if the firing had been from very close range. 129
128 In re, Kadur Thimma Raddi, AIR AP 1957 : 1957 CRL LJ 1091.
129 Sheo Shanker V. State, 1953 Cri LJ 1400 1953 ALJ 120 :  AIR 1953 All 652 (DB).
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In a case of close range firing, the brown parchment like appearance of
the none of scorched skin and embodied space of unburned powder are
permanent.  It is the accepted view of medico-legal experts that these are the
unmistakable signs of near discharge of a weapon.  Then such a fireman is
discharged from a distance, there will be total absence of characteristics of
near discharge ingraining of sunburn particles of powder is absent is fired
from beyond ten feet.  It is also the medico legal view that at a distance of six
or nine feet the wound is still ragged and the shots entering en masse at the
time the pellets show a tendency to scatter, for the wounds at this distance
shot holes may be found above the main wound, due to the upward jerk of the
muzzle caused by the recoil kick of the weapon. There medico legal experts
give several examples of general guide in determining the distance at which
of weapon was discharged, at the same time they also expresses that there
are so many circumstances to be considered such as length of barrel, choke,
or cylinder, black or smokeless powder, size of shot, etc. that a series of
experiments must first be carried out with the same weapon and loading as
were used in the case under investigation before a definite opinion can be
given. 130
 Every firing  pin scrape  and  breach face mark has its own
individuality. 131
130   Abdul Samad V. State, ILR (1964) Cut 623.
131  Kartar Singh V. State of Punjab 1976 SCC (Cri) 436 : (1973) 3 SCC 478.
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Where the ballistic expert gave his opinion that death of one victim and
injuries to anther victim were caused by the same gun fire, it was held, that
the opinion could not be accepted as the conclusion was based on the
dimension of injuries as described and photographed and the expert did not
have the opportunity of seeing the injuries and exit wound himself. 132
If identification marks are different at the base of the cartridge that
would show that they were not fired from the same weapon. 133
Where the expert stated that firing pin, marks present on the test
cartridges (recovered from the possession of the accused) tailed with the
firing pin marks present on the crime cartridge in their individual
characteristics and that the fired cartridges were fired through the rifle
recovered from the house of the accused and could the same make, his
evidence could not be disbelieved. 134
Where the expert give his opinion that the gun of the accused was not
in working condition and the spent cartridge was not fired from that gun, it
was held, that the opinion could not be rejected. 135
Microscopic Photographs may enable the evidence to be placed in a
visible from, but the court would not be justified in rejecting the opinion of the
expert who examined the markings under the comparison microscope
132 Kartar Singh V. State of Punjab 1976 SCC (Cri) 436 : (1973 3 SCC  478.
133 Mohan Singh V. State of Punajb, 1975 SCC (Cri) 512 : (1975) 4 SCC 254.
134 State of Gujarat V. Adm. Fateh Mohd. Umatiya, 1971 SCC (Cri) 381 : (1971) 3 SCC 208
135 Mukhtar Singh V. State of Punjab (1972) 4 SCC 483.
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although he did not take photographs. 136
Gun shot injury should be communicating or through and though
usually the exit wound should not be smaller than the entrance wound and
the diameter of the bullets. 137
Expert need not give reasons of his opinion in details. It is suffocation if
h gives it briefly. 138
Court refuse to place reliance on the evidence of expert unsupported
by reasons. 139
There is no need to examine the ballistic export under certain
circumstances. 140
Where the deceased died of gunshot wounds and ridles were not
recovered and it was not the prosecution case that the shots were fired by the
recovered revolver.  It  was  held  that  there  was no need to explained
expert. 141
If direct evidence it of unimpeachable type and consistent with the
report of the post mortem it is not necessary to examine the ballistic expert
but if the oral testimony is in conflict with the post mortem report and
136 Prem Dutt Gautam V/s. State of U.P.
137 Ramanathan V. State of T.N. 1978 SCC (Cri) 341 : (1978) 3 SCC 86 : 1978 Cri. LJ
1137.
138 Salim Zia V. State 1979 SCC (Cri) 568 : (1979) 2 SCC 648 : AIR 1979 SC 391
139 1956 AIJ 910 : 1957 Cri IJ 102 : 1958 Cri LJ 300.
140 AIR 1959 SC 488.
141 AIR 1963 SC 612 : AIR 1963 SC 340  But see rule SC 415.
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medical evidence, the Ballistic expert has got to be examined. 142
Where the ballistic expert was produced in defense and stated that
empties and misfired cartridges could not have been fired from the recovered
fire arm, it was held that it was not open to the court to make speculative
observations regarding some other possibility which is not supported by the
evidence on record. 143
If a cartridge containing pellets is fired from a distance of 12 feet the
pellets would spread out and disperse in an area of 4” – 5” from the place of
strike. 144
Where it is not certain whether a wound is the x result of a rifle or a
gun, it is always desirable that the prosecution should examine a duly
qualified Ballistic expert who alone is competent to state whether the injury
was cause by fire arm used and at distance as suggested in evidence. 145
The pellets unlike the bullets d not bear the impression of the barrel of
the gun. 146
Opinion of a ballistic expert can conclusively prove that a particular
cartridge has been fired by particular pistol. 147
142 AIR 1963 SC 612 : But see also AIR 1953 SC 415.
143   AIR 1963 SC 340 : 1963 Cri LJ 323.
144 1968 CAR (SC) 67
145 1968 CAR (SC) 57.
146   AIR 1953 SC 415 : 1953 Cri LJ 1761.
147   AIR 1957 AP 758 : 1957 Cri. LJ 1091
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Where a fire arms expert categorically states that he has compared the
land and groove marking on the bullets under a rejected simply because he
did not think it necessary to take photograph of the same for the perusal of
the court. 148
Where the ballistic expert stated that the recovered cartridges could
not have been fired through any other firms except those of the accused,
because very firing pin, firing pin scrape and breach face mark has its own
individuality The evidence was found to corroborate the eye witnesses and
good for upholding., the conviction of the accused for murder and maintaining
the death sentences in the absence of any mitigating circumstance,149 so the
evidence of eye witness cannot be discredited on the basis of expert
evidence which is oscillating.
Scope of – Murder caused by use of firearm prosecution, if bound to
cell ballistic expert in addition to direct evidence. It is called settled law that it
is not necessary in every case where an accused person is charged with
murder caused by a lethal weapon that the prosecution case can succeed
only if an expert is called and examined. It cannot be laid down as an
invariable proposition of law that in every case where a firearm is alleged to
have been used by an accused person, the prosecution must in addition to
the direct evidence, lead the evidence of a ballistic expert.150
148 Kalua V. State of U.P. 1958 Cr LJ 30 (SC)
149 Ramanathan V. State of Tamil Nadu,  1978.
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Opinion of Architects – Regarding cost of construction – value of – The
Architects say be experts for the purpose of designing and building house, but
they are not experts for the purpose of giving an opinion as to what would be
the cost of construction in a particular year without any data abut the prices of
material and wages prevalent in that particular year. 151
Opinion of Registrar of Trade Mark as an Expert – Registration of trade
mark–similarity with the existing trade mark– registrar’s opinion that there was
no deceptive similarity between two marks. Having an expert knowledge in
the matter his opinion should not be lightly disturbed. Where, however there is
concurrent finding of two courts below that there was deceptive similarity, the
finding is binding in appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.152
Copyright – In case of infringements of copy right, the court should be
reluctant to sit as experts and to decide without the aid of experts evidence.153
Excise Inspector – The report of an excise Inspector as to the strength of illicit
liquor. Unless admissible under section 32 of some other section of the Act,
cannot take the place of the sworn statement of the maker thereof. The
excise inspector should be examined and cross examined in court. Then and
then alone his evidence can have any weight. 154 The certificate, must be
called and examined as a witness before the court. For a certificate is nothing
more than a mere opinion of the person  purporting In  the State  V. Bhausa
Hanmanisa, it was said that, normally in order that a certificate could be
150 Anvaruddin V. Shakoor AIR 1990 SC 1242.
151  State V. Jawan Singh,1971 Cr. LJ 1656 (Raj)
152 K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar V. Sri Ambal and Co. (1970) 1 SCJ 23.
153 Sitanath V. Mohini, 81 IC 754.
154 Raja Ram V. State,1954  A 214.
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received in evidence, the person, who has issued to issue the certificate, and
opinion is not evidence, until the person who has given a particular opinion is
brought before the curt and is subjected to the test of cross-examination.
Therefore, the certificate of medical man, without more, nor being evidence,
cannot be relied upon and form the basis of a finding155
Failure to cross – examine an expert – Mere failure to cross-examine an
expert as to the grounds of his opinion and as to the test applied would not
detract from the weight of his evidence by applying to it consideration to which
his attention was not detected. 156
Court acting as an expert – The opinion of the court itself untrained
in medicine and without trained assistance, on questions of medicine is
valueless157. On questions of handwriting also, the practice of the court
itself acting as an expert has been disapproved158 But there is nothing in
the so-called science of finger prints which need deter a court from
applying its own magnifying glass or its own eyes and wind to the
evidence and verifying the results submitted to it by the witness. 159 In
trials with the aid of jury, a question of handwriting or thumb impression in
entirely a matter for the jury. 160
Value of expert testimony in general:Perhaps the testimony which least
deserves   credit   is   that   of   skilled   witnessed.  These   gentlemen   are
155 ILR  1962  Bom.472 : 64  Bom  LR  303
156 Sarwar Khan V. E. 55 IC 273 : 21 Cr LJ  25
157 E.V. Purna Chandra Ghose 82 IC 631 : 1924 C 611 : 29 Cr. LJ 71.
158  Azmat Ullah Khan V. M. Shiam Lal.
159 Public Prosecutor V. Virammal 46 M 715 69 IC 374 : 1923 M 178 : 23 Cr LJ 694
160 Panchu Mondal V. E. 1 CLJ 385
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usually required to speak not to facts but to opinions, and when this is the
case, it is quite often surprising to see with what facility and to what an extent
their views can be made to correspond with the wishes and interests of the
parties who can them. They do not indeed willfully misrepresent what they
think, but their judgment becomes so warped by regarding the subject from
only one point of view, that, even when conscientiously disposed they are
capable of expressing a candid opinion. To adopt the language of Lord
Campbell, “they come with such a bias on their minds so to support the cause
in which they are embarked that hardly any weight should be given to their
evidence.” 161
In considering the value of the evidence of an expert of it must be
borne in mind that an expert witness, however impartial he may wish to be is
likely to be unconsciously prejudiced in favour of the side which calls him. It
must also be remembered that an expert is often called by one side simply
and solely because it has been ascertained that he holds view v favourable to
its interest162 Expert evidence has little value when one expert is contradicted
by another163 or when the admitted facts of the case are against such
evidence164. The opinion of an expert by itself my be relevant but would carry
little weight with a court unless it is supported by a clear statement of what he
noticed and on what he based his opinion.  The expert should if he expects
161 Taylor 58 : Tracy Peerage Case (1843) 59 RR 59,see Hari Singh V. LachhmiDevi 59 IC
220 : 1921  L 126.
162 DiwanSingh V. E. 144 IC331 1933 L 561 34 Cr LJ 735 HariSingh V. Lachhmi Devi 59 IC
220 1921 L 126.
163 Sadiqa Begum V. Ata Ullah144  IC 497 : 1933 L 885.
164 See Sheothal Singh V. Arjun Das,56 IC879
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his opinion to be accepted. Put before the court all the materials which
induced his to come to his conclusion so that the curt, although not expert
may form its own judgment on those materials. The mere mention that certain
kinds of tests were applied and certain results obtained, might be relevant as
a piece of evidence, but would not be conclusive.165 At the same time if a
person with special professional qualifications such as a doctor or an
engineer, is called into make professional examination of  person or a
building, and is then asked to give the result of his examination as evidence in
court, it is hardly fair to treat him as being on the same footing as those
person who my be said to make a profession of giving evidence : nor is it
necessary to suppose that he must necessary be suffering from undue bias
merely because he has professional qualification166But there cannot be any
more unsatisfactory evidence than that of an interested party called as an
expert 167.
It is not the duty or even the function of a Magistrate to decide
before hand whether the evidence of an expert, if produced, would
influence his opinion on way or the other. That is a matter should be
settled only after the evidence has been recorded and read in the case168.
Value of expert evidence – The evidence of experts is nearly always a
weak type of evidence169.
165 Ram Karan SinghV. E. 154 IC 341: 1935 N 13.
166  Elizabeth Mand BainesV. Ram Sahai 1940 L 505 : 42 PLR 616.
167  Judah V. Isolyne Shrojbashini Bose, 945 PC 174.
168  Ram Narain Sharma V. E. 139 IC 508 : 1932 L 431 : 33  Cr LJ  761.
169  Melappa V. Guramma, AIR 1956Bom 129.
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Experts are not expected to be decisive in their opinion170. Their
evidence can never be conclusive as it is opinion evidence.171 Where a
person claims to be an expert but there is no evidence about the nature of
training received by him and his qualifications, and there is no data from
which he arrived at his conclusion, the evidence given by him is neither
legal nor sufficient. 172
The expert’s opinion does not take away the common man’s
judgment.  They have the right to think and judge things from day to day
experienc173. Expert evidence is nearly always a weak type of evidence
especially in the case of one who has not sufficient knowledge on the
subject. 174
Expert’s evidence and not supported by reason valueless: - A court
may refuse to rely on the evidence of an expert if it is not supported by
any reason175.
It is not necessary for an expert to give reasons at great length. It is
sufficient if he gives them briefly.176But the court may not place any
reliance on an expert, who is unsupported by reasons177.
Finding based on expert testimony may be challenged in second
appeal – It has been ruled in some decisions that where a finding is based
on the opinion of experts, it is not necessarily a finding on facts proved or
170  Ishwari Prasad V. Mohammad Isa, (1963) 3 SCR 722.
171  See Ayub V. State AIR 1967 Goa 17.
172  State V. Madhukar Gopinath 1965 B 259 : 67 Bom LR 226.
173  Bir Bahadur V. State, AIR1956 Assam 15, 16.
174  Nellappa V. Guramma AIR 1956 Bom 129
175  Haji Mohammed Ekramul Hq V.State of West Bengal,1959 SCJ 443:1959 SCA 477.
176  PremShanker V. State 1957 Cr LJ 108 (All)
177  Haji Mohammad Ekramul Haq V. State of WestBengal, 1959 SCJ 443.
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directly demonstrated and may, therefore be interfered with in second
appeal. 178 It is however, submitted that where an expert gives his opinion
as to the existence or non existence of a fact as defend by section 3, the
opinion is admissible evidence of the existence or non existence of that
fact and it is no more open to a court of second appeal to go behind a
finding based on such evidence than to go behind a finding based on the
evidence of an ordinary witnesses.
Mode of impeaching the credit of an expert – The credit of an
expert may be impeached like that of any other witness under section 146,
153 and 155. He may be asked if he had given a contrary opinion on the
same matter at some other time and whether his evidence has been
disbelieved on former occasion179 but technical works cannot be used to
refute his opinion unless his attention has been drawn in cross
examination to passages intended to be relied on.180
The weight of the evidence of an expert cannot be diminished by applying
to it considerations to which his attention was never directed181. “The  Act
makes no provision allowing evidence of the opinion of one expert upon
the qualification of another” 182 though such evidence can be given in other
system of evidence. 183
178 Tilok Chand Charan Das V.Manandu 144 IC 144 IC  741 : 1938 L 458 : Mohd.
Ibrahim V. Altafan  47 A 243 : 83 IC 27 : 1925 A 24 : Altafan V.Ibrahim 75 IC
502,1924 A 116.
179 Sections 155 and 146 (i)
180 Grande Venkata Ratnam V. Corporation of Calcutta.
181 SarwarKhan V. E. 55 IC 273 : 21 LJ 257.
182 Woodroffe, Ev. 8th Ed. 426 Footnote(6)
183 Lawson,Expert Testimony,  2nd Ed. 275.
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Cross examination of an expert by another expert – In specific CSS
an expert can be allowed under a special power of attorney to cross –
examine an expert in the name line of business coming as a witness for
the other side.184
Photography – The year 1839 generally is considered the birth of
photography. During that year William Henry For Talbot explained a process
he had indented to the Royal Society in London, and Jacques Mand Daguerre
gave a public demonstration in Paris of daguerreotype, a process he had
developed in collaboration with one Nice hero Niepae. Thus photography is
over one hundred years old. But more than a half century passed before
photography was possible as  scientific instrumentality.  The early cameras
were crude,the early lenses could not form a true image:the early sensitive
materials required long exposures and could not reproduce colours in proper
shades of grey. It was in 1890 before fully corrected lenses were introduced
and in 1906 before a plate was placed on the market that could reproduce all
colours in equivalent shade of grey185 But we are now past the middle of the
twentieth century, and hug scientific progress is visible all round, and
photography is no exception Needless to say that the instrumentalities used
in  photography  at  the  present  time  are  capable  of   the   most  perfect
reproductions, and the more the perfection the cameras has attained the
more sure is the results of expert investigations.
184 Thunnudeo V. Baldeo,  1944 NLJ    449
185 See photographic evidence by Charles.
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In the field of criminal investigation photography has been variously
utilized. A system has developed of late for preserving the photographs of the
criminals. That sort of thing helps the police later on to trace its culprit.
Photographs of the criminals may be shown with a advantage to witnesses
but here care must be take to see that the photographs of the criminal is not
put singly before the witnesses. The result will be more reliable if a witness is
confronted with  number of similar photographs. All the same the comparison
of the portrait with the picture formed in the mind is only a rough method of
identification and less so where the witness has seen the person only once,
as for example an individual who has cheated robbed or wounded him and
gone off.  Another advantageous use of comparison of a portrait may be
made when there is to be a hunt for a wanted person.  But the portrait must
be firmly impressed on the memory.  A policeman cannot afford to pull out the
photograph from his pocket., and compare it with the wanted person when he
meets him all the features of he wanted person must be carried in the
memory.
The identity of a dead person is secured by preserving a
photograph of the corpse. That helps the relatives and friends later on the
trace their man after the corpse it buried or creamed.
 The use of photography lead one to see more and even clearer
than what may be possible under the naked eye.  For instance, traces of
redness on the neck or the marks of ligature when the neck has been
softly pressed with it would be better revealed with the use of photograph.
Rontgen rays has made it possible to see through the living body, and
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perhaps better than what may not be possible even with the post mortem
examination.
The use of made of photographic pictures for the search and
identification of the culprits in the case of the assassination of President
McKinley.  The while thing is succinctly described by Dr. Gross in his book
on criminal Investigation. The author says / writes :
During the fatal visit of the murdered President to the Buffalo
Exhibition, the Kinematograph was of course in constant
Activity.  An exquisite series of pictures show the president as
he delivered his address and shook hands with the people who
approached him.  All his movements shortly before the moment
when the fatal bullet struck him were fixed upon the filmed when
some days later these photographs were developed to the
Edison Laboratory and examined by officers of the Criminal
Investigation Department, a discovery was made to the greatest
importance. Among the closely packed multitude surging around
Mokinley. One face and figure stood out with striking distinct-
ness it was zcolgosz. The first pictures of the series show the
President as he stop on the platform and begins his speech. A
man is next seen making his way with difficulty through the
crowd. Various people whom he pushed recklessly assist turn
round on him with angry looks. Unperturbed, however he forges
ahead and seems to succeed in making his way through the
living wall. Then he stands still for a second and turns his face
unsuspectingly towards the camera. Desperate resolution can
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be seen in his eyes. Then he goes on further pushing and
thrusting until he is almost immediately before the President.
Again the faces the camera At this moment he seems agitated
and excited. Now his that is knocked over his eyes and hastily
he push it back. He then looks wildly around, appears as if
waiting for someone in the multitude and expecting a single.
Thousand of people are in the picture with him, but most of
them stand with their backs to the camera. The features of all
who turned round are clear enough to make them recognizable
in the photograph. From these films drawings were taken for the
secret police service, with the project of discovering by their
help some clue to the confederates of the murderer.”
Now a days when amateur and professional photographers are very
where, clicking away almost all the time, he chances are becoming greater
everyday for criminal to be caught in the act by the camera. A newspaper
photograph helped to convict a defendant in a Pennsylvania riot and Sault
case.186 A crowd of strikers trying to prevent workers from entering a plant
knocked down and beat one of the workers. The defendant Balletic was
arrested and charged with participating in the riot but she denied that she had
taken any part in it. She claimed that she was just an innocent by newspaper
published a picture of the riot and prosecution obtained this picture and
introduced it in evidence. It showed the defendant the purported “innocent
bystander” at the scene of the riot with a potato masher in her hand. She tried
to explain third damaging evidence by saying that the reason she
186 CommonwealthV.Brirtic 173  A 686 (1934)
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had the potato masher was that she had been at home preparing breakfast
for her children and hearing the noise of the rioters in the street, she ran out
without a coat forgetting to put down the potato masher. The prosecution
caused her attention to the fact that she was wearing a coat in the picture.
The defendant tried to explain his discrepancy by saying that she really was
at the scene of the riot two times and that the photograph was taken when
she was at the scene two hours before the assault. But if that were the case,
what she doing on the street with the potato masher two hours, before
breakfast ? Everything she said got her in a little deeper and the photograph
thus totally destroyed her x defense.
There as much possibility of a chance snapshot aidling the
defense. The Amateur Photographer, an English publication published an
item relating how a man was proved innocent of a crime by a picture. The
accused and the deceased were known to have quarreled but it was
stated to have been settled. On the day the deceased was killed, the two
had gone siling in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro in a small bot. In the
veining the accused returned with the friend's dead body and firmly
asserted that the man met his death accidentally by falling from the mast
hed to the deck. Unfortunately for the accused an oar was missing and
doctors testified that death probably was their result of a blow with a blunt
instrument and that on an oar might have been the weapon employed.
Things looked for the accused until a passenger on a steamer made
public some starting evidence. He had happened to snap a picture of the
harbour an the day in question with a little box camera, and when several
days later he had the negative developed he noticed a little dark spot upon
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the sail of one of the small ca crafts included in the view. Upon the el
enlargement the craft was shown to be the boar owned by the deceased
and the “spot” turned out to be the image of a person falling from the mast,
thus iding in proving the accuser's innocence.
Finger Print:
 In the field of expert evidence, photography is proving of immense
use. The importance of finger print evidence for what it is today is perhaps
all due to photography. A criminal may have to leave his finger prints on
any object and these may be latent or visible Photography makes it
possible to bring out such latest or faint finger-prints which cannot be
studied by the checked eye but are immense use for identification
purposes. By the help photography permanent copies are made of finger
print on surface or objects that cannot be brought into court, without the
photographic copy comparison with other finger prints is not feasible, and
then what facilitates the comparison is the fact that by the help of finger
photography are enlarged or magnified to any extent and any number of
copies are made of them. In the case of dead body that is in an advanced
stage of purification it may not be possible to take the finger impressions.
That is because due to decomposition the skin tissue is rendered so
macerated that any attempt to make an ink impression of the fingers will
yield only blurred results or may even cause the skin tissue to peel off and
here to the inking plat. In such case x – ray photographs of the friction
ridges of the fingers know as dactyloscopic radiography is resorted to, A
property taken radiograph of the finger is capable of reproducing the ridge
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pattern so will that it can be enlarged and compared with other finger
prints to establish identity.
Handwriting and Typewriting : In the matter of handwriting and
typewriting study photography comes to the help of the expert. Handwriting
and typewriting are both too small to study in natural size because many
important characteristics proving either genuineness or forgery can be seen
only when the writing is enlarged. A magnifying glass or  micro scope may
sometimes enable the document examiner to form  a conclusion about the
genuineness of a document, but  properly made photomicrograph of
photomicrograph makes a permanent record of what the expert sees and
then the expert can well illustrate his conclusions by clear enlarged
photographs that can be placed in the hands of the court or the jury as the
case may be. Again, it becomes easy to compare the points of identity or the
difference between the two handwritings by the use of enlarged photographs
when the two of them are placed side by side. If the originals are used for this
purpose, there is always the risk of mutilation or spoliation and then
admittedly enlarged photographs of the originals can be used to a better
advantage in such a case. By the use of photographs as many copies as
desirable can be made of the original documents and they can be made use
of for comparison purposes of or for illustrating the points at issue. In case of
Adams V. Ristine  will was entries will was in the handwriting of the brother
and the sole beneficiary of the tester. Many grouped signatures were
photographed and used in the case. In approving their use the court said.
“It seems to be conceded that the jurors, with the originals
before them, could have made these groupings and
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comparisons for themselves and if need be might have used a
microscope for that purpose but this could only be done by one
juror at a time by looking at one paper and then at another and
by carrying the mental impression from one to the other. This
was well high impossible. To compare several writings with
each other to determine the identity or dissimilarity of author,
they must be placed side by side so that all can be seen at
once. This can best the done by a photograph in which the eye
can take in the whole group at one time. In the instant case,
there were a number of photograph used, so that the jurors
could have the picture before them while the expert pointed out
the peculiarities and explained the cases on for the opinions
which he expressed. This had a marked advantage in a search
for the truth, over a frequent reference to different papers and a
comparison of them with the disputed will. 187
Examination of documents thus with the help of photographs has a
distinct advantage over their examination with help of a magnifying glass or a
microscope and then a magnifying glass or a microscope may not even
render everything visible then what is possible with the help of photography.
For example infra red photography sometimes makes it possible to see that a
document which appears to have been written with one kind of ink was really
written with two kinds, for inks that appear like to the eye may photograph in
different shades of grey if infrared says are used to make the Picture.
187 122 SE126 (1924) 31 ALR 1413
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Firearm: The identification of shells, bullets, and firearms has made
possible by the application of photography. When a bullet or shell is found on
the scene of an accident it may often be necessary to prove whether or not
they have been fired from a certain weapon. The proof of it is rendered
possible because markings of the weapon often are impressed upon the
cartridge cases and bullets when the shot is fired, and these markings are
always individualistic in character. The breech end of the chamber of a
weapon into which the cartridge fits, is sealed by a solid that fiat piece of steel
called the “breech block” which supports the base of the shell against the
force of the explosion. The breech block always is finished off smooth either
by machining or by hand filing. In either case many fine scratching and it is
extremely improbable that any two breech blocks would have the same
pattern of the file markings, just as it is very unlikely that any two persons
would have the same pattern of friction ridges on the tips of their fingers.
Moreover, in addition to an individualistic pattern of tool markings just as
fingertip may have scars, a given breech block may have peculiar accidental
scratches caused, for instance by careless cleaning.
 When cartridge is fired its base jams back against the breach block
with a force of from two to twenty tons per square inch, and since the shell is
made of much softer metal than the breech block, very often the markings of
the breech block are stamped on the base of the base of cartridges.
Depending upon the type of weapon, the principle imprints will appear either
as parallel furrows or as concentric furrows since the tool markings of the
breech block of a given weapon are unlike those of any other weapon when
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two shell bases are stamped with identical breech-block markings, it can be
concluded that both were fired in the same poistol188
If breech block markings are discernible on the base of the shell fund
on the scene of the accident test cartridges can be fired in suspected weapon
and properly made photomacrographs or photo micrographs of both test shell
and evidence shell will show all the points of identity and dissimilarity. That is
one way of coming to a conclusion about the identity of weapons used at the
accident and for that the aid of photography is very necessary. There may be
another marking that may aid in identifying the weapon that fired a cartridge, it
is the identitation on the shell base made by the hammer of the firing pin. A
visual examination to come to a definite conclusion about the markings but if
he merely gives oral testimony of his conclusions, his opinions are likely to
carry little weight with the court or the jury as the case may be. Fire arm
identification evidence therefore a customarily presented in the form of
photomicrographs or photomicrographs that help the expert in demonstrating
and explaining his point of view.
Photographic and microscopic comparison : In Ramanathan V. State of
Tamil Nadu189 it was argued that the evidence of the expert could not have
been accepted because he did not take photographs for the purpose of
comparing the land and grove markings on the bullets and contended himself
by their comparison under a “Comparison microscope”. In support of the
argument regarding examination under the comparison microscope without
188 See Photographic evidence by Charles C. Scot.
189 AIR 1978 SC 204 : 1978 Cr LJ 1137.
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the aid of photographs reliance was placed on State of Gujarat V. Adam
Fatech Mohmed Umtiya. In that case the expert did not take photographs of
the misfire cartridges, and admitted that the photographs were necessary for
comparison. In that context the supreme Court made a reference to Burrad’s
The identification of Firearms and Forescis Ballistics”, 3rd edition, 1956 page
175, where it has been stated that any evidence of identification which is
unsupported by photographs cannot be regarded as being anything more
than an expression of opinion and held that it did not establish that the test
cartridge and the empty cartridges were fired from the same weapon or that
the misfired cartridge was fired from the same weapon. It appears that there
was no evident evidence in that case to show that the comparison had been
made with the help of comparison microscope. Some observations from
Hatcher’s “Firearms Investigation Identification and Evidence” were also
referred to for the purpose of showing the importance of photography and the
use of enlarged photographs in such cases. Hatcher has devoted a whole
chapter to photography in investigation of firearms crime and while discussion
the history of firearms identification he has pointed out the reason why
considerable importance was given to such photographs for the visual
satisfaction of the judge and the jury. But while referring to the importance of
photographs taken directly through the comparison microscope, he has
devoted a paragraph to the decline in the use of micro comparison
photographs and has gone on the state as follows:
“There are also photographic reason for the almost entire
abandonment of this method of presentation. Unfortunately, the
lenses of a camera do not adjust in the way that the human eye
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adjusts, The depth of field is extremely limited. Unlike the human
eye, a photographic film has far less tolerance to variations in
lighting Photographs are almost always unsatisfactory to the Expert
who has made a positive comparison through the microscope You
photograph only what you can see at one single time. The camera
cannot move along the surface of bullets to pick up identity after
identity.”
The position has been stated by Ehrlich and Jones190 as follows:
“Usually more can be seen through a microscope than can be
photographed through it. There are several reason for this
superiority of visual perception. In the first place, the eye looking
through a microscope can scan the field and change focus at
different points of the field. In addition the eye can see any
movement present and with he aid of mental “filling in” is able to
perceive form and detail that the may not be recorded
photographically. Moreover the lens system of the microscope
produces a curved fields, this works out nicely for the eye since the
retina is cured, but does not work so well photographically since the
film plane is flat. Due to this latter defense not all of the field will be
photographed to the same degree of sharp focus and some
distortion may be produced in the photographs.”
190 Photographic Evidence (1967 Edb.)Sec 178 p. 260.
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In cannot therefore be doubted that a comparison microscope is the
most important and most widely used scientific instrument in comparing the
crime cartridge with the test cartridge. Such microscope are of various types
but they have been described as follows191.
“A comparison microscope consists essentially of two compound
microscopes, having identical optical systems, so that they give the same
magnification connected by an optical “bridge” containing a combination of
prisms such that by viewing two a separate objects (one under each
microscope) through a single eye piece the two objects may be compared by
bringing the images of parts of each be compared by bringing the images of
parts of each into juxtaposition.” It has further been stated that when the
desired condition is attained for purposes of comparison the bullets are said
to the matched and correct opinion can be given thereon.
 It is true that there has been considerable differences of opinion
amongst investigators in a court for the purpose of illustrating the matching of
markings, and while it may be that microscope photographs, when taken with
due care and in the best of conditions, may enable the evidence to be placed
on the record in a visible form, it cannot be denied that a court would not be
justified in rejecting the opinion of an expert with has examined the markings
under the comparison microscope simply for the reasons that he has not
thought it necessary to take the photographs. The evidence of the Ballistic
expert who categorically stated that he had compared the land and groove
markings on the bullets under a comparison microscope cannot be rejected
191 Mathew :FirearmsIdentification Vol. I p. 38.
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simply because he did not think it necessary to take the photographs.192
Scene of accident: The scene of accidents can also be demonstrated
to the court with the help of properly made photographs. Photographs of
damaged property may with advantage b taken to show the nature and extent
of the loss. In homicide cases the position of the corpse may be preserved by
the use of photography, and the nature or type of injury may also be
demonstrated with its help. In rape case photographs of the scene, of the
crime may have probative value on the question of consent. It may show
whether the place selected is such as would likely be selected voluntarily. As
such photography plays an immense role, in very type of criminal
investigation.
There are some other kinds of experts which have been dealt with
in the next two chapters.
192 Ramanathan V. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 SC 120 : 1978 Cr LJ 1137.
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CHAPTER--8
ROLE OF EXPERT IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
 What role does a scientist pay in an invention ?  Well, he invents but
it is upto the administration ad the Government as to how to make use of it.
The same can he said about the role of an expert in the administration of
justice.  The experts explain intricate scientific matters and assist the court
in understanding the problem in logical, scientific perspective but how to
use it ad to what extent, is within the domain of the court only.  Expert  pay
the role of a valuable, reliable assistant but never the role of master, that is
the part played by the court alone.
 An expert in any science, art or trade is one who by practice and
observation has become experienced therein.  An expert, therefore, really
means  a person who by reason of his training or experience is qualified to
express an opinion where an ordinary witness is not competent  to do so.
His evidence is only an opinion evidence which is based on his special skill
or experience.  In view of the language of Section 45 Indian Evidence Act,
it is necessary that before a person can be characterized as an expert, it is
necessary  that there must be some material on the record to show that he
is one who is skilled in that he is one who is skilled in that particular
science ad is posses of peculiar knowledge concerning the same.  He must
have made special study of the subject or acquired special experience
therein.  Thus before the testimony of a witness becomes admissible, his
competence as an expert must be shown, may be, by showing that he was
possessed of necessary qualification or that he has acquired special skill
therein by experience.  Apart from the question that the report of an expert
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may be read in evidence, what is necessary is that the expert should be
subjected to cross  examination because an expert like any other witness is
fallible and the real value of his evidence consists in the rightful inferences
which he draws from what he has himself observed and not  from what he
merely surmises.1
 It is now well-settled that expert opinion must always be received
with great caution and tat it is unsafe to base conviction solely on expert
opinion without substantial collaboration. This rule has been universally
acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law.2
If the oral evidence leads to a positive conclusion one way or other,
the opinion of expert has to yield or have to be accepted or rejected in
accordance with the finding arrived at on an appraisal of direct oral
evidence.  It is only where there is no direct evidence that expert evidence
becomes relevant.3
In some cases the expert observes nothing.  His proper work is that
of pure reasoning.  Taking the facts as observed by other witnesses and
enumerated by them, it is his function to present to the  jury, the proper
conclusions which they indicate.  The plain administrative objection to
employing the expert is that his reasoning has a tendency to supplant that
of the jury.  As in other instances when administration permits as invasion
of the province of the jury, an adequate forensic necessity must be shown
for receiving the judgment of an expert. The administrative warrant differs,
1  Bal Krishna Das Vs. Radha Devi AIR 1989 All 133.
2  Magan Bihari Lal Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 1091, Murarilal Vs. State of M.P.
AIR 1980 SC 531.
3   Brij Basi Vs. Moti Ram AIR 1982 All 323.
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however, widely from tat presented in the case of the observer, whether
ordinary or skilled.  Where one is using sense to perception, the forensic
necessity for admitting the secondary evidence of an inference or
conclusion most frequently is this that the original phenomena can not be
so detailed by the witness as fully to be placed before the jury.  This being
so, the latter is allowed, after stating such constituting facts as he can, to
summarise these and those previously detailed upto the effect which they
have produced upon his mind.  In the case of the expert, however, the
inadequacy which the witness is to supply is in the reasoning power of the
jury. No man can satisfactorily reason about that which he does not
understand.  In a matter of art, science or trade, subjects beyond the
common   knowledge of jury, the necessary date of sound reasoning and
faculties for producing it may both be unknown and/or undeveloped.
Should this inadequacy be made clearly apparent, the judgment  of the
expert will be received upon ordinary principles, the court in seeking to
protect the function of the jury,  will exclude the judgment of an expert
which involves only acts of plain and simple reasoning which the jurer's
could draw for themselves.4
Expert's opinion must be based on and supported by reasons, and it
is the reason which is important in assessing the merit of the opinion.5
It is only the court which is competent to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and therefore, the opinion of an expert is never binding on
4  Chamberlain : Evidence p. 72..
5  Palamiswami Vs. State AIR 1968 Bom. 127..
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a court.  It is admitted in evidence only to help the court in arriving at the
correct decision.  In other words, evidence of an expert can not be taken as
conclusive.  This has to be decided by the court.6
In order to have a practical assessment of the role of expert in the
administration of justice we take up the working of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the Prevention  of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 and in the control of environmental pollution.
Recent scientific developments in the field of expert opinion and new
problems arising out of them are being death with in chapter. . .
The parliament enacted the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 to consolidate and amend the law to narcotic drugs,
to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations,
relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, ad for matters
connected there with :
The narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances covered under the
aforesaid Act are as follows :
1.   Cannbis (hemp) which means –
(a)  Charas, that is, the separated resin in whatever form,
whether crude or purified, obtained from the cannabis plant
and also includes concentrated preparation and resin
known as hashish oil or liquid hashish;
6   State of Mysore Vs. Sampangiramiah AIR 1953 Mys. 80, Methew Vs. State of Kerala
1960 Ker LT 1 (SC)..
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(b)   Ganj, that is, the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis
plant (including the seeds and leaves when not accompanied
by the tops), by whatever same they may be known or
designated ; and
(c) Any mixture, with or without any neutral material, any of  the
above forms of cannabis or any drink prepared ;
2. 'Cannabis plant' which means any plant of the genus cannabis.
3. Coca derivative which means –
(a)  Crude cocaine, that is, any extract of coca leaf which can be
used, directly or indirectly, for the manufacture of cocaine;
(b) Ecgonine and all the derivatives of ecgonine from which it can
be recovered ;
(c) Cocaine, that is methyl ester of benzol ecgonine and itsw
salts ; and
(d) All prepatrations containing more than 0.1 per cent of cocaine
;
4.  Coca leaf, which means
(a)  The leaf of the coca plant except a leaf from which all
ecnonine, cocaine and any other ecgonine alkaloids have
been removed ;
(b) Any mixture thereof with or without any neutral material, but
does not include any preparation containing not more than
0.1 per cent of cocaine.
5. Coca plant – which means the plant of any species of the genus
Erthroxylon.
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6. Manufactured drug means
(a) All coca derivatives, medicinal cannabis, opium derivatives
and poppy straw concentrate ;
(b) Any other narcotic substance or preparation which the
Central Government may, having regard to the avoidable
information as to is nature or to a decision, if any, under any
International Convention, by notification in the official
Gazette, declare to be a manufactured drug.
7. Medical cannabis, which means medicinal hemp, means any extract
or tincture of cannabis (hemp).
8. Narcotic drug which means coca leaf, cannabis (hemp), opium,
poppy straw and includes all manufactured drugs.
9. Opium which means –
(a) The coagulated juice of the opium poppy; and
(b) Any mixture, with or without any neutral material, of the
coagulated, juice of the opium poppy, but dues not include
any preparation containing not more than 0.2 per cent of
morphine.
10.   Opium derivative which means –
(a)  Medical opium, that is, opium which has undergone the
process necessary to adapt it for medicinal use in accordance
with the requirements of the Indian Pharmacopoeia or any
other pharmacopoeia notified in this behalf by the Central
Government, whether in powder form or granulated or
otherwise or mixed with neutral materials ;
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(b) Prepared opium, that is, any product of opium obtained by
any series of operations designed to transform opium into an
extract suitable for smoking and the dross or other residue,
remaining after opium is smoked.
(c) Phenanthrene alkaloids namely, morphine, codeine, the
beine and their salts;
(d) Diacetylmorphine, that is, the alkaloid also known as
diamorphine or hereoin and its salts; and
(e) All preparations containing more than 0.2 per cent of
morphine or containing any diacetylmorphine.
11.Opium poppy which means -
(a) The plant of the species papaver somniferum; and
(b) The plant of any other species of papaver from which opium
or any phenanthrene alkaloid can be extracted and which the
Central Government may, by notification in the official
Gazettee, declare to be  opium poppy for the purpose of this
Act.
12.  Poppy straw which means all parts (except the seeds) of the opium
poppy after harvesting whether in their original form or cut,
crushed or powdered and whether or not juice has been
extracted there from.
13.Poppy straw concentrate which means the material arising when
poppy straw has entered into a process for the concentration of
its alkaloids.
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14.   Psychotropic substance which means any substance, natural or
synthetic, or any natural material or any self or preparation of
such substance or material included in the list of psychotropic
substances specified in the Schedule.
Special characteristics of the NDPS Act :
 With a fair amount of accuracy, it could be stated that the Narcotics
Act is a land-mark legislation with any firsts to its credit.  Here the Indian
Parliament has displayed its creative genius to cope up with a means that
has tended to grow increasingly over the years.  To create an apparatus tat
could confront the drug traffickers, drug smugglers, drug dealers and drug
pedlars with the supremacy of law was no small task ad while it is too early
to say as to what success has been achieved, suffice it is to say at this
stage tat the Indian Legislature, conscious of its vide ranging social
responsibilities, has endevoured to rise upto the challenge and is second to
none in accepting it. While other enactments like the Indian Penal Code
and the Evidence Act have been lauded for the legal foresight of their
authors (Maclauley and Stephen) the present Act can be cited as an
expression of the bold resolve of the Indian Law maker to combat the drug
under-world.
 The Act extends to the whole of India and makes no exception about
it in the Preamble.
The definitions clause is very exhaustive and wide embracing.  The
schedule specifying psychotropic substances includes substances both
natural and synthetic, thereby expressing a legislative intent tat anything
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which is in the nature of a narcotic drug or a intoxicating substance does
not escape from the mischief of the Act.  Section 3 of the Act vests the
Central Government with the power to add or omit from the list of
psychotropic substances, thereby rendering the Act to be a dynamic
instrument capable to meet the ongoing and constant challenges.
Section 4 vests the Central Government with the authority of
preventing drug abuse, to enable it to co-ordinate the combating measures
and to fulfill its international obligations besides rehabilitation and social
reintegration of the addicts.  A welfarist slant is too prominent to be missed
in this section and it shows that  the Act is not entirely a punitive legislation.
Section 5 to 7 prescribe the enforcement structure laid down in the
Act – the machinery and the apparatus that is intended to be the strong
arm of the law.
Section 8 is a pivotal section in so far as it imposes almost a total
ban on private trade and dealings in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
substances, except for scientific and medical purposes, and that too not
without a valid license permit or authorization issued by the Competent
Authority.  Sections 9 and 10 are in the nature of explanations to Section 8,
in sp far as they detail the mode, manner and modalities of granting such
licenses etc.  the test laid down by these sections  are not lenient by any
standards.
Section 11 introduces, in turn, juristic concepts of public control of
private contract as also of the concept of exclusion of other statutes from
the operational field of this Act.
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Section 12 is also an equally revolutionary concept introduced by
any Indian Legislation for the first time in so far as it imposes a ban on
International drug trade by any person from Indian soil.  Such bar on
International Trade is even intended to care of transactions not necessarily
in the nature of export and import to and from India.
Sections 13 and 14 in the nature of exceptions to section 8, whereby
the Central Government in the case of Cocoa and Government in case of
Cannabis may allow their cultivation etc. thereof.
Section 15 to 32 are the penalty clauses of the Act.  Separate
penalty clauses are prescribed for different drugs to avoid confusion and to
serve the ends of clarity and expedience.  It is not for the first time that
minimum and maximum sentences have been prescribed but what is really
new hero is the large extent of such minimum and maximum sentences
that have been prescribed i.e. 10 years minimum and 20 years maximum
besides the liability to pay fine that may not be less than one Lakh Rupees.
In cases of subsequent convictions the minimum and maximum sentences
are 15 years and 30 years, while there is no provision for capital
punishment for these offences like in some other countries showing Indian
Legislative disapproval of the 'Tooth for Tooth and eye for eye' principle,
the large period of incarnation prescribed is intended to serve as an
effective control measure, discouraging to drug trade.  Section 15 to 25 are
all serious offences triable by a court of Sessions under the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
Section 26 deals with vicarious liability of malfeasance committed by
servants etc.
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Section 27 deals with punishment for illegal possession in small
quantity of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substances.  The punishment
for this offence is one year and six months and the offence is triable by a
Magistrate.  Attempts, abetment and criminal conspiracy and even
preparation have been made punishable under Sections 28 to 30.  So far
only preparation to commit dacoity was an offence under Section 399 and
402 I.P.C. and Section 30 of this Act now adds a degree of gravity to the
offences under the Act. By permishing punishment under Section 32 for an
offence for which no punishment has been prescribed, an attempt has
been made to exhaust all possibilities against "technical" acquittals.
Section 33 excludes application of Section 360 Cr. P.C. and the Probation
of offenders Act, 1958 except  for offences punishable under Section 26
and 27 of the Act.  This is not to undermine the laudable objective of
reformation as aimed at by the probation Act, but due to the fact tat experts
fear that the fight of the governments all over the world against the narcotic
drug means has been somewhat in the nature of a losing battle and this is
not the stage to generally apply the probation law to this Act, whereby the
convicts may feel encouraged to indulge into criminal prolictivity and drug
trafficking on a trendy course.
The Act has to be viewed in the perspective of the global report that
a production of narcotic drug is higher than before and so are their
consumption and drug related cases of violence, bribery  and terrorism.
Even the gnomes of Zurich (Switzerland) were moved recently to consider
a special law so tat the Drug Mafia could not use secret service accounts to
launder millions of dollars dishonestly earned in the drug trafficking.
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The report of the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotic matters
named six countries were drug production seems to thrive despite
concerted efforts to counter it – Bolivia, Perk, Columbia, Pakistan, Thailand
and Burma. Against only two Governments which were in the battle against
illicit drugs in 1981 there are 20 now in the fray.  But faster the drub crops
destroyed the more they seem to be grown secretly.
India has also unwritingly become the transit point for trafficking in
illicit narcotics.  In Mexico, the other such point, the report says that though
more opium poppies, cocaine and marijuana crops were destroyed in 1985
than ever before, none of the big time drug Mafiosi could be brought to trial
because of their dubious ways.
In the so-called 'Golden triangle', opium and marijuana production
actually increased, both in Burma and Thialand despite a strong drug
eradicationprogramme.  In Burma especially the World's largest opium
eradiction programme was launched but because of war lords planting
more opium, the aim was defeated.  Columbia witnesses an
unprecedented violence during 1986 against judges, journalists and
politicians involved in imposing the drug racket and the Mafiosi. While in
Peru, Cocaine peddlers were able to slow down even the campaign against
coca production.  In Pakistan, despite official measures and international
support for curtailing opium production, the U.S. Agency reported
'Significant increase in opium production and heroin trafficking.  Even in our
country, the Punjab violence and sikh militancy is reported to be thriving on
money earned from illicit and illegitimate trade in Narcotics and
armaments.'  It would thus appear that the world picture is depressing and
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the Indian scene is no less groomy.  The Indian Authorities hope to stamp
out the menance as incorporated in the Act.  The Government of India are
comtemplating now ordinance which is just on the anvil, to make preventive
detention application tom offences under the 'Narcotics' Act.
The Act, in face of the explosive nature of the problem confronting it,
does not adopt of much encourage release of offenders on probation for
serious offences, thereby ruling out reform where reform is not possible.  It
does not however entirely rule out reform of the criminal by release on
probation by making the probation Act and Section 360 of the Criminal
Procedure Code applicable to offences under Section 26 to 27 of the Act
thereby encouraging a reformative approach for a limited and serious
purpose.
A yet another departure from the usual is to found in Section 35,
which raises a presumption of presence of a culpable mental state, with the
result that the prosecution need not prove intention or knowledge or even
motive which the court shall take for granted as present ad existing in the
offender's mind unless otherwise proved by the defense.  This  is a
procedural sections.
Section 37 says that all the offenders punishable under the Act shall
be cognizable offences.
The provisions relating to search and seizures are also on the
stringent side.
Coordination in Government is sought to be facilitated by virtue of
the provisions of Section 56 which requires officers of different departments
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to assist each other.  It is based on the principle that the running of an
organization like the size of a government cannot ever be done by one man
alone.  It can only be done efficiently by a team of workers acting together
and every member of the team of workers must have a clearly assigned
role.  Under this principle, even though each member of the team has his
own separate and clearly defined role, the team must take collective
responsibility.
While the Act protects the action taken in good faith (See Section
69) by the different functionaries, it also provides punishment for vexatious
entry, search, seizure and arrest (Section 58) and for failure of officer on
duty or for the connivance in contravention of its provision (Section 59).
No human effort including this legislation on narcotics could ever be
expected to be complete and so the Act contemplated application of the
Customs Act, 1962 and the Drugs and Cosmetic Act  1940 for purposes
specified in Section 79 and 10.  Section 82 repeals the Opium Act, 1857,
opium Act, 1878 and the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 but action taken
under the repealed Acts shall be deemed to have been taken under the
corresponding  provisions of this Act. (Section 83).
The Narcotics Act prohibits sales, possession, production, import to
India and transport of Narcotic Drugs ad Psychotropic Substances named
in the Act.
For the purposes of definition of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
substances, the percentages in the case of liquid shall be calculated on the
basis a preparation containing one percent of a substance means a
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preparation in which one gram of substance, if solid, or one military of
substance,  if liquid, is contained in every one hundred milliliter of the
preparation and so on in proportion for any greater or less percentage.
Central Government may, having regard to the developments in the field of
methods of calculating percentages in liquid preparations, prescribe, by
rules, any other basis which it may deem appropriate for such calculation.
The Narcotic Drugs and psychotropic substance Act exists to be whole of
Indian and empowers the Central Government to constitute a Central
Board of Excise and Customs and to establish the Narcotic Drugs and
psychotropic Substance Consulative Committee besides the officers of the
State Government.  The duties of these bodies will be to advise the Central
Government and State Government on such matters relating to the
administration of this Act as are referred to it by that Government from time
to time and the most important provision of the Act is that no person shall
import or manufacture of sell or stock or exhibit for sale or distribute any
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance without a license, permit or
authorization issued by  the Central Government and the Central
Government under Section 8 or 9 of the Act may by rules permit the
cultivation, production, manufacture, possession, sale, transport, stocking,
use, consumption, import  inter-state, export inter-state, import into India,
export from India or transship any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance.
The Act does not prohibit cultivation, possession and sale etc. of these
substances entirely if they are done under specific license, permit  or
authorization of Central Government and for 'medical and scientific
purpose' exclusively.
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Conflict between Narcotics Act & laws made by State Legislatures :
Article 246 of the Constitution lays down that the Parliament has the
exclusive Power to make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I in the seventh schedule, and the Parliament and the
Legislature of a state shall both have power to make laws with respect to
any of the matters enumerated in List III in the seventh Schedule.  The
subjected in List III in the seventh Schedule.  The subject matter of this Act
is covered by Entry 19, List III of the Constitution. Clause (2) of the Article
254 lays down that where a law made by the Legislature of a state with
respect to any one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent List
contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law with
respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such
State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President
and has received his assent, prevail in that State, prevail in that state.
There is however a provision to this clause to say that nothing in this
clause shall prevent the Parliament from enacting at any time any law with
respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or
repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.
The upshot, therefore, is that a law made by the Legislature of a
State, which has received the ascent of President, shall prevail over this
Act, unless the Parliament under its residuary 254 of the Constitution has
expressly repeated it.
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Interpretation of Narcotics Act :
This Act is obviously a penal Statute and the purpose of the penal
law is to express a formal social condensation conduct, but tressed by
sanctions calculated to prevent it.7 The Act also comes in the category of
public welfare offences which are inter alia, concerned with physical and
intellectual well-being of the citizens.
'Public-welfare offences' are essentially standardized.  In the balance of
values, it is generally considered more essential that violation of such laws
is more strictly punished, in the interests of the public rather than that the
degree of individual guilt should be measured in each case.  On a balance
of social interests, the widespread tendency of modern Statutes to impose
strict liability for violation of public-welfare offences is entirely justifiable.
Researcher  most respectfully submits that the  judges  would  be
subverting their   own  process  if  they  did  not  adopt this principle of strict
liability in the  matter of interpretation of this Statue and other similar ones
and continued to insist on the old, hackneyed and hair splitting kind of
interpretations that ultimately prove to be self-defeating and tend to mock
the judicial process in the long run, by a spate of 'not guilty' or 'acquittal'
verdicts.  To talk of judicial reform is an empty rhetoric unless the
Judicature first sets its own house in order.  One does not expect 'reform'
or 'change' to descend like 'a Maturna from heaven.'  This is not to any that
the Judges should swing to the other extreme to record a guilty finding
where no much finding is possible to be recorded.
7 Wechaker : The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 UN of Chicago, LR 374 (1955).
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 This piece of legislation postulates a kind of 'negligence without
fault' liability. Its purpose is to compel the people to apply stricter standards
of inquiry ad control to transactions which may endanger public life and
public security.  This is not entirely illogical as some of the judges may tend
to think, for we must recognize the importance of public interest in this type
of contravention.  It would be dangerous to import the general concept of
'intention' as largely understood to this Act for intent as evidence of the will
of offender will certainly an incalculable damage.  The intention has to be
generally presumed by the court.
 Whatever may be the ultimate solution, the courts have to recognize
that a whole new area of law has developed as a concomitant to the social
responsibility of the modern state, an area to which the principles and
procedures of the traditional criminal law are only applicable to a very
limited extent.  May be, there would an occasional injustice once in a while
but that would be confined to an individual or a small group of individuals
ad that is simply a part of the price we must remain prepared to pay for
living in an increasingly mechanized society where well being of each
member of the community depends on a vast number of other persons and
the society at large.
Recent Amendments to the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic
Substances (NDPS) Act :
 Frequent amendments of a Statute do not necessarily cast an
aspersion on the authors of the Statute or the Parliament.  To slightly dwell
on the juristic concepts, no legislation, however thorough and up to date or
however complete, can take in all possibilities and the different
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permutations and combinations of the social conduct and behavior in a fast
changing social conspectus create new loopholes, possibilities and
avenues of escape, which must be constantly plugged.
Te concept of laissez faire advocated by Sir Adam Smith, now
stands frayed under the weight of the social welfare responsibilities of a
modern state and by the pressures extended by the group organizations ad
collective bargaining of these pressure groups. Sir Adam's concept now
sounds as distant in the past as the Biblical Adam and Eve.
The society may have progressed but it has not always progressed
positively and the anguish, pain and suffering over this park negative
growth is best expressed by the noted, Jurist, eminent scholar ad former
Judge of the Indian Supreme Court.  His Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.R.
Krishna Iyer speaks with intensity of the mind ad profundity of intellect,
when he says the following, though in a different content.  The researcher
may be excused for the bracketed additions superimposed on the language
of the Great Master, but how else would the poor writer of these lines been
able to make his point.  So with apologies to His Lordship, I quote :
"Escalating criminalization of the political process and its operators
including the drug barons) makes any decent Indian sad ad even guilty,
when delinquents with criminal antecedents, (drug traffickers ) and mafia
connections are more than a stray accident but the omni preset and
omnipotent in politics, otherwise a noble art, becomes a noxious craft.
Alas,  the newspaper and reports from other sources confirm our worst
fears about the pathological phenomenon of spreading criminality, vulgarity
and violence. Criminals are becoming politicians and politicians are
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becoming criminals.  And parties themselves are becoming vulnerable to
pressure from notorious characters.  This disease afflicts most political
parties, some for more than others. If this AID syndrome, rapidly invading
the public life, were not arrested, the coalition of crime and politics will
asphyxiate our democratic, especially electrical process.  Power is no
longer a public trust but a private robbery of gangsters and corrupt
operators, bearing deceptive marks ad labels.  In the name of   Mahatmaji
and Nehruji we must protest, resist lest the nation should surrender its soul
to the neo-mafia controlling the administration  from te little village to the
national capital.
Our motherland is struggling for the oxygen of corruption free, mafia-
proof politics.8
Other countries like Columbia, Pakistan and Burma are already
facing alarming situations.  In Columbia things have worsened to a point
that judges and magistrates have become a favourite targets for
assassination by the drug lords and  violence by drug gangs threatens the
very fabric of life in Columbia.  The Pakistan government is  also cracking
down hard on the country's drug barons.  Newspaper reports9 show that it
is difficult to assess as to what damage heroin money has caused and
what extent have they corrupted the political process.  There are reports
that the Afghan Mujahidin are engaged in the 'opium for guns' trade.  Even
nearer home, recent survey carried out in the country show that newer
areas  are taking to the drug trade,   like  Kinnaur, Ropa  Valley,  Chakrata,
8 Hindustan Times  dated 27.8.1989.
9 Times of India dated 28-8-1989.
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Dehradun and nomadic shepherds (gaddis) who come from opium growing
areas are suspected to be involved in large scale opium smuggling.
The 1989 amendments to the Act had become necessary on
account of this octopus like  mushrooming of the drug menance, lest it
destroy our yard earned freedom and an equally painstakingly developed
democratic process.
Now, on to the changes brought about by the amending Act No. 2 of
1989 :
The Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 was amended
by the amending Act o.2 of 1989 to further provide for the forfeiture of
property  derived  from  or  used  in  illicit  traffic  in  narcotic  drugs  and
psychotropic substance and "to implement the provisions of  International
Conventions of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances." (Preamble
of the amending Act, which has been added to the preamble of the original
Act).
 The definition clause (Section 2) has been enlarged to include
definitions of "controlled substance" and 'illicit traffic' in relation to N.D.P.S.
Act and these definitions are wide enough to take care of realities of
financing, abetting and conspiracies of offences and harbouring of
climinals.
 A new chapter II-A has been added consisting of Sections 7-
A and 7-B for creation of a National Fund for control of Drugs Abuse.  Such
a fund is intended to be financed, inter alia, by sale proceeds of properties
forfeited and is to be utilized for purposes connected with the Act.  This
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chapter has the effect of removing the financial constraints  in the matter of
administration of the Act and also lays down a scheme of Administration of
the Act and also lays down a Scheme of Administration of the fund ad its
annual accounting and auditing (Section 7-B).
 Proviso II has been supplemented o Section 8 to say ha nothing in
he said section shall apply o the export of poppy straw for decorative
purposes. The prohibition imposed by Clause (A) to(e) of this section could
be relaxed under Proviso I in relation to cannabis plant for production etc.
of ganja for "Medical and scientific purposes" under a notification on official
gazette issued in this behalf. Now the amended Proviso II makes an
exception about application of this section to Poppy straw for "decorative
purposes."
Section 9-A has been added by the Amending Act II 1989 to
increase Government Control in the matters relating to Narcotics etc.
It would also appear that this newly added Section 9-A is a parallel
provision for  regulating or prohibiting the production etc. of "Controlled
Substances" used in production or manufacture of any narcotics drugs or
psychotropic substance. This has the effect of  plagging a loophole in the
Act.
Amongst the penalty clauses, a new Section 25-A has been added
to work as a penalty clause for the offence defined in Section 9-A.
The newly added Section 27-A (Section 8 of the amending Act) lays
down punishment for financing illicit traffic and harbouring of offenders.
This is in the nature of a consequential amendment of the Act, due to a
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new insertion of the definition of the term "illicit traffic" in the definition
clause of the Act, Section 2.
Section 1-A is again a new insertion laying down death penalty for
certain offences to previous convicts, under Section 15 to (both inclusive)
or Section 27-A.  Under a table included in the Act the quantities of the
various narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances have been detailed to
make the offence punishable with death, in case the quantity recovered
was equal to or more than the quantity indicated in the table.  Under sub-
section (2) previous conviction by a Court of competent jurisdiction outside
India shall also be deemed to the conviction by a court in India.
Section 1-A excludes the application of the principle of suspension
or remission of  sentences to sentences awarded under the Act.  This
section supplements the already existing Section  in the Act.
Section 6 and 6-A to 6-D have a now substituted the original Section
6 of the Act under Section 11 of the amending Act.  These provisions deal
with Constitution of Special Courts for speedy trial of offences under the
Act and lay down the structure formation of such courts, the offences
triable by such courts, appeals and revisions and application of Code of
Criminal Procedure threats, same as otherwise provided in the Act.
Transitional provisions have been made under Section 6-D of the Act.
The old Section 7 stands substituted by the present Section 7 which
under Clause (b) lays down that no person accused of an offence
punishable for a term of five years or more shall be bailed out unless the
public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application
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and even then bail can only be granted to the accused if the court records
its twin fold satisfaction  that the accused does not appear to be guilty and
is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Both these findings are
very difficult to be arrived at the preliminary stage of bail, in absence of
requisite material on record as that time.  "Jail and no bail," therefore,
seams to be the general lot of the persons, hence-forth accused of
offences under the N.D.P.S. Act.
Section 1 of the Amending Act inserts a new Clause to wit "or any
officer of a gazette rank empowered under Section 42" to the language of
Section 48 so as to enlarge the list of public functionaries as enumerated in
that section to order attachment of crop of opium poppy etc. which has
been illegally cultivated.
Section 14 of the amending Act insects as entirely new Section 52-A
to lay down a detailed procedure for disposal of seized drugs and
psychotropic substance.
Statements of dead persons, or persons who cannot be found or are
incapable of giving statements or are being kept out of the way by the
adverse party or whose presence cannot be obtained without an amount of
delay or expense have been made relevant under the newly added Section
5-A (Section 15 of the Amending Act).
Section 16 of the amending Act No.2 of 1989 inserts sub-section (2)
to Section 59, prescribing a 10-12 years punishment and 1 lakh fine to an
officer who aids or commits at the contravention of any provisions of the
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Act or in the matter of custody of an addict or person accused of an offence
under the Act.
Section 65 has been omitted by Section 18 1of1 1the1 Amending At
and by the following Section 19 of the said Act a new Chapter has been
added dealing with forfeiture of property derived from illicit trade in
Narcotics etc. (Sections 68-A to 68-Y ).
Under newly added Section 74-A, the Central Government has been
authorized to issue directions to State Government.
Clause (d) has been added to Section 76(2) authorizing framing of
Rules for property forfeited under Section 68-G.
These amendments in the NDPS Act may superficially be found
draconian but we must be alive to the fact that there is a great need to
stem the tide of drugs pouring in to the country, which by sheet
geographical circumstances finds itself sandwiched between the
International drugs trades classical routes, the "golden triangle" and the
"golden crescent."  The former has caused big headaches in the past
during the heyday of Gen. Zia Ul Haq's rule in neighbouring  Pakistan, but
the futur4e is equally bleak due to a record poppy production in Burma in
1989.
While the Government has added teeth to the law under these
amendments, it has left  the Narcotic Control Bureau (NCB) which was
setup in the wake of NDPS Act severally constrained for want of trained
hands. The NCB is mostly manned by former revenue intelligence officers
who have proved to be dedicated workers and thanks to their  vigilance,
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the amount of heroin smuggled into India as reduced from 5% to 7% in
1987.
But in 1989 similar encouraging results cannot predicted for the
reason that NCB is hopelessly under manned despite the growing
menance in the north and the east, and an area not earlier considered a
problem like Delhi or Bombay.  There are only 10 Officers looking after 11
States. The NBC has only a total of 106 Officers in its centres all over the
country and proposals for opening a demand regional office in the eastern
region in view of burgeoning traffic from Burma and for the establishment of
an Indo-Burma Customs Preventive Collectorate.
These amendments reflect the fears of a society outraged by
degradation of its moral value, by displaying inelasticity, as a sign of
widespread commitment to battling the drug  underworld, despite terrifying
risks.
The druglords compaign intimidation and violence, killing people and
declaring war if the NCB attempt to bring about a crack-down on the
narcotics trade.
The amended NDPS Act is like a new  emergency measure
whereby the drug traffickers are now not allowed to prosper out of their
illicit earnings and financial empires that they have built.  The gravity of the
problem is intense and acute for these druglords are not only rolling in their
ill-gotten and ill-earned wealth but are even playing havoc with the lives of
millions of innocent people, so much so that drug sponsored violence now
even threatens to jeopardize country's electoral process.
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Let us make no mistake about it.  We are at war.  We are battling on
several fronts, with an enemy that is sub-verting individuals young and old,
holding entire communities to ransom, holding the forces of law and order,
sending the crime graph shooting through the roof and ultimately
threatening the very health and existence of the nation.  The enemy goes
under the pervious name of cocaine.  It has also several psyudynos like
speed, angle, dust, crack and smack. But it is as deadly under any of these
names and meanance has been spreading, partly because the efforts to
cocaine it have  been localized and sporadic; and the "soldiers" of the drug
barons are invariably better armed and bettor equipped than the local
police force.
Obviously a stupendous effort was called for  a coordinated battle
plan amongst the Central and State Governments, schools, homes and
individuals to catch the illicit and illegitimate Narcotics trade in its own
game and activities the hands of the drug-hydra.  The Act and its amended
version is an infrastructure to facilitate such a multipronged attack on the
drugs Mafiosi.
It is a firigatening scenario. 'Crack' a derivative of cocaine is
extremely addictive,  much more than regular cocaine. An crack threatens
to have a grater mind altering properties, including a proneness to violence
in the user in ways not et fully understood.  The consequences have been
predictable, more shoot-outs among drugs purchasers, more robberies and
killings by addicts, with innocent bystanders falling victim to the wild
fusillade of bullets.
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Smugglers use injurious and constantly changing methods to do
their work.  Drugs have been sent in shipments of fruits and vegetables, in
the hollowed out legs of furniture and the sides of packing cases.  It is
impossible to catch it all.
Efforts at eradication have continued since 1985.  In 1989 they have
been augmented.  The 1989 amendment is innovative and, as it is, there is
a decision to go after the drug trafficking in a big way to hit the demand and
supply sides of the problem and according to this new dispensation, no one
caught using or even possessing drugs will get off without severe
punishment.
It would have been better if driving licenses of drug users were
cancelled, in addition to confiscation of their vehicles for the simple reason
that drug addicts are not safe drivers and vehicle that has been used in
transportation of drugs, however small in quantity is a potential as well as
practical threat to nation's well being.
The Act at once though-minded on drug barons and tender-minded
on the addicts who can be reclaimed to the society, and to whom the
helping hand of law can be extended for their future betterment.  The
researcher suggests that we need resolute  action on all fronts and the
need to see the not so visible inner connection amongst tougher laws,
better treatment better education and the like of the addicts cannot be over
emphasized. These new plans will undoubtedly cost more money but the
specter of drugs is costing the country a whole to lot more.
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In U.S. and Columbia more than 220 Judges have been
assassinated for daring to stand against the drug cartels.  This raises a
question of their future security in this country as well.
The provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act dealing with forfeiture and
confiscation of the assets of drug barons, including their lavish homes,
p lanes, boats and vast armourises are laudatory as without this ill-gotten
wealth they will cease to command the loyalties of their cronies and
infiltrate the Government and Governmental agencies.  The author feels
that despite these powers, it would not be easy to liquidate these well-
founded and well entrenched druglord as they are formidable enemies of
the country and in many ways, they make "the Mafia" look like
kindergarten, to quote a U.S. General.  For too many people owe
allegiance to the drug cartels who can afford to be generous to those who
support them.  The cartels maintain schools and hospitals in an attempt to
get to people to their own side and also to simultaneously launder their
wealth.
Invoking the provisions of Chapter V-A, the Indian authorities will
perhaps able to hit the drug cartels where it hurts most i.e. in their pocket
and let us hope that they will mauage to seize the millions of laundered and
unlaundered drug money from various sources.  But even with such a
multifaceted attack, grievously injuring the drug trade will be a long fight,
but the battle has to be fought and won.  The country cannot afford to be
runners-up in this war.  In this task honest and qualified experts will be the
were heroes.
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Prevention of Food Adulteration Act :
Adulteration of food is a grave menace to the public health. It is a
great social evil playing with the life and health of the people. It is so
rampant all over the world, especially in India, that pure foodstuffs are
hardly available except in the forms of fruits, vegetables or cereals. Looking
to the rising trends in this anti-social activity, various state law were passed
with a view to ensure purity in the articles of food but since they lacked
uniformity, the subject matter was ultimately taken up by the Central
Government  and in the year 1954, the Central Act known as 'Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act,1954'  was passed which repealed the State Acts
and extended  its operation to whole of India.
The Act is a piece of consumer legislation.  It regulates to some
extent the consumer supplier relations. Consumerists demand enforcement
of discipline among the procedures and manufacturers of food to ensure
safety in the realm of food. The consumers', legitimate ignorance and his
almost total dependence on the fairness and competence of those who
supply his daily needs, have made him a ready target for exploitation. The
Act is intended to protect him against outright frauds.
The Act does not   make a distinction between cases coming under
it on the basis of the  degree of adulteration.
It does not provide for aggravation of offence based on the extent of
contamination.  The offence and the punishment are the same whether the
adulteration is great or small.  Food pollution even if it be to the slightest
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extent, if continued in practice, would adversely affect the Health of every
man, woman and child in the country.
Hence even marginal or border line variations of the prescribed
standards are matters of serious concern for all, as public interests are
involved in them.
The standard fixed under the Act is one that is certain.  If it is varied
to any extent, the certainty of a general standard would be placed  by the
vagaries of a fluctuating standard.  The disadvantages of the resulting
unpredictability, uncertainty and impossibility of arriving at fair and
consistent decisions are great.
The Act does not provide for exemption of marginal and borderline
variations of the standard from the operation of the Act.  In such
circumstances, to condone such variations on the ground that they are
negligible is virtually to alter the standard itself, fixed under the Act.
The standards of the qualities of the articles have been fixed by   the
Government under  the provisions of the Act after due deliberations and
after consulting a committee of competent men. It is for them to give due
allowance for probable efforts before fixing a standard.  They may have
done it also. There is no reason to assume otherwise.
Therefore the conclusion is that, for an article, of food, when a
standard has been fixed under the Act, it has to  be observed in every
detail.10
10 State of Kerala v. Vasudevan (1975) FAC S. at p.5.
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Under  the aforesaid Act, the word "Adulterated" has been given a special
meaning  (see Section 2) and its manufacture for sale,. Storing, selling or
distributing has been prohibited, (see Section7).Under Section8,the
provision for   appointment of Public Analysts has been made and under
Section 4, the Central Food Laboratories are to be established for analysis
of food.  Besides this, Food Inspectors are also appointed to take samples
of food stuffs and prosecute offenders after getting the samples analysed
by the Public Analysts if they are found to be adulterated.  Further, Rules
under the Act have also been framed and their violation has also been
made penal.  In Appendix B, Standards of quality for various food items
have been laid own an the foodstuffs sold, store, or manufactured have to
conform to these prescribed standards.
In modern times, the cases under the Food Adulteration Act are
numerous and invariably the Public Analysts are asked to give their
opinions on the question of presence of adulterants or prohibited articles in
the sample. They maintain a laboratory and analyse the sample in a
scientific way and submit their reports which are admissible in evidence
without proof (vide Section (5) ).  For our purposes, we shall confine
ourselves only to the matter of 'analysis of samples' and identification of
extraneous matters present in the sample constituting adulteration.
Public Analysts' qualifications are given by Rule-6.
'Adulterant' and 'Adulterate' defined " :
Section 2, of P.F. Act defines the two expressions as under. It says :
2.  Definitions : In this Act unless the context otherwise requires :
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(i)    "adulterant" means any material which is or could be employed for
the purposes of adulteration;
 The definition of 'Adulterant' was inserted by the Amended Act No.
4 of 976.  The definition is very wide to include any material which
is or could be employed for the purpose of adulteration.  Thus
whether a stuff is an adulterant or not would depend upon the
human food with reference to which adulteration is being tested.
(ia) "adulterated" – an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated
–
(a) If the article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance
or quality demanded by the purchaser and is to his prejudice,
or is not of the nature, substance or quality which it purports
or is represented to be ;
(b) If the article contains any other substance which affects, or if
the article is so processed as to affect injuriously the nature,
substance or quality thereof;
(c) If any inferior or cheaper sub-stance has been substituted
wholly or in part for the article so as to affect injuriously the
nature, substance or quality thereof;
(d) If any constituent of the article has been wholly or in part
abstracted so as to affect injuriously the nature, substance or
quality thereof;
(e) If the article had been prepared, packed or kept under
insanitary conditions whereby it has become contaminated or
injurious to health;
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(f) If the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putried,
(***) rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable
substance or is insect-infested or is otherwise unfit for human
consumption;
(g) If the article is obtained from diseased animal ;
(h) If the article contains any poisonous or other ingredient which
renderers it injurious to health;
(i) If the container of the article is composed whether wholly or in
part, of any poisonous or deleterious substance which
renders its contents injurious to health;
(j) If any colouring matter other than that prescribed in respect
thereof is present in the article, or if the amounts of the
prescribed colouring matter which is present in the article are
not within the prescribed limits of variability;
(k) If the article contains any prohibited preservative or permitted
preservative in excess of the prescribed  limits;
(l) It the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed
standard or its constituents are present in quantities not
within the prescribed limits of variability, which renders it
injurious to health,
(m) If the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed
standard or its constitutions are present in quantities not
within the prescribed limits of variability but which does not
render it injurious to health;
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Provided that, where the quality or purity of the article, being
primary food, had fallen below the prescribed standards or its
constituents  are present in quantities not within the prescribed
limits of variability, in either case, solely due to natural causes and
beyond the control of human agency, them such article shall not
be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this sub-
clause.
Explanation : Were two or more articles of primary food are mixed
together and the resultant article of food :
(a) Is stored, sold or distributed under a name which denotes the
ingredients thereof; and
(b) Is not injurious to health.
Then, such resultant article shall not be deemed to be adulterated
within the meaning of this clause.
It would be clear from the definition of the word 'Adulterated'11 that it
applies only to articles for human consumption as food and, it is  the duty of
the prosecution of prove that the article which is subject matter of an
offence is ordinary used for human consumption as food.  The different
clauses of sub-section (ia) of Section 2 are not mutually exclusive, and they
overlap each other. It is possible that an article of food may be found in two
or more clauses of sub-section (1) like the foreign substance which affects
injuriously the quality of food and at the same time renders it unfit for
human consumption, thereby attracting clauses (b) and (f) both together.
11 State of Kerala v. Parmeshwaram Pillai Viar,1975 Cr LJ 97.
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Then there may be a case where the colouring may also affect injuriously
the quality of the food and in such cases causes (b) and (f) would both be
attracted to the offence.
The Act makes no distinction on the bails of the degree of
adulteration and the maxim De minimis non charat tax. (The law does not
concern itself with trivialites) does not apply even marginal cases of
adulteration are matters of adulteration are matters of serious concern.
Public Analyst and analysis of food :
Public analysts are appointed by the Central or the State
Governments under Section 8 of the P.F. Act. For carrying out analysis of
food samples and their qualifications are prescribed under Rule 6.
Section 8, P.F. Act says :
"8 Public Analysts : The Central Government or the State
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint such
persons as it thinks fit. Having the prescribed qualifications to be public
analysts for such local areas as may be assigned to them by the Central
Government or the State Government, as the case may be :
Provided that no persons who has any financial interest in the
manufacture, import or sale of any article of food shall be appointed to be a
public analyst under this section :
Provided further that different public analysts may be appointed for
different articles of food."
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Rule 6, P.F. Rules provides :
"6 Qualifications of Public Analyst.  A person shall not be qualified
for appointment as a public analyst, unless he –
i) Is a graduate in science, with chemistry as one of the
subjects from University established in India by the law or has
equivalent qualifications recognized by the Central
Government in this behalf and has not less than seven years
experience in the analysis of food in any of the laboratories
recognized and notified by Government of India and included
in the list issued by that Government for such purposes ; or
ii) Is an M.Sc. in Chemistry or Biochemistry of agricultural
Chemistry or Food Technology or Foods and Drugs from a
University established in India by law or possesses
qualifications of Associate ship of the Institution of Chemists
(India) by examination in the  Section of analysis of food
conducted by the Institution of Chemists (India) or has
equivalent qualifications recognized by the Central
Government in this behalf, and has not less than  three years'
experience in the analysis of food in any of the laboratories
referred to in clause (i); or
iii) Is a graduate in medicine from a University established in
India by law or ha equivalent qualifications recognized by the
Central Government in this behalf, with post-graduate
qualification in Public Health or Biochemistry and has not less
than three year's experience in the analysis of food in any of
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the laboratories referred to in clause (i); or
iv) Is a Fellow of the Royal Institute of Chemistry of Great Britain
(Branch E) with at least one year's  experience of food
analysis in India :
Provided that a person who is a public analyst on the date of
commencement of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment)
Rules, 1968 may continue to hold office as such, subject to the term and
conditions of service applicable to him, even though he does not fulfill the
qualifications laid down in clause (i) to (iv).
Public analysts analyze the samples by scientific methods applying
various tests of chemical analysis.  After analysis of the sample they are in
a position to give their opinions on the following matters amongst others :
(a)  Presence of unpermitted colours,
(b) Presence of saccharine,
(c) Presence of insects,
(d) Percentage of fat contents,
(e) Percentage of non-fatty solids,
(f) Percentage of dirt and extraneous matters.
(g) Proportion of admixtures of other foods,
(h) Presence of inorganic colouring matters and pigments,
(i)    Presence of unpermitted antioxidants,
(j)    Presence of unpermitted emulsifying agents,
(k)    Presence of coumarin and dehydro coumarin,
(l) Presence of other impurities and deficiencies as compared to
prescribed standards.
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The report is only evidence of the opinion of the Public Analyst. The
general principle of law is that the opinion of an expert is not of much value
if it is unsupported by data.12  So it must contain the data to enable the
court to come to its own conclusion.
Public Analyst is a person appointed under Section 8 and a person
is not so appointed is not a public Analyst.  The duties of Public analyst are
given in Rule 7 framed under the Act.  The report of the Public Analyst
must be in a prescribed form or otherwise it would not be admissible as
evidence.13 The report should state the data and time of examination and
the report should not be unnecessarily delayed.14 The report cannot be
termed as under reliable merely on the grounds of delay so long as the
sample continues in the same condition and analysis can be ade.15
The report should give sufficient data to enable the court to come to
its own conclusion. It is not necessary to mention in the report the
methodology and technological process adopted by the Analyst.16 The
report must confirm to the statutory requirements.
CENTRAL FOOD LABORATORY AND ITS DIRECTOR :
These are established under Section-4 of P.F. Act by the Central
Government and its head is called the Director. Its functions are laid down
under Rule-3.
12 AIR 1959 SC 488; 1997  Cr LJ  2028.
13 Mangilal v. State, 1975 Cr LJ 614
14. Manka Hari v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 Guj. 88.
15 Sambhu Dayal v. State of U.P. 1979 SCC (Cr.) 246  AIR  1979 SC 310.
16 State of v. Trilok Chand 1979 (Cr.) FAC 44.
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Section 4, P.F. Act provides as under :
4.  Central Food laboratory : (1) The Central Government shall, by
notification in the Official Gazette, establish one or more Central Food
Laboratory or Laboratories to carry out the functions entrusted  to  the
Central.
Food Laboratory by this Act or any rules made under this Act :
 Provided that the Central Government may, by notification in the
official Gazette, also specify any laboratory or institute as a Central Food
Laboratory for the purposes of this Act.
 The Central Government may, after consultation with the
Committee, make rules prescribing –
(a) The functions of a Central Food Laboratory and the local area or
areas within which such functions may be carried out;
(b) The procedure for submission to the said Laboratory of samples
of articles of food for analysis or tests, the forms of the
Laboratory's reports thereon and the fees payable in respect of
such reports.
(c) Such other matters as may be necessary or expedient to enable
the said Laboratory to carry out its functions.
Rule-3, P.F. Rules, 1955 lays down as under :
3. Functions : 1.  In addition to the functions entrusted to the
Laboratory by the Act, the Laboratory shall carry out the following
functions, namely –
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(a) analysis of samples of food sent by any officer or authority
authorized by the Central Government for the purpose and
submission of the certificate of analysis to the authorities
concerned;
(b) investigations for the purpose of fixation of standard of any
article of food;
(c) Investigation, in collaboration with the laboratories of  Public
Analysis in the various States and such other laboratories
and institutions which the Central Government may approve
in this behalf for the purpose of standardizing methods of
analysis.
(3) The Laboratory specified in column (1) of the Table below shall carry
out the functions entrusted to it by the Act or these rules in respects
of the local areas specified in the corresponding entry in column (20
thereof.
TABLE
Name of the Central Food
Laboratory
Local Area
(1) (2)
i) The Central Food Laboratory,
Mysore- 570013
The States of Andhra Pradesh,
Karnaktaka, Kerala, Maharashtra and
Tamil Nadu and the Union Territories of
Labohdweep and Pondicherry.
ii) The Central Food Laboratory,
Pune-411001.
The States of Gujarat and Madhya
Pradesh and the Union
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iii) The Central Food Laboratory,
Ghaziabad-201001
The States of Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab,
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh and Union
Territories of Chandigarh and Delhi.
iv) The Central Food Laboratory,
Calcutta-700016.
The States of Assam, Bihar, Manipur,
Tripura, Nagaland, Orissa, Tripura and
West Bengal and the Union Territories
of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,
Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PUBLIC ANALYSTS' REPORT AND CERTIFICATE
OF THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL FOOD LABORATORY :
With regard to this, Section 13 (3) and 13(5) P.F. Act lay down as
under :
"(3)  The certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food
Laboratory under sub-section (2-B) shall supersede the report given
by the public analyst under sub-section (1).
(5)  Any documents purporting to be a report signed by a
public analyst, unless it has been superseded under sub section (3),
or any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director
of the Central Food Laboratory, may be used as evidence of the
facts stated therein in any proceeding under this Act or under
Section 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) :
Provided that any document purporting to be a certificate
signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory (not being a
certificate with respect to the analysis of the part of the sample of
any article  of food referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1-A) of
Section 16) shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated
therein.
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Explaination : In this section and in clause (f) of sub-section
(1) of Section  16, "Director of the Central Food Laboratory" shall
include the officer for the time being in charge of any Food
Laboratory (by whatever designation he is known) recognized by the
Central Government for the purposes of this section."
Evidentiary value of the reports and Certificates :
 Public Analysis' reports are admissible in evidence without
proof and so are the certificates of the Director, Central Food
Laboratory. They need not enter the witness box. But the court can
summon them and examine if it think fit in the interests of justice.
Once the Director's certificate is there, the public analysist' report
stands superseded (vide Section-13(3) P.F. Act).It is final and conclusive
evidence of the fact stated therein (vide Proviso to Section-13(5) P.F. Act).
In case of any discrepancy between the Analyst's report and the
Director's certificate,  the former stands superseded.17
The certificate is conclusive and final only as to the facts stated
therein and not of the opinion expressed therein, the court is not bound to
accept the opinion in suitable circumstances.18
It is the certificate and not the copy of the certificate which is
conclusive and final.  However, a duplicate certificate, signed by the
Director can serve the purpose.19
17  1980  Cr LJ  24.
18  Hari Ram v. State 1977 Cr LJ 383
19  1967  Cr LJ 1372.
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1.  Where the Government must appoint Public Analyst by name
: A person appointed as a chemist by the order of the State Government
can be appointed as Public Analyst. It is not correct to say that an officer
holding charge of medical officer can only be the competent person to be
appointed as Public Analyst.
The word "person" does not necessarily mean that the person
should be described by name. It is open to the State Government to
appoint a person holding a particular office as a public analyst, but at the
same time it can do so, provided the other requirements of Sec. 8 of the
Act are satisfied, because Sec. 8 requires that the State Government can
appoint a person possessing such qualifications as may be prescribed to
be a Public Analyst. If the State Government appoints a person holding a
particular office as Public Analyst, it can do so only if it is satisfied that a
person who holds that office is bound to possess the necessary
qualification for appointment as Public Analyst.
2. Duty of Public Analyst :  Rule 7 of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Rules, 1955 requires the public Analyst or an officer appointed
by him to compare the seals or container or outer cover with specimen
impression received separately and to note the conditions on the seals
thereon.  In Jammu Municipality v. Faquir Hussain it was held :
"the report of the Public Analyst without an express
mention that he had compared the seals would be
sufficient, though as already remarked courts would
wish that the for which is form No.1 made under the
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Act contained some such insertion.  Therefore rule 6
has not been  violated at all.
The Public Analyst is required to give his opinion in respect of
all the standards laid down by the Legislature.  That is his imperative duty.
He cannot leave out any test in his discretion, but it cannot be said that the
report
cannot be used as evidence under Sec.13(5) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act without examining the Public Analyst. Whether his opinion
can be accepted or not on account of the omission to carry out any
particular test is a different matter and would depend on the facts of each
particular case.
 There is not doubt that the prosecution must eliminate any doubt as
to the identity of the bottle the contents of which were analysed it is
desirable that the Public Analyst in food adulteration cases should
wherever feasible return the container with his report to enable its being
identified before the Court so as to eliminate any doubt that may arise
relating to mixing up of containers at his end a wrong sample being
reported on.
 It is not enough to give a few mechanical data. It is more pertinent to
help the Court with something more of the process by which the conclusion
has been arrived at.
 Where the Public Analyst to whom milk bottle is sent for
examination does not give actual percentage of water but simply opines
that it is adulterated with 10 per cent, added water the report is defective
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and indeed cannot be considered as good evidence to prove that the milk
is adulterated.
 In Municipal Board Kanpur v. Badloo, the certificate of the Public
Analyst was not given any weight.
3.  Presumption of the report of the Public Analyst under
Rule 7(1) Presumption whether rebuttable – It is a settled law that report
of the Public Analyst is, without any other proof, admissible in evidence
and the presumption of Illus. (e) to Sec.114, Evidence Act, would apply to
such case. It is, however, a rebuttable presumption.
4. Public Analyst Report – What it should contain – The
report of the Public Analyst need not contain the mode or particulars of
analysis nor the test applied but should contain the result of analysis,
namely, data from which it can be inferred whether the article of food was
not adulterated.  Where the report of the Public Analyst has not stated that
the sample examined by him was unfit for human consumption, though he
has referred to the presence of certain rubbish material and larva of insect
present in the atta, there is no evidence that the atta was unfit for human
consumption and it could not be said that it was an adulterated article of
food.
Unless there is evidence to prove compliance of the rules, the
Public Analyst's report cannot be admitted and acted upon. The Supreme
Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kacheru Mal held that although
the report of the Public Analyst is per se evidence by virtue of Sec. 13 of
the prevention of Food adulteration Act, but this does not mean the ipse
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dixit would be conclusive and binding on the Court.  To treat so would be to
leave the determination of the guilt of the accused to the whims and
fancies of the Public Analyst.
In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Sat Pal Kapoor, it was held that
it was not necessary, every case, for the Public Analyst to the exact
quantity of foreign substance present in the sample sent him.  When the
foreign substance happens to be one of the presence of which is
absolutely prohibited in that particular article of food, it would be
unnecessary to state the quantity.  So in the case of Suji what is permitted
is rodent hair and exreta not exceeding 5 pieces per kg. and no insects are
permitted. That in fact is the tolerance limit prescribed and since the rule
clearly makes Suji containing insects adulterated food no further obligation
is cast upon the public analyst to say that it was adulterated and unit for
human consumption due to the insect infestation.  The more fact that the
public analyst has not specifically said so does not make any difference.
In State v. Nathi Lal, it was pointed out that the certificate of the
Chemical Analyst should contain the factual data which the analysis should
reveal and not merely the opinion of the Public Analyst as to what that data
indicates about the nature of the article of food, and that  if the certificate
merely gives the final opinion of the Public Analyst and if such an opinion
be held to be conclusive evidence about the nature of the article of food,
the merit of the case against the accused is really decided by the Public
Analyst not by the Court and the court just gives its authority to the
conclusion of the Public Analyst and  this cannot be the position in law.
Where the report of the public Analyst is not complete report in that out of
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the seven tests that he had to make under A.17 of Appendix B to the Rules
he had only made three tests and secondly, the report does not give the
basis on which the Public Analyst came to the conclusion that the sample
of the mustard oil was adulterated, it was held that omission to report on
the other four tests does not make the report ineffective or the report
inconclusive.  It was further held that even assuming that the other four
tests are normal if the specification test alone did not confirm to the
standards indicated in A.17.06 of Appendix-B to Rules, the sample cannot
be said to have came upto the standard and, therefore, it is adultered.
5.  Admissibility of the report and necessity of examination of the
Public Analyst :
Report of the Public Analyst is admissible in evidence as provided
under Sub-section (5) of Sec. 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
only in proof of  the result of analysis of the article of food submitted for
analysis.  Though the report of the Public Analyst is admissible in evidence
without his being examined in the case the Court can, if considered
necessary, examine the Analyst, on commission or otherwise, to satisfy
itself that a proper test was applied and the opinion expressed is one which
can be accepted. Where it is found that standard books on Chemistry do
not lay down any reliable test for qualitative or quantitative analysts,for
determination of the existence or the percentage of constituents, it shall be
desirable for the Public Analyst to  indicate in his report the test he had
applied, otherwise the Court may consider necessary, sub note or on the
application of the accused, to summon the Public Analyst to make a
statement on oath with regard to the test applied and the result of analysis.
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This is a rule of propriety, necessary for expeditions disposal of cases
without dislocating the day-to-day work of the Public Analyst; but it cannot
override the clear and unambiguous provision of the Act.  The Analyst
Report shows that the sample contained foreign resin and when a finding
is based on a particular test and there is no evidence to show that this is
the only test prescribed under the Rules having regard to the peculiar facts
and circumstances of a case with reference to the concerned article if the
accused did not have the opportunity of cross-examining the Analyst with
reference to the various tests prescribed under the Act and the finality of
the test, the evidence of the report is not sufficient for acting upon the
finding and in a case of this kind, it would have been better, though not
obligatory on the part of the prosecution, to examine the Analyst.
When the Food Inspector is unable to alighten the Court on certain
material points the defense is perfectly justified in making a request to the
Court to better summon the Public Analyst, to submit himself to
examination.
It is always open to accused to insist upon the examination in the
witness box of some officer actually responsible for making the chemical
analysis and to cross-examine him on that point. When the prosecution
has established its case prima facie there is no duty cast upon the
prosecution to anticipate some line of defense and to exclude  it by further
expert testimony.  It is no where said that the accused's right to insist upon
the Public Analyst being summoned and examined as a witness is to be
exercised only after the accused has led evidence in his own defense
challenging the correctness of the Public Analyst's certificate.  It is open to
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the accused at the commencement of the trial, as soon as he is accused of
the offence, to require the Court to summon the Public Analyst as a
witness. If the accused deposits the requisite amount in court, he is entitled
as of right to have the Public Analyst called as a witness.
The Magistrate himself has ample powers if considered necessary
to summon the Public Analyst for the purpose of examining him about the
fact of his having kept the sample in refrigerator.
Of course there is a provision for calling the Chemical Analyser for
cross-examination under Sec. 510(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Even sub-section (2) of the said section provides that the Court may, if it
thinks fit, summon and examine any such person as to the subject matter
of his report. This sub-section does not make it obligatory on the Court to
examine such persons as to the subject-matter of their report. In the
English case of Bayley v. Cook, it was held that the certificate was
sufficient for convicting the accused.
There are certain mandatory provision, the non-observance of
which will automatically create a presumption of prejudice having been
caused. In other cases non-observance, delayed observance of absence
of strict observance will be fatal only if it is shown that prejudice has
resulted to the accused.  The question of prejudice is beyond imagination.
When rule 17(b) has not been compiled with. A prosecution can not fail
merely on the ground that the quantity sent to the Public Analyst is less
that what is prescribed, provided the quantity which is actually sent is
sufficient for purposes of analysis.  As held in Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union
of Indian, a report of the Public Analysis in the discharge of his public and
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statutory functions. It is a duty imposed upon him to see if From VII,
sample and the facsimile of the meal sent to him are in accordance with
the provisions of rule 18. This certificate is on the proforma prescribed by
the Rules in Form III under rule 7(3).  Whatever he found and noticed as
correctly done in entered in report. If there is any violation of any provisions
of rule 18, he can record it in his certificate.  If he has not received the
specimen of the seal at all or has not received it in the same packet
containing the sample and not separately or has received it after delay,
then such information, according to the situation, should be mentioned in
the report.  All acts done by the Public Analyst in discharge of the duties
imposed upon him by the Rules, when done regularly, have to be
presumed to have been done correctly.
In State of Kerala v. A.N. Ramkrishnan Nair, Kerala High Court had
to consider the effect of absence of evidence to prove that  a  sample  seal
was forwarded to the analyst for comparison as enjoined by rule 7 and
absence of evidence regarding  actual comparison.  Anna Chandy, J.,
overruling the contention that absence of specific evidence is fatal to the
prosecution case, stated that under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act, the
Court may presume that official acts have been regularly performed, that
when the Food Inspector was in the box, it was not suggested to him that
he did not forward the specimen seal as enjoined in rule 7, that the report
of the analyst that the seals were found intact, leads to a presumption that
he could not certify to that effect without making himself sure that there
was no tampering of any sort with the seal.  In Food Inspector, Cannanore
Municipality v. P. Kannan.
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 Anna Chandy, J., once again overruled a similar contention and
commented on the Buthukumaran v. State of Kerala.  The argument  was
that there was no evidence to the effect that the sample was sent to the
public Analyst along with the prescribed memorandum and specimen
impression of the sea, besides the contents of the report of the Public
Analyst. It was held that not with standing the lack of oral evidence the
statement of the Public Analyst in the report in Form No.III would be
sufficient.  This very case camp up for consideration before the Supreme
Court in K.K. Pockkunju v. Ramkrishna Pillai, and the Supreme Court after
referring to the fact that the High Court drew a presumption that the official
concerned acted in accordance with the rule, observed that there was no
error in the decision of the High Court.
 The matter has been dealt with by a Full Bench of the Madhy
Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chhotekhan
Nannekhan.
 It was held that it is a rebuttable presumption.  That being so, such a
report is not inadmissible only because it has not been specifically
established by evidence aliunde that the requirements of rules 7 and 18 of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 were duly complied with.
So where reading of the Public Analyst's report would show that he had
recovered the sample properly sealed and fastened, with seal intact and
unbroken, that he had received the specimen impression of the seal
separately etc.  if it has not been shown as o how prejudice has been
caused to the accused by the prosecution not producing or proving the
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office copy of the memorandum under which the sample was sent to the
Analyst, prosecution must not fail.
 In Gopaldas Baheti v. State of Assam, the receipt given by the
Health Officer stated that the sample was put in a sealed sack and no
reference was made to the sealed sack being put in a container as
required by the Rules.  Since there was nothing to show that this sealed
sack was  not put in a container as required by the rules the Supreme
Court overruled these objections. It is for the accused to raise the
necessary challenge in the course of evidence.  The report of the Public
Analyst which is admissible in evidence without examination of the Public
Analyst would normally show that the relevant  rules have been compiled
with and that analysis had been done only  after the necessary verification
of the container in accordance with the rules. Of course, it is open to one or
the other party to examine the Public Analyst to clarify any matter and to
challenge any aspect.  In the absence of any inhibiting factor it is open to
the Court to presume that the official act has been regularly performed,
where it is shown that the official act has been performed.  It is also open
to the accused to show that he has suffered prejudice on account of the
action or inaction of the Food Inspector, in which case, the Court is free to
draw necessary inferences.  The provisions contained in rule 7 of the
Rules  being mandatory in nature, as laid down by the Karnataka High
Court in the case of Belgaum Borough Municipality v. Shridhar Shankar
Kundri any non-compliance of the Rules affects the evidentiary value of the
report of the Public Analyst. In the absence of proof regarding the
compliance of the provisions of rule 7, it is not safe and proper to find the
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accused  guilty of the Charges merely on the basis of the report of the
Public Analyst.  Courts are also inclined to raise any presumption of the
compliance of rule 7(1) of the Rules, because although the Food Inspector
has started that he sent copy of memorandum with sample seal separately
by registered post and he has also produced the acknowledgement to that
effect, but whether specimen seals produced in the case is the copy f the
Memorandum sent to the public Analyst is not free from doubt since there
is neither any endorsement on it as having been received in the office of
the Public Analyst nor there is any indication that the same had been
received, so as to draw a presumption that the Public Analyst or any
pe5rson authorized by him had compared the sample seal as required
under the rules.
6.  Report not in the prescribed form –
Whether it is open for the prosecution to examine the Public
Analyst: It is clear that in a case where the report given by the Public
Analyst is not in the prescribed form the contents of the report can be
proved by examining the Public Analyst, it will be open for the prosecution
to decide in each case having regard to the contents of report as compared
with the prescribed form whether the Public Analyst should be examined or
not and where the report is not admissible in evidence, it is clear that there
is no other evidence in proof of the fact that the sample purchased was
adulterated the accused will be entitled to be acquitted.
7. The Court's power to decline to act on the strength of result
declared by the Analysts  on the reason that the report is bereft of other
particulars :  Neither Sec. 13 nor rule 7 nor Form II in terms, requires the
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Public Analyst to state the method adopted or the technical processes
involved in carrying out the analysis. If the Legislature had in mind that the
report of the Analysts could be accepted or acted upon only if further
particulars necessary for enabling the Court to check up the correctness of
the result declared in the report also were furnished  it would have been
specifically stated so in the Act or in the rules .It is not open to the Court  to
decline to act on the strength of the result declared by the Analyst on the
reason that report is bereft of other particulars.
8. Conviction based on Public Analyst report when not justified :
The date from which it can be inferred whether the article of food
was or  was  not  adulterated  must  be  explicit.  In  the  instant  case
there is the
In  gradients of  the sample mentioned in Ex. 15. As seen earlier
with that standard those ingredients came to be compared is not clear.
There is, therefore, no material in appreciating the opinion that the sample
was a mixture of two oils. What was the basic component and what was
the component mixed with it, cannot at all be gathered from the report as it
stands. Hence also the report is infirm and no conviction could be based
on it. In another case the accused had been consistently contending that
he has nothing to do with the provision shop and that he is the owner of the
adjoining ration shop and has obtained Licence for the same as could be
seen from the evidence of the Executive Officer of the Panchayat Mahazar
shows that both the witnesses signed the Mazazar  shows that both the
witnesses signed the mahazar in this case. Peon of the Food Inspector
also, was present, but he did not attest the mahazar. There is also
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evidence of Taluka Supply Officer, which would lend degree of
improbability to the prosecution case that the accused anything to do with
the provision shop. None of these circumstances was properly considered
by the Courts below. In the light of the evidence and the circumstances
emerging there from, it was held that there is reasonable doubt regarding
the sampling done by Food Inspector, and the connection of the accused
with the sampling.
9.  Public Analyst not necessary to be summoned :It is not
incumbent upon the prosecution to summon the Public Analyst as a
witness to substantiate the contents of the report. It is not possible to
understand that in no case the Public Analyst be summoned and examined
as a witness.  In an appropriate case where justice demands that his
evidence is necessary to unfold certain facts in relation to his report he
may be summoned as per the procedure contemplated under the
procedural code, be as prosecution or defense or even as a Court witness.
10.  Report of Public Analyst substantive evidence – Accused to
call him if necessary :
In Food Inspector v.v.v. Gangadharan, the Karnataka High Court
held that the certificate of public analyst is a substantive evidence in the
case as laid down by Sec. 13(5) of the Act. If the accused thought that the
recitals there in were not correct he could have requested the Court to
secure the public analyst for cross examination.
11.  Public Analyst report – whether it is necessary to specify the
period for which the sample will remain unaffected ? : It is unnecessary to
440
specify the period for which the sample will remain unaffected. Where
there is evidence of the Food Inspector that he added formalin as a
preservative and the report of the Public Analyst that no change had taken
place in the constituents of milk which would have interfered with the
analysis and the statement of the Analyst was not challenged it would not
be said that as the analysis was after 44 days therefore it was submitted
that the milk would not have been in a fit condition for analysis.  When a
Food Inspector speaks of addition of formalin to the sample taker, by him it
must be taken to be of formalin of the strength contemplated by rule 20, for
the very term "formalin" refers to 4- per cent aqueous solution of
formaldehyde.It was observed by Justice Koshal of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Joginder Singh v. State ,that where a person
speaks of formalin he must be deemed to refer to a liquid of that
specification and it is not further necessary for him to prove by evidence
that what was added was formalin as mentioned in rule 20.  Unless  the
qualifications of the Food Inspector challenged and unless it is not
acquitted with formalin the fact that he has not proved the chemical
contents of the formalin used by him cannot be taken as resulting in a
failure of the prosecution. Mere assertion on the strength of the table
pasted on the bottle may not by itself be sufficient to prove the addition of
formalin. But it is not necessary for the Food Inspector to lead independent
evidence that the formalin which he added had 40 percent strength. If he
speaks to the addition of formalin that would be evidence.
12. Check on the report of the Public Analyst : The intention  of
the legislature for obligating the Food Inspector to keep three separate
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samples of the article taken by him is to make a provision for check on the
report of the Public Analyst.  Clause 1 ( c ) (i) of Sec. 11 provides for only
delivering of  one of the parts to the person from whom the sample has
been taken, whereas in Cl. (1) ( c ) (iii) the purpose for retaining the third
part of the sample has been mentioned. If the accused makes a prayer for
sending the third sample for analysis by the Director of the Central Food
Laboratory under Sub-section (2) of Sec. 13, the prosecution cannot come
with a case that the sample with the accused may be sent. Similarly the
Court also should not in ordinary course of circumstances direct that it is
the sample of the accused which should be sent and not the one retained
by the prosecution. The sample to be given to the accused is solely for his
own protection, and is intended to enable him to have  it analysed privately
for purpose of producing evidence at the trial if necessary, to contradier the
report of the Public Analyst.  This does not however, mean that there is
anything wrong in the Court asking the accused to produce the sample
with him to be sent to the Central Food Laboratory. In case the accused
fails to produce his sample his sample and the third sample cannot be sent
for any reason or is not found worth analysis because of any leakage or
other wise, no adverse inference can be drawn against the accused for his
inability or reluctance to produce the sample given to him.  Where the copy
of the public Analyst's report is not proved to have been delivered to the
accused at any time after the institution of the prosecution so as to enable
him to get the sample further analysed by the Central Food Laboratory,
Calcutta, mere bald statement of the Food Inspector in this regard is hardly
sufficient. The accused, due to noncompliance of rule 9-A of the
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Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 and Sec.13(2) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954, is deprived of his available right
in the matter of his defense and this is sufficient to justify the acquittal of
the accused. The Food Inspector has not doubt sent the copy of   the
report of the Public Analyst to the accused on 26th  February, 1976 by
registered post but he had sent the report to the accused before filling of
the complaint in the Court against the accused. Admittedly the Food
Inspector had filed the complaint in the Court on 7th April, 1976, i.e. after
about (one and half) months of sending the copy of the report of the Public
Analyst to the accused.  The accused as such could not be informed by the
Food Inspector the court in which the accused as to make his application
for getting  his sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory within 10
days of the receipt of the report.  The provision contained in Sec. 13(2) of
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are mandatory and in view of the
its own compliance by the Food Inspector, the accused has been very
seriously prejudiced in his defense. Rule 9-A  requires the dispatch for the
copy of the Public Analyst's report and intimation immediately on the
prosecution being launched. A full Bench of Kerala High Court had
occasion to deal with this question in Food Inspector v.Prabhakaran. In
para 15 of the judgment Poti, Acting C.J. (as he then was ) speaking for he
Full Bench observed :
"It is only on the Local (Health) Authority getting intimation of
the launching of the prosecution that the Public Analyst's
report has to be sent.  The rule does not contemplate the
prior issue of the copy of the report and in fact is has been
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held by the Madras High Court that sending of copy of report
5 days  prior to the institution of the prosecution will not be in
compliance with rule 9-A.  The intimation by the Food
Inspector to the Local (Health) Authority of the fact of the
prosecution being launched cannot normally be expected to
be made on the same day. It is well known that on occasions
courts receive a number of complaint on the same day and
the Courts may be unable even to number them on that day.
It sometimes happens that complaints under Special
Enactments are prepared by the prosecuting agency and
filed in bulk on days convenient to them.  The officers of
Court faced with such a situation take some-time to go
through them and number them. In such cases it is likely that
the Food Inspector may intimate the Local (Health) Authority
of the institution not on the day the complaint is filed in Court.
There may be other circumstances where neither due to the
laches nor due to the default sometime is taken by the Local
(Health)  Authority to send the intimation under rule 9-A.
There is no logic or reason to cut down the elasticity of the
term 'immediately'  by the Court self-imposing any restriction
as to the period within which copy of the report is to be sent.
It will be, we are afraid, too unrealistic to think that such copy
of the report  must be sent on the same day the prosecution
is launched or the very next day….
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If  the object of providing that a copy of the report is to
be sent by the Local (Health( Authority immediately to the
vendor is to see that the trial was not protracted and there
is no undue delay in the vendor being told about the result
of the analysis so as to enable him to apply for an
analysis of the remaining samples a delay of a day or two
by itself may not be material. Therefore to say that the
Local (Health) Authority should issue a copy of the report
on the same day or at least next day would be
unwarranted.  We must also remember that the Local
(Health) Authority has various functions to perform and it
is the pressure of its work that must necessarily determine
the speed and promptness with which it acts.  That is not
to say that it can afford to be not prompt.  Whom the rule
requires it to act immediately it must do so. But if the
delay is such as it would not defeat the  purpose for which
the rule is made it could not be said that the action is not
'immediate.'
The following observations in para 18 are instructive :
"Prosecution against a person who has committed a
very serious offence under the Act ought not be fail
merely on account of some time, not unreasonable, taken
by the Local (Health) Authority to issue a copy of the
Public Analyst's Report, a delay which is not shown in any
way to cause injury or harm to the person prosecuted
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when there is no express provision providing for such
consequence.  Regard being had to the nature of the Act
and the Act and the nature of the punishment under the
Act any default or delay which would cause noticeable,
prejudice to an accused  should be frowned upon and the
prosecution must fail in that event. A different approach is
beset with carry will consequences as it may open the
door for corrupt practices and render the enactment,
which in its performance is already weak, weaker still."
 In the light of these principles, the Full Bench held in the case
before the Court that merely for the reason that there was a period of
eight days taken to send the copy of the report, prosecution cannot fail.
In this case, the Local (Health) Authority took three days to send the
copy of the Public Analyst's report to the accused. The accused has no
case that his delays has caused any prejudice to him.  In the facts and
circumstances of the case, there could be no such prejudice either.
Thus there has been no fatal failure to comply with Rule 9-A of the
Rules.  In Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal, the Supreme
Court while holding that rule 9(j) of the prevention of Food Adulteration
Rules is it was in force till it was replaced, observed as follows :
 There are no ready tests or invariable formula to
determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory.
The  board purpose of the statute is importance.  The
object of the particular provision must be considered.  The
link between the two is  most important. The weighing of
446
the consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory
or directory is vital and, more often than not,
determinative of the very question whether the provision
is mandatory or directory.  Where the design of the statute
is the avoidance or prevention of public mischief, but the
enforcement of a particular provision literally to its letter
will tend to defeat design, the provision must be held to be
directory, so that proof of prejudice in addition to non-
compliance of the provision is necessary  To invalidate
the act complained of. It is well to remember that quite
often many rules, though couched in language which
appears to be imperative, are no more than mere
instructions to those entrusted with the task of discharging
statutory duties for public benefit.  The negligence of
those to whom public duties are entrusted cannot, by
statutory interpretation, be allowed to promote public
mischief and cause public inconvenience and defeat the
main object of the statute. It is as well to realize that every
prescription of a period within which an act must be done,
is not the prescription of a period of limitation with painful
consequences if the act is not done within that period.
The period of 10 days was prescribed with a view to
expedition and with the object of giving sufficient time to
the person from whom the sample was taken to make
such arrangements as he might like to challenge the
447
report of the Public Analyst, for example, by making a
request to the Magistrate to send the other sample to the
Director of the Central Food Laboratory for analysis.
Where the effect of non compliance with the rule was
such as to wholly deprive the right of the person to
challenge the Public Analyst's report by obtaining the
report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory,
there might be just cause for complaint ,as prejudice
would then be writ large.  Where  no prejudice was
caused there could be no cause for complaint."
In State of Punjab v. Devinder Kumar, the  Supreme Court
observed (Para 3):
 "While construing such food laws Courts should keep
in view that the need for prevention of future injury is as
important as punishing a wrong doer after the injury is
actually inflicted. Merely because a person who has actually
suffered in his health after consuming adulterated food
would not be before Court in such cases, courts should not
be too eager to quash on slender grounds the prosecutions
for offences, alleged to have been committed under the Act."
The Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Food Inspector v.
Prabhakaran, observed while considering the meaning of the
expression on immediately' in rule 9-A of the Rules :
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"That would be to assign a rigit and flexible
meaning to the term 'immediately." Such an approach
would defeat the very purpose of the provision. It is no
doubt ture that the Act envisages absolute offences in the
sense that even without means real a person may fail
within the penal net of the Act.  But this is not the only
consideration that should weight with a Court in applying
the provisions of the Act, to prosecutions there under.
The Act is intended to serve a social purpose, to punish
offenders who indulge in a crime of great consequence to
the health and life of the people. No provision in an
enactment of the nature of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, should be read in such a way as to
search for and find a purely technical reason for dropping
the penal proceedings."
All the observations extracted above go in support of the view
that the time limit mentioned in the provision is not a rigid one, though
intended to be acted upon and any infringement of the time limit is per
se not fatal to the prosecution, unless of course, the accused in shown
to have suffered prejudice on that account. No attempt has been made
at any stage in proceedings on behalf of the accused to show that he
has suffered any prejudice on account of the delay of three days in
sending the sample to the Public Analyst.
Thus, the term 'immediately' in rule 9-A being a relative and
flexible term,… determinative according to exigencies and the nature of
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the article of food, conclusion appears to be irresistible that rule 9-A is
not mandatory, and is only directory in nature, in the same way ,as the
old rule 9(j) was.
It will be noticed that amended Sec. ii does not require a part of
the sample to be given to the person from whom the sample was taken.
While one part is required to be sent to the Public Analyst for analysis,
the other two parts are required to be sent to the Local (Health) Authority.
The amended Sec. 13 requires the Public analyst to deliver to the Local
(Health) Authority a report of the result of his analysis. Section 13(2)
requires the Local (Health) Authority to forward to the person from whom
the sample was taken a copy of the report of the Public Analyst, if the
report is to the effect that the article of food is adulterated.  The report is
to be forwarded in such manner as may be prescribed, after the
institution on of the prosecution. Thereafter the person from whom the
sample was taken is given the right to apply to the Court within ten days
of the receipt by him of the copy of the public Analyst's report to get the
sample kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food
Laboratory. It is no longer open to the accused vendor to wait till the very
minute to apply to the Court to have the sample analysed by the Central
Food Laboratory. If he wants to exercise the statutory right of  having
sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory he has to exercise that
right by applying to the Court within ten days of receipt by   him of the
Public analyst's report. It is also to be noticed that amended Sec. 13(2)
does not prescribed any point of time before which the report of the
Public Analyst is to be forwarded to the accused vendor. But, the very
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basis of a prosecution for adulteration of food is the report by applying to
the Court for an analysis by the Central Food Laboratory. If the report of
the Central Food Laboratory is to the effect that the article of food is not
adulterated the very basis of the prosecution will disappear. In such an
event the further pursuit of the prosecution will be needless and the
accused will have to be discharged or acquitted as the case may be. It is,
therefore, to be assumed that the report of the Public Analyst  is to be
made available to the accused vendor at the commencement of the
prosecution, that is to say, before the prosecution starts leading evidence
in the case, and in good and sufficient time to enable the accused to
exercise his right of having the sample analysed by the Central Food
Laboratory if he so desires it. Section 13(2) provides that the Public
Analyst's report, shall be forwarded to the person from whom the sample
was taken" in such manner as may be prescribed." Now 9-A of the Rules
as amended in 1977 which replaces rule 9(j) of the Rules prescribes the
manner in which the Public Analyst's report may be forwarded to the
person from the sample was taken. It reads as follows :
"The Local (Health) Authority shall immediately after
the institution of  prosecution forward a copy of the report of
the result of analysis in Form III delivered to him under sub-
rule (3) of rule 7, by registered post or by hand, as may be
appropriate, to the person from whom the sample of the
article was taken by the Food Inspector and simultaneously
also to the person, if any, whose name, address and other
particulars has been disclosed under Sec.14-A of the Act.
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Provided that where the sample conforms to the
provisions of the Act or the Rules  made there under, and
no prosecution is intended under sub-section (2), or no
action is intended under sub-section (2-E) of Sec. 13 of the
Act, the Local (Health) Authority shall intimate the result to
the vendor from whom the sample has been taken and also
to the person, whose name, address and other particulars
have been disclosed under Sec. 14-A of the Act, within 10
days from the receipt of the report from the Public Analyst."
The first thing to be noticed in that rule  9-A carefully refrains from
mentioning any definite limit of time such as that found in old rule 9(j)
which gave rise to the controversy whether the Rule was mandatory or
directory, and instead uses the general expression 'immediately. 'The
(Health) Authority is now require to forward  to the person from whom the
sample was taken in the manner prescribed, a copy of the report of the
Public Analyst immediately after the institution of the prosecution. While
prescribing the manner in which the report may be forwarded the opening
words of rule 9-A. "the Local (Health) Authority shall" immediately after
the institution of the prosecution forwarded", are borrowed verbatim from
Sec. 13(2) with the word "immediately" inserted in between. The Rule
making authority could never have intended to amend the statute by
super-adding the word "immediately" as indeed it was not competent to
do. Rule 9-A has to be interpreted so as to keep in tune with and within
the bounds of Sec. 15(2). The departure from the previous rule by
refraining from mentioning a definite period of time as was done in the old
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Rule makes it evident that the expression "immediately" is used to
convey a sense of continuity rather than a sense of urgency.  It is not to
be understood to mean the very next instant, the very next hour, that very
day or the very next day. It must be construed in its setting. It is no use
turning to dictionaries. Dictionaries give variegated meanings to words.
What meaning is to be adopted depends on the context.  Rule 9-A is
made in the context of  the amended Sec. 13(2) which provides for the
forwarding the Public Analyst's Report to the person from whom the
sample was taken after the institution of prosecution and enables that
persons to apply to the Court to have analysed by the Control Food
Laboratory the sample kept with the Local (Health) Authority. In the
context the expression "immediately" is only meant to convey reasonable
dispatch and promptitude and no more.  The idea is to avoid dilatoriness
on the part of  officialdom and prevention of unnecessary harassment to
the accused.  But the idea is not to penalize the prosecution and to
provide a technical defense. First to construe "immediately" as meaning
"at once" or "forthwith" and next to hold delay to be fatal to the
prosecution would perhaps be to make rule 9-A ultra vires Sec. 13 (2).  It
is no permissible to interpret rule 9-A in such a way.  The real question is,
was the Public Analyst's Report sent to the accused sufficiently early to
enable him to properly defend himself by giving him an opportunity at the
outset to apply to the Court to send on the samples to the Central Food
Laboratory for analysis. If after receiving the Public Analyst's report he
never sought to apply to the Court to have the sample sent to the Central
Food Laboratory, as in the present case, he may not be heard to
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complain of the delay in the receipt of the report by him, unless of course,
he is able to establish some other prejudice. Conclusions on this question
are the expression "immediately" in rule 9-A is intended to convey sense
of continuity rather than urgency. What must be done is to forward the
report at the earliest opportunity, so as to facilitate the exercise of the
statutory right under Sec. 13(2) in good and sufficient time before the
prosecution commences leading evidence. Non-compliance with rule 9-A
is not fatal. It is a question of prejudice.20 But where the report is served
on the accused after a delay of 22 days for which there is no acceptable
explanation and the date incorporated in the notice is misleading and
incorrect, the conviction has to be set a side.21 But the  provisions of the
law do not insist that the number of the case must be mentioned therein.
Therefore, the failure to mention the number of the case cannot be
regarded as a violation of the mandatory provision contained in Sec.
13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The Chockingam v.
Food Inspector.22  Was a case where Local (Health) Authority while
sending the copy of the report to the accused did not inform him that he
had a right to apply to the Court within ten days from the date of the
receipt of that intimation to send one of the samples with Local (Health)
Authority to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. The intimation only
invited the attention of the accused to Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of,
Food Adulteration Act.  Dealing with this aspect of the case it was stated
as follows (at p. 1239 of Cr. L.J.):
20Tulsiram v.State of Madhya Pradesh, 1984 Cr.L.J.1731at pp.1736,1737,1738 (S.C.)
21  Arumainayagam v. State, 1985 Cr. L.J. 1969 at p. 1970 (Mad.).
22 1981 Ker. L.T. 628 : 1981 Cr.L.J. 1225.
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"The Local (Health) Authority did not inform the revision
particulars of their right to move the Court to send a sample
to the Central Food Laboratory within 10 days from the date
of receipt of the information. It only invited their attention to
Sec. 13 (2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. To
invite their attention to Sec. 13(2) of the Act' does not
amount to informing them about the right which they have
under Sec.13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
It may be that when an accused received such an
information, he may go to a lawyer and consult him and
take appropriate steps. It is also possible that he may not
seek legal advice at all or may not seek legal advice within
ten days. As a read the provisions of Sec. 13(2)  of
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, on reading the
information given by the Local (Health) Authority the Vendor
without anything more and without legal assistance must be
able to realize that he has a valuable right vested in him of
moving the Court in an appropriate way.  The fact that the
Legislature has cast such a burden or duty on the Local
(Health) Authority of giving information to the vendor
necessarily reveals the concern which the Legislature has
in this matter. Of course, generally speaking, every person
is expected to know the law. But even in the face of such a
general principle of law, the Legislature has directed that
the Local (Health) Authority must give such specific
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information to the vendor. Hence, it is not open to the
prosecution to rely on the general principle that every
person is expected to know the law.  Failure to inform the
vendor  of his right to move the Court within ten days would
amount to non-observance of Sec. 13(2).A Statement
inviting vendor's attention to Sec.13(2) of the prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, is no compliance at all, substantially
or otherwise of the provisions of Sec. 13(2) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, Such a statement does
not have the effect of informing him of his right to move the
Court in ten days. Unless he is so informed he may not be
aware of his right and consequently he loses th4e
opportunity of exercising the right."
The case referred to above, as stated earlier was a case in which
the intimation as required under Sec. 13(2) of the prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, was not given. The Local (Health) Authority was content
with inviting accused's attention to Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act.  That is not what in provided by Sec.13(2) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. That did not even amount to
substantial compliance of the provision of law. If within ten days from the
date of the receipt of the intimation, the accused did not consult a lawyer,
the right given to him by law would be jeopardized.  But, such a
consequence will not result merely  because the number of the case not
mentioned in the intimation.  The Local (Health) Authority had mentioned
in this case the name of the Court in which the prosecution is launched
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against the accused here in.  Intimation also clearly stated that the
accused should apply to the Court within ten days of the receipt of the
intimation. If he so desires, to send one of the samples to the Central
Food Laboratory for analysis.  It was open to the accused even without
the help of a lawyer to get that court and file an application.  In such
circumstances, no court  can reject such application on the ground that
the number of the case is not mentioned in the application. If the accused
makes enquiries he can very well come to know the number of the case.
Even if he is not able to know the number of the case, he can state in his
application that he is not aware of the number of the case. Then, it will be
duty of the court to find out the number and treat his application.  As long
as the relevant provision of law does not specifically state that the
number of the case must find a place in the intimation, the Court cannot
hold that it is mandatory to mention the number of the case in the
intimation under Sec.13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
This is not to say that if the Local (Health) Authority is aware of the
number of the case, the number of the case need not be stated in the
intimation. If the Local (Health) Authority is aware of the number of the
case, it is always desirable that the number of the case is also stated in
the intimation under Sec. 13(2) so that no in convenience would because
to the accused in exercising his right under that provision. However, the
failure to state the number of the case in the intimation does not amount
to the infraction of Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
The Court while interpreting provisions of law should not lose sight
of practical aspects and realities.  There repeated complaints by
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Prosecutors and Food Inspectors that in courts of Magistrates,
complaints filed by Food Inspectors are not numbered immediately, but
are kept pending for a number of the days.  This is certainly an
undesirable practice. However, such a practice has developed in the
course of years, perhaps on account of the pressure of work or with an
eye on the statistical picture of the Court for a particular month. These
reasons are not sufficient to justify such as undesirable practice. Court of
Magistrates would do well to see that complaints filed by Food Inspectors
or others are taken up for consideration immediately and numbers are
assigned to them.  The Food Inspector in instituting the prosecution has
to inform the Local (health) Authority about it to enable Local (Health)
Authority to give intimation to the accused as required by law. The Food
Inspector cannot wait long for the Court to assign a number of the case
before giving information to the Local (Health) Authority. If the Courts
waits for 10 days or two weeks and that happens often, the Food
Inspector cannot delay in performing his duty to inform the Local (Health)
authority that he has launched prosecution against the accused and the
Local (Health) Authority also cannot wait indefinite to know the number of
the case before sending intimation to the accused in accordance with
law. Some times, these delays may work against the interests of the
accused and therefore in a number of cases it may not be possible for the
Food Inspector to inform the Local (health) Authority about the number of
the case or for the Local (Health) Authority to state the number of the
case in the intimation to be sent to the accused. It is the application of
this reality that caused the Legislature and the rule making authority to
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refrain from stating that the number of the case must be mentioned in the
intimation.  That being so, the Court cannot hold that it is mandatory to
mention the number of the casein the intimation to be sent to the
accused, however, desirable it may be that it should be done.
In Food Inspector v. Sadasivan23, Kader, J., had occasion to
observe as follows :
". . . After having duly received a complaint alleging
commission of or offence against a particular person, a
magistrate may at once take cognizance of the offence or may
keep it pending with him due to various reasons.  Suppose
after receiving a complaint disclosing commission of an offence
against a particular person a magistrate by oversight keeps it
on his file for days and takers cognizance only thereafter, it
cannot then be said that the complaint or prosecution was
instituted only on the date on which the Magistrate took
cognizance of the offence or summons was issued to the
accused. . .it is, therefore, clear from the above that as soon as
a complaint  as defined in the Criminal Procedure Code is filed
against an accused before a  magistrate with a prayer that
necessary action be taken against him, it must be deemed that
the prosecution or criminal proceedings have been instituted
against that accused."
Reliance was place on the observations of  Kerala High Court in
Criminal Revision Cases No. 9 of 1980 and Criminal Appeal No. 336 of
23 1981 Cr. L.J. 181 at p. 183 (Ker.)
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1979 in support of contention that it is mandatory to mention the
number of the case in the intimation under Sec. 13(2) of the Act.  The
former decision is reported in Paul, V.J. v. Ibrahim24.  In that case a copy
of the report of the Public Analyst was sent to the accused, but it was not
shown that along with the report intimation or communication as
contemplated under Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
had been sent.   The Copy of the intimation was not produced before the
Court.  The Food Inspector in his evidence also did not refer to any such
communication.  Therefore, it was held that there was non-compliance
with Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulterated Act. It was argued
before the Court that Sec. 13(2) was only directory. This argument was
negative emphasizing the valuable nature of the right conferred by this
provision of the accused.  In dealing with this aspect of the case, Janaki
Amma J., made the following observations :
". . . The person from whom the sample is taken will
be in a position to exercise the right to have the sample
analysed only on receipt of the information regarding the
fact of filing the complaint and the particulars like the Court,
when it is filed and the number of the case.  Therefore, the
supply of the information mentioned in Sec. 13(2) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is not an empty
formality. . ."
24 1981 Ker. L.T. Short Note page 81: 1982 Cr.L.J. N.O.C. 30.
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There can be no doubt that the accused will be in a better position
to make an application within the time prescribed, if he has the particulars
like the name of the Court where, the case is to be filed and the number
of the case filed against him etc.  It is desirable that all these particulars
must be mentioned in the intimation. But the learned Judge has not
stated that the mandate of Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act requires mention of the number of the case in intimation
on that the failure to do so would amount to infraction of Sec. 13(2) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.  In Criminal Appeal No. 338 of 1979,
it was found that the ground suggested by the first Appellate Court to
acquit the accused was not justified, but the acquittal was sustained on
the ground of infraction of Sec. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act. The matter was dealt with in the following manner by
Kadar J :
". . . The counsel cited a decision of this Court in
criminal Revision Case No. 9/80 reported in Paul, V.J.v.
Ibrahim25 and it was pointed out that there is no evidence in
the case that a copy of the report of the Public Analyst was
sent to any of the accused as enjoyed under Sec.13(2) of
the Prevention of Food Adulterated Act and rule 9-A of the
Rules framed under the Act.
This fact is not disputed by the counsel for the
appellant, although he made an attempt to show that P.W.1.
25 1981 K.L.T. Short Note page 81 : 1982 Cr. L.J. N.O.C. 30.
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was stated that intimation was sent under Sec. 13(2). But,
admittedly, there is no evidence that copy of the report was
sent to any of the accused.  It was further pointed out on
behalf, of the respondents that the intimation purported to
have been sent to the accused was quite vague and
ineffective and not in any way sufficient to enable the
accused to file a petition challenging the correctness of the
report of the Public Analyst before the court where the case
then was pending, Ext. P.11 series are said to be copies of
intimation sent to the accused.  These intimation are dated
15th December, 1977. But they are seen to have dispatched
on 14th December,1977.
The material particulars of the case are not mentioned in
any of the case nor the date of the filing of the complaint is
mentioned in any of these intimations. Although the name of
the Court is mentioned, the date of filing of the complaint is
shown as 6th December, 1977.But it is not now disputed
that the complaint was actually filed on 9th December, 1977.
The charge number also is not mentioned in any of these
intimations.  The decision relied on by the counsel squarely
applies to the facts of this case.  The acquittal of the
respondents has, therefore, to be sustained on this ground.
. ."
It is significant to note that copy of the report of the Public Analyst
was not sent to the accused in the case referred to above. The copy of
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the intimation produced in court had several suspicious features
regarding the mention of the date of the filling of the complaint and other
particulars. Failure to send a copy of the report  of the Public Analyst
itself, in the circumstances would have been sufficient ground to sustain
the acquittal. Suspicious nature of the intimation also added to this factor.
The learned Judge no doubt, referred to the non-mention in the intimation
of the number of the case and the date of filling of the complaint.  But in
the passage extracted above, it is not suggested that it is mandatory on
the part of the Local (Health) Authority to state the number of the case, or
the date of the  filling of the complaint in the intimation to be given to the
accused. As already point out, neither Sec.13(2) of the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act nor 9-A of the Rules requires the number of the
case to be mentioned.
It may not always be possible to mention the number of the case.
In contingencies where the  Courts delay the numbering of the case, the
Local (Health) Authority may not be n a position to wait till the number of
the case is made available.  Law also does not require mention of the
date of filling of the complaint, though, perhaps, if that date is mentioned
it will be easier for the accused to find out the number of the case from
the Court.  In this judgment also it has not been indicated that it is
mandatory to mention the number of the case in the intimation to be
given to the accused.  In these circumstances, the two decisions relied on
by the counsel for the accused cannot be taken to have laid down that it
is mandatory to mention the case number in the intimation.  The accused
in this case has no case that on receipt of the intimation he went to the
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Court concerned and filed an application without mentioning the number
and that such application was rejected.  There is no violation of Sec.
13(2)  of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act involved in this case. At
any rate, no prejudice is caused to the accused in not mentioning the
number of the case in the intimation given to him. The counsel took
through the documents and the oral evidence in the case in an attempt to
shot that there are serious infirmities in the evidence regarding  the
sampling and, therefore, it cannot be taken that the sampling was done in
accordance with law.26
13. Report of the Public Analyst and its value : In the under
noted case on 8th August, 1977 the Food Inspector took sample of
mustard oil from the proprietor of M/s. Dipak Stores. He purchased
mustard oil for analysis on payment of price. He sent one of the samples
of mustard oil to the Public Analyst who submitted his report. The Report
shows that the sample of mustard oil tallied with the standard specified in
item 17.06 of Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules
but the saponification value was excess by 2.7 and such it was opined
that it was sample of adulterated mustard oil.  The report was in respect
of the sample of mustard oil sent by the Food Inspector to the Public
Analyst. The case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, dealing
with adulteration and admixture of food stuff can not be brought home
unless the evidence is clean, pure and unpolluted. If the sample was
taken with polluted implements or instruments containing in purity or
contamination, the report  of  the  Public  Analyst  cannot be pressed  into
26 State of Kerala v. N. Soman, 1984 Cr. L.J. 567 at pp. 567, 570, 571, 572, 573 (Ker.)
464
Service to convict an accused of an offence under the Act where
imprisonment is compulsory. It is the bounded duty of the prosecution to
show that the article taken from the accused was taken and put in the
container or jar without impairing the standard and quality of the article by
the Food Inspector. It is in evidence that the sample of mustard oil was
put in the bottles having narrow necks. The evidence disclosed that the
Food Inspector had collected oil from a tin.  The Food Inspector used a
mug to collect oil from the tin with the help of a funnel, Challenged the oil
into the bottles, in which samples were stored and one of such bottle was
sent to the Public Analyst for his report. The defense witness stated that
the mug and the funnel were brought by the Food Inspector and traces of
oil were visible in those utensile. Learned Magistrate on appreciation of
the evidence has held that the funnel and the mug might have been used
earlier by the Food Inspector for collecting adulterated mustard oil from
other shops. This apart, the Food Inspector could not assert positively
that the bottle in which the samples were taken were unaffected,
unpolluted or antiseptic bottles. He said that he took the bottles from the
down.  Of course, the Food Inspector has stated in Court that he had
poured mustard oil direct from the tin into the narrow necked bottles,.
However, the evidence has been countered by the testimony of D.W.  It is
appears that the mug which was used had traces of oil. At last it was not
neat and clean, unadulterated and uncontaminated. The funnel had also
traces of oil and as such it was not unpolluted and untainted. The
evidence that the sample was taken in a pure bottle is shaky and
doubtful.  The food inspector relied on his memory and recalled the
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events. The Food Inspector candidly admitted that he had failed to
perform his statutory duties in maintaining the record or diary in respect
of the action taken by him at the time of taking the sample.  It is difficult
for the Court to accept that the public servant conversant with his duties
did not perform them in accordance with the provisions of rule 9(e), of the
Rules. If the Food Inspector had failed to perform his statutory duties
enjoined by rule 9 (e) of the rules, where is the guarantee of the purity of
his action in taking the sample 7 An adverse inference must be drawn
against the witness for the non-performance of his statutory obligations.
When he did not comply with the provisions of the "Rules, the Trial Court
was justified in holding that he did not take necessary care and caution to
take the samples of custard oil  in the bottle without impairing the
standard and quality of the matter as it was in the tin.27
14.  Charge of the sale of adulterated  article and the report of
the Public Analyst: In Diamond Products v. Delhi Administration,28  it is
not disputed that to start with, the Food Inspectors have taken the sample
of gold fingers containing edible ingredients and permitted food colours
for analysis. This very article was sent to the Public Analyst for analysis
and report. It was no body's case that standard of Macaroni Products be
applied to it. In the Pre-charge evidence, Food Inspector while under
cross- examination, frankly admitted that gold finger product is a savoury
product where in the permitted colours can be used.  He further
conceded that in case he had come to know that the article in the instant
27 State of Assam v. Radha Oil Industries, (1987) G.L.R. 134 at pp. 137,138,139.
28 1987 D.L.T. 46  pp. 50.
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Case was not a Macaroni Product but was a savoury he would have
withdrawn the prosecution.  In spite of that, the Public Analyst analysed
the sample keeping in view the standard of Marconi product and declared
it to be an adulterated one.  Even the Public Analyst while under cross
examination failed to satisfy the Court as to why he has not carried out a
test for starch before concluding that it was obtained from either suji or
maida which is one of the necessary ingredients in a Marconi Product.
But since the report of the Central Food Laboratory superseds the report
of the Public Analyst,a charge in terms of that report will have to be
framed by the learned Magistrate. He cannot do so unless a sanction for
the offence with which now the accused would be charged is given by the
consenting authority. If such a sanctions not been given for the institution
of a prosecution for the offence now disclosed by the report of the Central
Food Laboratory, the Magistrate can not legally proceed with the case.
The course open to him is not to pass as order of discharge but to return
the complaint to the complaint.29
 The fact that the Director found the sample to be adulterer for
reasons different to the one given by the Public Analyst would not render
the prosecution instituted on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst
invalid.30
29   Eventiary value of the report of the Public analyst and
Central Food Laboratory,Calcutta : It so transpires that a complaint was
29 Bachitrananda Nayak v. State of Orissa, 1978 Cr. L.J. 1050 at pp. 1051, 1052
(Orissa)
30 Municipal Corporation of Delhi 7, Shri Bishan Sarup, 1983(2) Crime 96% at p. 970
(Delhi).
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filed against the accused company in the Court of Special Magistrate,
Economic Offences, Ist Class, Lucknow under Sec. 7/16 of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.This complaint was filed on 5th
September,1983 and the learned Magistrate summoned the accused
persons. By an order on the same date i.e. 5th September,1983 the
accused persons were summonded for 5th October, 1983.In the
meantime, it so transpires that the accused moved an application for
getting the sample tested by the Central Food Laboratory, Calcutta and it
is alleged that a report from the said laboratory dated 31st may, 1984 was
received in the Court which indicates :
 "Opinion : the sample of unsweetened carbonated water is not
adulterated."
 It was submitted that in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of
Sec. 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act this report would
supersedes the earlier report of the Public Analyst on the basis of which
the accused were charge-sheeted. Be that as it may, the accused had to
bring this fact to the notice of the learned Magistrate by moving a paper
application and sought his decision.31
31    Report of the Central Food Laboratory – Value of :
Section 13(d) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act provides that the
certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall
supersed the report given by the Public Analyst.Sub-section (5) of that
Section also provides that the certificate of the Director of Central Food
31
Mohan Mikin Ltd., v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1987 (24)A.C.C. 92 at p. 62.
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Laboratory is final and conclusive of the facts stated therein.  Thus it is
clear that for all  intents and purposes, the report of the Public Analyst
shall cease to exist and only the certificate of the Director can be looked
into  for finding out the result of the analysis.32
 In State of Maharashtra v. Omprakash Bulakhidas Agarwal,33 the
trial Magistrate before sending the sample to the Central Food Laboratory
did not examine and ascertain that the marks and seals fastened as
provided in Cl. (b) of sub-section (i) of Sec. 11 were intact and the
signature of the panchas were not tampered with. As the trial Magistrate
did not follow the procedure laid down in Sub-section 2(b) of Sec. 13 of
the said Act, reproduced above, the report of the Director, Central Food
Laboratory, could not be made the basis for convicting the accused of the
offence punishable under Sec-7(i) read with Sec. 16(i) (a) (i) of the Act.
 The provision has been made with a view to secure formal
evidence of facts without requiring the Director to remain present and in
the interest of effective administration of the Act, the certificate signed by
the Director of the Central Food Laboratory is made final and conclusive
evidence of the facts stated therein.  The Director is a highly placed
official, an expert in determining the nature, substance and quality of
food, and is wholly disinterested in the result of any case coming before
the court.34
32 State of Maharashtra v. Nizamuddin Haxi Mohammad Kasam, (1979) Cr. L.J. 274 at
pp. 274-277 (Com.)
33 1983 (20 Crimes, 966 at. 967 (Bom.)
34 Andhra Pradesh Gram and Seed Merchants Association v. Union of India, A.I.R.1971
S.C. 3246: 1971 Cr. L.J. 1556.
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To discard the report of Director of Central Food Laboratory simply
because the same is inconsistent with the report of the Public Analyst is
tantamount to discarding the provisions contained in Sec. 13 of the Act.
Which contemplates  that  it is open to the accused or the complaint ant to
make an application to the Court for sending part of the sample to the
Director of Central Food Laboratory for a certificate.35
The question, therefore, or any comparison of the report with the
report issued by the Public Analyst which has already been superseded
does not arise.36
Having been so superseded,the report of the Public Analyst, cannot
be relied upon to base a conviction.37
It is obvious that even in a converse case where the accused claims
acquittal on the ground of any important variance between the earlier report
of the public analyst and the later certificate of the Director of the Central
Food Laboratory which superseded it, it would not be open to the Court to
rely upon the contents of the superseded report of the public analyst for
doubting correctness of the certificate issued by the Director.38
Once this type of conclusive evidence emerges on record, whatever,
might have been contraindicated regarding the concerned ingredients of
the sample as found in the prior report of the public analyst would be totally
35 V.B. Shukla v. Prakash, (1973) 14 Guj. L.R. 381: 1974 Cr.L.J. 124.
36 State v. Kutubuddin Isarafali, (1980) 21(2)  Guj. L.R. 167: 1981 Cr.L.J. 1908.
37 Chetumal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1387 :1981 Cr. L.J. 1999.
38 See Kantilal v. I.G. Patel, (1972), 13 Guj. L.R. 1725.
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pushed out the arena of contest and cannot be looked at. If that is so, there
would be no question of considering any variance between the results of
the tests carried out by the public analyst on the one hand and the Director
of the Central Food Laboratory on the other vis-à-vis two parts of the same
sample.  Any variation or variance between the different  ingredients
mentioned in these reports would presuppose comparison between two
existing reports on record. But if one of the reports is  wholly pushed out of
record as enjoined by Sec. 13(3) read with Sec. 13(5) there is no question
of resorting to the exercise of comparison between the contents of these
two reports with a view of finding out the supposed variance between the
existing and operative report of the Director and earlier report of the public
analyst which has ceased to exist on record.  Once this conclusion is found
to clearly follow from the aforesaid statutory scheme of Sec. 13, it must
logically follow that there can be no question of any variance between the
non-existant report of the public analyst and existing certificate of the
Director of Central Food Laboratory in connection with analysis of the part
of the same sample as initially taken by the Food Inspector.  If such a
question is ruled out, further question as to whether the prosecution should
explain the variance at the pain of otherwise falling through would become
totally irrelevant and besides the point.
39   Whether the provisions of rule 7(3) are mandatory or
directory : The violation of the time-limit given in sub-rule (3) of rule 7 per
cent is not a complete answer to a charge of food adulteration under the
Act.  In the above view of the matter, it is clear that the learned Sub-
Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Delhousie, has fallen into an error in
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discharging the respondent merely on the ground that the time limit
prescribed in rule 7(3) had not been strictly adhered to.  As a result the
order was set aside and the case was remanded.39
40 Non-compaliance of the rules–Whether vitiate the conviction :
The non-compliance with the provisions of rule 18 in its turn would result in
the non-compliance of rule 7(1) with the result that the Public Analyst would
not be in a position to say definitely if the same analysed by him was the
same which had been picked on the spot at the time of taking the sample
or that the same had not been tampered with during transit.  The non-
compliance of these Rules would, therefore, vitiate the conviction.40
In Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee v. Niranjan Paul,41 the
Patna High Court also held that rules 7 and 18 of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act are mandatory.
Where there is no evidence on record that the facsimile impression
of the seal was actually received by the Public Analyst, rule 7(1) must be
deemed to have been violated. Preferring the view expressed in Mary
Larado v. State of Mysore,42 State of Gujarat v. Shantaben, State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Abhasbhai Tyab Ali Bohra,43 was followed by S.P.
Singh J., in Gopal Sao v. State of Bihar.44
39 State of Himachal Pradesh v.  Punnu Ram, (1985)I.F.A.C. 91 at pp. 94,96(H.P.)
40 Mohinder Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1985 Cr. L.J. 110 at p. 113 (H.P.), see
also Dattari Mahto v. State, 1974 F.C.A. 54 at p. 57, Dilo Sao v. State of Bihar,
(1971)2 Cr. L.J. 1-47 at pp. 1048, 1049.
41 1976 Cr. L.J. 421 (Pat.), G. Chandramouli v. State, 1978 Cr. L.J,. 549 at pp. 554,555.
42      A.I.R.1966 Mys. 244.
43    A.I.R. 1964  Guj. 139.
44    1967  Cr. L.J. 1723 (Guj.)
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WATER, AIR, NOISE POLLUTION AND ROLE OF
EXPERTS IN POLLUTION LAWS
WATER POLLUTION
1.  Brief History : The problems of  environmental pollution proceeds
the history of mankind. Even before the birth of mankind the environmental
pollution existed, however negligible its form may have been. Mature
possesses an inherent quality of curing pollution by itself.  After the birth of
mankind, the environmental pollution started growing. The learned of the
yore took precautions to fight pollution by burning incenses, by performing
Homums and Yagnas.  The Hindus believed that the cowdung possessed
curatives of pollution. Slowly and steadily mankind grew in number and
now the world is facing the problem of population explosion which has
assumed dangerous proportions of enormous magnitude.  The grown of
population gave rise to increase in wants and demands of mankind.
Manual processes proved insufficient to cope with these demands and
wants.  Report had to be taken to mechanical processes to increase
production and thus industries came in existence, and in the present day
contaxt, industrialization in the developed countries is very high.  The
developing countries are also competing in the race of industrialization with
the developed countries.  Industries naturally had to be established near
urban areas so that the facilities required may be easily obtained and thus
urban areas provided sources of employment.  This resulted into a rush of
the rural population in urban areas. This triple process of population
explosion, heavy industrialization and growing urbanization has
urbanization has succeeded in creating acute problems of environmental
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pollution.  Nations, both in the developed areas in the  developing areas
have been from time to time, passing legislation to meet the problem of
pollution. But these statutes failed to keep pace with the expanding needs
of prevention and control of pollution and it was felt that specific and
stringent laws must be separately made in this regard.
In India, the lead in the matter was taken by the State of Orissa
which enacted in 1953 the  Orissa River Pollution Prevention Act.
Maharashtra, one of the most industrialized and thickly populated States
followed suit and it came out in 1969 with a much more comprehensive
statute, Maharashtra Prevention of Water Pollution Act, 1969. While the
Orissa Act was confined to only rivers whereas the Maharashtra Act
extended to rivers, water courses, whether flowing or for the time being dry,
inland water, both natural and artificial, subterranean streams, the course
of which is known and/ or defined and to see to such extent and tidal
waters to such point as the State Government may specify in this behalf.
By that time, the Central Government was already seized of the matter.
The Central Government had set-up an Expert Committee in 1962 to draft
an enactment for the prevention and control of water pollution.  The
Committed submitted its report which was circulated to State Government.
The Central Council of Local Self Government was also consulted in 1963.
The Council recommended that a Central law may be enacted by the
Parliament in regard to the problems of water pollution.  A draft Bill was
prepared in 1965 the draft was put up for consideration before a joint
Session of the Central Council of Local Self Governments and the Fifth
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Conference of the State Ministers Town and Country Planning. There was,
however, a hurdle in the way.
Water is a subject in the State List of the constitution. Entry 17 in
List II in the 7th Schedule of the constitution reads as follows :
"Water that is to say water supply, irrigation and canals, drainage
and enbankments, water storage and water power, subject to the
provisions of Entry 56 of List –I "
Entry 6 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule reads as follows :
"Public Health and Sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries."
Entry 56 of List-I  reads as follows :
"Regulation and development of interstate rivers and river Valleys to
the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of
the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the Public
Interest."
Water pollution as such does not find mention in any of the Lists.,
Thus it is clear that any legislation in regard to control of pollution of water
must draw its authority from the aforementioned two Entries in List-II for the
competence to legislate must be determined by the pith and substances of
the legislation itself.
Consequently, the Central Government after considering the
recommendations aforesaid of the Expert Committee and the Central
Council of Local Self Governments, drafted a Bill and circulated the same
to all the State Governments in December, 1965 with a request to the State
Governments to pass resolutions authorizing the Parliament under Art.
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252(1) of the Constitution to enact the law on subject of prevention and
control of water of water pollution.  After 6 States had passed the enabling
resolution to enact the law on their behalf, the Bill was introduced to Rajya
Sabha in December, 1969.
In August, 1970 it decided to refer the Bill to a Joint Committee of
both the Houses and the joint Committee examined a number of witnesses
and made several spot inspections.  It examined the Bill thoroughly and
suggested several modifications.  The report of the Joint Committee was
submitted to the Parliament in November, 1972. By the time the Parliament
passed the Bill, 6more states had passed the enabling resolution. The 12
States which passed the enabling resolutions are Assam, Bihar, Gujarat,
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh, Kerala, Tripura and West Bengal.  The  Bill was passed by the
Parliament in early 1974 and the President of India accorded
his_______on 23rd March, 1974. The Act thus came into force on the said
date in all the 12 aforementioned States and Urban Territories.
The States which had not passed the enabling resolution had,
therefore, been given the right to adopt the Act under Cl. (1) of Art, 252 of
the Constitution and the Act shall come into force in such States on the
date of such adoption.  The States of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra
Pradesh adopted the Act.
The Act was amended in 1978 by the Water (Prevention and Control
of Pollution) Amendment Act ( 44 of 1978 ).
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After a long interval of about 7 years the Air (Prevention and Control
of Pollution Act, (14 of 1981) came to be passed.  India has yet to enact a
legislation on the control and prevention of noise pollution. Noise pollution
is determental to the health of people psychologically, physiologically and
behaviourably. Unexpected or /  unwanted noise disturbs biological
organism and causes the pupils dilate, paling of the skin, dryness of
mucous membrances, intestinal spasms and adrenal secretion. It also
causes neurotic  and irrational behavior.  The World Health Organisation is
of the opinion that it causes lowered efficiency and increased errors. The
Times Magazine of America estimated in 1961 that the noise causes the
American Industry a loss of about two million dollars a day in the form of
compensation, lost hours and diminished efficiency.
Dr. Yabian Rouke reported to the New York Committee for a Quiet
City :
"One of the insidious aspects of excessive
noise is the fact that an individual may be
unconsciously building up nervous tension due to
noise exposures. Thus may cause a person thus
exposed to noise suddenly to be catapulted into an
act of violence, or mental collapse, by some
seemingly minor sounds which drive him beyond the
point of endurance. Many persons who are using
tranquilisers may be treating the symptoms rather
than the disease."
According to _____________
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"Studies show that workers in noisy jobs tend
to be more quarrelsome at work and away from it (at
home, for example ) than those doing equivalent jobs,
but who are not subjected to similar noise stresses.
Persons liging in an atmosphere of unwanted noise become
irritable and in socialable and suffer from hyper-tension and
insocialable and suffer from hyper-tension and insomnia.It is high
time that our Parliament takes necessary steps in regard to control
and prevention of noise pollution also. In the developed countries
law in this regards has already been passed.45
  2.   Earlier analogous Indian Statutory Provisions :   The
oldest  Act on the statute book regarding control of water pollution
in India is the shore Nuisance (Bombay and Colaba ) Act, 1853 (XI
of 1853).
The next oldest Act is oriental Gas Company Act, 1887.
oriental Gas Company was registered in England and subsequently
incorporated in India also.  The Company erected gas work on and
granted for the purpose by the Government in the vicinity of
Calcutta.  The Company was engaged in the preparation of
apparatus and materials for lighting Calcutta.  The Company was
given certain powers and facilities but certain obligations were also
imposed.
45 Vide Lall's Commentaries on Water and Air Pollution Laws, 2nd Ed., Pt. III,
Chapter III, pp. 12-15.
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The Sarais Act of 1867 (XXII of 1867 ) obtains a keeper of a
sarai or an inn shall be bound to fit thoroughly cleanse. . . . .drains
of the sarai water is obtained for the persons or a animals using it
and wells, tanks and other sources from which to the satisfaction of
the District Magistrate or his nominee. Its non-compliance is
punishable with find of  Rs. 20/-.
The common law doctrine of riparian rights was codified  for
the first time in 1882.  The illustration (f) to Sec. 7) of the
Easements Act, 1882, reads thus :
"(f). The right of every owner of land that, within his own
limits, the water which naturally passes or percolates by, over or
through his land shall not, before so passing or percolating, be
unreasonably polluted by other persons."
Illustration (h) of the same section reads thus :
"(h).  The right of every owner of land that the
water of a very natural stream which passes by,
through or over his land in defined natural channel
shall be allowed by other persons to allow within such
owner's limits without interruption and without
material.  Alteration in quantity, direction, force or
temperature; the right of every owner of land abutting
on a natural lake or pond into or out of which a natural
stream flows, that the water of such lake or pond shall
be allowed by every persons to remain within such
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owner's  limits  without material alteration in quantity
or temperature."
The rule embodied in Illus. (h) is wider in scope than the common
law, doctrine of riparian rights. Whereas the doctrine of riparian rights is
confined to a natural stream (that is, water which flows in a definite course),
a water-course having this characteristic including a tidal river, and an
underground stream where the course of such a stream is known and
defined, the rule of riparian contained in Illus. (f) is confined not only to
these but also even to percolating water and water flowing in undefined
channel and stagnant water (like that of sea, ponds or lakes).  Further,
Illus. (f) speaks of "unreasonable pollution" but this should not make any
difference between this and the common law rule because even under the
latter the pollution should not be trifling but appreciable.
Illustration (h) speaks, amongst others of the right of every riparian
to get water, of a natural stream and a natural lake or pond into or out of
which a natural stream flows, without any material alteration in
temperature. Since "alteration in temperature" is covered by pollution there
is overlapping to that extent in Illus. (f) and (h).
Illustration (j) to Sec. 7 reads thus :
"(j) The right of every owner of land abutting on a natural stream,
lake or pond to use and consume its water for drinking, house-hold
purposes and  watering his cattle and sheep; and the right of every such
owner to use  and consume the water for irrigating such land and for
purposes of any manufactory situate thereon :
480
Provided that he does not thereby cause material injury to other like
owners.
Explanation –
A natural stream is a stream, whether permanent or intermittent tidal
or  tide less  on his surface of land or underground, which flows by the
operation of natural only and in a natural and known course."
An easement is required by prescription, when the right has been
enjoyed peaceably and without interruption for 20 years.  Explanation 4 to
Sec. 4 which deals with acquisition by prescription reads thus :
"In the case of an easement to pollute water the said
period of twenty years begins when the pollution first
prejudices perceptibly the servient heritable."46
Indian Fisheries Act (IV of 1897), Indian Ports Act (XV of 1908),
Indian Stem Vessels Act, (Act  I of 1917 ), Forest Act (Act XVI of 1927),
Factories Act (I, XIII of 1948), Damodar Valley Corporation Act (XIV of
1948), River Boards Act (XLIX of 1956), Merchant shipping Act (XI, VI of
1958) and the various Municipalities Acts passed by the State legislators
and rules, regulations and by a laws made there under have also provided
for legal control and prevention of water pollution.
These are some of the analogous laws and they all air at the
prevention and control of pollution of water.  There are some State laws on
the subject also but it is not necessary to refer to them as they are of
limited significance.47
46 Vide Lall's Commentaries of Water and Air Pollution Laws, 2nd Ed. Pt. III,
Chapter IV, pp. 16,19.
47 Vide Lall's Commentaries on Water and Air Pollution Laws, 2nd Ed. Pt. III,
Chapter-IV, pp. 22, 22.
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2.   United National on pollution. – the economic and Social Council of
the United Nations passed a resolution No. 1346 (XLV) on the 30th
July, 1968 on the question of convening an International
Conference on problems of human environment.  This was followed
by a resolution No. 2398 (XXIII) passed on the 3rd December, 1968
by the United Nations General Assembly.  According to resolution
No. 2398 (XXXIII) of 3rd December, 1968 it was decided in
furtherance of the objective of the resolution to convene in 1972 a
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and
Secretary General was requested to submit a report to the General
Assembly in Consultation with the Advisory Committee on the
application of Science and Technology to development at its
twenty-fourth Session, through the Economic and Social Council at
its forty-seven Session.  In this resolution various points were
clearly set out which were required to be dealt in the report of the
Secretary General.  In pursuance of this resolution the Secretary
General submitted a report which came up for consideration by the
General Assembly at its 24th Regular Sessions which was passed
on 15th December 1989.the United Nations Conference on Human
Environment was held at Stockholm from 5th to 16th June, 1972 and
the following proclamation was made as under :
" I, Man is both creature and moulder of his environment which
gives him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for
intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth.  In the long and
tortuous evolution of the human race on this planet a stage has
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been reached when through the rapid acceleration of science and
technology, man has acquired the power to transform his
environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale.
Both aspects of man's environment, the natural and the man-made,
are essential to his wellbeing.
1.   Environmental pollution and the constitutional provisions of India –
Part-IV of the Constitution deals with the directive principles of State
policies. Article 47 says that the State shall regard the raising of the
level of nutrition and  the standard of living of its people and the
improvements of public health as among its primary duties…..This
article provides for the improvement of the public health as one of the
primary duties of the state and it could very well include by implication
of the protection and improvement of the environment, for the control
and prevention of environmental pollution necessarily and primarily
comes within the concept of the improvements of the public health but
the Parliament in its wisdom decided to add Art,48-A by the 42nd
Amendment Act, section 10 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment Act,
1976) says :
 "After Art, 48 of the Constitution of the following shall be inserted,
namely,-
 "48-A, Protection and improvements of environment and
safeguarding of forests and wild life. The  state shall endeavour to protect
and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and the wild life
of the country."
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 The problem of environmental pollution assumed a world-wide
recognition round the year 1970 and legislations of this problem were
passed by the developed as well as the developing nations through out the
world but the credit of giving a Constitutional recognition to the problem
goes to India. India was the first country in the world to give the control and
prevention of environmental pollution as a Constitutional obligation by
inserting Art, 48-A in the Constitution.
 Part-IV of the Constitution contains a number of directive principles
and some of them have not been pursued in right earnest  even after a
lapse of more than 30 years of the Constitution coming into force. Adding a
few more directive principles will be meaning less and will remain a mere
window dressing if steps are not taken by legislative measures to
implement the directive principles. It is a matter of genuine gratification that
India came out with the water (Prevention of Control of pollution ) Act in
1974 followed by the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1981.
 The 42nd Amendment also added Part IV-A after Part IV in the
constitution enumerating the fundamental duties of every citizen of India.
Article 51-A of Part IV-Always down that it will be duty of every citizen of
India. . .(g) to protect and improve the natural environment including
forests, rivers and wild life and to have compassion for living creatures. . .A
chapter on the fundamental duties was necessary in the Constitution in
view of the adoption of socialism in the preamble of the Constitution. The
Constitutions of socialistic  countries like Russia, Czecoslovakia, China,
Yugoslavia also contain provisions for fundamental duties of the citizens.
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 The 42nd Amendments Act has further made certain changes in the
7th Schedule of the Constitution. Entry 17-A forests,-17-B- protection of wild
animals and birds and 20-A population control and family planning has
been added to list III concurrent List. Forests and wild animals and birds
play a very important role in the prevention and control of environmental
pollution and pollution control and family planning have their own
importance in that regard or it can be safely said without any fear of
contradiction that the man is the greatest polluter of environment. Pollution
explosion is  playing a very vital role in polluting the environment. Some
authors have gone to the extent of asserting that in fact the history of
pollution begins with the history of mankind.48
2.   Role of expert in environmental pollution and procedure. – The Indian
Parliament for the protection and improvement of environment and the
prevention of hazards to human beings, other living creatures, plants
and property passed the Environment (Protection)Act,1986(No. 28 of
1986). The Act was passed to take appropriate steps for the protection
and improvement of human environment in keeping with the decisions
taken at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
held at Stockholm in June, 1972, in which India participated.
Like the water )Prevention and Control of pollution ) Act, 1978and
the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution)Act, 1981, the authority i.e. the
Central Government or any officer empowered by  it have been given
power  to  take  under  sub-section   (I)   of   Sec. 11  of   the  Environment
48 Vide Lall's Commentaries on Water and Air Pollution Laws, 2nd Ed. Pt. III pp. 10, 11.
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(Protection) Act,1986, for the purpose of analysis, samples of air, water,
soil or other substance from any factory, premises or other place in such
manner as may be  prescribed and the procedure of taking sample has
been provided under rule-6 of the Environment (Protection) Rules 1986,
framed under the Act, sub-section (2) of Sec.11, provides that the result of
any analysis, of a sample taken under sub-section (1) shall not be
admissible in evidence in any legal proceeding unless the provisions of
sub-sections (3) and (4) are complied with.  The report of the analyst has to
be submitted in Form-III of the Schedule.  The analyst in his report is
required to write full details  of analysis and refer to methods of anlaysis. A
person who conforms to the qualification given in rule-10 of the said rules
can only be appointed as Government Analyst.
RECENT TRENDS IN EXPERT TESTIMONY :
 "Expert testimony is becoming an embarrassment to the law of
evidence," notes on commentator.49
 There are two aspects of the criticism. First experts whose opinions
are available to the highest hidden have no place testifying in a court of
law. Second, courts should reject opinions of experts not based upon a
generally accepted scientific  principle.  The general acceptance  standard
for the admissibility of a novel scientific evidence is derived from Frye to
b.s.50, a 1923 decision prohibiting the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
The decision requires that scientific evidence be generally accepted in the
49 James W. Mc Elthaney : The 1992 All-Angus Rules, 19 Litig. 19(1992).
50  293   1013 (D.C. Circuit, 1923)
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Scientific community as a prerequisite to admissibility.  In Daubert V.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.51  the court held that the scientific
evidence must satisfy  a reliability test.  The trial Court must make "a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." In performing
this "gate keeping function," the trial court may  consider a number of
factors : (1) The Court should determine whether the scientific theory of
technique can be and has been tested.  Citing scientific authorities, the
Court recognized that a hallmark of Science is empirical testing. (2) A
relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing scientific
validity is whether a theory on technique has been subjected to pear review
and publication. The peer review and publication process increases the
likelihood that, flows in methodology will be detected. (3) A technique's
known or potential rate of error is also a relevant factor. (4) The existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation is
another indiciaum for  trustworthiness. (5) Finally, "general acceptance"
remains an important consideration.  Although the court rejected "general
acceptance" as the sole  criteria for admissibility, it recognized its relevance
in assessing the reliability of Scientific evidence.  These factors, however,
are neither dispositive nor exhaustive.
 The role of the expert should be to "substantially" assist rather than
merely assist the Court in administration of justice.
51 113  S.Ct. 2786 (1993)
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CHAPTER-IX
RECENT SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF
EXPERT OPINION
The deciphering of the genetic code embedded in DNA or deoxyribose
nucleic acid has often been referred to as one of the greatest triumpls of
modern biology.  DNA typing is a breck though that "could revolutionize law
enfacement."1
 The development of forensic tests for "typing" DNA was greeted with
enormous enthusiasm. Heralded as "the greatest advance in crime fighting
technology since fingerprints"2.  The new DNA typing tests were introduced
swiftly into the legal system. Recently, however, a serious scientific
controversy has erupted over the reliability and specificity of DNA tests.
Scientific critics have charged that the new technology was rushed to court
before it was ready.3
 The scientific dispute has led to confusion and conflicting rulings in the
legal system.  Although DNA evidence initially faced little opposition and has
already been used to obtain convictions in hundreds of Cases,4 a number of
courts recently ruled DNA evidence inadmissible on grounds that it is not
1. Jean L. Marx : DNA Fingerprinting Takes The witness stand (240 Science 1616 : 1988 )
2. People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S. 2d643, 644 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1988)
3. For reviews of the controversy, see William C. Thompson & Simon Ford DN.1, Testing
DebateUp date,Trial,Apr. 1992 at 52.
4. For a review of the early cass,see ThomasM. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA
Identification Evidence, 84 A.I.R. 4th 313 (1919) Several excellent reviews of subsequent
caselaw developments (as well as scientific issues raised in Court) have published in the
BNA Criminal Practice Manual. See Judicial Tide Turns Against Admission of FBI's DNA
Tests,, 7 BNA CRIM.  PRAC. MAN. 16 (1993) DNA Typing Critics Say Report Validates
Their Concerns, 6 BNA CRIM. PRAC. MAN. 195(1992).
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generally accepted as reliable by the Scientific community.5Some
commentators have called for reexamination of the DNA evidence in Closed.6
The dispute has generated such heated exchanges both inside and outside
the courtroom, that commentators7  and participant have called it a "war."8 Ex-
aggeratee criticisms.9  According to proponents, the major lesson of the
5 Appellate decisions holding DNA evidence inadmissible include, State v. Schwartz,
447,N.W. 2D 422 (Minn. 1989) Common Wealth v. Curnin. 565, N.E. 2d 44- (Mass, 1991)
Common Wealth v. Lamigan, 596, N.E.2d all (Mass, 1992), People v. Barney,10 Cal.
Rptr.2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) Statev. Vandebogart, 616 A. 2d 843 (N.H.1992) State v.
Anderson, 8532.2d 135 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); United States v. Porter, 618A. 2d 629 (D.C.
1992); Peoplev. Atoigue, No. CR91-95A, 1992 WL 245628 (Guam Dist. Ct. App. Div.Sept.
II, 1992): People v. Wallace, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) Statev.
Bible,No.Vr.90-0167-AP, 1993 WL 306544 (Ariz. Filed Aug. 12, 1993)(enbanc). Trial Court
decisions holding DNA tests in adminissible include People v. Castro,545 N.Y.S. 2d 985
(N.Y. Sup. CT. 1989) : Statev. Wheeler, No. C89-0901 CR (Wash, Co. Or, Cr. Ct. Maz. 8,
1990) State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yuma Co. ArizSuper Ct. Feb. 12, 1991); State v.
Fleming No.90-CR 2716 (Cook Co. III, Cir. Ct. Mar., 12, 1991); Statev. Watson, No. 90-
CR-5546 (Cook Co. III, Ct. Mar 12, 1991)State v. Passino,No. 185-1-90 Fer (Franklin Co.,
VT. Dist. Ct.May 13, 1991); People v. Halik,No. VA 00843 (Los Angeles Co. Cal. Super C.
Sept 26, 1991) United States v. Porter, 120 BAJAY WASH I. RPTR 477 (DC Super Ct.
Spet. 20, 1991); People v. Keene,591NY S. 2d 733,(N.Y. Sup. Cr. 1992).
 Recently, DNA evidence has been ruled inadmissible by two trialo courts in the United
Kingdom as well Regina V. Levy, No. 920188 (Central Crim. Ct. Dec. 7, 1992), Regina v.
Borhma, No. 920857(Central Crim. Ct. Nov. 3, 1992).  These cases are discussed in
William Brown DNA Fingerprinting Bacl in the Dock,NEW SCIENTIST, Mar 6, 1993,at 14.
6   Neufeld & Colman When Science takes the witness stand 262 SCL AM 46 (1990).
7   Edward Humes, DNA War, L.A. TIMES MAG. Nov.29,1992,at 29. For other accounts of
the heared nature of the dispute, see Leslie Roberts, Science in Court. A Culture Clash,
257 Science 732 (1992) ("Vituperative arguments over DNA fingerprinting epitomize the
difficulties of settling ?Scientific disagreements in a highly charged legal environment,
Roberts. Supra note 3at 1721, Christopher Anderson. DNA Fingerprinting Diwscord,354
NATURE 500 (1991).
8  "This is no (longer) a search for the truth, it is aware, the way people are behaving."
Roberts,supra note 7 at 736 (quoting John Hicks, head of the FBI's Laboratory Division).
9 Andre Moenssens,DNA Evidence and Its Critics-How Valid Are the Challenges  31
Jurimetrics 87 (1990); George Clarke,DNA Fingerprinting Critics   Have Run Afoul of
Science, I.A. Daily J.Jan. 28, 1992, at 5 (editorial comment of a prominent California
prosecutor, arguing that scientific Criticism of forensic DNA testing is, "counterfeit
dissent") See generally Roberts,Supra note 7, Leslie Roberts, Hired Cuns or True
Believers,257 Science 735 (1992).
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controversy is that the legal system offers powerful incentives for
ersatzscientific dissent and that courts take such dissent too seriously when
evaluating the admissibility of new scientific techniques. By this account the
hospitality surrounding the dispute arises from frustration over an untenable
situation in which a few dissenting scientists are able to hold a new
technology hostage by voicing ill-conveived objections to it.
On the other hand, critics claim that the new DNA tests were poorly
validated and may be considerably less probative than juries have been led to
believe.10 According to critics, the major lesson of the controversy is that
forensic laboratories are lacking in scientific rigor and that new forensic
techniques re-ceive inadequate scientific scrutiny before they are presented in
Court.11 By this account and atmosphere of hostility surrounds the issue
because promoters of forensic DNA tests have responded to legitimate
criticisms by attacking the critics rather than heeding their message.
 The National Research Council ("NRC") of the National
Academy of Sciences has made an important effort to resolve the underlying
scientific controversy, but has not been entirely successful. Responding to a
"Crescendo of questions concerning DNA typing," the NRC established a
10 Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl. Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing,254
Science 1745 (1991), William M. Shields, Forensic DNA Typing as Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings, Some Problems and potential Solutions, in Proceedings from the Third
International Symposium on Human Identification (1992),William C. Thompson & Simon
Ford, The Meaning of a Match Sources of Ambiguity in the Interpretation of DNA Prints,
in Forensic DNA Technology 93 (Mark Farley & James Harrington eds., 1991).
11    Neufeld & Colman,supra note 3: Lander, supra note 3, Janet Hoeffel, The Dark side of
DNA Prifilings Cureliable Scientific Evidence. Meet the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 465 (1990)
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distinguished panel of experts in 1990 to examine the use of DNA technology
in forensic science.12 The panel's report, based on a two year study, was
released in April 1992.Although the report firmly endorsed the general
Principles behind forensic DNA testing and said such testing should continue,
it acknowledged that there have been problems with the implementation of the
new technology and declared that improvements are necessary.  A number of
its recommendations for improvements are at odds with the current practices
of most forensic laboratories13 and consistent with the suggestions of critics.
Although generated further controversy, including charges that the committee
was biased and subject to improper includence,14 and that some sections  of
the report are scientifically flawed.15  Its recommendations have generally
been hailed by critics as essential for assuring the accuracy of DNA tests ,and
have been dismissed by proponents of the test as unnecessary and
unworkable.
The scientific and legal issues involved in the DNA were warrant close
examination because they can tell us much about the evaluation of new
12    Committee on DNA Tech.In Forensic Science. NAT'I Res. Council, DNA Technology in
Forensic Science VII (1992) hereinafter NRC Report).
13 See State v. Alt., No. K4-90-1437 (Olmsted Co., Minn. Dist. Ct. May 29, 1992) ("the FBI
Laboratory procedures are not totally defective, but neither do they meet the criteria of
the National Research Council and others.") See also Richard Lewontin.  The Dream of
the Human Genome,N.Y.,May 28, at 17. Lowontin notes that the NRC report contains
numerous recommendations which, taken seriously, will lead any moderately business
like defense attorney to tile an immediate appeal of any case lost on DNA evidence." Id,
at 39. The NRC Report cannot properly be read as an endorsement of current laboratory
practices. Lewontin argues. ("Slince no laboratory currently meets (the NRC's)
requirements" for reliable DNA testing. Id.
14   Christopher Anderson,Conflict, Concerns Disrupt Panels, Cland Testimony,355 Nature
753 (1992) Celia Hooper, Rancor Precedes National Academy of Science's DNA
Fingerprinting Report,4) J.NIH RES.26 (1992) Leslie Roberts DNA Fingerprinting:
Academy Reports, 256 Science 300 (1992).
15.  For an account of scientific attacks on the NRC Report.
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techniques in forensic science. The current DNA tests are the first spin-offs of
the molecular revolution in genetics to reach the courtroom, but they will not
be the last.  The lessons taken from the current DNA war will shape the
response of the legal system to battles over the DNA technology of the future.
These lessons may also influence the legal system's response to disputes
about the reliability of other scientific techniques.16
 This Chapter provides an account of the controversy over forensic DNA
testing and suggests some lessons that might properly be taken from it.
discusses the nature of the disagreements among experts and analyzes how
courts should respond to such disagreements.
A.  OVERVIEW OF DNA TECHNOLOGY :
The DNA tests discussed here are the product of basic advance in
molecular biology over the past fifteen years that have revealed a number of
potential methods for detecting genetic differences among individuals.17
Two of these methods have been developed and used for forensic
testing so far, and additional methods are currently being developed.
Continuing  advances in molecular biology and genetics will undoubtedly
prove a wellspring for more technology, sending a continuing stream of new
genetic tests toward the courtroom.
16 See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Kochler, What DNA,"Fingerprinting" can Teach the
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. Rev.361(1991).
17 William C. Thompson & Simon Ford. DNA Typings Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 U. VA. L. Rev. 45 (1989)
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The most widely used method at present, and the method that is the
primary focus of this article, is commonly called DNA fingerprinting of DNA
profiling. It employs a technique know as restriction fragment length
polymorphism (RFLP) analysis in which long strands of DNA are extracted
from biological material and broken into fragments, and then measurements
are made of the length of son.18 If two samples have fragments of different
lengths, they could not have a common source; if they have fragments of the
same lengths, they might have a common source (although they might also
match by chance ).  To reduce the likelihood of a chance match laboratories
attempt to measure six or more distinct framgements.19
Although RFLP, analysis has been used in scientific research since the
early 1980s, it became useful for identification of individuals only with the
discovery of certain areas of DNA, known as variable number tandem repeats
("VNTRs"),where there is a great deal of variability in the length of DNA
fragments and thus a low likelihood that any two people will match with regard
to the length of six   or more fragments. By some accounts, RFLP analysis of
VNTRs produces DNA profiles that are virtually unique to each individual and
thus are akin to fingerprints.20
18 In this process, DNA is broken into fragments through the use of restriction enzymes,
and the resulting fragments are called restriction fragments.  Hence,the polymorphic
areas are known as restriction fragment length polymorphisms ("RFLPs")and
examination of these areas  is called RFLP analysis.
19 In some cases, fewer fragments are measured due to limitations imposed by technical
problems or the limited quality of samples.
20  When DNA profiling tests were first introduced, it was frequently reported that the
likelihood two people would be found, by chance, to have matching DNA prints was
around one in thirty billion.
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DNA profiling was swiftly introduced in the legal system. Although the
term "DNA finger print" did not enter the scientific lexicon until 1985,21 two
commercial laboratories in the United States were offering DNA profiling
services by 1987,22 and 1988 the FBI laboratory began offering such services
to law enforcement agencies nation wide.
There was almost no opposition to the tests at first, but critics gradually
began to emerge. No one has questioned the theory underlying DNA testing
nor the fundamental validity of RFLP analysis Critics' concerns focus solely on
forensic applications of RFLP analysis which, they argue, are more
demanding than other applications of the  technique.23 The three major issues
that have consistently been raised are : (1) the adequacy of standards and
controls for assuring the reliability of the forensic tests,(2) the adequacy of the
procedures used by forensic laboratories to determine whether DNA profiles
"match", and (3) the accuracy of the procedures used to determine the
statistical frequency or rarity of DNA profiles. In subsequent  sections.  These
concerns, and the reactions of courts to them, will be discussed in detail.
A second method for DNA testing, less widely used than DNA profiling,
employs a technique known as polymerase chain reaction (PCR).  PCR tests
identify an area of DNA in which there tends to be variation from one person
to another and then  "amplify,"  that  area  by  causing  the  DNAs  trends   to
21 The term "DNA fingerprint"was coined by British Scientist Alec) J. Jeffreys his
colleageuesin 1985, Alec) J.Jeffreys et al. Individual-specific fingerprints of Human DNI.
316 Nature 76 (1985 ).
22 The two laboratories were Cellmark Diagnostics of Germantown,Md. And Life cordes
Corporation, formerly of Vahalla,N.Y., Now in Stamford, Conn. 24, Sea Lander,Supra
Note 3,at 501.
23 The two laboratories were Cellmark Diagnostics of German town, Md., and Life codes
Corporation, formerly of Valhalla.N.Y.,now in Stamford.conn.
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replicate themselves multiple times selves multiple times.24 Once it is
amplified, the DNA can be "typed" through the use of genetic probes.25 If two
samples have the same type,  they may have a common source; if they do not
have the same type, they could not have a common source.
 The first technique to be developed for "typing" amplified DNA, and the
one that has been most widely used in forensics, examines the HLA DQ-alpha
gene.26  DQ-alpha typing is not as discriminating as DNA profilling : there are
twenty' – one different DQ alpha types27 which range in frequency from about
one to fifteen percent,28 making the likelyhood of a coincidental match
between different samples far higher than with DNA profiling tests. But the
PCR- DQ-alpha test is far more sensitive than DNA profiling allowing it to
"type" samples that are much smaller and older.29
 The first forensic analysis employing the PCR DQ-alpha system was
performed in 1986 by Dr. Edward Blake of Forensic Science Associates
24 The polymerase chain reaction was discovered by Kary B.Mullis,an employee of Cetus
Corporation,a biotechnology firm,and was developed as a technology by Cetus See
generally.NRC Report,Supra note 12,at 63.70;Thompson & Ford,Supranote 18,at 76-81.
25 The probes  are engineered to detect specific forms (alleles) of a given gene,and are
therefore called "allele specific oligonucleotide probes," See Russell Higuchi et al. DNA
Typing from single Hairs, 332 Nature 543, 544 (1988).
26 To be useful for criminal identification, the section of DNA chsen for analysis must be
polymorphic and must have alleles (forms) that can reliably be be identified. The HLA
DQ-alpha gene was the first to be used in forensic PCR tests because it is the first
polymorphic gene that could be identified with primers for which reliable allele-specific
probes were developed. See Higuchi et al, supra note 26, at 544.
27    The DQ-alpha gene has six alleles. People have two copies of this gene in their DNA,
one inherited from the mother and one from the father. Hence, there are 21 different
"genotypes" in the HLA DQ-alpha system, representing all combinations of the six
alleles. Each person has 1 of the 21 genotypes. Catherme I. Comey & Bruce Budowle,
Vahdatron Studies on the Analysis of the HLA DQ-alpha Locus using the polymerase
Chain Reaction, 36 J, Forensic SCL 1633 (1991).
28   The frequency varies across the different types and the frequency of each type varies
some what across different reference populations, ID at 1643.
29    See Higuchi et al., supra note 26, at 545.
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 ("FSA"), a private forensic laboratory.30 FSA was the first laboratory, and for
several years was the  first laboratory and for several years was the only
laboratory, to offer forensic PCR DQ-alpha tests. However, the technology
has recently been licensed to a number of other forensic laboratories. Hence,
evidence from PCR DQ-alpha tests is likely to be offered in court with
increasing frequency.
 The reliability of the PCR-DQ-alpha test has been subject to a great
deal of debate.31  Although no one questions the theory underlying the
procedure, concerns have arisen about its susceptibility to errors caused by
inadvertent contamination of samples or poor "fidelity" of DNA amplification.32
Concerns have also been raised about some of the procedures used by FSA
for interpreting results33 and for estimating the frequency of DQ-alpha types.34
 A number of new techniques, currently at the experimental stage, will
soon reach the courtroom. Several new techniques employ PQR but use
methods for "typing" amplified DNA that afford greater specificity than the DQ-
30 See Edward Blake et al, Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) Amplification and Human
Lrukooyte Antigen (HLA) DQ-alpha oliganucleotide Typing on Biological Evidence
Samples : Casework Experience,  37 J Forensic SCI.700(1992).
31   Like DNA profiling tests,these test are subject to artifacts that can complicate the
interpretation of results in forensic cases. As with DNA profiling, there is considerable
debate about the sub-sceptibility of PCR procedures to artifacts, the conditions under
which artifacts might occur, and the reliability of the procedures used by forensic
analysts to detect antifacts and avoid being misled by them.
32    "In some cases, PCR can be qualitatively faithful but quantitatively unfaithful, because
some alleles amplify more efficiently than others. A sample might contain a 50,
50mixture of two alleles and yield an amplified product with a 90 : 10 ratio.
33    An important point of controversy is whether PCR-DQ-alpha tests provide a reliable
basis for determining which alleles belong to which donor in a mixed sample. Analysts
frequently assign multiple alleles in a mixed stain to "Primary" and "Secondary" donors
passed on the intensity of the "dotes" indicating the presence of the alleles. The
reliability of these assignments is of crucial importance in many cases.
34     FSA uses a statistical estimation procedure that is based on the assumption that the
frequencies of the various DQ-alpha alleles are statically independent.  The
assumption of independence is problematic, however, because there is evidence of
population structure-that is, evidence that some combinations of alleles (genotypes) are
far more common in  some groups than others.
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alpha system.35  Another new method allows analysis of mitochondrial DNA.36
Still another allows analysis of another type of  variation in DNA called a mini
satellite variant repeat ("MVR").37  The latter two techniques represent
fundamentally different approaches to typing DNA than the current RFLP and
PCR-based methods. All of these techniques will require independent
validation and review. Hence, the challenge posed to the legal system by the
need to evaluate new genetic technology is unlikely to diminish and may well
increase, over the foreseeable future.
B.  LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
 The results of new DNA tests are reviewed  by courts for admissibility
in pretrial evidentiary hearings. These hearings have been the primary arena
in which the DNA war has been fought. In the majority of jurisdictions, courts
have applied the  rule established in Frye v. United States,38 under  which
evidence derived from a novel scientific technique may be presented to a jury
only if the court first determines that the technique has "gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.39  In other jurisdictions,
35 Recently,primers and proges have been developed for other polymorphic genes, Methods
for measuring the length of polymorphic fragments of amplified DNA known as amplified
fragment length polymorphisms("AMP-FLPs") and short  tanderm repeats ("STRs")are
also under development and promise to increase the specificity of PCR based tests,
Chantal J.Froggau-Aubin et al.,An Evaluation of STRs and MVRs for Forensic DNA
Typing, Abstract of Paper presented at the meeting of the American Academy of Forensic
Science(Feb.1993) (on file with  William C. Thompson). However, the use of these newer
methods in forensic identification appears to be still at the experimental stage. Most
forensic PCR tests conducted to date have  examined only the HLA DQ-alpha gene.
36. See Mark D.Stone king et al.,Population variation of Human Mitochondrial DNA Control
Region sequence Detected by Enzymatic, Amplification & sequence-specific
oligonucleotide Probes, 48 AM J. HUM. Genetics 370(1991). This novel technique was
recently used for the first time in a case in San Diego, California.
37. Alec J. Jeflreys et al., Manisatellite Repeat Cading as a Digital Approach to DNA Typing
354 Nature 204(1991).
38 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
39 Id.. at 1014. For a genera discussion of the application of the Frye rule to forensic DNA
testing, see Thompson & Ford, supra note 18, at 53-60.
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courts have followed the "relevancy" approach, under which novel scientific
evidence is admitted if the judge determines that it will be more helpful than
misleading to the jury.40
 These admissibility rules primarily serve to shield juries from
misleading or prejudicial scientific testimony. A common theme in appellate
opinions and commentary is that because lay jurors are overawed by science
and lack the capacity to evaluate it critically, unreliable scientific testimony is
likely to be given more weight than it reserves.  There is also concern that
efforts to challenge unreliable scientific evidence through cross-examination
and expert testimony will be inordinately time-consuming, expensive and
confusing and particularly in criminal cases where the prosecution presents
novel evidence, that the defense may be handicapped by an inability to find
experts who are knowledgeable about the new technique.
The Frye rule is generally viewed as a more restrictive standard for
admissibility than the relevancy standard,41 and has proved to be so with
respect to DNA evidence. It is in Frye jurisdictions that DNA evidence has
received the most thorough scrutiny during pretrial admissibility hearings and
has most often been ruled inadmissible.
The Frye standard will be used less commonly in the future, however,
due   to   the   U. S.  Supreme  Court's  decision  in  Daubert  v.  Merrell  Dow
40 For a general discussion of the evaluation of DNA evidence under relevancy rules see
Hoeffel, supra note 11, at 507-19.
41 In relevancy jurisdictions, there is no need to show that scientists generally regard the
procedure as reliable.hence, new procedures about which there is substantial Scientific
controversy may nevertheless be admitted if the court either finds scientific proponents
more persuasive than critics or finds that, notwithstanding the dispute, the jury will be
able to evaluate the evidence appropriately. A necessary consequency of the greater
discretion granted courts in relevancy jurisdictions is that judges bear the burden of
making a correct assessment of both the reliability of scientific evidence and the jury's
competence to evaluate that evidence which, in the case of forensic DNA evidence, is a
formidable task indeed.
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,42 which abrogated the Frye  standard in Federal
trials.Daubert held that Frye had been superseded by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which do not require that scientific evidence meet the test of
general acceptance to be admissible.43   Although Daubert is binding only on
federal courts, it may have significant persuasive effect at the state level,
particularly in states that have adopted evidence codes paralleling the Federal
Rules.44
 But Daubert will not necessarily assure the admissibility of DNA
evidence, Although the Federal Rules do not require that Scientific Evidence
be "generally accepted," the Supreme Court emphasized that the Rules do
require that scientific evidence he valid and that it assist the trier of fact.
 The validity requirement stamps partly from the language of Rule 702,
which states that the subject of an expert's testimony be "scientific
knowledge" ; (I) In order to qualify as "scientific knowledge", An inference or
assertion must  be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must
be supported by appropriate validation i.e., 'good grounds,' based n that is
known."45 Rule 702 also requires that the evidence or to determines a fact isn't
issue."46 whether forensic DNA t4sts have been appropriately validated is
inadequate for at least some aspects of the forensic tests.Judges will need to
42 113 S.Ct. 2786 (19930.
43 Expert testimony is governed by Federal rule of Evidence 702, which states, If Scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the Trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
44   For example, the New Maxico Supreme Court, following the example of Daubert, recently
abandoned the Frye standard. The Court noted that the State's rules regarding Scientific
evidence are identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
45  Daubert, 113 Ct. At 2795.
46  FED. R. Evid, 702; Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
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Weigh this evidence against the claims of scientific supporters that the
techniques are valid.
 The Supreme Court mentioned a number of factors that should bear on
the admissibility of scientific evidence under Rule 702, noting that no single
factor is dispositive.47  The factors include "whether  (the theory or technique)
can be (and has been ) tested."48  "Whether the theory of technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication"49 " The known or potential rate of
error"50 "The existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation"51and finally, whether the theory or technique is
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.52 Parties supporting
and opposing the admissibility of DNA, evidence have disagreed with respect
of each of these factors.
 Rule 702 also requires that scientific evidence or testimony "assists the
trier of fact"53 According to Daubert, this helpfulness standard  "requires a
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
adnmissibiity"54 Some scientific testimony about forensic DNA tests may well
be challenged on grounds that it lacks a valid scientific connection to facts
properly at issue.55
47 Daubert. 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
48 Id.
49 Id. At 2797
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. At 2798.
53 FED. R. Evid, 702.
54 Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2795.
55 For Example, testimony about the Frequency of matching DNA types in a reference
population, even if valid, may be unhelpful if the reference population is inappropriate of if
other factors suggest a tenuous connection between the reported frequency and the
probality  of a flase match in the case at hand. See infra part IV.
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 Finally, the Daubert court emphasized the authority of the judge to
exclude scientific evidence under Rule 403, which permits the exclusion of
relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger  of  unfair  prejudice, confusions  of  the  issues,  or misleading the
jury. . ."56.  The Court noted the special dangers of prejudice surrounding
scientific testimony, which "can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it."57 Following Daubert, opponents of
DNA evidence are likely to place special emphasis on its potential for
prejudice.
THE DEBATE OVER MATCHING IN THE COURTS :
 The difficulty of distinguishing matching and non-matching dna prints
first came to public attention in the widely publicized case to People v.
Castro."58 Life codes corporation had declared a match between blood
samples from a homicide victim and a blood stain on the defendant's watch.
This evidence was offered to prove the defendant's identity as the killer. In a
pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the DNA evidence, several prominent
scientists initially vouched for the reliability of Life codes' findings. But experts
retained by the defendant criticized Life codes." Procedure on and number of
grounds.59  First, there were disagreements about the scoring of bands.
According    to  the  defense  experts.   Life  codes  drew  conclusions  from
ambiguous data, and did so in a seemingly biased manner-scoring fiant bands
56 FED.  R. EVID. 403.
57 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (citing Jack Weinstein Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is sound, it should not be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)
58 545 N.Y.S. 2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
59 Excellent summaries of the scientific issues in Castra may be found in Lander, supra
note3, &Ho4effel, supra note 11.
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According    to  the  defense  experts.  Life  codes  drew  conclusions  from
ambiguous data, and did so in a seemingly biased manner-scoring fiant bands
that  helped incriminate the defendant while ignoring bands that helped
incriminate the defendant while ignoring bands that would have exculpated
the defendant. Life codes' rationale for ignoring potentially exculpatory data
was adhoc and lacked scientific foundation. Life codes had not used adequate
controls to verify that its interpretations were correct and had ignored the
failure of some of the controls it did use. Finally, Life codes had disregarded
discrepancies between the bands it had scored that exceeded its quantitative
match criteria. Consequently, the defense argued that there was inadequate
scientific basis for Life codes' conclusion that the victim's blood and the blood
on the watch had a matching genetic characteristics.60
 These criticisms proved persuasive even to some of the prosecution's
expert witnesses.  In an unusual move, two scientists who had testified  for
the prosecution met privately with two experts for the defense.  The group
issued a statement saying that the results in the case "are not scientifically
reliable enough" to support the conclusion that the two key sample's
matched.61 Thereafter the two prosecution experts retook the stand and
recanted their previous testimony in support of the test.62
60 There was also extensive criticism of Life codes, procedures for estimating the
frequency of the matching DNA prints, which will be discussed  infra at part-III.
61 Lander, supra note 3, at 504.
62 Id. After the DNA avidence was ruled in admissible, defendant Castro pleaded guilty.
Moenssens, supra note 9, 98-99. In discussions of the case, some commentators have
cited the guilty plea an evidence that criticisms of Lifecodes' techniques were over
blown and incorrect. Id, Stolorow & Clarke,supra note 78, at 18-19.
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 The Court ruled the evidence of a DNA match inadmissible under an
innovative legal theory.63  Despite the spectacular clash of experts that had
occurred before him, the judge found that the prosecution had met its burden
under Frye of proving that "DNA forensic techniques and experiments are
generally accepted in the Scientific community and can produce reliable
results.64 The judge construed the scientific clash as a dispute over how
properly to apply a technique that "can produce reliable results" rather than a
dispute about whether the technique is inherently  unreliable. The DNA
evidence of a match was ruled inadmissible because" (t)he testing laboratory
failed in several major respects to use the generally accepted scientific
techniques and experiments. 65  In sum, Castro held that DNA profiling meets
the Frye standard, but  imposed an additional foundational requirement on the
proponent of the technology of demonstrating that the correct techniques had
been used, and held that the prosecution had failed to meet that foundational
requirement.66
 Following Castro, disputes over Life codes' matching procedures have
continued to surface in litigation.67 Scientific critics have questioned the
63 Lifecodes, conclusion that the blood on the waken did not match Castro was not
challenged by the defense; the challenge focused solely on the conclusion that the
blood matched the victim in the case.
64 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S. 2d 985, 999 (N.Y. su. Ct. 1989).
65 Id.
66 A number of courts have followed Castra in requiring proponents of DNA evidence to
make a foundational showing that"correct procedures "were used in the particular case.
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F. 2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990); Smit v. Deppish, 807 p.2d 144
(Kan.1991). People v. Fish back, 829 p.2d 489 (Colo.Ct. App.1992); Perry v. State,586
So. 2d 242(Ala.1991).See generally Edward J. Imwinkebied.The Debate in the DNA
Cases Over the Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence; The Importance of
Human Error as a Cause of Forensic.Masanalysis,69WASH.U.I.Q.19(Cal.Ct.App.1991).
67 Thompson & Ford. Supra note 10, at 98-110 (discussing technical details of several
cases); Attn. Anderson, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial, 342 NATURE 844 (1989); Colm
Norman. Name Case Deals Blow to DNA Fingerprinting  246 SCIENCE 1556 (1989).
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scientific basis for Life codes' quantitative matching. Rule 68 and have
criticized Life codes or relying ambiguous data for calling matches between
bands that differ in size more than allowed by Life codes' quantitative match
criteria.69  Dispute have arisen in some cases over Life codes use f
"monomorphic probes" (which produce a band of the same size in every
sample)to adjust for spurious mis-alignment of bands caused by technical
problems. 70  In the majority of cases, courts have held that disputes over the
matching procedure raise issues going to the weight, rather than the
admissibility, of the DNA evidence.
 At least one court, however, has held that DNA evidence is
inadmissible where the "match" did not meet Life codes" quantitative matching
rule. In People v. Keene, 71 experts for the prosecution 'testified that there
was a 'satisfying impression of a match' here. . ."72.  But two experts retained
by the defendant were neither satisfied with the match, nor impressed by Life
68 The reproducibility studies on which Life codes based its match criteria were performed
on fresh, clean blood samples, See Michael Baird et al. Allele Frequency Distribution of
Two Highly Polymorphic DNA Sequence on Three Ethic Groups and Its Application to
the Determination of Paternity. 39 AM. J. Hum, GENETICS 489, 494(1986). Some
experts final such studies inadequate because they neglect "the artifacts that can arise
with degraded and contaminated evidence samples" and may therefore give an
inaccurate picture of the actual variability of the DNA typing system. Lander, supra note
87, at 820. See also NRC REPORT, Supra note 12 at 61-62 ("The match criterion must
be based on reproducibility studies that show the actual degree of variability observed
when multiple samples from the same person are separately prepared and analyzed
under typical forensic conditions,")(emphasis added).
69 See e.g. Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E. 3d 436 (Ga. 1990) See also Anderson, supra note
100, at 844 (discussing such a case); Norman, supra note 100, at 1556 (discussing
such a case).
70      For a discussion of the problem of spurious band misalignment (sometimes called
"band shift")and the use of monomorphic probes to correct for it, see. NRC
REPORT,SUPRA NOTE 12, AT 59-61; Thompson & Ford. Supra note 10, at 98-110;
Landeer,supra note 87, at 821 (characterizing use of monomorphic probes to correct for
band shift as "venture some").
71 591 N.Y.S. 2d 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
72 Id. At 737.
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Codes' use  of monomorphic probes to "adjust" for the misalignment of bands.
They testified that the use of monomorphic probes for this purpose is not
generally accepted in the scientific community, and that Life codes had
performed, the adjustment  improperly in any case.  Acknowledging the
complexity, of the issue, the court declared "it would be judicial foolhardliness
to submit the issue… to the jury to determine the weight  of such evidence."73
A key factor in the Court's decision was the BRC Report, published shortly
after the hearing in the case, which advised against the use of monomorphic
probes to "adjust" for misalignment of bands, pending further study,74 and
thus strongly supported the defense claim that this  procedure is not generally
accepted in the scientific community.
 Disputes have also arisen over the admissibility of Cellmark's test.75
Cellmark has been criticized for failing to publish research on the
reproducibility of measurements in its DNA typing system,76 for failing to take
a variability  of measurements into account when in established its
quantitative match crierion,77 and for calling matches in cases where the
discrepancies between bands exceeded its quantitative match criterion.78
Cellmark has also been accused  of drawing conclusions in some cases in a
73 Id. At 740.
74 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 60-61.
75 People v. Axell, I Cal, Rptr. 2d 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
76 Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426; Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 739.
77 Cellmark did not perform reproducibility studies before establishing its match criterion. It
initially based its match criterion on the amount of variability in band measurements that
its system could reliably detect,rather than the amount of variability that actually occurred.
Lander has declared this to be an invalid basis for a match criterion because it "ignor(es)
all sources of experimental variability other than the final step of (scoring the band).
78 See e.g.State v.Schwartz,447 N.W.2d 422,426 (Minn.1989)."(T)he Cellmark report opined
that the DNA samples from the stained blue jeans and from (the victim's) blood are from
the same individual, even though the banding pattern did not fit their match criteria."
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cavalier manner, without adequate scientific foundation.79 so far, all
challenges on these grounds have been held to go to the weight rather than
the admissibility of Cellmark's DNA test.80
 The FBI's matching procedure has been similarly disputer.81 The most
extensive and  important clash occurred in United States v. Yee.82 A central
issue in Yee was the adequacy of the FBI's research to validate its matching
procedure research that is described in several published articles.83
Concerned about ambiguities and in consistencies in these articles,84 the
defense in Yee sought access to the underlying data.  After protracted
litigation, access was granted.85
 The defense in Yee made a multi-pronged attack on the FBI's matching
standards based on evaluations of these data by experts they had retained.
First, they argued that the FBI's validation research was inadequate and,
indeed, that many of the conclusions in the FBI's published articles were
either groundless or wrong.86 Second,  they argued that key findings reported
79 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 10,at 116-120 (discussing technical details of several
cases); Thompson & Ford, supra note  95-at 11-15 (manuscript) discussing a case).
80 See. E.g. Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d at 411. But see Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 and
discussion thereof, infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
81 For a particularly cogent critique of the FBI's matching standards,see shields,supranote10
82 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio, 1990).
83 The key publications are Bruce Budowle et al, validation with Regard to Environmental
Insults of the RFLP Procedure for Forensic Purposes, in FORENSIC DNA
TECHNOLOGY (Mar): Farley & James Harrington eds. 1991); Budowle et al., supra note
86,at 841.
84 Prepublication copies of these articles were available in manuscript form during the
YEE hearing in 1990.
85. In United States v. Yee,129F.R.D. 629(M.D. Ohio 1990), the court granted defendants'
motion for discovery.
86. For example,Professor Peter D'Eustachio, a molecular biologist at New York University,
in an expert's Report placed in evidence in Yee. Report of Professor Peter De'Eustachi,
An Evaluation of the FBI's Environmental Insult Validation Study and the FBI's Quanti-
tative Matching Criteria at 5-7,Yee,129 F.R.D.529(hereinafter D'Eustachio Report).
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in the FBI's validation research could not be replicated.87 Third, they
arguedthat the FBI's system for DNA profiling is subject to unpredictable
variability that can affect the sizing of bands and greatly complicate the task of
distinguishing matching and non-matching samples.88  The defense took the
position that too little is known about the variability of the FBI's DNA typing
system, or its susceptibility to artifacts, to allow adequate assessment of the
FBI's matching procedure, but suggested that available evidence indicated the
FBI's quantitative match standards are generally too borad.89
 Experts for the prosecution were unable to refute these criticisms
directly90but managed to persuade the federalmagi strate (whose conclusions
were adopted by the court) that they raise issued going to the weight rather
than the admissibility of DNA evidence.  The court, as did the magistrate,
acknowledged that there is significant disagreement about the reliability of the
FBU's test : "Scientists of indisputable national and international repute and
87 The data that the FBI's scientific staff characterize as "most" important for determination
of a tolerance window for matching criteria for forensic analysis" are contained in Table
3 of Budowle et al, supra note 86,at 842.
88 Another expert for the defense in Yee, Dr. Paul Hagerman of the University of Colorado
Medical School, placed in evidence a report that is highly critical of the FBI's methods
for "Isolation and quantization" of DNA and of the FBI's use of a chemical called
ethidiumbromide ("EtBr) in its gels during electrophoresio of DNA. Report of Dr.
Hagerman, Leading I'ariabiolity and the Use of Ethidium Bromide; Implications for the
Reliability of the FBI's Methodology for Forensic DNA Typing at 1, Yee, 139 FRD 629.
89 Professor Hartl states that the FBI's Window" should be scaled down by approximately
once hall" to be consistent with accepted scientific practice.Hartl Report, supra note
121,at 3. He notes that "(t) he problem with using the (FBI's window is that too many
false matches are declared" and concludes that "the matching criteria employed by the
FBI would not be considered as generally accepted and reliable in the scientific
community."
90 The magistrate generally credited the defense expert's criticisms of the validation
underlying the matching standard, concluding that there were "trouble some questions
about the quality of the Bureau's work." United States v. Yee. 134 F.R.D. 161, 207
(N.D. Ohio, 1991).
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 stature, aided and confronted by lawyers of unusual skill and understanding
of the issues, took diametrically opposed views on the issue of general
acceptability and those views reflected the division of opinion on the merits of
the underlying scientific disagreement."91 Nevertheless, the court ruled that
the FBI's DNA test met the Frye standard.92
A major theme of the prosecution experts in Yee, which the magistrate
(and court) found persuasive, was that a multiple prove match (within the
FBI's standards) is unlikely to occur if two samples from different people.93
and therefore the test is unlikely to incriminate an innocent person falsely, not
withstanding any uncertainties about match criteria.94
 The issues raised in Yee have been replayed in several subsequent
hearings on the admissibility of the FBI DNA test, with mixed results. Some
courts have concluded that challenges to-matching "involve considerations of
the reliability of particular test results and not whether the FBI's techniques
are generally   accepted   as   capable   of   producing   reliable  results."95
Consequently, such considerations "go  to either  the  admissibility of the
91 Id. At 206.
92 Although Yee purported to apply the Frye standard,the case was decided underthe law
of the Sixth Circuit, which has over ruled Fryee sub silent. "United States v. Potter, 120
DAILY WASH , 1,RPTR.477, n.79 (Super Ct. D.C.,1991),VACATED AND REMANDED,
618 a. 2D 629 (d.c. 1992) (CITING c. McCORMICR, evidence & 203,  at 606 (3rd ed.
1984).
93 Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 174-77.
94. The Prosecution position, adopted by the court, was that the value of a DNA match is
necessarily high because the likelihood of a coincidental match is low. The defense
position was that the value of a match on the FBI's system is impossible to evaluate
because insufficient date exist to assess the likelihood of any particular match if the
samples are from the same source, and there is reason to think the FBI could call
matches between samples unlikely to be from the same source.
95 State v. Vandebogart, 616 A 2d. 83, 492 (N.H. 1992) (FBI's DNA test inadmissible
because statistical techniques fail Frye standard). The defense had raised challenges
regarding the size of the FBI's match window, the lack of an objective criteria for
matching, and the insufficiency of the FBI's validation, Id.
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 weight to be given the evidence in a particular case, not admissibility under
Frye,"96
 Only one court has held that the dispute over the FBI's matching
procedure precludes the admissibility of the test under Frye.  In People v.
Halik,97 a Los Angeles trial court concluded that "matching is an integral part
of the total technology which, in a forensic setting, must pass the test of Kelly-
Frye. (consequently,)(m)atching is the keystone in the archway to admissi-
bility."98 To determine whether the FBI's matching procedure passed muster,
the court reviewed, "Perhaps the most comprehensive compilation of judicial
& scientific materials ever assembled for a pre-trial hearing on these issues"99
& found that scientific opinion on the FBI's matching procedure is split, with a
majority of scientists who have publicity spoken on the issue taking the
position that the FBI's matching procedures are unreliable & unacceptable.100
 There is a profound, significant and honestly held disagreement among
these men of science as to whether the protocol employed by the FBI to
declare a match of DNA fragments between a known and an unknown source
has gained general acceptance in their scientific community.101
96 A similar conclusion was reached in United State v.Jackkobetz. 747 F.Supp.250 (D.Vt.
1990)aff'd 955 F.2d 786(2dCir.1992).(FBIDNA test held admissible under relevancy
standard).
97 People v. Halik,No. VA 00843 (Los Angeles Co. Cal. Super Ct. Sept. 26, 1991) (Ruling
and Order of C. Robert Sunpson, Jr. J.).
98 Id. At 16-17.
99 Id at 2. The court took judicial notice of the complete records of the Frye hearings in
several previous cases, including State v. Anderson, 853 p. 2d 135 (N.M. Ct. App.)cer:
granted, 848 p. 2d 51 (N.M. March 11, 1993). United Stated States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D.
161 (N.D. Ohio, 1991); and State v. Despain, No. 15589 (Yum Co., Ariz Super Ct. Feb.
12, 1991) as well as hearing live testimony.
100 Mallik, No. VA00843, at 39.
101 Id.
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No other court has followed Halik, however, no other defense counsel have
raised challenges to the admissibility of the FBI's matching procedures based
on such an extensive record.  Thus, the debate over appropriat4e matching
procedure is probably  not resolved. Indeed, the NRC Report, with is
emphasis on the importance of empirical validation of matching standards, is
likely to add fuel to the debate about current procedures. Moreover,  because
the NRC Report makes it clear that the matching standards for each DNA
typing system must be validated independently,102 the debate is likely to arise
a new as new systems are developed.
 How should courts view disputes over matching ? To address this
question, we must consider two fundamental issues that underlie the
matching debate :
(1) Whether objective match criteria are even necessary, and (2) what kind
of empirical research, if any is needed to validate the match procedure.
THE NEED FOR OBJECTIVE MATCH CRITERIA
 Proponents of DNA testing often argue that a trained analyst can
reliably determine whether DNA prints match by simple visual inspection.103
They suggest that objective match criteria, although perhaps helpful, are not
really necessary.104 Hence, concerns about whether matching rules have
102 NRC REPORT,supra note 12, at 54( "The match criterion must be based on the actual
variability in measurement observed in appropriate test experiments conducted in each
testing laboratory.") (emphasis added).
103 Sec. e.g., Caldwell, v. State 393 S.E. 2d 442 (Ga. 1990) ("Lifecodes contended that a
visual observation was adequate to declare a match)  Smith v. Deppish,807 2d 144,
157 (Ka. 1991) ("One method of declaring a match is simply by visual
determination…").
104 A common argument is that formal match criteria are generally not used by scientists who
perform RFLP analysis for research and genetic diagnosis and therefore should not be
necessary in forensics, See Lender, supra note 3, at 501; Thompson & Ford, supra
note 10, at 24-97; NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 53-54.
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been adequately validated or appropriately followed have little to do with the
fundamental reliability or validity or validity of forensic test.105
But many scientists think objective matching standards are
necessary,and their position has been strongly endorsed by the NRC Report.
The NRC Report declared that objective standards are "essential" both for
scoring DNA prints106 and for determining matches.107 It acknowledged  that
subjective matching rules (e.g. comparison by eye) and the failure to adhore
to a stated matching rule had been a source of considerable controversy and
rejected these practices as inappropriate for forensic DNA testing.108
 Objective standards are needed, in part, because the results of
forensic DNA tests may turn on distinctions among DNA prints too subtle to
be reliably detected by visual inspection.109 Objective match criteria are also
needed in order to estimate the frequency of a match in a reference
population. One cannot determine accurately what percentage of the DNA
prints in a data base would "match" the print of a given individual, unless once
can specify with precision what constitutes a match.110
105 "Whether or not there is a match between  patterns produced by DNA samples extracted
from two or more sources is primarily a qualitative judgment by a knowledgeable
investigator based on a careful review of all information pertinent to the test undertaken."
Statement of the FBI working Group on Statistical Standards for DNA
106 "there must be an objective and quantitative procedure for identifying the pattern of a
sample, NRC REPORT,supra note 12at 53.
107 "The match criterion. . .must be objective precise and uniformly applied." Id. At54.
108  Id.The NRC Report seems to imply that the concerns about matching arose only in early
cases,"Id.But such concerns continue to be raised in litigation and in scholarly articles.
109 In research and diagnositics,scientists generally need to distinguish only three or four
possible DNA prints, each of which is quite distinct and known in advance.
110 (W)ithout an objective definition of a match,there is no meaningful way to determine the
probability that a declared match might have brisen by chance."Lander,supra note 3,at
5020."(T) he probative value of the evidence is best gauged not by the frequency of
prints that would match perfectly, but by the frequency of prints that would match under
the looser standards actually used by the analyst."Thompson & Ford. Supra note 10,at
97.
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 The most important reason for using objective standards, however, is
to prevent analysis from engaging in an appropriate bootstrap logic when
evaluating DNA evidence. Commentators have noted a disturbing tendency
for forensic analysts to resolve ambiguities in DNA patterns in a manner
consistent with the expected result.111 The analyst may, for example, infer
that a discrepancy between two DNA profiles on one autorad must be an
artifact (rather than a true genetic difference) because there is a match on the
other autorads or, worse yet, because other evidence in the case suggests
the two profiles have a common source.112  Professor Eric Lander has
condemned this kind of bootstrap interpretation in forensics because "one
runs the risk of discounting precisely those differences that would exonerate
an innocent defendant.113 An analyst who too readily dismisses discrepancies
in a DNA test that do not fit with other evidence can mistakenly conclude that
weak, equivocal evidence is quite powerful and thereby mislead the trier of
111 For example, Lander has suggested that Life codes' analysts failed to score potentially
exculpatory bands in the Castro case because they were "influenced by making direct
comparison between lanes containing different NDA samples, rather than by
considering  each lane in its own right." Lander, supra note 3, at 502.  Recognizing this
danger, the NRC Report declared that "(i) it is not permissible to decide which features
of an evidence sample to count and which to discount on the basis of a comparison
with a suspect sample, because this can bias one's interpretation." NRC REPORT,
supra note 12 at 53.
112 "Analysts not only know which samples are expected to match, but often are familiar
with details of the case wholly unrelated criminal history of the suspect and the opinions
of the police regarding likelihood  of guilt. Where samples are submitted by a law
enforcement agency, direct communication between voiced that when faced with
ambiguity (whatever its technical cause), it may be difficult for the analyst not to be
influenced by this type of information." Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 141.
113 Lander, supra note 3, at 502.
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fact.114  Bootstrap interpretation, whether intentional or unintentional can best
be prevented by the use of objective standards that remove the subjective
component of matching.
 A key issue now facing courts is whether to exclude DNA evidence
from laboratories that fail to comply with the NRC Report's call for "objective
and quantitative rules for identifying the pattern of a sample" and "a precise
and objective matching rule for declaring whether two samples match."115 In
light of the NRC Report, litigants challenging the admissibility of DNA
evidence can make a powerful showing that subjective interpretation of DNA
prints is not generally accepted in the scientific community.  They may also be
able to show that subjective interpretation undermines the accuracy of
statistical estimates and creates a serious danger or prejudice by allowing
analysis in some cases to engage in inferential bootstrapping.
 Such challenges have generally been unsuccessful so far, but have
been deflected by arguments that fail to withstand close analysis. For
example, in State v. Jobe,116 the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed
concerns about subjectivity in the FBI's matching procedures with the
observation that "each sample is also examined by a second trained examiner
114 An analyst who ignores an otherwise troubling discrepancy on one autorad because
there are good matches on other authorads is not treating the various bands in DNA
prints as independent data.  This practice invites overvaluation of the evidence because
the trier of fact receives statistics in connection with the DNA evidence that are
computed based on the assumption that the bands provide independent data. An
analyst who takes into account the apparent strength of the case against the suspect
when making critical judgments, such as what to make of an "extra band," is not
treating the DNA evidence as if it were independent of other evidence in the case. This
practice also invites overvaluation of the evidence in the case, because the trier of fact
is unlikely to appreciate that what the analyst says about the DNA evidence depends
partly on the strength of other evidence in the case.
115 NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at the NRC Report characterizes such objective
standards as "requirements" for DNA testing. Id.
116 486 N.W. 2d 407 (Minn. 1922).
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and ultimately the 'match' is confirmed or rejected through computer analysis
using wholly objective criteria.117 By this analysis, defendants have no cause
to complain about subjectivity in the determination of matches because a
match is not called unless it meets the "objective" quantitative match
standards as well as the analyst's subjective standards; hence, subjectivity
can never work against the defendant. This analysis is misleading for two
reasons.
 First, the "wholly objective" quantitative standards are applied by the
computer to data (band sizings) that are themselves determined
subjectively.118  For example, whether samples 18 and 25 in Figure 2 would
be declared match   or not by a laboratory's "wholly objective criteria" depends
entirely on how an analyst chooses to score the bands-which is to say that it
depends on the analyst's subjective discretion.  To label this process "wholly
objective" is to give objectivity a new and perverse meaning.
 Second, the use of quantitative match criteria des not eliminate the
need for subjective judgments regarding the reasons for discrepancies in the
number of bands.119 Such discrepancies are common and require careful
review because they are potentially exculpatory. The use of quantitative
match criteria will not prevent an analyst from mistakenly attributing to
experimental artifact a discrepancy that actually reflects a genetic difference
between samples, nor will it prevent the analyst from making such
determinations through in appropriate and prejudicial bootstrap inferences. In
117 Id. At 420.
118 The FBI arguably does not have the "objective and quantitative rules for identifying the
pattern of a sample" called for by the NRC see. E.g., supra note 81 and accompanying
text concerning State. V. Despain No. 15589 (Yuma Co. Ariz. Super Ct. Feb. 12, 1991).
119 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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 such cases, the analyst's subjective judgment clearly can work against the
defendant, notwithstanding the application of quantitative match criteria.
 On the other hand, problematic subjective calls may play a pivotal role
only in a minority of cases.120 If the case before a Court is one in which
experts all agree about the "match, it seems unreasonable to exclude the
evidence  on grounds that the match criteria are subjective.  The best
resolution to this dilemma may be the approach recommended in Castro:
holding a pretrial hearing to determine, as a foundational matter,  correct
procedures were followed in the case at hand.121 This approach was recently
endorsed  by the California Court of Appeal in People v.   Barney.122  The
court acknowledged the NRC panel's call for objective matching standards,
but concluded that the NRC report "does not equate the absence of a
standardized rule with a lack of general acceptance as to the matching step of
DNA analysis 123 and hence does not render subjective tests inadmissible per
so under the  Frye standard.124 However, the court left  open to litigatings the
120 While testifying in People v. Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d 429 (1991). Professor Gerge
Sensabaugh opined that two independent analyst, interpr4eting forensic autorads,
would reach the same conclusions" (m)ore than nine out of then times," Id. At 865.
Professor Simon Ford, who has reviewed autorads in over 100 forensic cases,
estimates that substantive disagreements about interpretation would occur in one-
quarter to one third of cases, with a higher rate for some laboratories than
others.Telephone Interview with Professor Simon Ford (March 16, 1993). Thus, in the
majority of cases, the match/no match determination may be straightforward, requiring
minimal subjective analysis.
121 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
122    1- Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
123     Id. At 739.
124    This conclusion is, of course, debatable. It seems difficult to maintain that subjective
matching procedure are acceptable when a distinguished national panel, appointed by
the National Research Council to examine the issue, has stated that objective
standards are "necessary" and "required".  On the other hand, the NRC panel also
recommended that DNA analysis "be continued while improvements and changes
suggested in this report are being made." NRC REPORT, Supra note 12,at x.
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opportunity to raise foundational challenges to the admissibility of  DNA
evidence in particular cases on grounds that the laboratory failed to use"
correct scientific procedure" for declaring amatch.125 Under this rule, a
defendant presumably could challenge the admissibility of a result that
depended heavily on a contested subjective call by as analyst.  In light of the
significant danger of prejudice that may arise from subjective interpretation of
DNA tests, such challenges deserve to be taken very seriously by the courts.
WHO IS AN EXPERT ?
 One of the difficulties courts have faced in dealing with the statistical
dispute is determining which scientists have relevant expertise.  This issue is
important in every jurisdiction, but has special significance under Frye which
requires that a novel technique be generally accepted "in the relevant
community." Disputes over the scope and boundaries of the  relevant
scientific community have been frequent as prosecutors have tried to define
the community have been frequent been frequent as prosecutors have tried
to define the community in a manner that excludes or marginalizes scientific
critics, while defense lawyers have tried to make the critic central.
A number of the Experts who have been called by the defense to testify
about theoretical issues in population genetics, such as the implications  of
population structure for the independence of alleles, are evolutionary
biologists who do experimental work with fruit flies.126  Prosecutors have
125    The use of match criteria in a given case is properly addressed as part of the inquiry
whether "correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case."Barney, 10 cal
Rptr. 2d at 739-40.
126   Because it breads profusely, using diploid, sexual reproduction, with a very short time
between generations, the fruit fly is an ideal organism for studying the transfer and
distribution of genetic characteristics through large populations over multiple
generations.
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argued that these experts are not qualified to comment on the frequency of
DNA prints because their expertise concerns flies rather than humans.  This
boundary drawing maneuver proved successful in some cases,127  perhaps in
part because it was supported by testimony from experts on the FRI's
scientific staff, although it has been disavowed by most scientists,128 To
assess such a challenge to the expertise of a scientific witness obviously
requires a court to delve rather deeply into the nature and foundations of
scientific expertise in esoteric fields. Thus, the notion that the Frye rule is easy
to apply and that it protects judges from the need to delve deeply into
scientific issues has not proven to be true for forensic DNA evidence.
Other boundary disputes concern scientists' familiarity with pertinent
facts.  A common attack against scientists in an opposing camp is that they
are unaware of certain key facts (often recent unpublished research findings)
that would (or should) alter their opinion. In theory, a court need not consider
how well informed the disputing scientific camps are in order to apply the Frye
rule.  The court need only determine whether there is a dispute in the
"relevant scientific community." However, a number of courts have considered
scientific knowledge a factor in defining  the relevant community, and have
127  In two Frye hearings in California, a judge issued written findings indicating that "human
population genetics" and "non-human population genetics" are distinct fields and that
"non-human population Genetics is not within this relevant scientific community.
Drosophila experts in the field of Evolutionary Biology are not within the relevant
scientific community,"  People v. Martinez, No.C-82183 (Orange Co. Cal. Super Ct. J,
Concerning the admissibility of a DNA test performed by the Orange Country,
California, Sheriff's Crime Laboratory).  The same findings were issue by Judge Millard
in People v. Cross No. C-75486 (Orange Co. Cal. Super, Ct. Apr.4, 1991) (a case
concerning the admissibility of the FBI DNA test).
128 For example ,Professor Bruce Weir, who is perhaps the most distinguished population
geneticist to testify in favour of current  statistical procedures, has denied that there is
any distinction between human and non-human population genetic, Record at 90,
People v. Halik No. VA-000843 (Los Angles Co. Cal. Super Ct. July 23, 1991).
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looked for general acceptance only among "knowledgeable scientists."
This application of Frye can enmesh the court in complex technical
disputes about whether particular scientific findings do or do not resolve
scientific concerns raised by critic. Moreover, carried to its logical extreme, it
can lead to ludicrously narrow requirements for  general acceptance.129  Yet
courts have found it difficult to resist the invitation to ignore ignorant voices,
and have been all to willing to undertake the assessment task that follows
from accepting such an invitation.  The success of lawyers on both sides at
discrediting opposing experts by exposing gaps in their knowledge has
provided an incentive for lawyers to rely on seasonal experts-repeat players
who stay on top of every new development.130
LESS FROM THE DNA WAR :
While debate has raged over DNA profiling, new genetic identification
procedures are already being developed. Molecular biology is advancing
rapidly, and forensic scientists have been eager to adapt the new DNA
technology to their purposes. New forensic tests involving more sophisticated
129 One population geneticist testified that the FBI's statistical technique was "Universally
accepted" among knowledgeable scientists. When confronted during cross-examination,
with criticisms of the FBI's methods made by other population geneticists (Hartl, Lewontin,
Lander, Mueller), he acknowledged their expertise but discounted then opinions because
they were unfamiliar with an important set of data.  Further cross examination revealed
that the data in question had not been published, were not publicly available, and had
been analyzed only the witness himself. Under the witness' narrow definition of the
relevant community, "Universal acceptance" was tantamount to acceptance by a single
individual, himself, Record at 99-120. People V. Halik, No. VA-00843 (Los Angeles Co.,
Cal. Super Ct. July 23, 1991)(Testimony of Dr. Bruce Weir).
130 It also has placed a premium on strategic use of discovery proceedings as each side tries
during the discovery phase to hold beck in formation that can be used to ambush
opposing experts in court, while trying to force, disclosure of information that might be
used in similar fashion by the other side.
518
techniques are already beginning to appear.131 What lessons have we learned
from the "war" over the first round of DNA technology that will help in
evaluating the new tests ?
A.. NEW FORENSIC TECHNIQUES MUST BE VALIDATED :
A major source of uncertainty about DNA profiling was the failure of
forensic laboratories to validate the techniques adequately at the outset.132
Proponents assumed to readily that the acceptance of RFLP analysis for
research and genetic diagnosis assured it would be reliable for forensic
identification.  They failed to anticipate all of the difficulties that would be
raised by the transfer of RFLP technology to forensics. In retrospect, it is clear
that some widely cited claim about forensic DNA tests were simply false,133
while other claims lacked an adequate scientific foundation.134 Courts have
been slow to catch and correct these errors.135
Whether all of the criticisms raised in court were valid remains to be
seen. Only time and additional research will tell, for example, the extent of
population structure or the rate of false positives in forensic DNA testing.  But
regardless of whether the situation turns out to be as good as supporters
131 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
132  See NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at ch. 2.
133 See e.g., supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text for the claim that DNA tests are
incapable of producing a flase positive and for the claim that loci on different
chromosomes are necessarily in linkage equilibrium. Compare testimony of Dr.Patrick
Conneally, in people V. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)with NRC
REPORT Supra note 12, at 77-82, and Lewontin & Hartle, supra note 10 at 1747.
134 See e.g. supra note 214 and accompanying text for the claim that VNTR alleles are
statistically independent.
135 The erroneous statement that DNA profiling incapable of producing a false positive,  for
example, has been remarkably persistent. See, People V. Wesley, 589 N.Y.S. 26 197,
200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) ("(I)t is impossible under the RFLP procedure to obtain a false
positive result, i.e. to indentify the wrong individual as the contributor of the DNA being
tested."
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hope or as bad critics fear, these concerns should have been raised and
evaluated.  Indeed recent developments have been kind to the critics. Leading
scientists have sided with the earliest critics and the NRC Report has
acknowledged the seriousness of their concerns.
Perhaps the most valuable and important aspect of the NRC Report is
that it sets forth, in considerable detail, the steps that a laboratory should take
to validate a new forensic DNA typing procedure. The NRC's validation
standards take into account not only the range of problems that have arisen in
connection with DNA profiling, but also issues likely to arise in connection with
newer technology.  When evaluating the admissibility of current and future
DNA technology, courts should be very attentive to whether the validation
research recommended by the NRC Report has been done. If it has not, then
a strong case can be made for excluding the laboratory's results either on
grounds that they fail to meet the general acceptance standard of Frye or that
they are insufficiently validated to constitute "scientific knowledge" under
Daubert.
B.  NEW FORENSIC TECHNIQUES MUST BE EXPOSED TO BROAD AND
OPEN SCIENTIFIC SCRUTINY.
Exaggerated claims about the new tests probably arose, in part, from
proponents enthusiasm about a promising new technique.  The claims were
then perpetuated by commentators who confused  the commercial hyperbole
of laboratories marketing the new tests with scientific fact.
1. FORENSIC SCIENCE HAS INADEQUATE INTERNAL MECHANISMS
FOR DETECTING PROBLEMS AND CORRECTING ERRORS :
The persistence of inadequately validated assertions may also reflect
flawed error-checking mechanisms in the field of forensic science.
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Forensic DNA tests were initially shielded from broad scrutiny by the
scientific community.They were developed by commercial laboratories
whose procedures were proprietary, whose work product was generally
not available for examination by  outsiders (except when used in a court
hearing), and whose laboratory protocols were initially available only by
court order. The forensic scientists who developed and validated the
techniques on both commercial and government laboratories were well
aware that they should be called upon to defend the new tests when their
admissibility was challenged in litigation, and that they had a professional
state in the outcome of that litigation.136 In that atmosphere, they  had little
incentive to air and discuss problems, and strong incentive to suppress
doubt and uncertainty for fear that candid statements would be used
against them in court.
It is not surprising, then, that the emergence of DNA profiling tests was
accompanied by what one commentator called "scientific happy talk" rather
than critical evaluation.137 Until recently, there has been almost no discussion
in the scientific literature of the novel aspects of forensic DNA tests
(particularly the matching and statistical procedures) that have become
controversial.  Given the institutional structure of forensic science, future
innovations are likely to emerge in the same manner.
136 Burk, supra note 309, at 79-8-0 (Employees of forensic labs "have a clear peculiary
interest in the acceptance of DNA evidence by the Courts. The success of their
employers and the stability of their own employment depends upon continued use of
DNA testing.")
137 Statement of Eri c Lander at the meeting of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers (March 16, 1990).
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2.  SCIENTIFIC CRITICS MAY BE SLOW TO EMERGE
At first, nearly all of the academic scientists who testified about DNA
evidence were supportive, some defense lawyers reported they were unable
to find any scientists who were critics. Proponents of DNA evidence were
undoubtedly more successful in recruiting experts, at first, because, they were
helped by the forensic laboratories, while opponents were left to their own
devices. Many criminal defense lawyers wasted their time in a fruitless search
for scientists who would  challenge the fundamental principles and theory of
DNA testing, not realizing that the real issue is not the validity of the
underlying theory but the reliability of the scientific  protocols designed to
implement the theory. Of course, most academic scientists also did not realize
that this was an issue, because they were unaware of the details of the
forensic procedures.  In most of the hearings that occurred before 1989, the
defense failed to produce a single witness to challenge the reliability or
general acceptance of forensic DNA tests, and efforts of defense lawyers to
raise concerns through cross-examination were notably in effective.138
Defense counsel eventually recruited experts from the ranks of
academic scientists. None of these defense experts had any previous
experience in forensic testing. Some learned about forensic DNA testing from
the published articles and conference presentations  of those engaged in
forensic  DNA testing; most, however, first became familiar with the details of
forensic DNA testing only upon being retained by criminal defense lawyers to
examine DNA evidence and give a second opinion.
138 Hoeffel, supra note 11, at 514-15.
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Some of these experts were slow to appreciate the full range of
problems that might arise in forensic testing because they often saw only one
or two cases.  Their limited exposure to casework gave them little basis for
assessing the range of possible results for a particular procedure and limited
opportunity to observe and document problems that might occur in some
cases but not others.  Experts who speculated about problems  that might
occur (but had not occurred in the case at hand) were dismissed as having
raised "hypothetical problems.139 In fact, problems dismissed as
"hypothetical" in early cases often appeared in later cases. This experience
should  alert courts, particularly appellate courts, to the danger of foreclosing
challenge to a new procedure before casework experience, and critical
scrutiny  by independent scientists, reveal the  full range of problems.
3.  EVALUATION OF NEW FORENSIC TECHNIQUES IS IMPEDED BY
SECRECY :
Efforts of defense experts to evaluate the tests were also impeded by
the secrecy of  forensic laboratories.  Protracted battles over discovery
erupted in 1989 and 1990 as defense lawyers, guided by their new experts,
sought more information. Information emerged piecemeal and fueled a
running dispute that pitted groups of critics and  supporters against each other
in one hearing after another.
Generally, defense experts have been allowed to see the laboratory
reports, lab notes and autoradiographs in the case inquyestin.140 However,
139 People v. Axell, I Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
140 However, this has not always been the case, In one capital case in Texas, which the
author has studied, the prosecutor provided to the defense in advance of trial only this
own expurgated (and incorrect)summary of what the laboratory report stated Hicks v.
State, 860 S.W. 2d 419 (Tex. Crim.App. 1993), aff, g. No.88-134-CR (Freestone Co.,
Tex. 1989). The prosecutor's actions are discussed in Simon Ford & William
Thompson. Letter, Reply SCIENCES JULY/aUG. 1990 AT 10.
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questions over access to laboratory protocols, population data, bases, and the
raw  data underlying laboratory validation studies and proficiency  tests have
led to extensive controversy and protracted litigation.
The forensic laboratories have resisted disclosing these materials on a
variety of grounds, including claims that the materials are legally irrelevant, 141
constitute trade secrets142 and are privileged.143 The fight against  disclosure
has been led by prosecutors with the active assistance of private lawyers
hired by the commercial laboratories and FBI staff counsel.
Defense lawyers fought hard for disclosure and gradually gained
ground. In several early cases, defense lawyers spent more time and money
in efforts to obtain information which their experts had requested than they did
in litigating the substantive issues.  A ruling of the Minnesota Supreme Court
holding the Cell mark DNA test in admissible based, in part, on Cellmark's
refusal to disclose information requested by the defense marked an important
early victory for defense lawyers.144  An Iowa District Court helped defense
lawyers gain more ground when it compelled the FBI to disclose results of its
141 A summary of some of the legal arguments may be found in the order of federal
magistrate, granting discovery to the defense in United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629
(N.D.Ohil 1990)
142 The trade secret argument lost its force after commentors pointed out the fundamental
incompatibnility of the claim that protocol is a trade secret and the claim that is
generally accepted by the scientific community within the meaning of the Frye standard.
143 The FBI claimed that some of the scientific studies at had conducted to check the
accuracy of its DNA tests were priviledged, arguing that forced disclosure of the results
of such research would deter the agency from doing such research in the future and
would therefore be a bad policy see Yee, 129. F.R.D. at 629.
144 The fair trial and due process rights are implicated when data relied upon by
a Laboratory in performing tests are not available to the opposing party for review and
cross examination. The defense request for specific information regarding its
methodology and population data base was denied by Cellmark, "State v. Schwartz,
447 N.W. 2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989).
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proficiency testing studies.145  The most important discovery ruling, however,
came in United States v. Yee, where a federal magistrate granted the defense
access to the raw data underlying the FBI's validation research and population
data bases.146 The wisdom of this ruling quickly became apparent when
defense experts found instances in which conclusions published in scientific
journals by FBI employees were not supported by the underlying  data.
Nevertheless, efforts to obtained discovery of such data have met strong
resistance and have only been partly successful.
Even when courts have ordered discovery, compliance has been
grudging.  Internal memorandum obtained through court-ordered discovery
from the FBI show that the agency contemplated destroying its own scientific
data concerning the performance of its DNA test in proficiency trials rather
than turn the data over to defense lawyers.147  The adversarial nature of the
discovery process has engendered game-playing by the litigants.  Some
defense lawyers have made unnecessarily broad discovery requests in the
hope of at least obtaining something; the forensic laboratories have
stonewalled, provided information in misleading formats, ex-aggregated the
145 Record Vo.II at 57, State v. Smith No.41733 (Polk Co.,Iowa Dist. Ct. Dec. 18,
1989)Waan the Judge in Smith Smith held a hearing on a defense request for discovery
of the results of the FBI's internal proficiency tests in late 1989 FBI administrator James
Kearney, Section Chief of the FBI's Forensic Science Research and Training Centre,
flew to Des Moines, along with FBI Legal Counsel I.W. McFarland, to argue against
such as order.
146 United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Chio, 1991). Court should be mindful of fears
expressed by some that "retrospective validation by a laboratory already heavily
invested in a particular technology or procedure will be half-hearted, goal-directed self-
congratulatory or even deceitful," Thompson & Ford, supra note 10, at 151.
147 Memorandum from FBI Legal Counsel to Assistant Director, FBI Laboratory Division
(April 20,1990)(Introduced in evidence in Yee).
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time and expense required   to produce materials,148 and generally released
data in a piecemeal manner that has made it difficult for experts in any
particular case to become fully informed.
Scientific scrutiny of the forensic tests was also impeded by the use of
protective orders. In cases where courts have ordered intensive disclosure of
information by forensic laboratories, prosecutors have often requested that
the court also issue a confidentiality order to protect alleged trade secrets and
prevent defense experts from taking unfair advantage of information provided
to them in discovery.149 In some cases; these orders have placed severe
limits on what  use defense  experts could make of the information by
forbidding them from discussing it with anyone not  involved in the case and
specifically barring them from making reference to the information in any
publication, lecture or conversation about forensic DNA testing.150  Defense
lawyers  complain that forensic laboratories have used these protective orders
to frustrate defendants' preparation of their cases, prevent necessary
consultation among scientific experts and keep problems in their techniques
secret.
148 In a recent civil paternity action, for example one commercial laboratory estimated the
cost of complying with a request for information about studies validating its procedures
to be $ 684.925.  After a lengthy hearing on the issue; the court found that the
laboratory response to discovery "lacked credibility". And that the laboratory had
wanted to charge defendant money to produce…information that did not exist. Rodick
v. Cazale, No.379-874 (Parish of Jefferson, La, Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 1991).
149 Forensic scientists have expressed fears that their unpublished data may be "stolen" by
defense experts, or used in a manner or  for purposes they disapprove. Fear of
disclosure is also aid to hinder  efforts of forensic scientists to establish collaborations
Affidavit of FBI employee Bruce Budowle in support of the Government's motion
opposing the defendant's discovery request at 8, Yee, 129 F.R.D. at 629.
150 See. E.g., State v. Ferguson, No.591717 (St.Louis Co. Mo Cir. Ct. June 25, 1991).(Order
relating to discovery of DNA typing material).
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Scientific discussion has also been impeded by concerns about who
has the right to comment upon and publish data that is made public in court
hearings. For example, in two instances the FBI has refused to allow defense
experts to cite or rely upon unpublished FBI data in academic
publications.151These refusals were apparently based on a desire to protect
the FBI employees' right of first publication of data which they collected (at
government expenses). However, the refusal to allow defense experts to use
the data prevented much-needed public scrutiny and commentary upon the
FBI's procedures.  The data had  repeatedly been relied upon in litigation but
has not been (and may never be) published.
The recent report of the National Research council argues powerfully
for greater openness and public scrutiny of the techniques used in DNA
testing.  Nothing that some laboratories had used methods that "were not
experimentally supported," the NRC Report traced the problem to the
absence of "open scientific scrutiny" and to the failure to publish a detailed
explanation and justification of methods.152
Presenting scientific conclusions in criminal court is at least as serious
as presenting scientific conclusions in an academic paper.  According to long-
standing and wise scientific tradition, the data underlying an important
scientific conclusion must be freely available, so  that other can evaluate the
results and publish their own findings, whether in support or in disagreement.
There is no excuse for secrecy concerning the raw data. Protective orders are
151 One episode is described in Christopher Anderson, FBI Attaches Strings to its DNA
Database. 357 NATURE 618 (1992)
152   NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 56.
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in appropriate, except for those protecting individual's names and other
identifying information, even for data that have not yet been published or for
data claimed to be proprietary. If scientific evidence is not yet ready for both
scientific scrutiny and public re-evaluation by others, it is not yet ready for
court.153
The DNA war would have been shorter and more productive had the
NRC's recommendations  been followed from the beginning.
4.  EVALUATION OF NEW FORENSIC TECHNIQUES MAY BE IMPEDED
BY ACTIVE EFFORTS TO SURPRESS CRITICISM AND DISCREDIT
CRITICS.
The acrimony that has made litigation over DNA evidence a "war"
stems, in part, from proponents' efforts to silence or discredit critics,154 in
order to prevail under the Frye standard, and from critics ' resentment at being
treated in such a fashion.  The nasty, personal nature of exchanges between
prosecutors and defense experts, both inside and outside the courtroom, has
been widely noted.155 For example, prosecutors and FBI personnel have been
accused of making threatening comments and spreading false rumors about
scientists who have testified for the defense. Perhaps the most disturbing
allegations, however, are that proponents of DNA testing have attempted to
corrupt the peer-review process in order to prevent the publication of articles
critical of the forensic tests.
153 Id. At 93-94.
154 See generally Gina Kolata, Critic of GeneticFingerprint' Tests Tales of Pressure to
Withdraw Paper, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at Al., Leslie Roberts, Prosecution v.
Scientist : A Cat-and Mouse Games, 257 SCIENCE 733 (1992); Anderson, Supra note
14, at 753.
155 Roberts, supra note 9, at 753.
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 In one episode, a federal prosecutor twice called Professor Daniel
Hartal and allegedly pressured him to withdraw an article that had already
been accepted for publication by Science.156  According  to Hartal, who found
the calls chilling,’’ the prosecutor cited the ‘’ political consequences’’ of
publishing the article and ‘’ possible disasterous consequences for future DNA
fingerprint- based prosecutions.157  After Hartl refused to withdraw the paper,
a prominent scientific supporter of DNA testing, Dr. Thomas Caskay, who has
been a    frequent prosecution witness, persuaded the editor of Science to
reconsider publication of the article.158 It was eventually published, but  only
after Hartl and his co-author, Richard Lawontin agreed to "tone’’ their
criticism.159  Furthermore, at Caskey’s recommendation, the editor took the
tinusual step of soliciting a rebuttal article from two proponents of DNA
testing, which was published in the same issue. Caskey told Nature that he
had intervened in the editorial process of Science because’’ he was
concerned that ‘publishing defense testimony in a scientific journal gives it
such weight that course might reopen, perhaps to overturn convictions
obtained on the basis of DNA evidence. 160
  Another defense witness, Professor  Laurence Mueller, has been the
target of  numerous public attacks by a California prosecutor.161 The
prosecutor has sent a series of letters  criticizing Mueller to editors
considering  publication  of  Muleller’s  scientific  articles   and   to   Mueller’s
156 Kolata, supra note 340, at Al, Roberts,  supra note 7, at 732; Anderson, supra note 7 at
753.
157 Anderson, supra note 7, at 500.
158 Roberts, supra note 7, at 735.
159 Anderson,"supra note 7, at 500.
160  Id.
161 Roberts, supra note 340, at 753.
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department  chair and  University Chancellor.The  letters make disparaging
statements about the quality of Mueller’s scientific testimony and suggest  that
he is an unethical individual whose work warrants special scrutiny. The
prosecutor characterizes Mueller’s ideas as ‘’ knuckle-headed’’ and claims
that they ‘’ could conceivably result in a vicious violent criminal being freed to
continue to  prey on society. 162
In yet another episode, a Minneapolis prosecutor was tipped off that a
defense witness,Professor Seymour Geisser,had submitted an article to
Genetics and that the article had been rejected   based on negative reviews.
163 The prosecutor apparently learned about the bad reviews before Geisser
himself. Fifteen minutes before Geisser received, by fax the comments  of the
editor and reviewers on his he received a fax from the prosecutor requesting
that he bring  the reviews with  him to court when he came to testify the
following weak. Subsequent inquiry  revealed  that the author of the most
negative review was  Dr.Ranjit Chakraborty, a frequent prosecution witness,
who often is at loggerheads with Geisser in the courtroom.Chakraborty has
collaborated with  FBI scientists  on research designed to validate the FBI’s
DNA test, of which Geisser has been critical, and was co-recipient of a $
200,000 grant from the Department of Justice to support additional validation
research . He did not inform the editor of Genetics of any potential conflict
when he was asked to review Geisser’s article.164
162  Id.
163 Christopher Anderson, Comadence or Conspiracy ? 355 NATURE 753 (1992), Roberts,
supra note 7, at 736
164  Id.
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These efforts to suppress criticism probably stammed from proponents’
attempts to meet the general acceptance  standard  imposed by Frye. The
Frye standard is designed to block the admissibility of evidence about Which
here is a serious scientific controversy. As the California Supreme Course
once put it, if  "scientists significant either in number  or expertise publicly
oppose……( a scientific technical ) as unreliable, " a court may safely,
conclude that it should not be presented to the jury. 165 Consequently, the
admissibility of the technique in court is threatened when scientists begin
speaking out in opposition to it.
The only effective way to deal with critics is to silence them or discredit
them. Proponents cannot simply argue that the critics are wrong (although
they may sincerely believe this).  Under the general acceptance standard,
courts are not supposed to decide which scientists are right and which are
wrong in a scientific dispute; the mere existence of a serious disputes over the
fundamental value of scientific evidence randers it inadmissible.If proponents
debate the critics in a  respectful manner they implicitly admit the existence of
the dispute, which is fatal to their cause. Therefore, name-calling and
personal assault, rather than respectful debate, persists in this area. Courts
should recognize unfortunate reality and not assume that experts targeted by
disparaging attacks are necessarily unworthy  of  notice.
165 People v. Shirley, 723 p. 2d 1354, 1377 (Cal. 1982).
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LESSONS FROM THE ‘’ DNA  WAR’’
IV. CON CLUSION
It is hard to disagree with Eric Lender’s observation that, when you try
to manage the quality of scientific evidence the legal system is a very, very
blunt instrument. 166  The legal debate polarized the scientific community and
created perverse incentives for secrecy, posturing, personal attacks and other
behaviour contrary  to the norms and values of science. The great majority of
pretrial hearings have been poorly organized, poorly funded affairs in which
scientists (often recruited at the last minute and placed on the stand after only
minimal consultation) were questioned by lawyers with fuzzy understanding of
the scientific issues. Important advances  in the litigation have come in only a
relative handful of hearings in which defense counsel managed to retain
experts in advance, obtain information through pretrial discovery, and present
it in an organized apparent, so will the need for a better approach to
evaluating novel scientific evidence. Like most wars, the DNA war evokes a
powerful feeling in retrospect that there must have been a better way.
Nevertheless, the courtroom debates have served a useful purpose.
Forensic Laboratories have been forced to open themselves to much needed
scientific scrutiny. For all of its disadvantages, the adversarial system at least
assured that  someone looked at the  new techniques with critical eyes and
tried to  explore their limitations.
Perhaps the real problem is that we rely too heavily on admissibility
hearings for screening new scientific innovations. These hearings would be
166 Roberts , supra note 7, at 736,
167  NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 56, 93-94.
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less costly and more manageable if new forensic procedures received
broader scrutiny  before they came to court, The NRC Report makes a
number of helpful suggestions to this end. First, the report condemns the sort
of secrecy that has  surrounded RFLP- based tests and urges that laboratory
protocols, data bases and validation studies be open  and available for public
scrutiny. 167 Second, the report urges the creation of a National Committee on
Forensic DNA Typing, consisting of Distinguished  independent scientists and
legal Experts, that would provide advice to forensic laboratories and review
new technologies before they went to court.168   The new committee would
have  no formal  regulatory authority,  but would be a body  to which courts
might look for authoritative guidance when evaluating the admissibility of a
new techniques. Third, the report suggests that a formal system be developed
for accreditation of laboratories doing forensic DNA testing, that admissibility
of test results in courts  be contingent on the laboratory being accredited, and
that accreditation depend on complying with rigorous standards for quality
assurance, such as participation in externally administered proficiency test. 169
These proposal have great merits.  They would not eliminate the need
for judicial review of new innovations, but would help assure that future DNA
wars  are more limited than the first.
168 Id. At 70-72.
169   Id. At 97-110.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF  DNA FINGER PRINTING UNDER
THE  INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT.
Barring an isolated unreported case170 From kerala, cases have yet to
come before  the Courts involving expert opinion in the science of DNA finger-
printing. In a case that came before Chief Judicial Magistrate’s Court,
Tellichery one Vilasini, a village girl, filed, a petition against one kunihi Raman
for maintenance. It was stated that kilasini had illicit  connection with kunhi
Raman and a child was born out of this, kunihi Raman disowned her and
denied the paternity of the chilod.e expressed his willingness before the Court
that he was prepared to undrgo lencocyte antigen test at his own cost to
prove his innocence. The Chief Judicial magistrate  Tellichery, ordered the
petitioner and respondent to undergo DNA. finger printing test to ascertain the
percentage of the child, at COMB, Hyderabad Dr. Laljith Singh, who was
incharge of these experiments deposing as witness stated that the chances of
error with regard to the test were only one in three hundred million. As Kunihi
Raman had no identical twin brother it could be safely concluded that he was
the biological father of the child. He also said that  nobody would be found
with identical DNA fingerprinting which also contributed to the paternity of the
child. The Chief Judicial Magistrate accepted  the expert opinion as very
reliable and correct under sections 45 and 51 of the Indian Evidence Act.
The deciphering of the genetic  code Embedded in DNA or
decoxyribose nucleic acid  has  after been referred to as one of the greatest
triumphs of modern biology.DNA typing is break through that ‘’ could
revolutionize law  enforcement. 171
170 V. Krishnamachari. The Law of Evidence (191) p. 173.
171 Jean L. Marx: DNA Fingerprinting Takes  the witness stand (240 SCIENCE 1616)(1988).
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CHAPTER- X
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
 Experience reveals that human right are being violated throughout the
world in all ages, meanly by the criminal wrong and in certain situation by the
tortuous wrong.   Therefore, the study must focus mainly with reference to the
criminal law.  The present study encircled on the value of evidence in general
and expert evidence in particular must focus with reference of the
administration of criminal Justice.
The stud y occupies the special significance particularly when there
exists a perilous and precautious concept of human right.  The concept itself
is shaking, theoretician at International level are weighting for theories, which
shape the concept of human rights and to identify all issues which shape the
concept  of human  rights.
It is possible only when one holds accountable approach with reference
to concept of human rights.   The concept and value of evidence with respect
to criminal law.
It is generally believed that criminal law is an index of civilization for it
reflects the changes in the social structure and the general depravity in
human individual.  It is a barometer of moral thinking.  The task of an expert in
the realm of law and criminology in particular is rather delicate, for he is to
bridge the seemingly distant gap between the science and the law.  The
essence of science lies in the general proportions of universal validity which
can be made only in regard to stable and homogeneous unit, and crime can
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never be considered to be stable and of homogeneous Unit.1
Criminology seeks to study the methodology and the phenomenon of
criminality in its entirety. The criminology involving science can generally be
classified in two broad divisions, namely (a) theoretical and criminology, and
(b) applied or practical criminology.  The role of an expert is to probe into the
second branch.  A new dimension was opened to the applied practical
criminology when Edmond Locard, Director, Institute of Forensic Medicine,
Lyons, France, formulated his exchange principles, according to which when
any two objects come into contact, there is always a transference of material
from each object to the other.  Any contact between the criminal and the crime
will leave a trace.  Presence of such evidence proves that the two objects may
be miles apart when found. Analysis of a very tiny quality of any frequent or
other inorganic material by spectrographic analysis, X-ray diffraction on
neutron activation analysis yields data as to the presence of various trace
material as its intrinsic component.
The decision in George Cherivan V. State of Kerala2 highlights, this
aspect in the context of the role of hair in identification.
An expert may give an   opinion within his area of  expertise as a
means of enriching  the tries of fact with his special knowledge. The expert
helps the triers  of  fact to understand areas not within the knowledge of non-
experts.  The basic test of the need for an expert is whether his special
expertise will be helpful in understanding the evidence of determining a fact in
issue.  The expert's opinion is advisory, no more.
1 Sutherland : Principles of Criminology, 6thEdn., p. 19.
2 (1989) 3 Crime 259.
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The court must decide how much credibility to award an expert witness
and how much weight to give his testimony in reaching a verdict, just as it is
expected to evaluate all the evidence it receives.  The basic qualification
required of an expert witness is that he satisfies the court that he is an expert.
He should be shown to have skill, experience, training and education in the
area of expertise he will testify about.
In criminalities (the term used in U.S.A. is synonymous with forensic
science),  the expert witness is expected to offer his opinion about the
identifying characteristics of some item of physical evidence. His opinion must
necessarily be based on his examination of the evidence and various physical
and chemical tests he may have made. As a general rule, the expert must
testify about his basis of his opinion before stating his beliefs or conclusions.
"The pedigru of forensic science, as it is practiced to day is by forensic
medicine out of police work."3 Evidence technicians or scenes of  crime
officers now process crime scenes for physical evidence such as weapons,
finger prints, and other traces.  They often help to connect the evidence
examined by criminalists with the crime scene and to offer testimony about
the integrity of the scientific means used to collect the evidence.
Medico-legal experts also testify about the basis for their opinions. This
area of forensic medicine covers opinions about injuries wounds, suspected
weapons and deaths.  Medico-legal opinions must be prefaced by  testimony
about the medico-legal examination they are based on.
3   H. J. Walls : Forensic Science (New York, Praeger, 1968), p.1.
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The ballistics is an exact science where the main problem  is the
establishment of the  identity of the weapon from the fired cartridges, shells
and fired projectiles. The techniques of firearm identification have greatly
advanced and the ballistic experts have advanced and sophisticated
equipment.
A photograph despite its great utility lacks precision and accuracy.  The
objects  closer to the  camera look bigger and those which are far away from it
look smaller.  If a large area is to be covered all objects can not be included
clearly in the small periscope of a camera.  To avoid this element of error, a
site plan of the place of occurrence is made to assist the investigation.
There is a varying degree of many that can be accorded to different
kinds of opinions while the science of identification of handwriting is a doubtful
or not so accurate science for the reason that any literate person can if he so
decrease, create radical differences in his hand writing to defy identification.
The science of identification of finger prints has reached a stage of perfection
and is regarded as an indispensable tool of detection of criminals.
Facts which establish the  identify of any person or thing whose identity
is relevant are by virtue of Sec-9 of the Evidence Act, relevant.  The term
"identification" means proving that a person, subject or  article before the court
is the very same that he or it alleged, charged or reputed to be Identification is
almost always a matter of opinion or belief.  With regard to a criminal offence
identification has a two fold object, first to satisfy the investigating authorities
before sending a case for trial to court, that the person arrested but not
previously known to the witnesses was one of those who convent the crime,
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or the property concerned was the subject of such crime, second, to satisfy
the court that the accused was the real offender or the Article was concerned
with the crime which is being tried.
Who can hold a test identification ? This depends on what is the true
nature of a test identification.  On this point there was conflict has since long
been resolved by the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan Mithan Lal Sharma V.
State of Bombay.4  The note or memo  of the proceedings prepared bythe
person  in question is a record of the statement of the identifying witnesses.
But  since there is no legal bar to any person recording the statement of
another (provided the statement has been  voluntarily made) any person can
conduct a test identification.  This is the theory underlying the above judgment
wherein other  conditions being satisfied, identification proceedings by  punch
witnesses – witnesses who are all ordinary citizen, were given  the seal of
approval.
The accused person may or may not have legal right to claim for test
identification and  the holding of test identification may or  may not be a rule of
law, but it is a rule of appendence.  Test identification parade should be held,
especially when the accused persons assets that they were unknown to the
prosecution witnesses either by name or by face and they requested the
authorities concerned to have the test identification parade held.  The non-
holding  of  a test identification parade though may not be a ground to vitiate
the trial is undoubtedly a very important feature in considering the credibility of
the witnesses on the point of identification.5
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4   AIR 1955 SC 104.
5   Awadh Singh V. State AIR 1954 Pat. 483.
There is no  doubt that the holding of  identification parade is a
procedure not prescribed by any law but one which can usefully be adopted at
the investigation stage before the accused has become a cynosure of
witnesses to test the veracity of eye witnesses.6
On the question of voice-identification, it is submitted that there is no
provision in India which expressly gives power to a police officer or a court to
require an accused person to speak, and it is not clear whether the general
power of investigation given to the police officers under Sections 155 to 157
Cr. P.C. includes the power to require the accused to speak.  To remove all
doubts, it is suggested that specific provision for voice-identification should be
made.
EXPERT :
An expert in any science, art or trade is one who by practice and
observation has become experienced therein.  An expert is a person who by
reason of his training or experience is qualified to express an opinion whereas
an ordinary witness is not competent to do so.  His evidence is only an
opinion evidence which is based on his skill or experience.  In view of the
language of Sec. 45 of the Indian Evidence Act it is necessary that before a
person is characterized as an expert, there must be some material on the
record to show that he is one who is skilled in that particular science and is
possessed of peculiar knowledge concerning the same. He must have made
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special study of the subject of acquired special experience therein.  Thus,
before the testimony of a witness becomes admissible, his competency as an
6  Lajja  Ram V. State, AIR 1955 All 671.
expert must be shown, by showing that he possesses necessary qualification
or he has acquired special skill therein by  experience.  Before his testimony
is made use of, what is necessary  is that the expert should be subjected to
cross-examination because an expert like any other witness is fallible and the
real value of his evidence consists in the rightful inferences which he draws
from, what he has himself observed and not from what he merely surmises.7
It is now well-settled that expert opinion must always be received with
caution  and perhaps  none so with more caution than opinion of  a
handwriting expert. There is profusion of precedential  authority which holds
that it is unsafe to  base a conviction solely on expert opinion without
substantial corroboration. This rule is universally acted upon and it has almost
become a rule of law.8
Usually both parties are able to get hold of an expert to support their
respective cases. Such experts operating on private basis on their
engagement in a case and appearance in the witness box to an
understanding that they would support their respective pay matures. They
would not be laid into the witness-box until they were to stand so committed.
Under the circumstances no reliance can be placed on the conflicting opinions
of these two experts with regards to the disputed writings.  All the attending
circumstances have to be kept in mind before the opinion testimony of any
such expert can be accepted.9
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7   Bal Kishan Das V. Radhadevi,AIR 1989, All 133.
8  Murarilal V. State of M.P., AIR 1980 SC 531 Magan Behari Lal V. State of Punjab, AIR
1977 SC 1091.
9   Molar Singh V. Din Dayal, AIR 1974 P & H 302.
Expert's evidence as to hand-writing is  opinion evidence and it can
rarely, if ever, take  the place of substantive evidence. Before, acting on such
evidence it is usual to see if it  is corroborated either by clear directed
evidence or by circumstantial evidence.10
According to20 American Jurisprudence Sec. 783, Evidence, an expert
witness is :
"A person  who is so qualified, either by actual experience or by careful
study as to enable him to form a definite opinion of his own,  respecting any
division of science, branch of art, or department of trade about  which persons
having no particular training or special study are incapable  of forming
accurate opinions or of deducting correct conclusions."
In America before an expert is permitted to give his evidence a
preliminary examination is allowed for ascertaining the qualifications of the
expert.  In France experts are officially appointed by the court to enquire into
facts and  report upon them and they stand on a much higher footing than
either ordinary or scientific witnesses amongst us.  According to the Rule 28
of the Fedral Rules of procedure  in America, "the court may order the
defendant or  the Government or both to show cause why expert witnesses
should not be appointed and may request the parties to submit nominations.
The court may appoint any export witness agreed upon by the parties and
may appoint witnesses of its own selection.  An expert witness shall  not be
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appointed by the court unless he consents to act.  A witness so appointed
shall be informed of his duties by a court at conferences in which parties of his
10  Ram Narayan V.State of U.P., AIR  1973, SC 2200, fAKRUDDIN v. sTATE OF m.p., air
1967, sc 1326, jAFAR aLI v. rAJ rAM 1986, aLL., lj, 981.
findings, if any, and my thereafter, be called to testify by the court or by any
party.  He shall be subject to cross-examination by each party.  The court may
determine the reasonable compensation of such a witness and direct its
payment, out of such funds as may be provided by law.  It is submitted by way
of suggestion that because this rule is very comprehensive and practically
useful, and since we do not have any specific rule or provision of such kind, it
may be adopted in India through its incorporation in the statute book.
The right to put questions to witnesses is conferred by Sec.165
Evidence Act. The Section says that he may "in order to discover or to obtain
proper proof of relevant facts" ask any question, he pleases in any form at any
time, of any witness or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant.
Thus, if the criminal court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice
the presiding judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording
machine.  He must become a participant in trial by evincing intelligent active
interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain truth. And the
judge may ask any question, in any form at any time, or any witness or of the
parties, about any fact, relevant or irrelevant.  But no question would frighten
or bully the witness.  Nor the judge must expose any hint of  his partisanship,
nor any question should coerce, confuse or intimidate the witness.11
It is obvious form Sec.165 Evidence Act that the judge contemplated by
the Section is nota mere umpire at a wit-combat between the lawyers for the
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parties, whose only duty is to endorse  the rules of the game and declare at
the end of the combat who has won  and who has lost. He is expected, and
indeed it is his duty to explore all avenues open to him in order to discover the
11   Ram Chander V. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1-36.
truth, and to that end, question the witness on points which the lawyers for the
parties have either over-looked or left obscure or willfully avoided.  The judge
may always intervene in the course of examination by Counsel, to put a
question in a clearer form or to have an abscure answer clarified or to prevent
a witness being unfairly misled.
In exercise of the power under Sec.165 in view of the wide power to
examine a witness at any stage court should be circumspect in its exercise,
always bearing in mind that it is designed to further the ends of justice.  It
should not be used in an inquisitorial manner.   It is also no part of the duty of
the court to act as a counsel for one or the other of the parties, as the primary
duty of a court is to weigh evidence for both  parties and come to a decision in
the case on such evidence. It ought not to lay itself open to a suspicion, by
exercising this power in such a manner as will create an apprehension in the
mind of one or the other party, that it is biased.12
Expert should not cloud a simple issue in a deluge of technical words.
An expert should use plain  and simple language and avoid as much as
possible the use of technical or professional terms.  The natural desire of a
good witness is to make himself understood, but this can  not be
accomplished if he clothes his idea in language which is incomprehensible to
educated man of the legal profession.13
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Probative or Evidentiary Value of Expert Evidence :
It is only the court which is competent to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and therefore the opinion of an expert is never
12  State of Mysore 7. Sabjansab 1969 Mad. LJ (Cr) 499.
13  Bose J. in Basantrao Bajirao V. Emperor AIR 1948 Nag. 66.
binding on the court.  It is admitted in  a evidence only to help the court in
arriving at a correct decision.  In other words, evidence of expert can not
taken as conclusive.  This  has to be decided by the court.14
It has a corroborative value only and may be used in judging the truth
or otherwise of the direct evidence.  It is absolutely unsafe to base a
conviction on that opinion only.15
Expert's opinion must be based on and  supported by reasons, and it is
the reason which is important in assessing the merit of the opinion.16 No
expert would claim that he could be absolutely sure that his opinion was
correct, but the value of the opinion given by an expert depends, to a great
extent upon the materials put before him and nature of questions that are put
to him. The criticism that the expert speaks from an impregnable fortress
hardly holds good today.  Experts are always ready to explain the reasons for
their opinions, and judges are entitled to attach little or no importance to their
evidence if the explanations given are not satisfying.17
The expert should always give facts on which his opinion is based, and
the court can refuse to rely on the opinion of an expert which is unsupported
by any reason. When the reasons are given they must be carefully probed
and examined, when the reason for the expert's opinion is convincing and
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there is no reliable evidence throwing doubt, the uncorroborated testimony
can be accepted.18
14  Mathew V. State of Kerala 1960 Ker. L.T.I.(SC).
15  Mir Abbes Hayat Khan V. Emperor AIR 1937 Pesh. 99.
16  Palamiswami V. State AIR  1968 Bom. 127.
17  In Ve S.A. Sattar Khan AIR 1939 Mad. 283.
18  Ram Gopal V. State of H.P., 1982, Sim. LC 225.
If the expert evidence indicates two alternative possibilities, one
favouring the prosecution and another and defense, direct evidence that
stands in the line would prevail.19
The opinion of an expert, however eminent he may be must not be
taken as conclusive of facts which the court has to try.20  An expert opinion
should always be clear cut and unambiguous confused state of an expert
evidence is held to be wholly unsafe to uphold a conviction.21  It  will be
unsafe to base a conviction solely upon an expert evidence without
substantial corroboration.  An expert however impartial, has natural bias in
favour of the party calling him, and where an expert gives evidence in favour
of the party calling him, the value of such evidence is generally discounted.
As was observed by Lord Campbell22 : "skilled witnesses, come with  such a
bias or in the minds to support the case in which they are embarked that
hardly any weight should be given to their evidence."
An expert opinion contradicted by the opinion of other expert carries
little weight. Where experts differ in their opinion on the same point, the court
must accept that opinion which fits in with the direct testimony.  If  the court
does not feel itself capable of overcoming the confusion created by
contrasting expert opinions, it can come to its own conclusions without such
opinions. The evidence is also not meant to diminial the value of other the
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value of other reliable evidence. For example, evidence of an eye-witness can
not be rejected on the basis of obscure and oscillating expert evidence.23
19  Punjab Singh V. State of Haryana AIR 1984 SC 1233.
20  Kamalu Kur V. Ratanlal AIR 1971 All 304.
21  Dhanna Chowdhary V. State of Bihar 1945 Cr LJ 1864
22  Quoted in Hammed Mann :Expert Evidence 10 Mad. LR (1947) 39.
23  Anvaruddin & Other V. Shakoor & Other AIR 1990 SC 1242.
In the final analysis, we may conclude that the judge holds the final
authority in deciding a matter that is put before it and all witnesses including
experts, have the function only to render their assistance and help in reaching
a decision.  The court is not bound to rely on the opinion of an expert and
applying its own mind can reach its own conclusions.  In this sense the court
is also an expert.24 The  court should try to  reap  the fruits of advancement  of
science in determining a question of fact through skilled persons.  What is
required is that the expert evidence should be received with great care or
caution.  The reason is that expert evidence is after all an opinion and not a
fact or law.  It should also be remembered that of all  the kinds of admissible
evidences, the opinion evidence is the weakest.  The court should consider
various things before attributing the evidential value to the  expert opinion.
The fact that the expert was not in a fit state of mind or health to form a proper
opinion or is interested in a particular  party or is corrupt or has expressed
contradictory opinion at difficult times must also be taken into consideration.
An expert should always be held accountable for whatever he deposes before
the court in the form of his opinion25 so that the testimony of unqualified and
preudo-expects may be discredited, and the integrity of real and genuine
experts may not be doubted.
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It is suggested that the ascertaining the reliability  of expert opinion the
court should keep the following in mind :
(a)  Age of the expert
(b) Academic qualifications.
24  It is suggested that refresher courses should be arranged for the judicial officers and
judges giving them some knowledge in the specialized science fields with which they
have to frequently.
25  Bal Kishan Das Agarwal V. Smt. Radha Devi, AIR 1989, All 133.
(c) Reputation of the Institution where the expert received his training.
(d) Period of practical experience.
(e) Published work of the expert
(f) Any professional honour bestowed upon the expert.
The development of science and arts in all the fields is not uniform.
Therefore, the science of handwriting comparison can not be treated at par
with the science of comparison of finger prints.  Similarly conclusions drawn
by Chemical Analyst are more accurate than that of the finger print expert.
Grading of the expert opinion may be resorted to by the court before relying
upon it.
Neither the court nor the parties are expected to have a blind faith on
the expert opinion.  The expert is not the preceptor for the court but  an
ordinary witness meant for assisting the court in the administration of justice.
Hence, the expert must also face the ordeal of examination that is to say
examination in chief cross examination and re-examination, as is faced by an
ordinary witness. Therefore, the court should ask all those questions from the
expert which are necessary for testing his  veracity.  The reliability of expert
opinion can be properly ascertained and evaluated by thorough cross-
examination. During examination the court has the opportunity of observing
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expert's behavior temperament, way of expression and his inclination or bias
in favour of a party.
The court should minutely consider the grounds, upon which the expert
opinion is based and should give reasons for its acceptance or rejection in its
judgment.
The expert testimony is not the sole mode of preparing a particular fact.
There are other modes also viz., oral testimony of non-expert witnesses,
documentary evidence, circumstantial evidence, admissions, confessions etc.
It is proper for the court to require corroboration of the expert testimony by
other evidence, although it is not mandatory.
By keeping the above consideration in view the court may fairly
ascertain the reliability of an expert opinion.  In hardly need be emphasized
that more the reliability of the opinion, the greater will be its evidentiary value.
In America, before an expert is permitted to give his evidence a
preliminary examination  is allowed for ascertaining the qualifications of the
expert about to depose. In France experts are officially delegated by the Court
to enquire into facts and report upon them, and they stand on a much higher
footing than either ordinary or scientific witnesses amongst us.26 Rule 28 of
the  Federal Rules of Procedure in America deals with expert testimony : "The
court may order the defendant or the Government or both to show cause  why
expert witnesses should not be appointed and may request the parties to
submit nominations.  The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed
upon by  the parties and may appoint witnesses of  its own selection. An
expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he  consents to act.
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A witness so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court at
conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate.  A
witness so appointed shall advise the parties of  his findings, if any, and may
thereafter be called to testify by the court or by any part.  He shall be subject
26   Best referred to in C. Behari : Law of Identifiction Toxicology and Discovery (3rd Edn.,
1990), p.93.
to cross-examination by each party. The court may determine the reasonable
compensation  of such a witness and direct its payment out of such funds as
may be provided by law.  The parties may also call expert witnesses of their
own selection."
It is suggested that such a rule of procedure can be adopted in India
also, and it can be inserted at a proper place in the Evidence Act.
It is submitted that the law of opinion evidence is wide enough to
include possibly all relevant material but simultaneously not too wide so as to
successfully exclude all irrelevant material.  The expression "special means of
knowledge is milder when pitched against the phrase" the opinion upon that
point of persons specially skilled" occurring in the language of Sec.-45
Evidence Act and the former expression broadens the scope of opinion
evidence.
There is a subtle distinction between the work of an expert and a judge.
Firstly, to highlight the distinguishing features, the work of the expert is
auxiliary or supplemental to that of the judge, and is strictly limited to
questions that come within the range of his knowledge in some special branch
of science or technology.  The law makes a clear division between the
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working spheres of the judge and the  expert, who has to functions only in  his
own field and is not required to touch upon legal aspects of the matter.
The expert can not either replace the judge or the investigator.  He has
no right to-gather material for expert examination himself and must study only
that material that has been submitted to him for expert examination.
No wonder that  the Indian Evidence Act was lauded for its all
pervasive approach and excellent drafting of Sir Stephen, its author, by an
equally eminent jurist Edmund Cahn. As time progresses and scientific and
technological advancement keeps pace unabated, the courts will be required
to  face these challenges on an increasing basis and the emphasis will shift to
more and more expertise and skills.  It goes to the credit of Sir Stephen that
the structure of the Evidence Act may still not require much change but at the
implementation level, change by installation and establishment of scientific
and forensic laboratories on a greater and larger scale will be entirely
necessary.  It is therefore suggested that such  laboratories with up-to-date
modern technology and equipments must be established throughout the
country.
There is a feeling that expert testimony is becoming an embarrassment
to the law of evidence.27  There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its
face,  that can not now be proved by some so-called expert.  To blunt this
criticism, the following suggestions are submitted :
(1)  Experts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder should
have no place testifying in a court of law.
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(2) The courts should reject opinions of experts not based upon a
generally accepted.
Scientific principle.  This general acceptance standard for the
admissibility  of   novel   scientific  evidence  is  derived  from Frye V. United
27  Paul G. Giannelli, "Junk Science" : The Criminal Cases (the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, Vol. 84, No.1(1993), p.105.
States.28  The Frye test requires  that scientific evidence be generally
accepted in the scientific community as a prerequisite to admissibility. In
Daubert V. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticsls,29  it was ruled that the trial court
must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether
that reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue.
It will also be worth full to suggest that  the expert testimony should
"substantially" assist, rather than merely assist, the trier of fact.
It is further submitted that the court should be more careful in scrutiny
of expert evidence when death sentence is being given.
In a country like India when we have poverty all around, a welcome
rule would be which prohibits the payment of contingent fees to expert
witnesses. A provision may be added to Sec.-45 of the Evidence Act to the
following effect : "An expert is disqualified if any compensation directly or
indirectly would vary as a result of the outcome of the case."
This suggestion, however, does not deal with problems of constitutional
or institutional bias –the control of crime laboratories by the  police. Problems
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in relying on police controlled  crime laboratories may arise in politically
sensitive cases.
It is submitted by the  way of suggestion that expert assistance be
provided by the state, for indigents. The accused in such cases, must make a
preliminary showing that expert assistance is likely to be a significant  factor at
the trial.  The defendant must satisfy a two-pronged test :
28    293  F  1013 (1923)
29    113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
1.  That an expert would be of assistance to the defense.
2. That the devial of an expert would result in a fundamentally unfair
trial.  The changing compass of Art.21 of the Indian Constitution will
be of great assistance to the defense.
As regard the subject of identification the following suggestion are
submitted :
1.  There is no provision of the court to take 'foot print impression' see 73
refers to finger impression but not foot-print.  It is suggested that 'foot-
print impression may be included by making a suitable amendment.
2. There are no rules as regard precautionary measures to be adopted at
the time of identification. Most of the precautions to be taken are Judge
made contain in decision. We should make rule on the line of the report
of the Royal Commission in palace power and procedure in England.
3. As regard previous identification of article or things as corroboration
there is one lacuna.  The accused is not present when such identi-
fication is made. It is suggested that rule may be made to this effect.
Admissibility of Voice Spectrograph Evidence
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Expert testimony relating to voice print or spectrograms is admissible
with the expertise of the individual who make the identification and
comparison, there is sufficient scientific basis to around the belief and such
evidence is reliable.
Voice print is admissible to corroborate the direct testimony of impress
who has identified the identified voice on telephone.  The scientific stature of
such evidence is growing. 30
30  W. Ken Katsuries : Evidence & Procedure in  Administrlates of Justice (1775) p. 253.
As regard to the  value  of expert evidence in human right is concern it
is submitted that,
1.  The value of Expert Evidence must be determine on Philosophy of
Law of Evidence, Principle of Criminal Law and Principle of
Tortuous Law to protect the Human Right and strict Violation of
Same.
2. We know and as acknowledge by all concern that people do not
has one idea of the definite shape of concept of human right, nor
they have foundation for formal Education of Human Right and
therefore, all concern which include people at Bench, Bar,
academician, Jurist, Politician, Social Scientist, People running
Nao's etc do not have an idea of the concept of human right.
Therefore, it is difficult to find people as expert, judge or at bar to
deal with work the problems for formation of the expert opinion on
argument and judgment.  The situation can be improved by strict
implementation of certain suggestion, which includes.
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2.1 There should be an effective programme for formal education and
training of all who are engaged in administration of Human rights.
2.2 People should not be allowed to deal  with issues of Human
Rights and dispose of the same with ad-hoc approach nor they
should be allowed to form any opinion or Judgment on this without
the foundation of expertise in Human Rights.
2.3 Human Right Education should be launched effectively at all level.
2.4 The concept of Human Right is contextual in nation and therefore
all the value and norms which shape human right must be identify
and implemented in a accountable manner.
2.5 The goal and object when form concept of human right have to
be addressed in responsible manner and with effective manner.
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